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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The study argues for the integration of good governance principles in 
developing financially viable, effective and social equity-laden microcredit strategy 
for the impoverished agrarian reform beneficiaries in Western Mindanao. It 
particularly examines the program design and implementation strategies of the 
Enterprise Development Credit (EDC) sub-component of the Western Mindanao 
Community Initiatives Project (WMCIP).  The study aims to provide lessons and 
insights for the planning and implementation of comprehensive and integrated Official 
Development Assistance (ODA)-funded government programs for poverty reduction 
and rural development. 
 
The data and information were generated from combined descriptive and field 
studies covering a sample survey, group discussions, interviews, field visits and 
observations, official documents and other secondary sources.  The respondents were 
officials and field personnel of WMCIP, line agencies, local government units 
(LGUs), and non-government organizations (NGOs); officers and members of 
cooperatives and people’s organizations (POs); religious leaders and informal 
moneylenders; and WMCIP beneficiaries.   
 
Overall, microcredit is applicable only to the enterprising poor.  The 
application of microcredit to other poverty groups who actually need subsidies and 
social safety nets would be a mistake.   Thus, the EDC sub-component should be 
reformulated and revitalized following the program design of the Bangladesh Rural 
 i 
  
Advancement Committee (BRAC).  Its graduated strategy for helping the poor should 
be applied to the poverty pyramid by categorizing the WMCIP beneficiaries into four 
poverty groups: (1) micro-enterprise operators or the less poor, (2) enterprising or 
moderately poor, (3) laboring or very poor, and (4) poorest of the poor and most 
vulnerable or the ultra-poor.   
 
The results further reveal that based on the poverty pyramid, the credit 
program designs of the Credit Assistance Program for Program Beneficiaries 
Development (CAP-PBD) and Quedan Rural Credit and Finance Corporation 
(QUEDANCOR) are readily applicable to the credit needs and financial capabilities of 
the enterprising poor.  Beyond QUEDANCOR’s microcredit facility, the non-
enterprising poor may actually opt for financial assistance from cooperatives or CAP-
PBD to help finance their agriculture-and fishery-related production activities.  On the 
other hand, the beneficiaries and their “not-so-strong” organizations that could not 
readily comply with the minimum credit standards should be provided with farm 
production subsidies, capability-building services and social safety nets under a 
special poverty alleviation project.  This will enable them to pass minimum credit 
standards within a transition period of six months to one year.   
 
In view of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component, the study further identifies the 
factors that enable or limit successful design and implementation of microcredit 
program and the provision of public support services.  The enabling factors are vital to 
planning and decision-making that will eventually make the program effective and 
 ii 
  
appropriate.  The limiting factors, on the other hand, facilitate the identification of 
strategies to manage and control credit risks and other circumstances that may hinder 
participation and adversely affect the attainment of objectives and desired outcomes. 
 
On the whole, the application of good governance will improve program 
design and will make the implementation strategies acceptable to all organized 
stakeholders and individual end-beneficiaries. This will also improve the 
administrative capabilities of partner organizations and enable them to be effective and 
responsive to the differentiated poverty conditions, credit needs, preferences and 
financial capabilities of the impoverished target beneficiaries.  These are consequently 
geared towards the attainment of the long-term vision of sustainable human 
development for the impoverished WMCIP beneficiaries. 
 
The integration of good governance into microcredit intends to improve its 
program design, implementation strategies and processes.  However, support services 
are actually necessary so as to simultaneously attain the desired social equity and 
financial viability objectives.  The program should be orchestrated within a 
comprehensive and integrated approach to poverty reduction and rural development.  
The good governance of microcredit requires multiple organizational partnerships 
among the different government agencies, business sector and the civil society.  Most 
importantly, the financial and technical support programs of the international donor 
community are absolutely necessary in the light of Philippine economic and fiscal 
challenges. 
 iii 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Abstract  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    i 
List of Tables  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    viii 
List of Figures  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    x 
List of Acronyms .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    xi 
 
CHAPTER          TITLE            PAGE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  1 
   
A. Background of the Study   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    1    
B. Situational Analysis: The Western Mindanao  
        Community Initiatives Project (WMCIP)    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   7 
C. Statement of the Problem     .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  17  
D. The Research Objectives   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   21 
E. Significance of the Study    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 22 
F. Scope and Limitation     .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   25   
 
II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL   
FRAMEWORK  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    27 
   
A. Review of Related Literature .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    27 
A.1. Global Movement for Poverty Reduction through  
     Microcredit  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     27 
           A.2.  Microcredit as a Mechanism to Reduce Poverty .  .  .  .   .  .  .    31 
              A.3.  Controversies and Current Debates in Microcredit .  .   .  .  .  .   34 
                     A.4.  Microcredit for Poverty Alleviation: A Critique .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  42 
         A.5.  Microcredit as an Instrument of Governance .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    46 
          A.6.  Successful Microcredit Models   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .    60 
          A.7.  Implementation Strategies of Successful  
      Microcredit Models  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   62 
      A.7.a.  The Grameen Credit-Only Strategy  
      (minimalist approach) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   63 
         A.7.b.  Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC): 
      A Graduated Process for Helping the Poorest .  .  .  .  .  66 
         A.7.c.  Bank Rakyat Indonesia’s (BRI) Character  
      References .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   70 
      A.7.d.  Association for Social Advancement (ASA) 
      and Compulsory Savings Scheme .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   71 
         A.8.  Microcredit for Poverty Alleviation: The Philippine  
      Experience .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   77 
A.9.  Grameen Replication in the Philippines: Selected  
      Best Practices .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    80 
                 A.9.a.  Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna, Inc. (CRBLI) .  .    81 
 iv 
  
                 A.9.b.  Center for Agriculture and Rural Development  
       (CARD) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   82  
                 A.9.c.  Tulay Sa Pag-Unlad Inc. (TSPI) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   85 
                 A.9.d.  Negros Women for Tomorrow Foundation, Inc.- 
              Project Dungganon (NWFTFI)   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   86 
     A.10. The National Government’s Performance as a Banker  
      for the Poor .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  93 
        A.11. The National Strategy for Microfinance .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   96 
              A.12. Microfinance Rhetoric in the General Banking Law .  .  .  .  .   100 
     A.13. The Factors Affecting Microcredit Programs .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  101 
      A.13.a.  Household Financial Conditions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  104 
      A.13.b.  Credit Needs of the Poor .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  107 
      A.13.c.  Credit Experience .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 109 
            A.13.c.1.  Access to Loans .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  112 
                A.13.c.2.  Loan Utilization .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  113 
           A.13.c.3.  Loan Repayment .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 115 
                    A.13.d.  Credit Providers  for the Poor .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 117 
         A.13.e.  Microcredit Preferences and Demand .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    120 
        A.13.f.  Good Governance as Microcredit Strategies  .  .  .  .     125 
                     A.13.f.1.  Participation .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    128 
          A.13.f.2.  Transparency .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   131 
          A.13.f.3.  Accountability .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    132 
          A.13.f.4.  Sustainability  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     136 
B. The Conceptual Framework .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    143 
C. Operational Definition of Variables .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   154 
  
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    160 
 
 A. Research Technique    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    160 
 B.  Difficulties Encountered    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  166 
  C.  Population and Sampling    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 167 
    D.  Data Analysis and Interpretation    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     171 
 
IV. PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS  
AND OBSERVATIONS    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 176 
   
A. Credit Options for WMCIP Beneficiaries  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   176 
a.1. Credit Option #1:  LBP Assistance to Cooperatives .  .  .  .  .  .  .  178 
a.2. Credit Option #2: Credit Assistance Program for  
        Program Beneficiaries Development (CAP-PBD) .  .  .  .  .  .  .    188 
a.3. Credit Option #3:  PCFC’s Credit Program for  
     Grameen Bank Approach Replication (GBAR) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     193 
         a.4  Credit Option #4.  QUEDANCOR’s Microcredit  
     Program (Grameen Replication) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  197 
          a.5.  Summary of Findings: Credit Program Designs .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  201 
 
 v 
  
B. Limiting and Enabling Factors in Microcredit Program .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 214 
           b.1. Demographic Attributes of the Respondents .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 215 
      b.1.a. Gender  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  . .216 
   b.1.b. Age .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   216 
      b.1.c. Ethnicity .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .   217 
      b.1.d. Religion  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .   219 
      b.1.e. Household Role .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..  .  .  .  .  .  . 220 
      b.1.f.  Number of Children  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .  .  221 
         b.1.g. Summary of Findings: Demographic Attributes ..  .  .  .  .  222 
 b.2. Household Financial Conditions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..  .  .  .  .  .    226 
b.2.a. Type of House .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .   228 
b.2.b. Main Source of Income   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  229 
b.2.c. Other Sources of Income for the Family .  .   .  .  .  .  .  . .   231 
b.2.d. Estimated Average Monthly Income .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  234 
b.2.e. Average Monthly Expenses .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 239 
b.2.f. Household Cash Flow .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .. 242 
 b.2.g. Actions Toward Savings  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  245 
 b.2.h. Actions Toward Cash Shortages   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 247 
 b.2.i. Summary of Findings: Household Financial Conditions     249 
 b.2.j. The Appropriateness of Microcredit Program  
      based on Household Financial Conditions .  .   .  .  .  .  .  .  256 
        b.3. Credit Experience .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  264 
  b.3.a. Credit Experience in the Last Two Years    .  .  .  .  .  .  .   266 
  b.3.b. Credit Needs: Overspending Situations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   260 
   b.3.c. Creditor  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    262 
  b.3.d. Access to Loan and Other Credit Services .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  270 
  b.3.e. Uses of Amount Borrowed     .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 272 
  b.3.f.  Interest Rate .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   273 
  b.3.g. Mode of Payment .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 274 
  b.3.h. Loan Utilization .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  276 
   b.3.i. Repayment .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   277 
  b.3.j. Summary of Findings: Credit Experience .  .  .  .  .    .  .  .  280 
  b.4.  Microcredit Preferences and Demand  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .  .288 
  b.4.a. Income-Generating Activities for Financing .  .   .  .  .  .  . 291 
  b.4.b. Loan size .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .  . .  292 
  b.4.c. Collateral .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .  .  . .  294 
  b.4.d. Public Support Services .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  296 
  b.4.e. Summary of Findings: Microcredit Preferences  
        and Demand .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .  .  .    301 
  b.4.f. Appropriateness of Credit Program Design to  
        Credit Needs, Preferences and Demand  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  303 
           b.5.  Summary of Findings: Enabling and Limiting Factors .  .  .  .  .   307 
    C. Good Governance in Pro-poor Microcredit Strategies .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    314 
                c.1.   Participation .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    317 
           c.2.   Transparency .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  321 
                      c.3.   Accountability .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 325 
 vi 
  
                      c.4.   Sustainability .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   331 
                 c.5.   Summary of Findings: Good Governance in Pro-poor  
                          Microcredit Strategies .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    335 
 D. Good Governance Strategies in Microcredit Program  
       for Poverty Reduction .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 337 
            d.1.   Beneficiary Perspectives .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  337  
            d.2.   Program Implementors’ Perspectives .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .   341 
                E.  Summary of Findings and Observations  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .  .  .    348 
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .     359 
 
     Summary .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .  .   359 
     Conclusion .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .    370 
 
VI. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS  .  .  .  .  .   .  .    377 
 
A.  Lessons Learned  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 377 
         a.1. Productive Potential of Target Beneficiaries  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .    378 
a.2. Resources and Capabilities of Potential Governance  
        Partners  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .   380 
a.3. Natural Resource Endowments  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  383 
a.4. Direct Involvement of the National Government and  
             International Donors  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .  .  . 384 
B.  Recommendations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .   391 
      1.  Creation of Two Special Microcredit Windows  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    395 
     A. CAP-PBD Application  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  396 
      B. QUEDANCOR Microcredit Window for  
      Self-Reliant Teams (SRTs) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   397 
      2.  Creation of Special Poverty Alleviation Sub-component (SPAS)    398 
      3.  Administration of Microcredit Program and Special Poverty  
   Alleviation Sub-component and Microcredit Program  .  .  .  .  .  .   401 
     A.  Socio-Economic Parameters  
          (Poor and Non-Poor Beneficiaries)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    402 
     B.  Operating Guidelines for Microcredit and SPAS  .  .  .  .  .  .    408 
      4.  The Recommended Microcredit Goverance Model   .  .  .  .  .  .  .    413 
     A.  Participation .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    414 
     B.  Transparency  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     414 
             C.  Accountability  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   415 
     D.  Sustainability  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     419 
          5.  Impact Assessment   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   421 
 
Bibliography .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  .  .  .  .   424 
Appendix A  Survey  Questionnaire for Availers of Credit Services  .  .  .  .  .   .    433 
Appendix B Survey  Questionnaire for Non-Availers of Credit Services  .  .  .  .   442 
Appendix C    List of WMCIP-covered Barangays .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     449 
Appendix D    List of Sampled Barangays .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 451 
 vii 
  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
  Table          Page 
Number    Title             Number
 
     1  Highlights of 2002 WMCIP Accomplishments  
    by Component        11 
     2  Highlights of Success Benchmarks for MFIs     74 
     3  Highlights of Benchmarks for Philippine MFIs    88 
     4  Distribution of Survey Respondents     169 
     5 Summary of Research Questions, Data Gathering  
   Methods, Data Analysis and Expected Outputs  174 
     6  Key Eligibility Criteria of Existing Credit Programs  203 
     7  Distribution of Respondents by Gender   216 
     8  Age of Respondents      217 
     9  Ethnic Groupings of Respondents    218 
    10  Respondents' Religion     219 
    11  Respondents' Household Role    220 
    12  Distribution of Respondents by Number of Children   221 
    13  Respondents' Type of House     228 
    14  Main Source of Income     230 
    15  Other Sources of Monthly Income for the Family  231 
    16  Source of Son’s Income     232 
    17  Source of Daughter’s Income     234 
    18  Respondents' Average Monthly Income   236 
    19  Average Monthly Expenses     240 
    20  Monthly Expenditure Item as a Proportion of Monthly   
     Income         241 
    21  Monthly Household Cash Flow    243 
    22  Action Toward Savings     246 
    23  Action Toward Cash Shortages    248 
    24     Experience Incurring Debt Within the last Two Years 266 
    25     Experience Spending Beyond Capability to Spend  267 
    26     Situations for Spending Beyond Capability to Spend 268 
    27     Creditor       269 
    28     Amount of Debt Incurred     271 
    29  Purpose for the Amount Borrowed    272 
    30     Monthly Interest Rate on Debt Incurred   274 
    31     Mode of Payment/Amortization    275 
    32     Utilization of Previously Borrowed Amount   277 
    33     Repayment of Amount Borrowed    278       
    34     Amount of Unpaid Balance     279 
    35     Reasons for Non-repayment of Debt    280 
    36     Preferred Income-Generating Activities if Loan  
   will be Available      285 
 viii 
  
  Table          Page 
Number    Title             Number
 
    37     Preferred Amount to Finance Desired Income- 
   Generating Activities     293 
    38     Collateral to Offer to Secure the Loan   295 
    39     Needed Public Support Services    298 
    40  Enabling and Limiting Factors    311 
    41     Strategies for Beneficiary Participation before Loan  
  Release       319 
    42     Strategies for Beneficiary Participation after Loan  
   Release       321 
    43     Strategies to Ensure Borrower-Group Transparency  324 
    44    Strategies to Pursue if Loan Cannot be Paid   327 
    45     Actions towards Guarantor if Loan Cannot be Paid  328 
    46     Action towards Defaulting Co-borrower   330 
    47     Strategies to Ensure Profitability of Loan-financed    
   Project       333 
    48     Activities for Profit Utilization    334 
    49     Beneficiary’s Indicators for Good Governance in  
   Microcredit Strategies     338 
    50   Program Implementor’s Indicators for Good Governance  
   in Microcredit Strategies     342 
51   Levels of Measuring in the Poverty Classification  
   of Beneficiaries      407 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
                      
    Figure                    Page 
   Number     Title             Number
 
    
        1  The Poverty Pyramid        38 
 
        2  The Conceptual Framework       153 
 
3  Western Mindanao Household Poverty Pyramid    237 
 
4  Application of Credit Program Designs to the  
  Poverty Pyramid       262 
 
5 Recommended Program Design Based on the  
  Poverty Pyramid       412 
  
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
  
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
 
 
ACPC  Agricultural Credit Policy Council 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
AFMA  Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
ASA  Association for Social Advancement 
ASG  Abu Sayyaf Group 
BRAC  Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
BRI  Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
BRW  Bureau of Rural Workers 
BSP  Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas 
CAP-PBD Credit Assistance Program for Program Beneficiaries Development 
CARD  Center for Agriculture and Rural Development 
CDA  Cooperative Development Authority 
CEDA  Credit and Enterprise Development Adviser 
CEDO  Credit and Enterprise Development Officer 
CEF  Credit and Enterprise Facilitator 
CGAP  Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest 
CID  Community and Institutional Development 
CIRDAP Center on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and the Pacific 
CO  Community Organizer 
COC  Community Organizing Coordinators 
CRBLI Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna,  Inc. 
DA   Department of Agriculture 
DAR  Department of Agrarian Reform 
DBM  Department of Budget and Management 
DENR  Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
DOF  Department of Finance 
DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development 
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry 
EDC  Enterprise Development Credit 
EO  Executive Order 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization 
GB  Grameen Bank 
GBR  Grameen Bank Replicator 
GOP  Government of the Philippines 
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IGVGD Income Generation for Vulnerable Groups Development 
IGA  Income-Generating Activity 
JSS  Joint and Several Security 
LBP  Land Bank of the Philippines 
LCC  Lead Credit Conduit 
LGU  Local Government Unit 
 xi 
  
LPCI  Local Participating Credit Institution 
MFI  Microfinance Institution 
MFO  Microfinance Organization 
MILF  Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
MNLF  Moro National Liberation Front 
MTPDP Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 
NCC  National Credit Council 
NEDA  National Economic Development Authority 
NGO  Non-Government Organization 
NPA  New People’s Army 
NPMC  National Project Management Committee 
NRM  Natural Resources Management 
NWFTFI Negros Women for Tomorrow Foundation, Inc. 
ODA  Official Development Assistance 
PCFC  People’s Credit and Finance Corporation 
PA  People’s Association 
PD   Project Dungganon 
PIDS  Philippine Institute of Development Studies 
PMES  Pre-Membership Education Seminar 
PMO  Project Management Office 
PO  People’s Organization 
PPMC  Provincial Project Management Committee 
QUEDANCOR Quedan Rural Credit and Finance Corporation 
RPMC  Regional Project Management Committee 
SHG  Self-Help Group 
SEC  Securities and Exchange Commission 
SME  Small and Medium Enterprises 
SOU  Site Operations Unit 
SPAS  Special Poverty Alleviation Sub-component 
SPSS  Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
SRT  Self-Reliant Team 
SSD  Support Services Division 
TSPI  Tulay Sa Pag-unlad, Inc. 
UN  United Nations 
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
WMCIP Western Mindanao Community Initiatives Project 
WB  The World Bank 
WM   Western Mindanao 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii 
  
 1
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  The lack of client analysis and poor governance tend to weigh down capacities 
of government-sponsored microcredit program to reach target beneficiaries and to 
deliver the desired outcomes.  As an option for resolving a program implementation 
dilemma, the study is geared towards carving out sound governance strategies for 
implementing a government-driven, social equity-laden and financially viable 
microcredit program for poverty reduction and rural development.  
  
A. Background of the Study 
 The Enterprise Development Credit (EDC) sub-component of the Western 
Mindanao Community Initiatives Project (WMCIP) is a credit program intended for 
the entrepreneurial activities of the poor and vulnerable beneficiaries.  As a state 
action for poverty reduction and rural development, it is funded by the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and implemented by the Department of 
Agrarian Reform (DAR).  It is based on the cooperative credit program of the Land 
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) which is also designated by IFAD as the sole executing 
agency for EDC.  However, the EDC sub-component cannot be implemented due to 
perceived inappropriateness of program design and lack of administrative capacity of 
implementing partners. 
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 Using the good governance model, this study examines the EDC sub-
component of WMCIP with the end in view of making it more effective and 
appropriate to the credit needs and financial capabilities of the impoverished target 
beneficiaries while ensuring its financial viability and sustainability.  These are geared 
towards the improvement in the processes of client analysis, social targeting, service 
delivery and the monitoring and evaluation system.  Finally, this study focuses on 
microcredit program design, the factors that enable or limit successful implementation, 
the processes involved and the application of the principles of good governance—
participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability—as implementation 
strategies.   
 
Central to this study is an attempt to introduce into the epistemology of public 
administration the assertion that within the context of microcredit, the twin goals of 
social equity (Frederickson 1971) and financial viability—earning money for the 
government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992)—are simultaneously attainable through good 
governance.  Good governance provides a working framework and doable strategies 
for implementing the state-driven microcredit program as a strategy for poverty 
reduction and rural development.  Its desirable outcomes focus on the needs-based and 
equity-laden delivery of pertinent public services to the socially targeted beneficiaries 
and the profitable microcredit operations of the government financial intermediaries 
and the microfinance institutions (MFIs) from the civil society and business sectors. 
 
 3
The attainment of the twin goals of social equity and financial viability in the 
government-driven microcredit program for poverty reduction and rural development 
requires good governance starting from the participation of different stakeholders.  
Participation encompasses the financial support from the international donor 
community, the technical expertise and administrative machinery of the government, 
the social targeting mechanisms of MFIs from the civil society, the entrepreneurial 
acumen of the business sector and the skills and capabilities of the impoverished target 
beneficiaries.     
 
The significant contribution of microcredit to poverty reduction is evidenced 
by two world summits in 1997 and 2002 sponsored by the United Nations (UN).  The 
world summits celebrated the success of microcredit as a tool for the eradication of 
global poverty.  Microcredit has deviated from traditional credit paradigms and 
provided an innovative banking model with extensive outreach towards the poor and 
disadvantaged communities both in urban and rural areas.  Although evaluation after 
evaluation proved that most institutions providing microcredit services are kept 
financially viable and helped by donor and government funds, worldwide experience 
shows that microcredit has improved the financial conditions of an increasing number 
of poor households by the millions. 
 
Microcredit is one of the Philippine government’s poverty reduction and rural 
development initiatives for the impoverished agrarian reform beneficiaries in Western 
Mindanao who are mostly marginal farmers and fishermen.  In its totality, the 
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application of microcredit as a strategy for poverty reduction and rural development 
combines the social equity value orientation in helping the poor and the vulnerable 
sectors with the objective of earning money (viability) for the government through the 
state-driven microcredit program.  
 
As a state action for development, the application of good governance in the 
implementation of microcredit program emphasizes the role of public administration 
in development (see Braibant 1996).  Thus, the state provides incentives and catalyzes 
the participation of all stakeholders and regulates the actions and motives of 
collaborating organizations and target beneficiaries.  Finally, the state ensures that 
appropriate state-driven and credit-based poverty reduction and rural development 
programs are profitable, effective and consistently beneficial to the development of 
target beneficiaries and their communities. 
 
Scholars and development institutions argue that good governance is not only 
an essential component; but also a pre-condition for development.  That is, 
development cannot exist without good governance (see Leftwich 1993, Boeninger 
1993, UNDP 1997, ADB 2003).  Thus, good governance is necessary in the planning 
and implementation of national development programs that focus on poverty reduction 
initiatives for the impoverished sectors in the rural areas—the landless, indigenous 
peoples and the marginal farmers and fishermen.   
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Currently, however, a large body of literature on good governance focuses 
more heavily on the role of the state in development.  This suggests that despite the 
governance perspective of tripartite collaboration among government, business and 
civil society sectors, development still remains as a major activity of the government.  
Evidently, most of the studies and literature on good governance in developing 
countries focus on the dynamics of program administration for development from the 
perspective of the government.  Beyond this, little effort, if any, has been directed 
towards the applicability of good governance principles in the implementation of 
development programs outside the government agencies and lifted from civil society 
perspectives.   
 
Governance is defined as the exercise of political, economic and administrative 
authority to manage a nation’s affairs (UNDP 1997).  In this view, poverty reduction 
is one of the major affairs of the Philippine government. Thus, the integration of 
governance into microcredit programs emphasizes the significant role of public 
administration, via the public service delivery system, in the application of microcredit 
as a strategy for poverty reduction and rural development.  According to Bautista 
(2002), governance is one aspect of poverty reduction that affects the different phases 
of program components—situation analysis, planning, implementation, 
monitoring/evaluation.  In this view, good governance involves the design, processes 
and strategies of implementing and managing government-driven microcredit program 
for poverty reduction and rural development. 
 
 6
 Different scholars argue that good governance is crucial for an effective and 
efficient delivery of public services.  It catalyzes the participation of different 
stakeholders and market players in microcredit programs; enables convenient access to 
information, openness and transparency of motives in the presence of other 
stakeholders; instills social responsibility, discipline and legal accountability to each 
other and to the clientele; and builds financially viable local financial intermediaries 
and sustainable microcredit programs.  These provide adequate financial and technical 
support for the income-generating activities and microentrepreneurial projects of the 
poor who have been historically excluded from the mainstream commercial banking 
system. 
 
Governance affects the different dimensions of program administration 
involving poverty reduction initiatives and integrated rural development interventions 
(see Bautista 2002 and ADB 2003).  Microcredit program as an anti-poverty 
intervention is primarily state-driven and it requires the participation of MFIs from the 
civil society and the business sectors.  Hence, the administration of microcredit 
program should include the analysis of alternative credit program designs and public 
support services, the factors that may enable or limit implementation, the processes 
and procedures involved, and the formulation of innovative implementation strategies 
for the impoverished target beneficiaries in marginalized rural areas.   
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B.  Situational Analysis: The Western Mindanao Community Initiatives Project    
Western Mindanao (Region IX) is the third poorest region in the country 
(World Bank 2002). Thus, the Philippine government faces the developmental 
challenge of designing and implementing a comprehensive package of credit and 
public support services for the impoverished groups in the marginalized agriculture, 
fishery and rural sectors.   
 
 Across the four provinces, 55 percent (12 municipalities) of the 22 
municipalities covered by WMCIP belong to the fourth-and fifth-class categories of 
municipalities in the Philippines suggesting that these municipalities are the poorest 
not only in the region but also in the country. 
 
In view of the primary function of the state to alleviate poverty and to protect 
and assist the poor and vulnerable, the Philippine government launched WMCIP.  It is 
a special project of DAR that aims for the local socio-economic development of 
16,000 poor and vulnerable beneficiary-households in at least 80 selected communities 
in Region IX. 
 
The development goals of WMCIP are: (1) to provide self-employment and 
income-generating activities to farming and fishing households; (2) to increase 
subsistence in cash crop and fishery production; and (3) to increase the income by 
increasing farm and fishery production.  The attainment of these goals largely depends 
on governance processes involved in managing a network of partner organizations 
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from the national government agencies down to cooperatives and people’s 
organizations (POs).   
 
The WMCIP is administered through an Inter-Departmental Steering 
Committee at the national level composed of the Secretaries or Directors of DAR, 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of 
Agriculture (DA), National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), Department 
of Finance (DOF), Department of Budget and Management (DBM), Land Bank of the 
Philippines (LBP) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development 
(SPCPD).  Similar sub-committees are also present at the regional, provincial, 
municipal and barangay levels.  That is, all activities are executed in partnership with 
local government units (LGUs) and other government instrumentalities; sub-
contracted to non-government organizations (NGOs) via competitive tendering; and 
channeled through cooperatives and POs. 
 
 The WMCIP is managed by the Project Executive (PE)—an eight-man 
management team chaired by a Project Manager (PM) based in the Project 
Management Office (PMO) in Zamboanga City.  The PE is responsible for the 
implementation and supervision of all activities in three Site Operations Units 
(SOUs)1 and maintains contact with Provincial, Municipal and Barangay Liaison 
Committees, and planning bodies.  Other PE members include one Financial 
                                                 
1 represents the three provinces of Basilan (B), Zamboanga del Norte (ZDN) and Zamboanga del Sur (ZDS).  
Zamboanga Sibugay (ZB), which was included as the fourth province in the study, remains under ZDS-SOU 
because it was carved out of ZDS when WMCIP was already fully operational, 
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Controller/Administrator; three specialists—Community and Development Supervisor 
(CDS), Natural Resource Specialist (NRS) and Credit and Enterprise Development 
Adviser (CEDA); and three Site Operations Unit Managers (SOUMs).  
 
 The supporting staff to the PE comprises the financial and administrative 
cadres in the PMO and SOUs; and various technical staff at SOUs.   Together, they 
encompass, arrange, and direct all the managerial, coordinating and support inputs 
required for efficient implementation, whether contracted or undertaken directly. 
 
The project operates through four components: 
1. Community and Institution Development (CID) - covers 80 local 
communities and their associated NGOs and POs, barangays and 
municipality LGUs, and line agencies with the capability to plan, prepare, 
finance and manage development activities and enterprises.   
 
It has three sub-components: (a) Community and Organizational 
Development (COD) which is expected to enable 80 functional and 
cohesive community organizations able to implement locally-conceived 
programs and plans; (b) LGU Capacity Development (LGUCD) which is 
expected to enable and improve the planning, coordination and 
implementation capability in 21 municipalities and 80 barangay LGUs; and 
(c) Line Agencies Processes Support (LAPS) which is expected to enable 
effective procedures for support to community organizations by three 
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DAR, three DENR provincial offices, and DA regional office and 
departments. 
2. Resource Management (RM) - covers developing technically and 
financially sound, and ecologically sensitive production systems benefiting 
1,650 coastal and 4,200 upland and indigenous families, backed up by 
infrastructure improvement and communal resource responsibility and 
management and reversing the degradation caused by present imprudent or 
exploitative use.   
 
It has the three sub-components: (a) Land Resource Management (LRM) 
which is expected to enable the beneficiaries’ adoption of proven new crop 
options and farming systems distributed by extension service; (b) 
Marine/Water Resource Management (MWRM) which is expected to 
enable the beneficiaries’ adoption of proven new fishery enterprise options 
for distribution by extension services; and (c) Infrastructure and Resource 
Enhancement (IRE) which is expected to install improved infrastructure or 
resource management in 80 communities. 
 
3. Small Enterprise Development and Credit (SEDC) - covers expanded and 
new individual and group entrepreneurs as well as small enterprises based 
on farm, fishery and related activities.  It involves 1,600 households, with 
the requisite supporting credit funds for all Project purposes, totaling 
36,000 available and accessible loans.   
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It has two sub-components: (a) Business Advisory Services (BAS) which is 
expected to enable effective government and private advisory research and 
counseling services for owners or operators of on-farm and off-farm 
enterprises; and (b) Enterprise Development and Credit (EDC) which is 
expected to enable viable and accessible credit services and to provide 
36,000 loans for small businesses or microenterprises. 
 
4. Project Implementation (PI) - covers project management and 
implementation capability for both the immediate tasks of implementation 
and to demonstrate innovative and cost-effective approaches to the 
dilemma of financial stringency and resource scarcity in local development 
planning and execution.   
 
It has two sub-components: (a) Services and Resource Provision (SRP) 
which is expected to enable responsive, cost-effective and timely delivery 
of Project services; and (b) Project Executive (PE) which is expected to 
enable efficient management and ensure achievement of Project targets. 
 
Since the beginning of WMCIP operations, all components have already been 
well implemented and targets have likewise been accomplished as scheduled except 
for Component 3 as shown in Table 1.   
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Table 1.  Highlights of 2002 WMCIP Accomplishments by Component  
 
Component Targets (1998) Accomplishments (2002) 
Component 1 
(CID) 
 
80 barangays and 
16,000 
households 
9 12,647 households mobilized (79% of 
target) 
9 122 POs organized in 49 barangays 
9 15 NGOs engaged covering 49 barangays 
9 571 LGU personnel trained 
9 120 personnel in 10 line agencies trained 
9 222 paratechnicians trained and deployed 
9 433 beneficiary trainings and educational 
tours 
 
Component 2 
(NRM) 
 
1,650 coastal and 
4,200 upland and 
indigenous 
people families 
(5,850 
households) 
 
9 2,469 households assisted (2,201 farming 
and 268 fishing) 
9 99 farm demonstration plots established 
9 fish culture cages  
9 food processing 
9 floating training center 
9 49 Barangay Development Plans (BDP)  
9 100 infrastructure projects  implemented in 
49 barangays (drinking water supply, 
irrigation, dikes, training centers, farm-to-
market roads, etc.) 
 
Component 3 
(SEDC) 
 
 
 
36,000 loan 
releases for small 
businesses or 
microenterprises 
 
 
 
 
9 no loan releases to target borrowers 
9 eligible borrowers identified (1,827 
households and 250 enterprises) 
9 LBP believes the areas are too poor;  and 
credit may not be an instrument to achieve 
poverty reduction 
9 LBP is not willing to bear credit risk of 
financing not-so-strong Lead Credit 
Conduits (LCCs) and Local Participating 
Credit Institutions (LPCIs) 
9 EDC credit funds remain unutilized and 
still in the custody of IFAD 
 
Component 4 
(PI) 
Project 
Management 
Office (regional) 
and 3 Site 
Operations Units 
(provincial) 
9 project management and supervision 
ongoing 
9 accomplishments are based on the 
consolidated accomplishments of SOUs 
and clustered according to the four project 
components 
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The EDC sub-component of SEDC is executed by LBP.  This credit program is 
intended for the expanded and new individual entrepreneur and group small 
enterprises based on farm, fishery and related activities, with requisite supporting 
credit funds for all project purposes.   
 
Under the original financing agreement between IFAD and the Government of 
the Philippines (GOP), the implementation strategy of the EDC sub-component 
involves five layers of financial intermediation processes.  Each layer consists of 
financial intermediation and re-lending processes and procedures from IFAD down to 
individual beneficiaries: 
1. IFAD to GOP-DOF.  The first layer covers a loan granted by IFAD to GOP 
through the Department of Finance (GOP-DOF) at 0.75 percent interest 
rate per annum, payable in 30 years with five years grace period.    
2. GOP-DOF to LBP.  The second layer includes GOP-DOF’s re-lending of 
the funds to LBP at 4.75 percent per annum. 
3. LBP to LCCs.   The third layer consists of LBP’s re-lending of the credit 
funds to LCCs at 6.75 percent per annum.  The LCCs are wholesale credit 
providers such as the government-owned People’s Credit and Finance 
Corporation (PCFC) and Quedan Rural and Credit Guarantee Corporation 
(QUEDANCOR) and other credit-granting NGOs such as Mindanao 
Alliance for Self-Help Societies (MASS-SPEC) and the Philippine 
Development Assistance Program-Peoples Sustainable Development 
Cooperative (PDAP-PSDC). 
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4. LCCs to LPCIs.  The fourth layer covers LCCs’ re-lending of the credit 
funds to LPCIs such as rural banks and other small banks, cooperatives, 
NGOs and POs.  The interest rate charged by LCCs to its LPCI-borrowers 
usually range from 12 to 18 percent per annum.  
5. LPCIs to WMCIP Beneficiaries.  The fifth and final layer covers the 
LPCI’s re-lending of the credit funds to WMCIP beneficiaries or the target 
end-borrowers.  The interest rates charged by rural banks, NGOs, 
cooperatives and POs usually range from 18 to 60 percent per annum. 
 
The EDC aims to provide financially viable and accessible credit services of at 
least 36,000 individual loans for small businesses.  However, it remains 
unimplemented. Contrary to the target loan releases, LBP has not released a single 
loan under WMCIP’s EDC sub-component.   According to the 2002 IFAD-DAR 
evaluation, there are three reasons why this is so:     
1. The EDC sub-component may not be implementable given its 
implementation design;  
   
2. Reluctance of the pre-identified LCCs to participate in the credit program; 
and 
 
3. Stringent lending policies.  Interested target borrowers are not qualified 
under existing lending criteria enforced by LBP. 
 
A closer examination of the documents and discussions with cooperative 
officers, NGO field personnel and the Credit and Enterprise Development Officers 
(CEDOs) revealed that LBP lending program is open to all qualified cooperatives. The 
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main pre-condition for access to LBP credit facility is that each applicant-cooperative 
must meet all six minimum requirements for accreditation, as follows: 
1.) PhP30,000.00 paid-up capital; 
 
2.) Membership base of 60; 
 
3.) Savings mobilization of PhP500.00 per member per year; 
 
4.) Three-year profitable track record in credit operations; 
 
5.) With written policies, systems, procedures, and short/long-term plans; and 
 
6.) Other selected financial viability requirements (e.g., 95 percent repayment 
rate, no past due and no history of default in the last 2 years, no bouncing 
checks, and satisfactory external audit report for the previous financial 
year). 
 
In view of the above criteria, however, only three WMCIP-assisted 
cooperatives are fully qualified to avail of LBP’s credit program.  That is, even 
without the WMCIP-LBP credit program, the three cooperatives can avail of any loan 
from LBP under its lending program for cooperatives.  However, cooperative officers 
are reluctant to avail of LBP credit services.   
 
On the other hand, other WMCIP-assisted cooperatives have repayment 
problems with LBP.  The POs lack the required three-year track record in credit 
operations and could not raise the required minimum capitalization.  The PO officers 
were unable to start savings mobilization among members. Moreover, LBP requires 
that the POs be converted into cooperatives first before they can avail of LBP credit 
services. 
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The 2002 IFAD-DAR evaluation team notes that despite current efforts, credit 
will still not be accessible to the poorest.  Outreach to the poorest remains constrained 
by geographic isolation and their refusal to participate in meetings, seminars and other 
barangay affairs.  They are shy and they fear that no one will listen to them.  In rare 
instances where they attend meetings, they hardly voice out their opinions.  The 
illiterate and the poorest are further constrained by their inability to understand the 
Filipino language or Cebuano dialect normally used during meetings and seminars. 
 
The less poor beneficiaries who are interested to avail of credit could not meet 
the minimum requirements for access to LBP services.  There is also inadequate 
emphasis on mobilization of savings and credit groups consisting of the poorest 
households.  The activities of WMCIP are channeled through cooperatives and POs 
but the poorest and most vulnerable households are usually not members of any PO or 
cooperative.  This situation further constrains the overall EDC outreach to the poorest 
and most vulnerable target beneficiaries. 
 
The 2002 IFAD-DAR Evaluation Team further observes that credit alone will 
not also help in improving the plight of these households.  Alternative mechanisms 
will have to be developed to ensure that frugality is inculcated into the minds of the 
poorest people more as part of tracking the functioning and discipline of the group, 
infusion of capital in the form of equity support, support to develop group-based 
financial management systems and delivery of services for the improvement of 
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livelihood systems.  Hence, a careful redesigning of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component is 
deemed necessary. 
 
C. Statement of the Problem 
The major part of the dilemma in implementing the pro-poor EDC sub-
component focuses on the unacceptable “degree of fit” between the original IFAD-
approved EDC program design and implementation strategies vis-à-vis needs, 
resources and capabilities of LCCs, LPCIs and target beneficiaries.  An analysis of the 
“mismatch” between the original program design and the actual conditions of target 
clientele suggests that there are four dilemmas in the processes involved: (1) 
inadequate client analysis, (2) lack of social targeting mechanisms, (3) problems in 
service delivery, and (4) lack of monitoring and evaluation system. 
 
The program administration dilemma starts from the refusal of qualified LCCs, 
LPCIs and WMCIP beneficiaries to avail of the credit services from LBP under the 
EDC sub-component.  This is followed by disqualification of the interested LCCs, 
LPCIs and WMCIP beneficiaries because they did not pass the credit standards 
imposed by LBP as the minimum requirements for availment of the WMCIP-EDC 
credit services.    
 
Without LCCs and LPCIs, credit services will not be available and will not 
benefit qualified WMCIP beneficiaries.  However, while interested LCCs and LPCIs 
could not meet LBP’s minimum standards for accreditation, qualified ones are 
 18
reluctant to participate in the implementation for three reasons:  (1) financial viability 
constraints; (2) high interest rate (pass-on rate) of the loan from LBP; (3) and high 
credit risk involved in lending to target borrowers who are classified as poor and non-
bankable.   
 
For example, PCFC is fully accredited by LBP as LCC and as a pro-poor credit 
wholesaler specializing in Grameen Bank replications in the country (i.e., unsecured 
loans through peer-group lending scheme).  The PCFC enforces its own credit policies 
stipulating that target borrowers should only be eligible for credit upon full 
compliance with all the minimum accreditation requirements.   However, PCFC 
management politely refused to participate in WMCIP-LBP credit program for two 
reasons:   
1. The cost of the credit funds (interest rate) is too high and not financially 
viable.  The PCFC generates profit largely from interest earnings from its 
re-lending operations.  It could also avail of wholesale credit funds from 
other sources at a much lower interest rate of two or three percent per 
annum; and   
2. The target borrowers are not qualified and the transaction is too risky—
loan delinquency and default rates are likely to result to loan repayment 
problems and unacceptable levels of bad debts. 
 
Meanwhile, QUEDANCOR—a credit wholesaler and retailer designated by 
President Gloria Mancapagal Arroyo in year 2001 and enabled by the Agriculture and 
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Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997—is interested to participate in the program.  
However, its application for accreditation as LCC was disapproved by LBP despite its 
multi-billion peso capitalization and financial resource-base.  There are two major 
reasons for the disapproval of QUEDANCOR’s application for accreditation: first, 
QUEDANCOR lacks a three-year successful track record in credit operations; and 
second, its credit program design and service delivery system are too risky and 
unacceptable under LBP standards. 
 
Further analysis of the implementation dilemma reveals that even if the LBP 
interest rate will be reduced to the lowest acceptable level (i.e., 2.75 percent covering 
IFAD interest rate plus two-percent LBP administrative cost), still, majority of the 
prospective LCCs and LPCIs (e.g., NGOs, cooperatives, POs) and target individual 
end-borrowers could not satisfactorily comply with all LBP requirements. 
 
The 2002 IFAD-DAR evaluation team observes that LBP believes the 
WMCIP-assisted barangays are too poor (not bankable) and credit may not be an 
instrument to alleviate poverty.  Furthermore, LBP is not willing to bear the credit risk 
of financing not-so-strong LCCs and LPCIs since the possibility (credit risk) of loan 
delinquency and default is high.  Thus, high credit risk will adversely affect the quality 
of the LBP loan portfolio. 
 
Generally, the EDC sub-component of WMCIP can be viewed as a microcredit 
program “blueprint” based on the original IFAD-approved EDC implementation 
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framework.  However, the credit program “blueprint” is unimplementable under local 
conditions because the target clientele who are qualified and capable are not interested 
to participate in the program.  Meanwhile those who are interested are disqualified 
because they could not pass LBP-imposed minimum standards for participation in the 
credit program.  Thus, the applicability of microcredit program and its appropriateness 
to credit needs and financial capabilities of target borrowers are crucial issues that 
have to be resolved. 
  
In view of the abovementioned implementation dilemma, this study attempts to 
evaluate available credit program designs, identifies the factors that enable or limit 
successful implementation, the processes involved, and how the credit program should 
be implemented using four principles of good governance—participation, 
transparency, accountability and sustainability.   
 
The study attempts to describe and evaluate existing pro-poor credit program 
designs that could be used as alternatives to the original IFAD-approved EDC 
program design and implementation framework.  The study also identifies and 
examines the local socio-economic contexts that may enable or limit the successful 
implementation of the credit program.  Thus, the applicable credit programs and the 
factors that are likely to enable or limit successful implementation will make the EDC 
program design appropriate and responsive to the credit needs and financial 
capabilities of target beneficiaries and the administrative capacities of partner 
organizations.   
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Finally, the study focuses on the application of good governance in 
development administration via the implementation strategies of WMCIP’s EDC sub-
component. The application of good governance into program design and 
implementation strategies will serve as basis for reformulating and revitalizing the 
EDC sub-component.  This is intended to make microcredit plus public support 
services as a financially viable state-driven intervention for the reduction of poverty 
incidence among beneficiaries and the development of agrarian reform and indigenous 
communities in the rural areas of Western Mindanao.   
 
Research Problems 
Specifically, the study attempts to answer the following questions: 
 
1. What is the design of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component that would adequately 
address the needs of the poor and the non-bankable beneficiaries of WMCIP? 
 
2. What are the enabling and limiting factors to a successful design and 
implementation of the EDC sub-component? 
 
3. How do the principles of good governance—participation, transparency, 
accountability and sustainability—apply in a microcredit program for the 
reduction of poverty incidence among WMCIP beneficiaries? 
 
D.  Research Objectives  
This study hopes to identify and recommend the appropriate microcredit 
program design based on local socio-economic contexts as well as needs and 
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capabilities of program partners and target beneficiaries.  The study also aims to 
identify the options for reformulating program design and implementation strategies of 
the EDC sub-component to make it workable, effective and responsive.   
 
The study further hopes to determine the enabling and limiting factors that will 
serve as guideposts for designing microcredit programs, mapping out the necessary 
processes as well as procedures and ascertaining the effective delivery of microcredit 
and public support services, risk management mechanisms and other performance 
benchmarks.   
 
Finally, the study hopes to operationalize good governance in the 
implementation strategies of the EDC sub-component via client analysis that are 
relevant to the needs and capabilities of target beneficiaries and partner organizations, 
social targeting mechanisms, delivery of microcredit and pertinent public support 
services and putting in place the appropriate monitoring and evaluation system.  These 
processes are vital to the planning and implementation of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA)-funded, government-sponsored and financially viable microcredit 
program for poverty reduction and rural development in Western Mindanao. 
 
E. Significance of the Study 
 The study contributes to the epistemology of public administration by 
introducing the new perspective that within the context of donor-funded and state-
driven microcredit program, profit objectives are not only confined within the 
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premises of capitalism for economic development but also applicable to humanist 
approaches to social development.  That is, business philosophy and profit motive are 
also applicable to the humanist approaches and social equity-laden state interventions 
for social development.    
 
 The study further introduces the integration of the financial viability and social 
equity value orientations in the administration of ODA-funded and state-driven 
microcredit program for poverty reduction and rural development.  This integration is 
an attempt to apply the profit-generating motive of Entrepreneurial Government 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992) into non-profit and social equity-laden state actions via 
the New Public Administration’s (Frederickson 1971) preferential treatment towards 
the poor and marginalized sectors.   
 
 Within the context of microcredit, the capitalism-based financial viability and 
the humanism-based social equity value orientations are attainable through good 
governance.  Thus, the profitability and sustainability of poverty reduction and rural 
development programs are attainable when the design and implementation strategies 
are anchored on the four principles of good governance—participation, transparency, 
accountability and sustainability.   
 
 In general, the good governance of pro-poor and financially viable microcredit 
program emphasizes the participation of stakeholders—international donors and 
creditors, government financial intermediaries and other government agencies, MFIs 
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and the poor and vulnerable target beneficiaries.  Stakeholder participation further 
promotes transparent processes, transactions and convenient access to information.  
Participation and transparency further facilitate the enforcement of compliance with 
rules, regulations and other accountability measures as well as credit standards.  
Furthermore, participation, transparency and accountability enable the continued 
profitability of the income-generating activities (IGAs) of impoverished beneficiaries 
and the microcredit operations of MFIs and other creditors.   
 
 Finally, the profitability and sustainability of microcredit programs depend on 
the full repayment of small loans by the non-bankable but creditworthy borrowers.  
This enables the government’s full repayment of the credit funds to the international 
creditors and consequently, the continuous cycle of profitable microcredit operations 
and viable financial intermediation.  Ultimately, microcredit and public support 
services will enable the graduation of beneficiaries from the poverty trap and will 
facilitate their participation in the mainstream commercial banking system. 
 
 The study provides lessons and insights for improving client analysis, social 
targeting, service delivery and monitoring and evaluation system.  These are geared 
towards ensuring the financial viability of government-sponsored and market-driven 
microcredit services for the poor and non-bankable sectors through partnership with 
business and civil society organizations.  Finally, the strength of this study lies in 
coming up with market-driven, financially viable, needs-based, beneficiary-oriented, 
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workable microcredit program design and doable implementation strategies within the 
framework of good governance.   
 
F. Scope and Limitation 
This dissertation primarily covers the sampled WMCIP beneficiaries and 
program implementors from the government, civil society and private individuals who 
are involved in credit-related activities.  The study, however, neither intends to 
establish causality among the factors and variables under investigation nor attempts to 
make any generalizations from the sample.   
 
In general, WMCIP is considered as one of the Philippine government’s 
foreign-funded initiatives for peace and development in Region IX which is known for 
peace and order problems both in urban centers and rural areas.   The data and 
information presented in this study were gathered while the peace and order conditions 
of a few sampled barangays were still considered as risky.   
 
The safety and security of the researcher and enumerators were fully 
considered in the data gathering stage.  When the study was conducted, WMCIP-
reported the presence of bandits and pirates in the island barangays which was noted 
by the research team as a travel security risk.  This is in addition to the ongoing 
military operations against the Abu Sayyaf group and the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) in a few barangays in the provinces of Zamboanga Sibugay and Basilan.   
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The other difficulties encountered were the Ramadan celebration of the 
Muslims, geographic isolation of selected barangays, intervention of local political 
personalities, and refusal of some WMCIP beneficiaries to become respondents to the 
study.  The limitations have been compounded by time and resource constraints during 
the data gathering stage.  Thus, only the respondents and barangays which were 
conveniently accessible to the research team were selected and included in the sample.   
 
Due to the abovementioned constraints, the WMCIP beneficiary-respondents  
were selected based on the recommendations of barangay officials and other local 
political personalities and the availability of the target respondents or his/her 
representative on the exact day of the interview, group discussion and/or 
administration of survey questionnaires.  Furthermore, other data and information 
presented in this study were purposively obtained from key informants based on their 
availability, involvement and experience in credit-related programs of the government, 
the NGOs/POs or as informal moneylenders themselves.   
  
In view of the abovementioned limitations, the data on WMCIP beneficiaries 
were obtained through the sample survey.  These were reinforced and elaborated using 
the data and information generated from group discussions, interviews, researcher’s 
interactions, observations, and visits to homes, neighborhood and farms of selected 
respondents and other primary and secondary sources of data.   
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 Microcredit can be an effective tool for tackling the global poverty problem.  
Making microcredit work better for the poor necessitates a framework that integrates 
the principles of good governance in the design and implementation of a microcredit 
program. 
 
A.  REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
A.1.  Global Movement for Poverty Reduction through Microcredit 
The successful experience of Grameen Bank has provided a model that utilizes 
microcredit as a viable tool for poverty reduction.  Microcredit has successfully 
enabled the enterprising poor, especially women, to increase their household income 
above the poverty threshold, improve their living conditions and enabled them to 
graduate into having continuous access to commercial banking facilities.  However, 
microcredit is not designed to respond to the daily survival needs of the non-
enterprising poor, the poorest and most vulnerable sectors.  Thus, the success of 
microcredit as a tool for the eradication of global poverty is limited only to the credit 
needs and financial capabilities of the enterprising poor. 
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The FAO (2000) clarifies that there are different poverty groups needing 
different kinds of anti-poverty interventions.  The application of microcredit to the 
non-enterprising poor, the farm production for home consumption-oriented poverty 
groups and the poorest and most vulnerable sectors would be a mistake.  These 
poverty groups may actually need farm production subsidies and social safety nets to 
satisfy daily survival needs; not microcredit.  The consequences of the misapplication 
of microcredit may result to total failure of the microcredit program and may push the 
non-enterprising poor deeper into the poverty trap. 
 
Poverty is defined as a person’s inability to provide for his/her own basic food 
and non-food needs.  According to UNDP (2000), more than one billion people are 
poor and they live on an income falling below one-dollar a day.  Efforts for 
eradicating or reducing global poverty are spearheaded by the United Nations (UN) 
system encompassing various interventions to increase per capita income above one-
dollar a day or above the poverty threshold defined on a country-to-country basis.    
 
Providing microcredit and other forms of financial services to the enterprising 
poor is one of the many interventions for poverty reduction in developing countries.  
The UN General Assembly (1997) notes that, in many countries (especially 
Bangladesh, Indonesia and Bolivia) microcredit programs proved to be an effective 
tool in freeing people from poverty.  It also helped increase their participation in the 
economic and political processes of society.  According to World Bank (1998:1), 
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providing the enterprising poor with financial services increases their income and 
productivity, thereby, reducing poverty.   
 
Microcredit—also called "microfinance" and "microlending"—means 
providing small working capital loans to the self-employed and enterprising poor. 
Even small amounts of capital—typically $50 to $3002—can make a difference 
between absolute poverty and a thriving little business generating enough income to 
feed the family, send kids to school, and build decent housing (Swider 2001).  The 
most widely used microcredit strategy for poverty reduction is the Grameen banking 
model which originated in Bangladesh. 
 
Microcredit is by and large, interpreted as microfinance by practitioners 
(Rengarajan 2001:3).  Microcredit are small loans provided to the enterprising poor 
clients by microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as rural banks, credit cooperatives, 
credit-granting NGOs and other banks.  A common characteristic of the microfinance 
or microcredit institutions’ type of clientele is their exclusion from the traditional 
banking system because of their perceived credit risks, inability to provide loan 
collateral and generally, low incomes (Llanto 2001:1-2).  Microcredit programs use 
social mechanisms such as group-based lending to reach the poor and other groups, 
especially women, who lack access to traditional financial institutions.   
 
The international development agencies usually fund microcredit replication 
programs in developing countries.  The MFIs such as cooperatives, rural banks and 
                                                 
2  Philippine MFIs provide small unsecured loans from PhP1,000 to PhP25,000 per individual borrower. 
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NGOs generally provide microcredit services to community and neighborhood-based 
grassroots organizations such as POs, self-help groups (SHGs) or associations.  In 
turn, they provide unsecured small loans to low-income households and micro-
enterprises. These programs normally go beyond conservative financial intermediation 
schemes and practices of commercial banks and other commercial credit-granting 
institutions and private lending companies. 
 
Although microcredit is hardly a panacea for poverty eradication, two world 
summits on microcredit and a large body of literature from the World Bank (WB), 
United Nations (UN) system, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other international 
development agencies have clearly established that microcredit can contribute to 
poverty reduction.   
 
Empirical evidence further shows that the socially disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups are capable of owning and managing microcredit-financed projects 
when catalyzed by a change agent.  Thus, microcredit programs have provided new 
directions in the utilization of credit as a development tool.  In the new era of 
alternative credit programs for the poor, the catalytic and steering functions of the 
government are widely emphasized, especially in providing incentives for community-
level initiatives and in creating an environment where financial services can 
significantly contribute to the fulfillment of the basic needs of the poor.   
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Microcredit belongs to a variety of national development interventions 
supported by international development organizations such as the WB, UN and ADB 
among others.  As an anti-poverty intervention, microcredit is embedded in sustainable 
integrated area development approaches to rural development. Although there are 
noteworthy efforts with desirable results, development interventions may produce 
unintended consequences indicating a huge waste of scarce government resources and 
a squandering of foreign aid.   
 
Although the 2005 deadline for the goal of providing microcredit services to 
100 million poorest families worldwide is rather quite ambitious, it provides a new 
road map for many anti-poverty approaches that failed.  Despite the limitations of 
microcredit models, the 1997 and 2002 World Microcredit Summits have shown 
ample evidence that microcredit is a significant contributor to the global movement 
towards poverty eradication through national action and international cooperation.  
This suggests the need for good governance implying that the participation of 
international donors, the government, civil society, the business sector and the 
impoverished but enterprising target beneficiaries is a necessary pre-condition for 
making microcredit a viable strategy for poverty reduction. 
 
A.2.  Microcredit as a Mechanism to Reduce Poverty 
Poverty reduction remains as the main challenge of the Philippine government; 
and it is still largely a rural phenomenon (World Bank 2002:9). Microcredit is 
considered as an innovative financial intermediation scheme aimed to reduce 
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incidence of poverty especially in the rural areas.  Its program design and 
implementation strategies should be aligned with the impoverished beneficiaries’ 
financial capabilities to pay debts and their need for credit services because they have 
been traditionally excluded from mainstream commercial banking system.  They are 
also prey to usurers, loan sharks and other abusive moneylenders.   
 
 The Center for Integrated Rural Development in Asia and the Pacific 
(CIRDAP 1999:15) notes that action research experiences in the Philippines show that 
credit has given beneficiaries the opportunity of increasing livelihood through 
enhanced family income and employment opportunities.  Cost-benefit analysis of the 
income-generating activities (IGAs) of the beneficiaries shows substantial increase in 
family income.   
 
The study of the beneficiaries of the Center for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (CARD) shows that for enterprises financed with credit, the productivity 
of labor is higher than the wage rate and the rate of return is higher than the interest 
rate charged on the loan.  The credit further contributed to 25 percent increase in 
household incomes (Hossain and Diaz 1999).   
 
The impact of microcredit on household income is well-established in 
Bangladesh.  The study of Pitt and Khandker (1996:vi) on the poor clients of Grameen 
Bank reveals that program credit has a significant effect on the well-being of poor 
households and this effect is greater when women are the program participants:  
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1. Grameen Bank and similar targeted credit programs can “empower” women 
by increasing their contribution to household consumption expenditure, 
their hours devoted to production for the market, and the value of their 
assets;  
2.  Program credit increases total per capita consumption of the poor and the 
asset holdings of women; and  
3. Group-based credit provided to men can also have beneficial effects, 
particularly on the schooling and total household expenditure.  
 
In view of the above, Satyamurti and Haokip (2002) caution that the positive 
effects of microcredit on household income may not be true to all beneficiaries and 
may not be the same under all conditions throughout the year.  Thus, even though a 
family may have a significant income for extended periods, it may also face months of 
no income, thereby reducing its ability to enter into the type of commitment demanded 
today by most credit providers. Some people are just too poor, or have incomes that 
are too undependable to enter into today's loan transactions. These extremely poor 
people at the bottom percentiles of those living below the poverty line need safety nets 
(e.g., grants and subsidies) that can help them with their basic needs. Some are 
working to incorporate plans to help recipients graduate to microcredit programs.   
 
For microcredit to be meaningful and profitable, it should be linked to other 
forms of support services such as awareness training, skills training, savings 
mobilization, marketing, gender equality and others.  Sufficient amount of credit 
 34
should be provided at the right time and at the right price and be used for the most 
profitable productive purposes.  Linkages between credit and other inputs and 
assistance should be ensured (CIRDAP 1999:9).   
 
The appropriateness of microcredit programs to the credit needs and financial 
capabilities of the impoverished target beneficiaries is generally measured in terms of 
social outreach and financial viability.  That is, the integration of good governance 
into the microcredit program design and implementation strategies should 
continuously enable a large number of the poor and non-bankable groups (outreach) to 
generate considerable margins of profit (viability) from their efforts and investments 
in income-generating livelihood activities and micro-enterprises.  Consequently, the 
net cash returns from microcredit-funded economic activities are used to satisfy a poor 
family’s fundamental needs so as to cross the poverty threshold. 
 
A.3.  Controversies and Current Debates in Microcredit  
One of the main controversies in microcredit is its applicability under different 
poverty conditions of the target end-borrowers. That is, microcredit is not a solution to 
all poverty problems because it responds only to profit-oriented activities of the 
enterprising poor.  The consequences of misapplying microcredit to the non-
enterprising poor, the poorest and the most vulnerable would be a mistake.  This 
mistake may result to the beneficiaries’ further cycles of impoverishment. 
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According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (2000), neither the growth 
nor the reception of the microcredit movement has been without controversy. Like 
most development efforts, particularly those that compete for scarce donor funds, there 
are disagreements over the applicable and appropriate role and vision of microcredit. 
The three most vociferous debates concern the financial sustainability of MFIs, the 
social targeting of the poorest of the poor, and impact assessment:  
1. Financial sustainability. There is a concern that some MFIs are dependent 
on donor subsidies.  In the past few years, major donors have imposed time 
limits on the subsidies that they offer for microcredit programs in the hope 
that MFIs—whether they be public or private—will eventually achieve 
financial sustainability. For the World Bank-Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poorest (WB-CGAP) recipient organizations, that period is five years.  
2. Targeting the poorest.  The second debate currently raging in the 
microcredit world revolves around social targeting of the poorest. There are 
some who question whether it is appropriate to lend to poor people who 
cannot meet normal standards of "bankability," especially with donor 
funds. The crux of this debate concerns the ability of very poor people to 
pay back loans and avoid further cycles of impoverishment.  
3. Impact assessment. The third major controversy delves on whether it is 
necessary to devote resources to measuring changes in the behavior of 
microcredit borrowers owing to their ability to borrow funds. Impact 
assessments have become a requirement of most lending programs, and 
yield a confusing array of results.  
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In terms of financial viability, it is clear that the maturation of MFIs reveals a 
financially viable market among the poor and enterprising beneficiaries that do not 
need subsidies to carry out their profit-oriented livelihood activities.   On the social 
targeting of the poor, the impoverished and non-enterprising beneficiaries could not be 
helped by microcredit.  Thus, for the non-enterprising poor, the poorest and the most 
vulnerable, microcredit would be a wrong instrument for poverty alleviation.  Outside 
Bangladesh, Indonesia and Bolivia, the impact of microcredit on the financial viability 
of MFIs as well as wages and household income of the poor and enterprising 
borrowers has remained controversial.  Evaluation of microcredit programs in 
different countries yields a conflicting array of results indicating both positive and 
negative outcomes.   
 
Ideally, the financial sustainability of MFIs is primarily a function of net profit 
from microcredit operations.  Net profit is a function of full loan repayment by 
borrowers and is generally generated from the interest earned from the micro-
enterprise loans granted to the readily qualified borrowers.  In reality, however, the 
profit-objective of MFIs constrains outreach to the poorest and most vulnerable sector 
because borrowers from this sector do not have the financial capability and are not 
credit-worthy at all.  The application of microcredit to this sector is likely to result to 
loan defaults and net losses of the MFIs’ microcredit program.   
 
On the other hand, the direct flow of benefits of microcredit to the 
beneficiaries remains uncertain.  That is, the year-to-year net effects of microcredit on 
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the changes in wages and household incomes of socially targeted borrowers and the 
profitability of the MFIs’ microcredit operations remain controversial.  Thus, the 
impact of microcredit based on annual changes in wages and income within a period 
of five to ten years and across time and across the different poverty groupings may 
yield a conflicting array of results.   As FAO (2002) clarifies, there are different 
poverty groups requiring different types and different doses of anti-poverty 
interventions (e.g., microcredit, support services such as technology transfer and farm 
equipment, farm production subsidies, social safety nets, etc.) that should be targeted 
at the different stages of their dynamic movement out of the poverty trap.   
 
Using the poverty pyramid as a framework of analysis, Joe Remenyi (1999:6-
7) identifies the four poverty groups representing four types of impoverished target 
beneficiaries.  The graduation or movement of target beneficiaries across poverty 
groups is bidirectional.  That is, within a transition period of six months to one year, 
some of the poorer beneficiaries at the bottom of the poverty pyramid may graduate 
into higher levels faster than others while some may not graduate at all.   
 
On the other hand, other beneficiaries may slip down to the lower levels faster 
than others due to the failure of the loan-funded projects to generate net profits, which 
in turn, would have been used to repay the loan. The project’s failure and loan defaults 
could be caused by a wide array of factors such as adverse weather conditions, 
mismanagement of the project and price fluctuations among others.  These factors 
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form part of credit risks which should also be included in the microcredit program 
design and implementation strategies. 
 
Nevertheless, among the four poverty groups, microcredit is only applicable to 
the enterprising poor who belong to the first and second quartiles of the poverty 
pyramid.  Based on the FAO, WB-CGAP and IFAD reports, worldwide experiences 
show that microcredit is most successful among the enterprising poor.    
 
For the enterprising poor, microcredit involves the granting of small amounts 
of working capital for their income-generating and profit-oriented activities.  On the 
other hand, the laboring poor in the third quartile may need either microcredit or credit 
assistance through cooperatives or farm input subsidies depending on their actual need 
and overall capacity to pay a loan.   Finally, the poorest and most vulnerable group 
could not be helped by microcredit because their economic activities are not even 
sufficient to meet their daily requirements for survival.  The poorest and most 
vulnerable groups actually need social safety nets; not microcredit (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  The Poverty Pyramid 
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At the apex (first quartile) of the poverty pyramid are the microenterprise 
operators. These persons are distinguished by the fact that they employ others, 
possibly family members on a part-time basis, to assist them in the conduct of their 
business. Typically, these micro-enterprises will be directed at adding value to goods 
or services that can be described as 'wage-goods'—for example, food, clothing, 
household items, transport, and health services—produced and sold to the informal 
sector. In this context, working capital is often critically needed.  
 
The next highest stratum (second quartile) of poor persons is composed of the 
self-employed poor. These individuals are not engaged in subsistence activity but in 
producing for the market, often on a part-time basis. The self-employed poor need 
working capital and are fully integrated into the cash economy when working as self-
employed persons, even though they may not have given up waged labor or 
subsistence activity entirely.  The MFIs can enable members of the vulnerable and 
laboring poor to migrate into this higher stratum by funding their involvement in 
income-generating activities, many of which will be part-time and home-based self-
employment options.  
 
Above the vulnerable poor (third quartile) are the laboring poor, whose main 
source of income is the sale of their labor, either in the marketplace or to themselves in 
the course of subsistence production. Rural credit programs in the past were 
essentially targeted at the agricultural activities of this stratum. The MFIs serve the 
needs of poor and subsistence farmers, but there is a deliberate attempt to concentrate 
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on financing activities that diversify their sources of income beyond staple crop 
production. 
 
At the bottom of the pyramid (fourth quartile) are the poorest of the poor; the 
vulnerable poor, including pregnant women, old people, children and the infirm. 
Their vulnerability is directly tied to the fact that the contribution they make to 
household income is not sufficient for their own survival.   
 
The third and fourth groups are critical since a single mistake could lead to 
disastrous consequences.  The third group consists of clients and potential clients for 
whom subsidized microcredit provides an opportunity to move out of poverty, but at a 
pace consistent with their income-generating abilities and the economic capacities of 
their communities.   
 
The fourth group consists of microcredit borrowers who succumb to a cycle of 
increasing debt, or who face other difficulties in maintaining the demands of financial 
responsibility imposed by MFIs. For the third group of clients, an excessively swift 
removal of subsidies would be a mistake; while the fourth group would be better 
served by other development approaches and tools such as direct food transfers and 
other social safety net provisions; not microcredit.   
 
In general, it is quite evident that microcredit is neither a “one-size-fits-all” 
formula nor the only solution to all types of poverty problems.  The design of 
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microcredit programs is limited, discriminatory and applicable only to credit needs 
and financial capabilities of the enterprising poor.   
 
In the Philippines, for example, microcredit programs automatically disqualify 
three groups of interested borrowers.  The first disqualified group is composed of 
enterprising borrowers who actually need a working capital higher than the 
microcredit ceiling of PhP25,000.00 based on the lending guidelines of PCFC and 
PhP15,000.00 for the clients of QUEDANCOR.  The second disqualified group is 
composed of interested borrowers who are engaged in non-trading business such as 
crop production, livestock raising and other production-oriented projects with long-
gestation periods of more than one month.  For projects with long-gestating periods, 
the loan could only be paid during the harvest season or three or more months after the 
release of the loan.  The third disqualified poverty group is composed of those who are 
not credit-worthy at all.  That is, they are too poor they could not generate small 
amounts of savings of at least PhP500.00 per year, the heavily indebted and those who 
have previous records and negative neighborhood reputation of not paying their debts. 
 
Other anti-poverty interventions supportive of microcredit or the daily survival 
needs of target beneficiaries should be appropriate to household financial conditions 
and should be responsive to the needs of the non-enterprising poor and vulnerable 
beneficiaries.  In reference to the third and fourth quartiles of the poverty pyramid, the 
laboring poor and the poorest and most vulnerable are considered as not enterprising 
because they are mostly engaged only in marginal agriculture and fishery-related 
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production activities for home consumption.  These poverty groups do not actually 
need microcredit.  What they actually need are either production loans from 
cooperatives, farm production subsidies or social safety net provisions from concerned 
government agencies and LGUs—not microcredit from MFIs.  
 
In this view, the profit-oriented microcredit program should be combined with 
not-for-profit public support services and other anti-poverty interventions that respond 
to the various needs and capabilities of the different poverty groups as defined by the 
poverty pyramid.  This is intended to ensure that the governance-based program 
design and implementation strategies are in accordance with the needs and capabilities 
of target beneficiaries, adequate social targeting mechanisms, delivery of appropriate 
doses of microcredit and public support services and monitoring and evaluation of 
program outcomes.   
  
A.4.  Microcredit for Poverty Alleviation: A Critique     
Despite the celebrated success of microcredit, critics still point to its flaws and 
weaknesses.  Like many other foreign-funded development programs worldwide, the 
role of microcredit in poverty alleviation and rural development has never been 
without critics and controversies.  The impact of microcredit and other lending 
programs for the poor have produced a confusing array of both positive and negative 
outcomes (see Cracknell 2000, FAO 2000 and WB-CGAP 2003).  But despite the 
limitations, the failed experiences and success stories of both MFIs and borrowers, 
microcredit remains a viable option for poverty reduction and rural development.   
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On the negative side, Gina Neff (1996) argues that while the press and the 
global network of localists rave about the Grameen Bank's lending to "landless" 
women, the miracle dissolves on closer inspection. For example, Grameen rules insist 
that its borrowers own their homes—unlike the assumption that shoeless women have 
bootstraps. Evidently, Bangladeshi homeless women do not count as the poorest of the 
poor. And unfortunately, Grameen borrowers are staying poor. After eight years of 
borrowing, 55 percent of Grameen households still are not able to meet their basic 
nutritional needs—so many women are using their loans to buy food rather than invest 
in business. That is a figure that the press failed to mention. The World Bank, in its 
1995 study of Grameen, focused mainly on the bank's financial viability, checking 
whether the program was breaking even or turning a profit. Unfortunately, only 
foreign grants are keeping it afloat. 
 
Gina Neff (1996) further notes that Mohammad Yunus—the founding 
chairman of Grameen Bank—himself lustily defends his vision of for-profit lending to 
the poor.  In his words, capitalism does not have to be the "handmaiden of the rich"; 
even poor people can benefit from the system if they are only given the chance to use 
their innate business savvy. But even though part of his mission is to let lenders 
graduate into commercial banking, and the World Bank sees lenders' graduation a sign 
of the program's viability; that is just not happening. According to the World Bank 
report, " Grameen Bank may have a market niche because its borrowers are dependent 
on the program, but over the long run this relationship could render Grameen Bank 
vulnerable. Unless borrowers' graduation from low-level incomes to higher levels (if 
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not from the program entirely) is encouraged or achieved, many members will become 
permanently dependent on Grameen Bank credit and services." The same study 
reveals that Grameen had no significant impact on women's wages in rural villages, 
although it did boost men's and children's wages. And with all the hype about 
Grameen's being the largest microlending program in the world, one could never guess 
that loans to women have remained a mere five percent of the total amount lent in the 
Bangladeshi countryside since the 1980s. 
 
Successful MFIs like Grameen have been criticized for being too harsh in 
enforcing social and legal accountability measures.   The Bank never forgives a loan, 
despite natural disasters, and the loan circles result in domineering women pressuring 
weak women into repayment.    Furthermore, there has been doubt expressed that 
microcredit can have an impact on poverty. A major blow to microfinance came in the 
form of a report to the UN Secretary General which examined the role of microcredit 
on the eradication of poverty. The report stated that resources could be put to better 
use than microcredit in helping rid the world of poverty and implied microcredit was a 
squandering of aid. The report claimed that microcredit was too experimental and that 
resources should only be “channeled to sectors that have potential, especially 
agriculture, infrastructure and education.” The report further stated that in order to 
succeed, the MFI must be very efficient, have support in the form of training and 
information disseminated to the poor, government and non-governmental agencies 
would have to work together, and there would have to be strict regulations on loans. 
The report implied that satisfying these standards was unlikely to yield desirable 
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results.  Therefore, microfinance was a bad prospect for eradicating poverty (Figura 
2002:177-180). 
 
Furthermore, outside Grameen Bank, BRAC, Association for Rural 
Advancement (ASA) and Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) which are considered the 
world’s largest and most successful MFIs, many microcredit programs have failed.  
Typical features of failed microcredit programs include endless dependence on 
government or donor subsidies, high default rates, unsustainable administrative costs, 
and long delays in the delivery of services (FAO 2000).  
 
On the positive note, while the net long-term effects of microcredit on the 
quality of life of the poor beneficiaries remain shrouded with controversies, the most 
successful experiences especially in Bangladesh and Indonesia have provided a wide 
array of best practices in microcredit.  The best practices serve as models that can be 
modified and replicated in other developing countries.  The final choice among 
successful models largely depends on which model is applicable and appropriate to 
local conditions and to the needs and capabilities of target beneficiaries as well as the 
support systems from the national government and international donors.  
 
Despite the limitations of microcredit as a tool for poverty reduction as 
forwarded by Gina Neff (1996) and Figura (2002), the success of Grameen Bank and 
its variants all over the world still provide sufficient evidence that microcredit as a 
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state-driven intervention is a viable business proposition and a potent strategy for 
poverty reduction and rural development.   
 
The limitations of microcredit, however, could be adequately addressed 
through the provision of public support services and capability-building initiatives to 
enable the target beneficiaries to access microcredit facilities and appropriately 
manage loan-funded projects.  This will ultimately facilitate the recovery of the cost of 
investment plus considerable margin of profit.  The provision of microcredit and 
public support services for poverty reduction emphasizes the significant role of 
institutional arrangement in development administration. 
 
The administration of state-driven and credit-related development interventions 
suggests the need for the good governance of microcredit within the micro-financial 
intermediation infrastructure.  The application of the good governance framework into 
the design and implementation strategies of microcredit program needs to be carved 
out from multiple organizational collaboration between and among the national 
government and its instrumentalities; the international donors and creditors; the credit-
granting NGOs, cooperatives and other MFIs from the civil society; and banks as well 
as private lending companies from the business sector.  
 
A.5.   Microcredit as an Instrument of Governance 
The World Bank (1998) argues that poverty is a manifestation of poor 
governance.  It is also argued that the failure of microcredit programs has been largely 
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caused by poor governance.  Since sound development is synonymous with good 
governance (Leftwich 1993:605), it is necessary to incorporate good governance 
principles in the design and administrative machinery for the implementation of 
microcredit program to make it an effective and responsive strategy for poverty 
reduction and rural development.   
 
Closely linked to the issue of governance is ownership.  Understanding what 
an owner stands to lose clarifies the factors that contribute to effective governance of 
MFIs.  The new economists of organization also consider institutions as governance 
structures and social arrangements geared to minimize transaction costs (Powell and 
Di Maggio 1991).  The clarity of policies and procedures and willingness to engage in 
critical self-evaluation are the final essential components of effective governance.  
Thus, along the argument posited by Maria Otero (2001:6-15), the  challenge for all 
MFIs is to emerge with strong and long lasting governance structures that will help 
assure their long-term sustainability.   
 
Business in the emerging microfinance industry goes through three stages 
characterized by vision, management and governance.  The emerging interpretation of 
governance emphasizes an active participation of citizens as community members, as 
organizations and as individuals (UN DESSA 1999:3).  Governance is a system of 
checks and balances. Governance is sometimes conceived as a project cycle that links 
the shareholder to the board, to the management, to the staff, to the customer, and to 
the community at large (Otero 2001).   
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The need for good governance in the administration of poverty alleviation 
programs is clearly established among Filipino scholars.  According to Victoria 
Bautista (2002:1), governance is one of the aspects of poverty alleviation that needs 
serious attention because it affects the different phases of the management of program 
components—situation analysis, planning, implementation, and 
monitoring/evaluation.  Governance innovations can come from two sources: one is 
direct, if the innovation targets pro-poor program structures and mechanisms; the other 
is indirect, when innovations are undertaken to improve efficiency and effectiveness 
of the administrative machinery without necessarily addressing programs and projects 
that directly target the poor. 
 
In the microfinancial intermediation infrastructure, wholesale microcredit 
funds are generally sourced from the international donor community and delivered to 
target clientele via public service delivery system and in collaboration with the 
network of civil society and business sector organizations.  Institutional partnerships 
involve the non-government instrumentalities as service providers, consortium 
members or subcontractors of the government for the delivery of credit and pertinent 
support services to target borrowers who have no access to commercial credit 
facilities. 
 
Microcredit aims to increase income and improve livelihood systems of the 
poor and disadvantaged groups especially in the agriculture and fishery sectors in the 
rural areas.  In this context, good governance involves the process of managing 
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through the involvement of stakeholders encompassing the economic, political, social 
and cultural backdrops of microcredit; the administrative capabilities of partner 
organizations; needs and capabilities of target beneficiaries; and the natural resource 
base of communities.  
 
Ideally, designing microcredit programs should be highly participative and 
should involve a series of consultations at the household level to determine the general 
socio-economic conditions of target clientele, their credit needs and financial 
capabilities.  These are the empirical bases in determining available community 
resources being used for income-generation and in identifying resources that are not 
available but are actually needed to increase economic productivity in the agriculture 
and fishery sectors. 
 
The information from the beneficiaries should be fed to Barangay 
Development Plans (BDPs) which should then be used as basis for determining the 
nature and extent of poverty alleviation interventions and other forms of development 
assistance that will be provided in coordination with partner organizations.  In the case 
of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component, the design and implementation strategies should 
encompass credit-related activities of the beneficiaries and what they can do or must 
do to help themselves; ongoing self-help and other development activities of 
grassroots organizations; and the existing LGU and NGO projects in the community.  
All these development activities can be analyzed using a working framework of good 
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governance covering the principles of participation, transparency, accountability and 
sustainability. 
 
In the case of participation in credit programs either through the cooperative 
lending or microcredit programs, the beneficiaries should be involved in profit-
oriented economic activities such as crop, livestock and poultry production, fishing, 
aquaculture (fish ponds) and microenteprises such as retail (sari-sari) stores, vending, 
home-based food processing and other income-generating or livelihood activities.  
Only micro-enterprises are eligible for microcredit while production activities with 
long-gestation periods are eligible for production loans from cooperatives.   
 
On the other hand, target beneficiaries who are classified as non-enterprising 
poor, the poorest and most vulnerable are automatically excluded and disqualified 
from any pro-poor credit program but provided with appropriate public services such 
as farm production subsidies (e.g., fertilizers, planting materials, insecticides, etc.), 
direct food transfer, food for work programs, medical assistance and other social 
safety net provisions.    
 
In the administration of state-driven microcredit and the provision of public 
support services as well as other social safety net provisions, the participation of 
credit-granting civil society organizations is necessary.  This will enable social 
targeting and outreach in order to provide appropriate public services to the isolated 
and very poor communities.  The participation of wholesale credit providers is 
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likewise necessary because the Philippine government (see EO 138, 1999) prohibits 
the involvement of any non-credit-granting government instrumentality from 
administering any credit program. Moreover, when ODA funds are involved, only 
LBP and the DBP are recognized as government financial intermediaries (GFIs).  That 
is, any other institution wishing to participate in any ODA-funded credit programs 
should first secure full accreditation from either LBP or DBP. 
 
Transparency, meanwhile, could be analyzed using two levels, the program 
implementors and the beneficiaries.  All information should be made available and be 
easily accessible to all stakeholders and program participants.  In the case of program 
implementors, the accreditation of GFIs facilitates the easy and convenient access to 
vital information on the resources and administrative capabilities of partner 
organizations.  Outside EO 138, however, vital information on partner organizations 
could not be ascertained especially in the case of subcontracting public services.  This 
is apparently caused by laxity in enforcing prequalification and bidding requirements; 
or less than three qualified bidders and competitive public service contractors 
operating in the target communities; or required documents are simply falsified. 
 
At the beneficiary level, credit-related transparency remains limited.  In the 
case of cooperatives and POs, financial records are normally kept confidential by 
officers while individual beneficiaries do not keep any record at all or they do not 
simply divulge the truth about financial records and related documents.   
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Formal information exchange and dissemination are limited to the frequency of 
contact of the beneficiaries with the representatives of concerned organizations and 
their ability to translate official documents into the vernacular.  In certain instances, 
even if the document is translated into the dialect, it is still of no use to some 
beneficiaries since they could neither read nor write.  Hence, the most effective and 
the fastest means of communication and information exchange are direct interaction 
and other forms of informal communication. 
 
Furthermore, the accountability of program implementors and beneficiaries 
remain as the most crucial and most central to microcredit programs.  Accountability 
is measured in terms of the borrowers’ ability to pay the loan by virtue of the project’s 
profitability, reputation in the neighborhood and peer pressure. Otherwise, legal 
measures of enforcing accountability become necessary.  The accountability measures 
are largely dependent on the responsibilities of the credit-granting organizations in 
enforcing borrower and institutional discipline.   
 
The enforcement of accountability measures in credit programs suggests a 
series of delegating responsibilities from the top.  For example, since the EDC sub-
component is a form of business loan from IFAD, its repayment by GOP primarily 
depends on loan repayment of the end-beneficiaries.  That is, if the beneficiaries do 
not repay their loans, the ripple effect will be evident across all the financial 
intermediation layers of the EDC.  Because EDC is a sovereign loan, the national 
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government will take full responsibility in case of ultimate failure and will eventually 
pay IFAD the loan that the end-beneficiaries could not repay. 
 
Under unsecured microcredit scheme, it is assumed that if the object of 
financing does not generate sufficient net profits, the borrower cannot repay the loan.   
In this case, enforcement of accountability measures come into play by enforcing 
repayment from co-makers of peer-group guarantors. This may strain social relations 
among neighbors, friends and relatives.  In ultimate cases when repayment could no 
longer be made to the guarantors who assumed the debt, the defaulter will finally be 
excluded and ejected from the group in the presence of neighbors, relatives and friends 
within the community.  Thus, the enforcement of accountability measures is normally 
carried out in the presence of representatives of concerned organizations.  This makes 
the whole process transparent and known by the community which may eventually 
result to social exclusion of defaulters or migration to distant places. 
 
In terms of sustainability, governance could be analyzed in two levels: 
program sustainability and borrower sustainability.  Program sustainability is 
measured in terms of the net profits generated from the interest earned from credit 
operations while borrower sustainability is measured in terms of net profits generated 
from the loan-funded livelihood projects and activities.  Ideally, the net profits should 
be generated in order for the borrower to repay the loan.  However, this may not hold 
true under all conditions.  Loan funds may be utilized for other purposes and still be 
fully paid by the borrower using other income sources. 
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The end-borrowers’ full repayment of the loan provides them with access to 
repeat loans and higher loanable amounts.  This suggests expansion of the loan-funded 
projects, increased profitability and increased income.  Ultimately, after subtracting 
operating expenses and loan payments from gross income, the net profits could be 
used for other household expenditure such as house improvements, children’s 
education, clothing and other requirements beyond the satisfaction of the family’s 
basic needs for survival.  The beneficiary’s full repayment of the loan will enable the 
creditors to repay their loans to the government and generate net profits from 
microcredit.  Furthermore, this will enable the government to fully repay its loans to 
IFAD. 
 
Using the good governance framework in describing the different phases of 
financial intermediation involved in implementing the EDC sub-component, it is 
apparent that governance processes are crucial in the design and implementation of the 
EDC sub-component.  That is, all processes and transactions involved in implementing 
EDC consist of governance processes.  The processes encompass the creation of an 
appropriate profit-generating environment that will encourage the participation of 
credit wholesalers, retailers and borrowers through loan availments; providing 
adequate information to all program implementors and maintaining open and 
transparent communication and information systems; and the continuous cycle of loan 
availment, repayment and re-availment processes.   
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The continuity of loan cycles suggests that borrowers are profitable and hence, 
microcredit program itself is financially viable.  Since sustainability is largely 
determined by full cost recovery plus profitability, this scenario suggests the 
sustainability of microcredit and the MFIs.  In this context, good governance involves 
the continuous processes of formulating and reformulating program designs and 
managing and implementing microcredit programs for continuous improvement which 
could make it more effective and more responsive to the changing needs and 
capabilities of the clientele. 
 
In reality, however, most MFIs face a difficult task of balancing social and 
financial objectives; reaching large numbers of low-income microentrepreneurs   
while generating profits (Rock, Otero and Saltzman 1998:17).   This is because 
providing credit to the poor and non-bankable is costly and quite risky.  The 
possibilities of loan delinquency and default are high and the administrative costs of 
operations and maintaining credit officers and staff to handle microcredit transactions 
at the barangay and borrower levels are likewise high.   
 
For example, Hossain and Diaz (1999) in a study of CARD Rural Bank in San 
Pablo, Laguna reveal that the microcredit operations could only be profitable if the 
interest rate charged on the loan is at least 60 percent per annum or five percent per 
month.  The CGAP (2003) on the other hand, agrees that it will require at least five 
years of successful operations to make the program fully profitable.  In this case, 
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successful operations mean at least 90 percent loan repayment rate so that profits can 
be generated from the MFI’s interest earnings.  
 
Thus, providing credit to the poor and the non-bankable is also considered both 
as a profit-making business and a social mission.  Otero (2001:6) avers that this is 
largely because commercial banks do not transact business with the poor and the non-
bankable.  The MFIs fill this gap by devising appropriate and innovative strategies of 
doing business with the poor who have been historically excluded from conservative 
banking and mainstream commercial financial intermediation.  
 
Furthermore, MFIs originated with a mission that combines social and 
financial objectives.  The social mission—to provide financial services to as many of 
the lowest income population as possible—is combined with a financial objective, 
which is to achieve financial self-sufficiency, enabling sustained service delivery 
without dependence on subsidies (Otero 2001:6).  This largely means that while doing 
business with the poor, MFIs should also generate profits from unsecured loans at a 
commercial level pegged at the prevailing interest rate on secured (with collateral) 
commercial bank loans (e.g., 25 to 30 percent per annum). 
 
In this view, the social mission of MFIs espouses the social equity value 
premise of New Public Administration (see Frederickson 1971) while the financial 
viability objectives are well-established in the principles of Entrepreneurial 
Government (see Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  Both social equity and financial 
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viability value orientations are well-founded in the nature and extent of support to 
microcredit programs provided by the national and local governments and the 
international donor organizations.  Both social equity and financial viability are 
likewise the twin objectives that should be espoused in applying good governance in 
the design and implementation strategies of microcredit programs.  This working 
framework is believed to make microcredit effective and responsive to the needs and 
capabilities of target clientele.  
 
The state-driven microcredit programs are primarily profit-oriented business 
activities that aim to maximize profits and minimize transaction costs.  Thus, the 
infusion of social equity into the financial viability goals of microcredit could not be 
attained by MFIs alone.  The microcredit programs of MFIs only provide profit-
generating micro-enterprise loans to the readily qualified borrowers via microcredit 
facility. This maximizes repayment rate and the interest earned by the MFIs from the 
loan while minimizing cost of operations that could not be recovered directly through 
the interest earnings of the loan. 
 
Meanwhile, MFIs do not normally provide credit-related support services such 
as skills enhancement and entrepreneurial trainings, technology transfer and livelihood 
development programs, storage and processing facilities.  Although there are MFIs 
that provide microcredit support services, these are normally given to beneficiaries 
through financial assistance from donors or directly funded by the government.  
Moreover, microcredit does not include subsidies, social safety nets, community and 
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institutional development or any social preparation services to target beneficiaries who 
could not pass the minimum microcredit standards such as profitable livelihood 
project, savings generation, good debt repayment track record and good neighborhood 
reputation. 
 
The abovementioned limitations of microcredit programs are the primary 
reasons why microcredit could not be applied as a solution to all kinds of poverty 
problems. Thus, the infusion of social equity in the financial viability value orientation 
of microcredit requires the partnership of government agencies, civil society 
organizations and business groups that specialize in the provision and administration 
of not-for-profit and credit-related support programs for poverty reduction and rural 
development. Anti-poverty services supportive of microcredit are normally funded by 
international donors and implemented by the government either directly or 
subcontracted to the NGOs.   
 
While MFIs provide small amounts of working capital to the enterprising poor, 
line agencies and LGUs provide public support services that enable the qualified 
borrowers to repay their loans and to continue benefiting from microcredit.  
Simultaneously, capability-building and other productivity-enhancing public support 
services are also provided to the not-qualified target beneficiaries to enable them to 
pass minimum credit standards.   
 
 59
The MFIs ensure the attainment of financial viability goals by minimizing cost 
of operations and maximizing the interest earned from business-oriented microcredit 
operations.  Simultaneously and in concert with MFIs, the government agencies and 
other partner organizations provide social equity-laden and not-for-profit microcredit 
support services via public service delivery system.  This concerted effort in the 
administration of a development program aims to enable the enterprising poor to 
generate net profits from their microcredit-funded livelihood activities.  Consequently, 
this helps ensure that the enterprising but impoverished borrowers are able to pay their 
loans to the MFIs on schedule.   
 
The borrowers’ full loan repayment ensures the MFIs’ profitable microcredit 
operations and their repayment of the credit funds from the government financial 
intermediaries.  This further enables the latter’s repayment of the government’s loan to 
the international donors and creditors.  In this view, the continuous cycle of net profit 
generations and full loan repayments determine the sustainability of MFIs and the 
continuous flow of benefits to the end-beneficiaries and other stakeholders 
consistently, effectively and as long as microcredit is needed. 
 
The attainment of social equity and financial viability value orientations within 
the context of microcredit requires multiple partnerships among development-oriented 
organizations.  Making microcredit a meaningful tool for poverty reduction and rural 
development requires a working framework that is anchored on the good governance 
platform.  This emphasizes the participation of government agencies, civil society 
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organizations and business groups in the design and implementation strategies of 
microcredit program.   
 
Thus, the good governance of microcredit program enables the participation of 
several organizations in simultaneously providing both microcredit and public support 
services to the impoverished but enterprising target beneficiaries. That is, a successful 
design and implementation strategies of a microcredit program not only requires 
public support services but it also requires good governance.  This will ultimately 
facilitate the beneficiaries’ proactive climb out of the poverty trap and their graduation 
into having regular and continued access to commercial banking facilities. 
 
A.6.  Successful Microcredit Models 
But what is needed for a successful microcredit program?  If the conditions for 
microcredit are in place, then who should do it?  Ideally, a strong local microcredit 
institution, or a bank that is committed to poor clients, or an international microcredit 
organization are the best choices. Suitable institutions should have a commitment to 
the four basic tenets of high-quality microcredit (CGAP 2001:3): 
1. Providing long-term financial services, or permanence suggesting at least 
10 years of microcredit operations; 
2. Reaching large numbers of clients, or scale suggesting a minimum of one 
million active borrowers; 
3. Reaching the poor, or depth of outreach starting from the richest among the 
poor down to the poorest of the poor; and  
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4. Reaching full financial sustainability by generating net profits from 
microcredit operations and without grants and subsidies from donors. 
 
Following the four basic tenets of high-quality microcredit, three of the four 
most successful microcredit programs are Bangladeshi models—Grameen Bank, 
BRAC, and Association for Social Advancement (ASA).  The fourth is the Indonesian 
model—Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI).   
 
With more than two million active borrowers, the first and the world’s most 
successful microcredit pioneer is Grameen Bank.  It started its operations in 1976; has 
total outstanding loan portfolio worth US$298.8 million; and served 2.06 million 
active borrowers as of end-1995 (Seibel 1998:2). The ASA entered the industry in 
1991; served more than 1.7 million active borrowers; and managed an outstanding 
loan portfolio worth US$112 million as of end-1998 (Hatch, Levine and Penn 
2002:10).  The BRAC started its microcredit operations in 1974; served 2.03 million 
active borrowers; and managed US$ 108.9 million outstanding loan portfolio as of 
end-1998 (Zaman 1999:37).  The BRI started microcredit in 1984; served 2.6 million 
active borrowers; and managed an outstanding loan portfolio worth US$1.38 billion as 
of end-1995 (Seibel 1998:2). 
 
The successful microcredit models have gained international recognition in 
terms of the four criteria of successful microcredit programs.  That is, for at least 10 
years (permanence), they have continuously provided credit services to at least one 
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million active borrowers (scale) who are mostly the enterprising poor (outreach) while 
recovering the full cost of operations plus profit, thereby reducing or totally 
eliminating dependence on donor or government subsidy (sustainability).   
 
The success of Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA and BRI are largely attributed to 
the financial support and technical assistance provided by the international donors and 
the government via the public service delivery system.  This suggests that inter-
organizational collaboration among microcredit providers, donors and the government 
is a necessary pre-condition for the successful implementation of microcredit 
programs. 
 
A.7.  Implementation Strategies of Successful Microcredit Models 
Despite the popularity of microcredit—evidenced by two world summits in 
1997 and 2002 and the enormous financial support from the international donor 
community—its program design and implementation mechanisms are geographically 
limited, culture-bound and primarily limited to the enterprising poor only.   
 
Microcredit principles heralded in the clarion call of microcredit fanatics 
cannot be a panacea or a “cure-all formula” for the global poverty problem.  The 
success of microcredit is likewise dependent on local socio-economic contexts, the 
credit needs and financial capabilities of target beneficiaries, and the multi-sectoral 
and organized participation of target beneficiaries, partner organizations and other 
stakeholders from the government, civil society and the business sector.   
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Thus, microcredit is neither universal nor is it a “one size-fits all” formula or 
“blueprint.”  The different cases presented below point to one direction—the 
replicability of Grameen-based microcredit programs is limited only to the 
enterprising poor.  Therefore, the replication and implementation of the Grameen 
Bank approach under different contexts are not intended to solve all kinds of poverty 
problems.   
 
A.7.a.  The Grameen Credit-Only Strategy (minimalist approach).   Grameen 
Bank is the successful pioneer in what we know today as microcredit.  Its clientele are 
the enterprising poor; at least 90 percent of them are women (see Grameen Bank 
website). They are apparently the richest group among the poor whose incomes fall 
within the highest quartile and slightly below the nationally-defined poverty threshold.  
On the other hand, the poor but who are not enterprising and not credit-worthy are 
automatically excluded from Grameen banking. 
 
The Grameen model is known for its minimalist approach providing only 
credit through peer-groups composed of five member-borrowers.  This model is based 
on sole microlending practices and a rooted social commitment towards marginalized 
peoples (De Noose 2001:2).  The Grameen program design covers only microcredit 
for the enterprising poor women.  It does not include support services and it has no 
program for the non-enterprising poor or the poorest and most vulnerable.   According 
to Joe Remenyi (1997:2-4), the Grameen ‘model’ has six key features: 
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1. Grameen Bank is a licensed bank and as such can present itself as part of 
the legally recognized network of financial institutions able to access the 
due processes of the law to protect depositors and its other members; 
2. Banking operations are built on ‘peer group’ procedures for client 
selection, risk management and loan repayment enforcement, based on 
small groups of not more than five members. These small groups meet 
regularly and take responsibility for collecting small amounts of money on 
a frequent schedule;  
3. Loans are made almost exclusively to poor women from households that 
own no farmland or other significant assets;  
4. The program is ‘minimalist,’ specializing in the delivery of small loans for 
short durations at a rate of interest that is above the inflation rate and the 
cost of capital.  
5. Client training, deposit and loan repayment collections and participant 
motivation work is ‘externalized’ onto groups and group leaders. Group 
formation and group activities are crucial to the Grameen model, but the 
cost of these is largely borne by the group members themselves.  All 
borrowers must make a commitment to a compulsory saving regime, which 
acts as a form of loan default insurance program; and  
6. All potential clients must make a commitment to the Grameen Bank 
principles that directly relate to good citizenship, social goals and personal 
wellbeing. 
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Although the Grameen model has been replicated in 45 countries (FAO 2000),   
not all of the six main features of the Grameen principles are universally applicable 
and not all principles are appropriate to all poverty conditions.  The minimalist 
approach (credit only strategy) of Grameen automatically excludes the non-
enterprising poor thereby pushing them deeper into the poverty trap.  Moreover, the 
advent of natural calamities and inevitable circumstances adversely affecting the 
borrowers’ capability to pay as well as the harsh enforcement of accountability 
measures pushes the poor further into debts they could no longer repay.  This will 
ultimately result to the defaulting borrowers’ migration to distant places where they 
could no longer be held socially and legally accountable for their indebtedness. 
 
The limitations of the “credit-only” program design and implementation 
strategies of the Grameen model resulted in different hybrids and innovations in the 
light of prevailing poverty conditions and capabilities of target beneficiaries and 
partner organizations.   The Grameen microcredit processes involve client analysis 
which focuses on creditworthiness and capability to pay; social targeting that focuses 
on the enterprising women only; delivery of credit services only; and monitoring and 
evaluation of individual loan repayment rate based on profitability of micro-
entrepreneurial activities and the impact of microcredit on household income and 
wages. 
 
The Grameen model, however, does not cater to the needs of the non-
enterprising poor or the poorest and most vulnerable.  Enabling the poorest and the 
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economically inactive groups to engage in a dynamic interchange with economically 
active agents requires not only microcredit but a comprehensive and integrated 
program for poverty reduction and rural development that combines microcredit and 
public support services.  These include among others, savings mobilization, provision 
of support services (e.g., farm subsidies, social safety nets, etc.) and a graduated 
mechanism the enables the target beneficiaries’ proactive climb out of poverty.   
 
A.7.b.  Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee: A Graduated Process 
for Helping the Poorest.  Among the four most successful microcredit models, only 
BRAC provides public support services (e.g., subsidies and social safety nets) to the 
poorest and most vulnerable groups who are generally not credit-worthy and 
microcredit for the credit-worthy and enterprising poor, simultaneously.   
 
The BRAC’s Income Generation for Vulnerable Groups Development 
(IGVGD) program client analysis and social targeting via the identification of the 
needs and capabilities of different poverty groups and service delivery via the 
administration of appropriate doses of anti-poverty interventions and public support 
services to each poverty group.  The monitoring and evaluation system of BRAC 
covers all aspects of the general socio-economic conditions of beneficiaries.  These are 
intended to respond to survival needs, develop credit-worthiness and ultimately enable 
the beneficiaries to graduate into from social safety nets, subsidies, or microcredit and 
ultimately graduating them into having regular access to commercial banking facilities 
in Bangladesh. 
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The BRAC went beyond the minimalist approach of Grameen Bank and had 
set the stage for a graduated scheme of using microcredit as a tool for poverty 
eradication.  Its major programs include credit-based income and employment 
generation, poultry and livestock, fisheries, sericulture, income generation for 
vulnerable group development, microenterprise lending assistance, human rights and 
legal support, and essential health care.  The BRAC programs resulted to the 
improvement of income and living conditions of beneficiaries. 
 
Since 1974, the BRAC model, common to many NGOs that support a 
microfinance program, shares many of the features of the Grameen Bank model, but it 
also includes ‘social welfare’ components in addition to the minimalist microcredit 
programs. In addition to the Grameen features, there are only two elements unique to 
the BRAC-NGO model: 
1. Microfinance is part of a broader strategy of ‘holistic development’ that 
may or may not use the group approach to deliver and regulate the services 
offered; and  
2. Opportunistic tailoring of activities to meet local circumstances and 
compliment the non-microfinance activities which are designed to help 
poor households help themselves. 
 
 
Specifically, the BRAC-IGVGD Program provides a model for a graduation 
process of helping the poorest of the poor. It aims to strategically link the food aid 
with training, savings and credit.  Targeted towards destitute rural Bangladeshi 
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women, the program assists participants to move from absolute poverty to economic 
independence. Over 10 years, nearly a million participants have made that transition.   
The IGVGD begins with an 18-month commitment of free food (with the support of 
the World Food Program and the government) to people at greatest immediate risk. 
The program engages participants in skills-training programs on income-generating 
activities such as poultry rearing and silk. The IGVGD program also provides the 
hardcore poor participants with access to BRAC’s Essential Health Care services, 
which addresses the link between productivity and health. During this period, BRAC 
teaches participants to save, building up an economic “nest-egg” for future investment 
and protection. Most participants then progress to individual income-earning activities 
within the same sectors. Within two years of starting the process, roughly 80 percent 
had made the transition–with their small income-earning activities and accumulated 
savings–into BRAC’s mainstream microfinance program as borrowers. This 
progression of support services–from grants to training to savings to self-
employment–appears to be sufficient to break down the barriers of extreme poverty, 
social isolation, lack of productive skills, and poor self-confidence that previously kept 
this population from self-employment (CGAP 2001:8). 
  
The comprehensiveness of the BRAC-NGO service delivery system includes a 
microcredit program for different target groups starting from the poorest of the poor 
and the most vulnerable up to the non-poor.  It combines the delivery of microcredit 
and social safety nets simultaneous with capability building measures to develop skills 
and confidence for a dynamic movement from subsidy dependence towards economic 
 69
options with positive financial returns.  The strategy aims to enable the non-bankable 
poor to eventually have access to mainstream commercial banking system regularly 
and sustainably.   
 
Furthermore, Joe Remenyi (1997:2-4) observes that some of the larger NGOs, 
such as OXFAM, Save the Children, World Vision, CARE and CONCERN, follow 
implementation and funding strategies that lend characteristics to their individual 
programs of microfinance that are genuinely unique. Most NGOs see their 
involvement in microfinance as a necessary but temporary activity, which they are 
happy to abandon once the target households graduate into the mainstream financial 
system. 
 
The BRAC-NGO model appears to be a comprehensive package of microcredit 
plus support services intended for the poor and non-poor clientele.  Hence, the BRAC-
IGVGD model not only provides microcredit but also a wide array of poverty 
alleviation and rural development initiatives to different poverty groups and to non-
poor groups as well. 
 
Going Beyond the Group Guarantee.  All over the world, many variants of 
microcredit emerged as the geographical reach, clientele and aims of MFIs expanded.  
A study of the FAO (2000) reveals that MFIs are more flexible in their terms of 
lending and repayment than many formal institutions, but more structured than 
informal lenders.  Thus, in terms of the conditions for lending and the nature of the 
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borrowers, contemporary microcredit program emerged as a hybrid of development 
tool and financial service.  
 
A.7.c.  Bank Rakyat Indonesia’s Character References.  The BRI’s 
successful microcredit program went beyond the traditional Grameen-type group 
guarantee scheme in its microcredit program design.  Although the program design of 
the BRI model share some features of Grameen banking, its successful 
implementation strategies are considered as innovations that went beyond the core 
principles of Grameen.   
 
The success of BRI is largely contributed by a different and innovative 
implementation strategy.  Its microcredit processes—client analysis scheme, service 
delivery and monitoring and evaluation systems—share the same features with the 
Grameen model except for its social targeting mechanism.  The BRI relies on 
character references and locally recruited lending agents in place of the peer-group 
guarantee scheme and physical collateral.   
 
The BRI also operates in a deregulated policy environment and serves broad 
low-income market segment with the highly individualized microcredit technology 
(Seibel 1998).  However, the BRI microcredit scheme is culturally-bound and appears 
to be unique only under Indonesian context.  Hence, BRI’s microcredit program 
design and implementation strategies are unlikely to be applicable under different 
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conditions.  Thus, the BRI model may not be appropriate for replication outside 
Indonesia (CGAP 2001). 
 
A.7.d.  Association for Social Advancement and Compulsory Savings 
Scheme.  The program design and implementation strategies of ASA also went 
beyond the core principles of the Grameen banking model because it does not rely on 
the peer-group guarantee scheme.  Instead, its implementation strategies use 
compulsory member-savings as a pre-condition for delivery of credit services and as 
collateral and hedge against fortuitous events and possible loan defaults.   
 
The ASA’s target borrowers are required to comply with the required 
minimum amount of savings prior to their acceptance as members and before they 
could avail of microcredit services.  Moreover, their savings are used as collateral to 
secure their loans with ASA.  Thus, the amount of member-savings primarily 
determines the loan size that the concerned members could borrow.  The ASA model, 
however, apparently exclude the poorest and most vulnerable groups because they 
could neither comply with the required savings generation and augmentation 
requirements, nor possess the skills and the money-management capabilities that are 
common among the enterprising poor. 
 
The ASA entered the microfinance industry in 1991 and in a span of 10 years 
has become one of the largest and fastest-growing MFIs in the world with 326,200 
active borrowers in 1995.  As of end of 1999, the program currently serves more than 
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1.084 million clients through a network of 1,087 branch offices, has 70,300 village-
based client groups, has mobilized $29.7 million in savings, and has an outstanding 
loan portfolio of $112 million distributed via one-year loans with weekly repayments 
(Hatch, Penn and Levine 2002:10). 
 
With this kind of critical mass in its favor, in 1998 ASA took the radical step 
of going beyond the group guarantee requirement, such that its clients no longer have 
to pay for each other’s delinquency or default. In its place, ASA enforces a policy of 
zero tolerance for arrears and currently enjoys an overall repayment rate of 99 percent. 
It also allows its clients fairly unfettered access to their savings (particularly to 
confront emergencies or seasonal cash needs) without leaving the program and 
without having to start all over again with entry-level loans (Ibid.). 
 
 The ASA program design and implementation strategies as a microcredit 
model is fast gaining ground among MFIs in the Philippines.  To date, ASA has the 
following basic features (Manlagñit and Lamberte 2003:32): 
1.) Individual lending without peer pressure; 
2.) Simple, standardized and cost effective branch structure, with only the branch 
manager and four loan officers.  Having no accountant and other support staff 
such as office assistant and cashier at the branch level; 
3.) Simple standardized bookkeeping and accounting operations.  Everything is 
done manually at the branch level; 
4.) Simple loan and savings products, also single product service; 
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5.) High degree of decentralization at the branch level; 
6.) Delinquency controlled by sit-down or doorstep technique; zero tolerance; 
7.) Fast expansion through cost-minimized operation since a branch becomes 
sustainable in nine months; and 
8.) Formation of homogenous groups for credit repayment and savings. 
 
 
The program design and implementation strategies of the ASA model are not 
only about providing small amounts of loans to the enterprising poor; it is also about 
savings generation.  Its client analysis is also based on financial capability; social 
targeting towards enterprising poor women who are able to save and delivery of 
microcredit plus support services.  In collaboration with the government and other 
development organizations, ASA also focuses on providing public support services 
that catalyze social action, promote legal rights, and enable awareness and social 
justice for the poor.  These services are apparently not intended for the non-
enterprising poor, the poorest and the most vulnerable.  The ASA’s monitoring and 
evaluation system focuses on the impact of both microcredit and other public support 
services on income and wages of the poor and enterprising beneficiaries. 
 
The unique features and growth of the microcredit programs of Grameen, 
BRAC, BRI and ASA are widely perceived as phenomenal.  The microcredit 
processes and implementation strategies are still anchored on the Grameen approach.  
The innovations are largely manifested in the different mechanisms of social targeting 
and provision of support services.   
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Following the CGAP’s (2003) four basic tenets of high-quality microcredit as 
success benchmarks for MFIs, the review of literature and analysis of selected features 
of GB, BRAC, ASA and BRI are summarized and shown in Table 2.   
 
Table 2.  Highlights of Success Benchmarks for MFIs 
Microfinance Institution (MFI) Benchmark GB BRAC ASA BRI 
Permanence (length of 
operations as of 2003) 
 27 years 
(since 1976) 
 29 years 
(since 1974) 
12 years 
(since 1991) 
19 years 
(since 1984) 
Scale (number of active 
borrowers) 2.06 million 2.03 million 1.7 million 2.6 million 
Depth of outreach (type 
of clients) 
enterprising 
poor 
all poverty 
groups 
enterprising 
poor 
enterprising 
poor 
Loan Portfolio $ 298.8 
million (as of 
1995) 
$ 108.9 
million (as of 
1998) 
$ 112.0 
million (as of 
1998) 
$ 1.38 
billion (as of 
1995) 
 
 In terms of permanence, BRAC is the oldest among the four MFIs with a track 
record of 29 years in microcredit operations while the youngest is ASA with 12 years 
of experience in microcredit.  In terms of scale, the largest among the four MFIs is 
BRI with 2.6 million active borrowers while the smallest is ASA with 1.7 million 
active borrowers.  In terms of depth of outreach, all four MFIs serve the poor as 
indicated by income falling below the poverty threshold and defined on a country-to-
country basis.  Finally, BRI has the largest loan portfolio equivalent to US$1.38 
billion as of 1995 while BRAC has the smallest loan portfolio equivalent to US$108.9 
as of 1998. 
 
In terms of depth of outreach and social targeting, only BRAC is different from 
the three other MFIs for helping the poorest and the most vulnerable target 
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beneficiaries as determined by household income falling below 50 percent of the 
national poverty threshold.  The BRAC-IGVGD program specifically targets the 
poorest and most vulnerable groups and employs a graduation process in helping them 
by providing donor and government-funded social safety nets and subsidies, then 
graduating them into microcredit, and ultimately into commercial banking facilities.   
 
In general, successful MFIs have proven that financial services can be an 
effective and powerful instrument for poverty reduction, helping poor people to 
increase incomes, build assets, and reduce their vulnerability in times of economic 
stress (CGAP 2003:1). However, beyond, Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA and BRI, 
microcredit experiences worldwide yielded a wide array of results.  While microcredit 
successfully reduced poverty of their clients in some Asian and Latin American 
countries, the results in other countries are the opposite.  The World Bank’s 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (WB-CGAP 2003:1) observes that there is 
greater consensus than ever before about what is needed to make microfinance 
sustainable. Yet, with the exception of a few countries such as Bangladesh and 
Bolivia, microcredit has failed to reach a massive scale thus, likewise failing to 
improve the lives of large number of the poor. 
 
The critics and advocates could not reconcile their positions and arguments in 
the controversies and debates surrounding the role of microcredit in the eradication of 
poverty. Along the line of argument presented by the WB-CGAP, the only point of 
convergence is that, the challenges, issues and controversies in microcredit as a tool 
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for poverty reduction will have to be resolved in the next decade, otherwise, 
microcredit will remain an unfulfilled promise.  Thus, the possible strategy for 
meeting the challenges, resolving the issues and addressing the controversies and 
debates surrounding microcredit is being posited in accordance with the conclusion of 
the CIRDAP (1998:8) that microcredit is more effective when combined with other 
social development interventions.   
 
In view of the limitations of Grameen replications, CIRDAP further observes 
that there is a need to look beyond microcredit and deploy a wide portfolio of financial 
services to meet the diverse financial requirements of the poor and support their 
coping strategies to reduce vulnerabilities for both income promotion as well as 
income protection (Ibid.).  Thus, the issues and challenges in microcredit revolve 
around the need for a comprehensive and integrated development program design that 
enables the participation of different stakeholders from the government, civil society 
and business sector.    
 
The participatory mechanisms suggest the need for good governance in the 
different stages involved in the program administration of state-driven microcredit 
interventions. This further emphasizes the role of the government in development 
administration through poverty reduction programs.  This is because microcredit 
programs or poverty reduction initiatives or any other development interventions are 
mostly funded by the international donor community, implemented through the 
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administrative machinery of the state and finally delivered to target clientele via a 
consortium of government agencies, business entities and civil society organizations. 
   
Thus, the replication of microcredit as a tool for poverty reduction and rural 
development requires program design and implementation strategies that enable the 
simultaneous attainment of the three major goals of stakeholders in the micro-financial 
intermediation infrastructure: (1) the profit motive of foreign creditors, the public 
enterprise system or government financial intermediaries, the MFIs and target 
beneficiaries; (2) improved social targeting based on the analysis  of the diverse needs 
and capabilities of the poor and used as basis for the delivery of appropriate doses of 
microcredit or public services or both; and (3) the monitoring and evaluation of the 
outcomes and long-term effects of the program on household income, wages and the 
living conditions of the impoverished beneficiaries.  
 
A.8.  Microcredit for Poverty Alleviation: The Philippine Experience 
 
The Philippine government believes that microcredit is a tool for poverty 
reduction.  Thus, it secured the support of the international development agencies (e.g. 
World Bank, ADB, IFAD, etc.) in the replication of Grameen Bank’s microcredit 
strategy for poverty reduction and rural development under Philippine conditions.  
However, the overall attempt at replicating the success of Grameen Bank in 
microcredit has not been very successful in the Philippines.  It is noted that the 
replicated program designs have not been appropriate to the needs and capabilities due 
to inadequate client analysis and social targeting.  The delivery of pertinent services 
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has been problematic while the monitoring and evaluation system for the program and 
beneficiary performance have not been given priority.  Furthermore, the 
implementation strategies have not been responsive to the administrative capacities of 
partner organizations. 
 
Among the 49 microcredit replicators in the country, only four Grameen Bank 
Approach Replicators (GBARs) could be considered as having quality microcredit 
operations based on CGAP’s four tenets:  (1) the Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna, 
Inc. (CRBLI); (2) Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD); (3) Negros 
Women for Tomorrow Foundation, Inc. (NWTFI); and (4) Tulay sa Pag-unlad, Inc. 
(TSPI).    
 
Hans Seibel and associates (1997:2) note that some claim that only the rural 
banks have the potential for truly reaching out to the poor, but would require thorough 
familiarization with financial technologies of profitable banking with the poor.  Some 
rural and private development banks in Mindanao have successfully demonstrated that 
banking with the poor is feasible through the replication of the Grameen microcredit 
model.  This involves the granting of small loans (maximum of PhP25,000.00 per 
individual) to small groups of enterprising poor (maximum of five members with an 
elected leader) without any physical collateral.  However, the physical collateral is 
being replaced by the peer-group or mutual guarantee scheme among all members of 
the borrowing group.  This microcredit strategy is inherent in the self-help group 
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lending model operated profitably by PCFC, a subsidiary of LBP that specializes in 
the replication of Grameen banking approaches in the Philippines.  
 
Comparatively, the cost of borrowed money from the informal credit sector 
usually runs to a maximum of 20 percent per month or 240 percent per year vis-à-vis 
the 60 percent annual interest rate charged by cooperatives, MFIs and other credit-
granting civil society organizations.  The interest rate in the informal credit sector is 
also much higher than the usual 25 to 35 percent interest rate per annum being charged 
by private commercial banks and other formal credit providers. 
 
The successful local experiences and indigenous models of microcredit as a 
strategy for poverty alleviation in the Philippines still offer some areas for possible 
improvement.  Other avenues and mechanisms still remain to be explored.  Some 
indigenous models proved to have generated a positive impact on the living conditions 
of their clientele and have continuously developed the institutional capacity to respond 
to the poverty problem of their clientele.   
 
Finally, the emphasis on designing and implementing a comprehensive 
microcredit program with support services necessitates the participation of 
stakeholders from the international and national levels and down to the municipal and 
barangay levels.  These should focus on the analysis of needs and capabilities of target 
clientele, the social targeting of all poverty groups, the delivery of microcredit or 
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public support services whichever is actually needed and the monitoring and 
evaluation of the impact of the program on household income and wages.    
 
On the whole, the institutional landscape for inter-agency collaboration in the 
planning and delivery of adequate microcredit and support services via public service 
delivery system necessitates a working framework that applies the good governance 
principles in the design and implementation strategies of microcredit programs for 
poverty alleviation and rural development. 
 
A.9.  Grameen Replication in the Philippines: Selected Best Practices 
The Grameen replications in the Philippines have been designed and 
implemented through a consortium of government agencies and the network of civil 
society organizations such as NGOs, cooperatives and POs.  While the concerned 
MFIs provide profit-oriented microcredit services to the enterprising poor, the not-for-
profit and public service-oriented government agencies (e.g., DA, DAR, DTI, DSWD, 
etc.) and partner organizations provide microcredit support services (e.g., skills 
training, technology transfer, enterprise development, marketing assistance, etc.) to the 
beneficiaries so as to ensure the profitability of the microcredit-funded projects.  
 
Among the successful Grameen replicators in the Philippines, the CRBLI 
figures prominently when it comes to viability because it is the only microcredit 
program that is financially sufficient and fully profitable.  However, when CGAP’s 
(2003) four basic tenets of high-quality microcredit are used as benchmarks; the 
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CRBLI, CARD, NWTFI and TSPI pale in comparison with the Grameen Bank, 
BRAC, ASA and BRI (see comparative analyses in Tables 2 and 3). 
 
         A.9.a.  Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna, Inc. (CRBLI) 
The CRBLI is a Grameen replicator since 1991.  It is a recipient of the 
cooperative lending program of LBP and the microcredit program of DA and other 
government agencies.  As of end-1995, it served 1,792 active borrowers, mostly poor 
women and managed a PhP28.25 million (equivalent to US$1.13 million) outstanding 
loan portfolio.  It has been singled out for a closer inspection, for two reasons: (1) it is 
the only institution which is financially self-reliant and viable, serving both poor and 
non-poor clients, but among them, poor women as the large majority; and (2) since 
1991, it is a Grameen Bank replicator, thus combining regular banking and Grameen-
type operations (Seibel et. al. 1997:8).   
 
The CRBLI has demonstrated the profitability of microfinance in two respects: 
both its own original operations with poor and non-poor members and its more recent 
operations with very poor women under a Grameen-type replication scheme cover 
their costs and yield a profit (Ibid, p. 18).   Since CRBLI provides only credit, the 
success of its operations is largely contributed by the public support services that the 
government agencies have provided to its borrowers in support of its credit operations 
and in support of the profitable livelihood projects of the borrowers. 
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         A.9.b.  Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD)  
The CARD is primarily supported by international donors and local 
benefactors via grants and subsidies to its Grameen-type microcredit operations.  Its 
borrowers are likewise provided with public support services by a consortium of 
government agencies (e.g., DA and DAR) and other not-for-profit and development-
oriented NGOs. 
 
The CARD, now a rural bank, started its Grameen operations in 1990.  As of 
March 1997, it served 20,617 active borrowers and managed a PhP19.4 million 
(equivalent to US$776,000.00) outstanding loan portfolio (Hossain and Diaz 1999).  It 
started as an NGO and had 20,880 savings accounts and approximately 26,691 
outstanding loans as of December 1998.  The bank has ambitious goals: 50,000 active 
members by 2000 and 150,000 by 2002 (Seibel 1998:16).  Despite high rate of interest 
charged on the loan, CARD has not yet been able to cover its operating expenses, 
because of the high cost of operation of this intensively supervised credit program.  It 
takes four to five years for a branch to achieve financial viability and it has so far 
covered the loss by mobilizing small amount of grants from sympathetic donors and 
drawing on available low-cost sources of fund (Hossain and Diaz 1999:27). 
 
A good illustration of Grameen replication in the Philippines (see CIRDAP 
1999 and FAO 2000) is CARD, with head office in San Pablo City in the province of 
Laguna.  It has modified some of the basic features of Grameen to suit the lifestyle and 
economic conditions of its poor and landless clientele in the provinces of Laguna, 
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Quezon, Marinduque and Masbate.   And CARD is one of the more popular and well-
studied Grameen replicator in the Philippines, but it is still struggling to reach 
desirable levels of outreach and financial viability.  Hossain and Diaz (1999:3) 
identified the Grameen features replicated in CARD microcredit operations, as 
follows: 
1. Targeting women from the low-income households as the clientele; 
2. Taking the bank services to the village in place of the normal practice of 
asking people to come to the bank to avail of the credit facilities; 
3. Organizing the prospective borrowers into groups of five like-minded 
persons with a number of Groups (5 to 8) being federated into a Center; 
4. The Center holds a meeting on a fixed day of the week which is attended 
by the Field Staff of the Bank to conduct the credit business; 
5. Group solidarity and peer pressure are used to oversee proper utilization of 
the credit, which are used as the substitute for the collateral taken in normal 
credit programs. Group members take responsibility for repaying the loan 
of a defaulting member. Members are given training to ensure strict credit 
discipline;  
6. Credit is given in small sizes with progressively higher amounts for repeat 
loans as members gain confidence in utilizing the previous loan. The loan 
is repaid within a year, in weekly installments of two percent of the loan 
amount, so that the repayment would not be a burden to the borrowing 
household;  
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7. Developing collective funds with compulsory weekly savings of the 
members and five percent of the loan amount deducted upfront, for the 
mutual benefit of the members; and  
8. Using credit as an entry point for social development promoted by the 
institution among members with active involvement of the field staff. 
 
The major differences with the Grameen model are in the selection of the 
target group, organization of the training program, and in the operation of the 
collective funds.  The CARD provides more intensive training on project management 
and credit disciplines to the prospective borrowers than the Grameen Bank. In 
Bangladesh, Grameen Bank uses land ownership (up to 0.2 ha) as main criterion for 
selecting the target group while CARD identifies its target group on the basis of 
housing and marketable assets (up to PhP25,000) determined on the basis of means 
tests on prospective members. In Grameen approach, the collective fund is managed 
by the Group while in CARD approach, it is managed by the Center. A mutual fund is 
developed to provide insurance against accidents, limited old age pensions and burial 
expenses (Ibid). 
 
An analysis of CARD’s microcredit program design and implementation 
strategies shows that it is considered successful not because its Grameen-type 
microcredit program is profitable by itself but because of grants, donations and 
subsidies provided by its foreign and local benefactors.  Furthermore, the high loan 
repayment rate of at least 90 percent had been also attributed to the public support 
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services provided to its beneficiaries by different government agencies, NGOs and 
other development-oriented organizations.  Thus, the profitability and sustainability of 
CARD remain uncertain if donor support is exhausted and government assistance is 
withdrawn. 
 
         A.9.c.  Tulay Sa Pag-Unlad Inc. (TSPI) 
The TSPI is similarly situated with CRBLI and CARD because it is also a 
beneficiary of various forms of financial and technical assistance from the Philippine 
government and donors.  Thus, its microcredit program is primarily dependent on the 
participation of different organizations both for-profit and not-for-profit development 
organizations. 
 
The TSPI was established in 1982 targeting the entrepreneurial poor.  As of 
end-1995, it served 3,119 active borrowers who were all poor, 64 percent of them 
women, and 12 institutions.  It managed a PhP55.9-million (equivalent to US$2.2 
million) outstanding loan portfolio (Seibel, et. al. 1997:8). 
 
It served a total number of 3,024 savers, 64 percent of which were women. 
Outstanding total savings as of December 1995 amounted to PhP4.8 million, but only 
18.5 percent has been mobilized from women.  Of the active loan portfolio of direct 
lending, 90 percent has been lent to men and only 10 percent to women (Seibel et. al. 
1997:8).  
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Similar to CRBLI and CARD, the profitability and sustainability of TSPI could 
not be accurately predicted if donor support is exhausted and government assistance is 
withdrawn. 
 
         A.9.d.  Negros Women for Tomorrow Foundation, Inc.-Project Dungganon  
The NWFTF is likewise dependent on government and donor assistance, grants 
or subsidies to its microcredit operations and its borrowers.  Thus, the profitability and 
the sustainability of the NWFTF are subject to the availability of donor support and 
government assistance. 
 
The NWFTF was incorporated in 1986.  As of end-1995, it served 9,216 poor  
women-clients and managed a PhP8.0 million (equivalent to US$320,000.00) 
outstanding loan portfolio (Seibel, et. al. 1997:8).  Its Project Dungganon (PD) is a 
Grameen Bank replication program which was started in 1989.  As of end-1995 there 
were 5,866 borrowers with active loan portfolios and 6,952 with active savings 
accounts amounting to PhP3.3 million.  However, the major challenge facing the 
foundation is financial viability given a negative equity and fund balance standing at 
negative PhP7.2 million. 
 
Despite donor and government support to the microcredit program of the 
NWFTF, the overall performance of its microcredit operations has remained below 
average.  More evidently, the swift removal of technical and financial support from 
foreign donors and the government will lead to its failure.  Thus, there is a need for a 
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re-assessment and revitalization of its program design and implementation strategies if 
it intends to effectively attain desirable levels of financial viability while continuously 
serving its impoverished but enterprising beneficiaries. 
 
It is noted, however, that client analysis, social targeting, service delivery and 
monitoring and evaluation become difficult, if not impossible, when the program 
attempts to reach-out to the non-enterprising poor, the poorest and most vulnerable 
because these poverty groups do not normally participate in social and civic activities 
in their barangays.  As Joe Remenyi (1999) observes, these poverty groups prefer to 
engage in activities that are directly related to the search for food that they could serve 
on the table for the family on a meal-to-meal basis and within the day; rather than 
attending meetings, seminars or trainings.  Thus, the program processes—client 
analysis, social targeting, service delivery and monitoring and evaluation—of CRBLI, 
CARD, TSPI and NWFTF focus only on the clientele’s micro-entrepreneurial needs 
and capability to pay a loan.  Thus, social outreach has been limited to the non-poor 
and the enterprising poor only. 
 
In view of the four program designs and implementation strategies of CRBLI, 
CARD, TSPI and NWFTF, the CGAP’s (2003) four basic tenets of high-quality 
microcredit is being applied as analytical framework.  This framework is being used 
for a comparative analysis of the four largest and most successful MFIs in the 
Philippines. 
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Applying the CGAP’s (2003) four basic tenets of high-quality microcredit as 
success benchmarks for Philippine MFIs, the review of literature and an analysis of 
selected features of CRBLI, CARD, TSPI and NWFTF are summarized and shown in 
Table 3.   
 
Table 3.  Highlights of Benchmarks for Philippine MFIs 
 
Philippine Microfinance Institution (MFI) Benchmark CRBLI CARD TSPI NWFTF 
Permanence (length of 
operations as of 2003) 
12 years 
(since 1991) 
13 years 
(since 1990) 
21 years 
(since 1982) 
17 years 
(since 1986) 
Scale (number of active 
borrowers) 1,792 20,617 3,119 9,216 
Depth of outreach (type of 
clients) 
poor/non-
poor all poor all poor all poor 
Loan Portfolio $ 1.13 
million (as of 
end-1995) 
$ 0.776 
million(as of 
March 1997) 
$ 2.20 
million (as 
of end-1995) 
$ 0.320 
million (as 
of end-1995) 
 
 
The oldest among the most successful Philippine MFIs is NWFTF which has a 
track record of 17 years while CRBLI is the youngest with a track record of 12 years 
in microcredit operations.  In terms of scale, the largest is CARD with 20,617 active 
borrowers while the smallest is CRBLI with 1,792 active borrowers.  In terms of depth 
of outreach, only CRBLI serve both the poor and non-poor clientele.  Finally, TSPI 
has the largest loan portfolio equivalent to US$2.20 million in 1995 while NWFTF has 
the smallest loan portfolio equivalent to US$320,000.00. 
 
 Using the same benchmarks for comparing the largest and most successful 
Philippine MFIs (see Table 3) with the world’s largest and most successful MFIs (see 
Table 2); the Philippine MFIs pale in comparison especially in terms of scale and loan 
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portfolio.  Being the largest MFI in the Philippines, CARD’s number of active 
borrowers represents only one percent of that of Grameen Bank, the largest MFI in 
Bangladesh with 2.06 million active borrowers; and even less than one percent 
compared to BRI, the largest MFI in Indonesia with 2.6 million active borrowers.  In 
terms of loan portfolio, TSPI’s US$2.20 million is only less than one percent of the 
size of Grameen Bank’s loan portfolio of US$298.8 million and even so much smaller 
than BRI’s loan portfolio which is equivalent to US$1.38 billion. 
 
Further analysis of the four Philippine MFIs and applying FAO’s (2000) and 
CGAP’s (2003) financial sustainability, social targeting and impact standards reveal 
that in terms of financial sustainability, only the CRBLI is financially self-sufficient 
and fully profitable because as a rural bank it serves both poor and non-poor clients.  
The other MFIs are kept financially afloat by government support and financial 
assistance from donors.   
 
In terms of socially targeting the poorest, the four MFIs apparently cater to the 
working capital needs of the enterprising poor only and they are mostly women.  
These enterprising women come from households which are considered as the most 
affluent among the different poverty groups.  Their household incomes are within the 
highest quartiles and slightly below the NEDA-defined poverty threshold.   
 
Thus, the four MFIs do not actually serve the poorest and most vulnerable 
groups simply because these groups are not credit-worthy, are not enterprising and are 
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unable to pass the minimum credit standards.  The impact then of microcredit on 
wages and household income can be felt only by the most affluent among the poverty 
groups and may have nothing to do with the survival-related economic activities of the 
poorest and most vulnerable sectors. 
 
 In view of the benchmarks for evaluating the successful program designs and 
implementation strategies of MFIs, this study argues that the lackluster performance of 
Philippine MFIs is largely attributed to poor governance.  Prior to year 2000, the 
Philippine government did not have a clear policy framework for profit-oriented and 
market-driven microcredit.  This situation is mainly due to the proliferation of pro-
poor credit programs that are heavily subsidized by the government.  Since the 1970s, 
the credit programs for the poor were primarily implemented and managed by DA, 
DTI, DAR, DSWD, LGUs and other government agencies.  Thus, insufficient 
attention was given to the participation of civil society and business organization in 
the microfinancial intermediation infrastructure.  
 
The market-driven microcredit system was encouraged only in 1997 when the 
phase-out of the government-subsidized credit programs became legally enforceable 
via the enactment of the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA 1997).  
The National Strategy for Microfinance also came out only in 1997 which reinforces 
AFMA and calls for the phase-out of the government’s subsidized credit programs.  
The Executive Order 138 (EO 138) signed in 1999 finally ordered the phase-out of 
subsidized credit programs and prohibits the involvement of non-credit-granting 
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government agencies in any credit program.  However, in the banking sector, the legal 
basis and other support policies for small loans without collateral only appeared later 
in the year 2000 when the General Banking Law (Republic Act 8791) was enacted.   
 
Based on the EO 138, the administration of microcredit and other pro-poor 
credit programs of the government has become the sole responsibility of LBP and 
DBP.  The two government financial intermediaries are the only entities which are 
legally authorized to administer and regulate the state-sponsored credit programs for 
the poor either through the cooperatives, MFIs, private commercial banks or other 
commercial micro-financial intermediaries.   
 
Under the EO 138, the implementation of profit-oriented microcredit programs 
should be left solely to authorized credit-granting organizations while the delivery of 
credit-related public support services should be left exclusively to not-for-profit 
organizations.  This implies the need for the participation of different organizations 
from the government, civil society and the business sector in providing microcredit 
and public support services to the impoverished but enterprising target beneficiaries. 
 
Using the good governance principles of participation, transparency, 
accountability and sustainability as analytical framework, the government, the MFIs 
from civil society and the commercial banking system were unable to previously 
create the proper microcredit policy framework.  Moreover, there were no timely 
incentives that would have enabled the market-oriented and financially viable 
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participation of a larger number of borrowers via social targeting mechanisms, support 
services and financial incentives for MFIs.  In terms of transparency, information 
about the poor is apparently insufficient.  Moreover, monitoring the borrower’s 
financial transactions and gathering of information about the credit track record of 
target clientele increases the cost of MFI operations.  This results to the MFIs’ and the 
banking sector’s reluctance to participate in the microcredit programs of the 
government.  
 
Moreover, the inadequate legal support for microcredit results to inadequate 
legal options and insufficient administrative machinery to enforce contracts and 
accountability that would ensure full loan repayment.  Moreover, the enforcement of 
accountability measures to ensure the borrower’s loan repayment is further 
constrained by political interventions especially at the provincial, city and municipal 
levels.   
 
In certain cases, for example, the mayor or the governor would prevent the 
bank or MFI officials from pursuing legal actions against loan defaulters; or the 
congressman simply threatens to initiate congressional investigation concerning the 
legal actions of government agencies against defaulting borrowers.  In conflict-ridden 
barangays, for example, some of the armed defaulting borrowers simply threaten an 
on-sight “shoot-to-kill” action against loan repayment collection agents. 
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Finally, the sustainability of the microcredit program primarily depends on full 
loan repayment by the borrowers.  However, this is further constrained by the 
inadequacy of support services that would have facilitated the generation of net profits 
from the borrowers’ loan-funded projects.  This is also tied to accountability measures 
relative to loan repayment schemes which could not be enforced by the bank and the 
credit-granting MFIs. 
 
Thus, the inadequate attention given to the good governance principles of 
participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability in the design and 
implementation of microcredit programs resulted to the failure of microcredit 
programs in the past.  These conditions are largely caused by insufficient client 
analysis, problematic social targeting system, inadequate participatory mechanisms 
and limited collaboration between and among the national government agencies, 
LGUs, the civil society organizations and business entities.  These organizations are in 
the best position to provide adequate institutional support, technical assistance and 
even cooperation with the police in ensuring that microcredit operations and processes 
are profitable and unhampered. 
 
A.10.  The National Government’s Performance as a Banker for the Poor 
It is argued that the lackluster performance of earlier Grameen replications in 
the country were attributed to insufficient attention to good governance in the design 
and implementation strategies of microcredit programs.  This is being shown by the 
dominance of donors and the government in microfinancial intermediation.  This also 
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indicates the limited participation of organizations from the civil society and the 
business sectors that are in the best position to provide adequate institutional support, 
technical assistance and even cooperation with the police in ensuring that loans are 
paid on time and microcredit operations are profitable in general. 
 
It is also evident that previous programs did not emphasize the participation 
and institutional development of civil society organizations at the community level 
and closest to the homes of the target beneficiaries.  These organizations possess the 
potential for client analysis, social targeting, the service delivery and monitoring and 
evaluation systems that are complementary to pertinent activities of the government 
agencies.  Given adequate institutional development and other logistics support 
systems from the government and donors, civil society organizations (e.g., NGOs, 
cooperatives, POs, etc.) are also capable of implementing anti-poverty and rural 
development programs.   
 
Seibel and Torres (1999) report that a study conducted by the Agriculture and 
Credit Policy Council (ACPC) reveals that Grameen replicating MFIs in the country 
are donor-driven; their internal resource mobilization is minimal; the interest rates are 
inadequate; and costs—shared equally between government and replicators—are 
exorbitant; and  the operational self-sufficiency ratio is below average.     
  
Hans Seibel and associates (1997:2-4) conclude that the overall microcredit 
accomplishment reports and figures from government agencies clearly show that such 
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programs are more symbolic in nature, with only insignificant outreach and impact.   
Flerida Chan (1989) further delivers a more devastating critique of the microcredit 
replication in the Philippines.  She notes that the Philippine government has performed 
below par as a banker and its dismal performance in administering credit programs 
leaves much to be desired.  The existing physical network of financing institutions has 
not been totally responsive in meeting the credit needs of the marginalized groups in 
particular. The present credit delivery mechanism has remained inadequate for lending 
to small farmers.  There are two major reasons why this is so: first, the formal 
financial system is not suitable for rural lending; and second, there is inadequate 
support for innovative financial intermediation schemes.  
 
Despite the shortcomings of Grameen replication in the country, the Philippine 
government created PCFC and enabled QUEDANCOR to provide similar microcredit 
facilities to almost the same type of target clientele.  This clearly manifests state 
commitment towards using microcredit as a strategy against poverty and an integral 
component of integrated development programs in the countryside.   
 
Despite the issues and controversies in microcredit programs that remain to be 
resolved, the international donor community and the Philippine government provided 
the increased foreign and counterpart funds for capital investments in both PCFC and 
QUEDANCOR (MTPDP 2001-2004).  This shows that the administration of President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2004), strongly supports microcredit as an effective 
tool to enable the poor to free themselves from the poverty trap and to ultimately 
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enable them to have continued and sustained access to the credit facilities of 
mainstream commercial banking system.  Moreover, the present Macapagal-Arroyo 
administration (see MTPDP 2001-2004) reported that its microcredit program has 
successfully provided self-employment opportunities to the poorer sectors in the rural 
areas. 
 
The increased financial and technical support from the international donor 
community and the increased government investments in microcredit will help 
improve client analysis, social targeting, service delivery and monitoring and 
evaluation systems.  These processes are aimed at increasing the participation of a 
larger number of partner organizations and beneficiaries.  This also helps improve the 
delineation of responsibilities and accountabilities among governance partners while 
ensuring coordination and convenient access to information.  Taken together, these are 
aimed at increasing the profitability of the MFIs as well as their microcredit programs 
and the income-generating livelihood activities of the impoverished but enterprising 
beneficiaries.  Finally, the desired impact of microcredit could be attained via the 
government’s collaboration with civil society and the business sectors in providing 
more self-employment opportunities.  These are aimed at increasing the income of the 
enterprising poor above the national poverty threshold. 
 
A.11. The National Strategy for Microfinance 
 In the administration of poverty alleviation and rural development programs, 
the Philippine government recognizes the potential role of MFIs in providing micro-
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enterprises and small borrowers in general with access to deposit facilities and loans.  
However, Hans Seibel (1998:2) warns that, any attempt to replicate or expand 
Grameen replication program should be carried out with great caution.  This is largely 
because the applicability of microcredit is limited only to the enterprising poor.   
 
In the past, the social welfare-driven state interventions in subsidized credit 
programs for the poor have resulted to the prevalence of “dole-out mentality” and 
subsidy-dependence among the poor.  Moreover, the impoverished target beneficiaries 
misperceive the government credit programs as a social amelioration and a social 
welfare program of the government.  These are the major factors that contributed to 
the failure of subsidized credit programs in the past indicating a huge waste of scarce 
government resources and a squandering of ODA funds (see FAO 1998). 
 
Learning the pitfalls of microcredit and the failure of the government’s 
subsidized credit programs in the past (see Chan 1989), the National Strategy for 
Microfinance (NSM) was formulated by the National Credit Council (NCC) in 1997.   
The NSM envisions a significant contribution of microcredit in the overall efforts to 
reduce poverty incidence in the country. The NSM recognizes the importance of 
market-based microfinance and of creating a hospitable policy environment.   
 
The NSM called on the government to create an appropriate policy 
environment that will encourage more market-driven participation by rural banks, 
credit cooperatives and credit-granting NGOs in the delivery of microfinancial 
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services to the basic sectors.  In ensuring that microcredit appropriately responds to 
market forces and the credit needs and financial capabilities of the enterprising poor, 
the first step adopted by the government has been to work for the dismantling of a 
number of subsidized credit programs that compete with private sector initiatives in 
microfinance (Llanto 2001:3).    
 
The issuance of EO 138 allows market forces to determine a demand-driven 
loan pricing system and to encourage business sector initiatives.  This suggests the 
state’s withdrawal of social welfare-based subsidies in credit programs for the poor 
and allowing market forces via competition to determine the appropriate role of 
microcredit in market-driven economic development.   
 
In this light, EO 138 issued in August 1999 directed the non-financial agencies 
of the government to stop their involvement in direct lending and to use financial 
intermediaries (e.g., banks and MFIs) instead in providing loans to target sectors.  It 
also provided a phase-out schedule for subsidized credit programs in the non-
agriculture sector thus, complementing the AFMA of 1997 which has earlier sought 
the phase-out of all subsidized credit programs in the agriculture sector and the 
creation of a market-based financing mechanism for the sector (Llanto 2001:3). 
 
The NSM, AFMA and EO 138 mandated the market-driven state-interventions 
in microcredit in order that the past failures of the subsidized credit programs would 
not be repeated in the government efforts to use market-driven microcredit as a 
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strategy for poverty reduction.  These state actions are well-founded in the ninth 
principle of the Entrepreneurial Government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) which 
encourages market-mechanisms to determine the development of the industry.  Thus, 
government interventions become limited to the market-driven and competitive 
participation of the government in the microcredit arena via public enterprise system.  
This includes state actions via the profit-oriented government financial intermediaries 
such as LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR.   
 
Thus, the misapplication of microcredit to the laboring poor, the poorest and 
most vulnerable would be a mistake (see FAO 2000, 1999).  Inadequate attention to 
the analysis of the needs and capabilities of target beneficiaries, proper social targeting 
mechanisms based on poverty conditions, poor service delivery and problematic 
monitoring and evaluation systems may result to the complete failure of the 
microcredit program.  This may result to further cycles of impoverishment of the non-
enterprising poor.  The misapplication of microcredit to the non-poor shows that 
poverty alleviation programs could benefit the wrong clientele while neglecting the 
target beneficiaries who need microcredit the most.   
 
Sebstad and Cohen (2000:115) put forward the argument that microcredit is 
more than just credit for the poor.  It is a vital component of rural development.  
Microcredit can play an important role beyond enterprise development in supporting 
the livelihood of the poor. The concept of livelihood is broader than that of enterprise 
development. It considers a mix of resources, activities, and capabilities that enable 
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individuals and households to pursue their economic goals. In reality, resources within 
households are fungible, and it is important to recognize that clients will use 
microfinance services for a variety of purposes. Clients use microcredit not only to 
invest in enterprises, but also to build household assets, smoothen income, and help 
manage their cash flow. Thus, it is concluded that providing chunks of money when it 
is needed, microcredit can help clients reduce their vulnerability, expand their options, 
and graduate from a reactive mode of survival to a proactive climb out of poverty. 
 
A.12.  Microfinance Rhetoric in the General Banking Law 
The National Strategy for Microfinance was strengthened by the General 
Banking Law (GBL) of 2000 by making microcredit as part of mainstream banking in 
the Philippines.  Republic Act 8791 mandates the Monetary Board to formulate 
appropriate rules and regulations on microcredit operations.  However, the realities 
appear to be different from the rhetoric of the law.  Llanto (2000:3) laments that 
despite support for microcredit in the General Banking Law of 2000, realities on the 
ground appear to be in favor of the traditional commercial banking practices.    
 
Although banking regulations do not prohibit the grant of small and unsecured 
loans, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ (BSP) stance on small clean (unsecured) loans 
supported by informal information is not clear and, worse, vague to banks subject to 
BSP supervision.  In practice, there has been a traditional regulatory bias against 
microcredit—the grant by banks of loans with insufficient collateral or without any 
form of security or collateral (Ibid.). 
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A.13.  The Factors Affecting Microcredit Programs 
There are factors that may contribute directly or indirectly to the success or 
failure of the microcredit programs.  These factors either enable or limit successful 
implementation of microcredit programs as a tool for poverty reduction and rural 
development.  The enabling or limiting factors are anchored on the socio-economic 
characteristics not only of the livelihood activities and micro-entrepreneurial 
capabilities of the rural poor and non-bankable groups, but also their household 
financial conditions, credit experiences as well as credit preferences and demand.    
 
In ensuring that the government-driven and social equity-laden microcredit 
program design will work effectively and profitably in favor of the poor, it requires the 
application of good governance in its implementation strategies.  This will ensure 
applicability to the prevailing local conditions and appropriateness to the credit needs 
and financial capabilities of intended beneficiaries.  Thus, good governance offers new 
perspectives towards making microcredit as one of the more applicable and 
appropriate strategies for rural development and for tackling the poverty problem.   
 
Good governance aims to attain sustainable human development in accordance 
with global efforts to improve the quality of life of the disadvantaged and vulnerable 
groups.  Thus, an enlightened appreciation of local socio-economic and credit 
infrastructure will enable planners and implementors to capitalize on the principles of 
good governance for sustainable human development as the primary mechanisms that 
will lead to the application of appropriate strategies and effective government-driven 
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anti-poverty and other development interventions for the disadvantaged and vulnerable 
sectors in the rural areas.  Hence, in order to formulate appropriate implementation 
strategies for microcredit programs and other microfinancial services as part of a 
comprehensive anti-poverty intervention for the marginalized minorities, good 
governance is necessary.   
 
It is argued that the financial conditions of rural poor households are the 
primary determinants of their mechanisms for survival (Warner 1997; Otero 2001).  In 
the absence of other options, local credit services become one of their means to satisfy 
the family’s basic needs.  Hence, the poor households’ credit experiences are 
conditioned by their need for credit and availability of creditors in their neighborhood 
and in the immediate community.  On the other hand, the borrowers’ capability to pay 
largely determines the size of credit they need.  For example, Philippine MFIs 
generally provide small loans to the enterprising poor ranging from PhP1,000.00 to a 
maximum of PhP25,000 per individual end-borrower.  Since the poor are generally 
classified as non-bankable, small loans are deemed appropriate for their repayment 
capabilities.    
 
Any government-sponsored microcredit programs will become appropriate if it 
is based on the needs and capabilities of intended beneficiaries and socially targeted at 
their microcredit preferences and demand.  When appropriate doses of microcredit and 
support services are delivered, the effects of the interventions on the household and 
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living conditions of the beneficiaries should also be monitored and evaluated against 
program objectives and other performance benchmarks.   
 
The integration of good governance in the design and implementation 
strategies of microcredit programs provides a working framework necessary for the 
improvement of program operations.  These are likewise intended to ensure the 
attainment of desired outcomes—profitable microcredit programs, reduction of 
poverty incidence within a particular geographic pocket of interest and rural 
development.   
 
The good governance framework in the microcredit program needs to be 
anchored on local contexts and realities at the levels of the community, household and 
individual beneficiary.  The contexts and realities that surround the target 
beneficiaries—household financial conditions, credit experiences, microcredit 
preferences and demand— are being investigated and treated as factors that are likely 
to directly or indirectly affect successful program implementation.  In the same 
manner, the study identifies the existing credit programs that are likely to be 
applicable based on the needs and capabilities of target beneficiaries and partner 
organizations; the application of the principles of good governance—participation, 
transparency, accountability and sustainability—as the implementation strategies; and 
the processes involved in microcredit operations—needs analysis, social targeting, 
service delivery and monitoring and evaluation. 
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     A.13.a.  Household Financial Conditions 
Household financial conditions as defined by sources of income, amount of 
income and expenditures as well as net cash savings/deficits largely determine how 
microcredit program should be designed and implemented encompassing the processes 
involved in client analysis, social targeting, service delivery and monitoring and 
evaluation.  These also indicate how the poor households manage risks that affect the 
family, money management strategies and their mechanisms of coping with daily 
household expenditure requirements and unanticipated events such as accidents, 
illness or death.  Since the poor do not separate business from household transactions, 
credit becomes an integral component of the poor’s struggle to manage their economic 
activities and vulnerabilities, to satisfy the family’s needs for survival and to 
continuously improve their living conditions and quality of life.   
 
Household financial conditions can be determined using three criteria: (1) main 
source of income; (2) estimated net cash flow; and (3) type of dwelling unit.  The main 
source of income reveals the main economic activities used to support the needs of all 
household members such as direct income from economic activities and income 
transfers from affluent relatives or family members.  The estimated net cash flow 
determines the actual amount of cash left after all household expenses have been 
deducted from the total household cash revenues.  The type of dwelling unit and its 
ownership readily show the poor’s accumulated wealth.  House and landholdings can 
also be used as collateral for commercial bank loans depending on its quality and 
market value. 
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Understanding household cash flow (total income minus total expenses) and 
how people repay or save is the key to explaining the role played by financial services 
in the lives of poor households (Llanto 2001:1, Satyamurti and Haokip 2002:2).  In the 
cash flow analysis, all the sources of income, both from farm and non-farm activities, 
as well as the overall expenditures of the farm household are considered.  As the net 
cash flow depends on all sources of income, farm households with diversified 
revenues have more possibility to obtain larger loans.  These farmers can also repay 
their loans in more frequent installments and thus, reduce the risk of loan default for 
the lender.  The cash flow analysis assists the lender in designing a manageable loan 
repayment strategy (Klein, et. al. 1999:50).    
 
Because income does not arrive in exact rhythm with outflow of expenditure, 
microcredit facility is needed. The poor need it no less than other groups of people. 
Indeed, they may need it more. This is not just because their incomes are uncertain and 
irregular (which is often true), but because the absolute amounts of cash they deal with 
are very small. As a result, anything more than the tiniest expenditures will require 
sums of money greater than what they have with  them at the time—in their pocket, 
purse or home. Expenditure of almost any kind can require them to look for a way of 
financing the expenditure, or part of it, out of yesterday's or tomorrow's income. For 
example, basic needs in life cycle events, such as birth, schooling, marriage, home-
making, retirement and death, emergencies including personal ones like illnesses and 
accidents and impersonal ones like cyclones, fires, floods and droughts, all require the 
expenditure of sums bigger than those available on an everyday basis.  Besides needs, 
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there are opportunities–opportunities to invest in land, business, buildings and 
comforts like fans and TVs. These too, involve spending sums that force the poor to 
look for ways of using past and future, as well as presently available incomes 
(Rutherford 2000). 
 
 The minimum basic needs approach to human well-being is a function of 
household financial conditions and sources of income. Central to poverty alleviation 
initiatives and governance for sustainable human development is the enhancement of 
the capability of the household members to generate resources to satisfy the families’ 
survival needs and to ultimately attain better quality of life.  It is also a primary input 
for determining extent of poverty, credit needs and financial capabilities of intended 
microcredit beneficiaries.  
 
Credit programs and creditors focus on household financial conditions as the 
primary determinant for the delivery of appropriate doses of public services which are 
intended to help the poor help themselves so as to improve their living conditions.  It 
is used as a basis for identifying and evaluating the credit-worthiness and bankability 
of target borrowers and in estimating the potential risk of loan delinquency and 
default.   
 
Household financial conditions are crucial factors that may limit or enable the 
attainment of the objectives of the microcredit program.  They also determine how the 
good governance mechanisms in microcredit programs should be implemented so as to 
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improve client analysis, social targeting, service delivery and monitoring and 
evaluation.  These will help make the program applicable and appropriate to the 
community and target beneficiaries, respectively.   
 
     A.13.b.  Credit Needs of the Poor  
The poor need credit for two main reasons.  The first lies on how the family 
copes with daily needs for survival, and the second lies in generating enough financial 
resource base for their livelihood and microentrepreneurial activities.  Since credit can 
be used either for survival or for income augmentation, microcredit programs become 
appropriate if they adequately respond to the microcredit and micro-entrepreneurial 
needs of the impoverished but enterprising target beneficiaries. 
 
Program credit has a significant effect on the well-being of poor households 
and this effect is greater when women are the program participants (Pitt and Khandker 
1996:vi).   Lack of access to credit is the biggest constraint on the poor.  They need no 
other outside inputs to increase their incomes and are themselves the best judges of 
how to use the credit extended to them.  Not only would credit  help the poor women 
acquire self-esteem, but their extra income would bring about better living conditions 
for other family members, especially children (Khandker, Khalily and Khan 1995:xi-
xii).  But the loan must be backed up by a viable project and the entrepreneurship and 
managerial capacity of the borrower to run the project (Tolentino 1987:5).  Another 
important consideration is not to overlook the distinct culture and way of life of the 
poor, small, rural farmer-borrowers in general (Chan 1989:3).   
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Understanding client behavior goes beyond simply looking at how borrowers 
use and repay loans. It requires an awareness of (1) the economic goals of poor 
households, (2) how people manage resources and activities in the context of their 
household economic portfolios, and (3) how they deal with risk in their day-to-day 
lives. With this starting point, it is possible to see how financial services fit into the 
process. These factors all affect clients’ capacity to assume debt, bear risk, and 
effectively use financial resources to generate a stable income flow and build assets.  
Ensuring that the terms, conditions, and delivery of financial products and services 
correspond to the financial cycles of clients can reduce risks for both clients’ and 
lenders’ portfolios.  Products and services that respond to clients’ needs provide the 
basis for programs to expand and deepen their outreach and achieve the dual goals of 
impact and sustainability (Sebstad and Cohen 2000:114).   
  
Worldwide experience shows that a microcredit program becomes successful if 
it is socially targeted at the enterprising poor.  That is, microcredit is not intended to 
respond to the survival and other well-being needs of the impoverished clientele.  
However, the delivery and recovery of appropriate amounts of small credit largely 
depends on the accuracy of the analysis of the target clientele’s credit needs and 
financial capabilities as well as the financial viability of their micro-entrepreneurial 
and livelihood activities.   
 
The program designs and implementation strategies of microcredit and other 
anti-poverty interventions of the government are supportive of the target beneficiaries’ 
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struggle to move out of the poverty trap and to attain better quality of life for the 
family.  The application of good governance to the delivery of appropriate public 
services to target beneficiaries based on their needs and capabilities will facilitate the 
attainment of program objectives and desired outcomes such as reduction of poverty 
incidence and development of impoverished communities. 
 
     A.13.c.  Credit Experience 
Both microcredit programs and good governance are cognizant of the 
importance of credit in the well-being of the poor.  However, the program needs to be 
designed and implemented in such a way that it responds to the needs and capabilities 
of the different poverty groups.  The misapplication of microcredit to the non-
enterprising poor may yield undesirable outcomes.  That is, providing credit assistance 
to the heavily indebted poor may push them further into indebtedness, and may result 
in the enforcement of accountability measures that may destroy their main source of 
livelihood.   
 
The type of credit availed of by the poor forms part of their life cycle and day-
to-day struggle for survival and better quality of life.  The bankable groups are able to 
benefit from commercial credit facilities.  The less bankable and less poor are able to 
access credit facilities of semi-formal creditors such as cooperatives and NGOs.  The 
poorest and most vulnerable usually depend on informal credit from relatives, friends 
and other local moneylenders. 
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Microcredit may not be exclusively used for livelihood and 
microentrepreneurial activities. It is important in coping with economic shocks 
brought about by adverse weather or social conditions such as natural calamities, 
illnesses, death, religious obligations and family responsibilities.  Hence, it is vital to 
scrutinize how credit affects the household’s socio-economic conditions in order to 
determine how microcredit strategies can assist the poor in meeting their needs as 
conditioned by the manner in which they have used credit in the past.    
 
Development practitioners, policy makers, international development agencies, 
and other governance partners have to recognize that providing efficient microfinance 
services for the poorer segments of the population is important for a variety of reasons.  
Improved access and the efficient provision of savings, credit and insurance facilities 
in particular can enable the poor to smoothen consumption, manage risks better, build 
assets gradually, develop micro-enterprises, enhance income earning capacity, and 
enjoy improved quality of life.  Microfinance services can also contribute to 
improvement of resource allocation, promotion of markets, and adoption of better 
technology, thus, microfinance helps to promote economic growth and development.  
Hence, to increase the overall impact of microfinance on poverty reduction, it is 
essential to extend a wide range of services on a continuing basis to the poor who are 
still excluded from the benefits of microfinance (ADB 2000). 
 
At the field level, the target clientele should have strong institutional base for 
which intensive training and motivation programs should be implemented.  The MFIs 
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and SHGs should formulate and implement appropriate credit delivery and collection 
procedures to make their lending programs viable.  Aside from developing 
institutional capability, there is also a need for developing their technical skills in 
production and marketing.  
  
The accurate analysis and social targeting of the intended beneficiaries based 
on their credit experiences will help determine how the microcredit program should be 
designed and delivered as well as how the desired outcomes should be evaluated and 
monitored.  Furthermore, the application of good governance in these processes can 
help the state-driven microcredit and other development interventions make significant 
and timely contributions in mitigating poverty conditions and in putting the 
beneficiaries in the appropriate microcredit stream.   
 
Credit programs should be specifically designed considering the characteristics 
of the targeted group of beneficiaries and the environment in which they operate.  This 
suggests that in designing a credit program among others, the borrowing capacity of 
the clientele and the distinctive climatological and geographical attributes of their 
location should be noted (CIRDAP 1999:49-50).  These attributes may enable or limit 
successful implementation.  They are also considered as crucial determinants in the 
assessment of the rural poor’s access to microfinancial services, loan utilization and 
repayment. 
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     A.13.c.1.  Access to Loans 
Lack of access to credit has plagued poor farmers and rural dwellers for many 
years. Credit experience starts with how people are able to benefit from credit 
services.  The type of creditors in the community largely determines how credit forms 
part of the poor’s daily struggle to improve living conditions and how credit services 
should be delivered in response to their credit needs and financial capabilities.   
 
Rural people need credit to allow investment in their farms and small 
businesses, to smoothen consumption, and to reduce their vulnerability to weather and 
economic shocks. Because they have little access to formal financing institutions, poor 
rural people follow suboptimal risk management and consumption strategies and rely 
on costly informal credit sources. Recognizing this, governments and international 
agencies created banks and lending programs targeted at rural farmers. The track 
record of these programs is mixed, especially with regard to reaching the poor. 
Reforms and innovations have emerged in recent years to improve credit market 
opportunities for the rural poor and increase the efficacy of rural finance (FAO 2000). 
 
Maintaining access to MFI program credit, in itself, is a protectional risk 
management strategy for many clients. They go to great lengths to ensure repayment, 
particularly when confronted with a crisis or shock, often by mobilizing informal 
sources of finance to ensure repayment. Repayment means access to a new loan to 
start back on the road to recovery, to restock a microenterprise, to rebuild a house, or 
to pay school fees (CGAP 2000).  Access to loans also may decrease the level of other 
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assets held for precautionary savings. This form of ‘insurance’ may increase 
investments in and allocation of human and physical capital to current and future 
income generation. Finally, easy access to loans may decrease emergency sales of 
productive assets at low prices (Diagne in Sebstad and Cohen 2000:84). 
 
The strategies for poverty reduction and rural development highlight the 
crucial role of credit along with financial sector reforms and have opened up new 
possibilities for increasing the share of the rural poor in institutional credit (CIRDAP 
1999:iii).   Thus, the poor’s access to credit forms part of their credit experiences and 
is considered as a critical factor for enhancing economic productivity and increasing 
household income.  This may also enable or limit successful program implementation.   
 
     A.13.c.2.  Loan Utilization 
Different studies proved that the poor clients are prone to using credit beyond 
what the loan is originally intended for.  Loan utilization either enables or limits 
program implementation.  Microcredit programs should be designed and implemented 
in such a way that it accurately analyzes and determines the credit needs and financial 
capabilities of target clientele. Appropriate doses of microcredit services and other 
anti-poverty interventions should also be delivered to the right beneficiaries at the 
right time and this should be based on well-defined social targeting mechanisms.  
Finally, how the credit services are utilized is crucial in evaluating credit experiences 
which are also considered as indicators for monitoring the loan-funded project and the 
borrowers’ creditworthiness and bankability. 
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Both lenders and borrowers acknowledge that loan funds are fungible. 
Fungibility refers to the interchangeability in the way money is being used.  For 
example, loan funds may be used to defray other expenses not related to the purpose 
of the loan.  While in the past fungibility has been seen as a problem within the 
context of credit for the poor.   This belief is less prevalent today. The industry 
increasingly recognizes that flexibility in the use of loan funds enables borrowers to 
allocate the funds to their best advantage at a given point in time. Because of its 
dynamic nature, flexibility in loan use is the key in the comprehensive efforts to 
reduce vulnerability.  
 
The nagging concern that, without supervision, borrowers from poor 
households will ‘consume’ rather than ‘invest’ their loans and therefore have no way 
to repay them has been proven to be unfounded. The bulk of loan funds are used for a 
wide range of investments. Another concern—that clients will waste resources by 
investing loan funds in something they would have invested in anyway 
(substitution)—reflects a narrow and linear view of household money management 
strategies. Such use may free up funds that households can use in other ways and 
provide a chunk of money when it is needed. Fungibility—the interchangeable nature 
of resources—is not a problem for microentrepreneurs; it is a solution (Sebstad and 
Cohen 2000:76). 
 
Littlefield and associates (2003:1-2) conclude that microcredit, and the impact 
it produces, go beyond just business loans. The poor use financial services not only for 
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business investment in their micro-enterprises but also to invest in health and 
education, to manage household emergencies, and to meet the wide variety of other 
cash needs that they encounter.  Thus, microcredit should be combined with other anti-
poverty conditions that respond to the target beneficiaries’ need for credit, their 
financial capabilities and the need for public support services in order to facilitate their 
proactive climb out of the poverty trap.   
 
     A.13.c.3.  Loan Repayment 
The cycle of all credit programs ends in the full repayment of the loan.  It is 
used as basis for determining eligibility to credit programs via credit-worthiness or 
bankability standards.  Within a specific period of time or a one-year period, these are 
dependent on the amount of net profits generated from the loan-funded project.  The 
amount of net profit from the project consequently determines the financial viability 
and sustainability of a microcredit program.  Thus, full loan repayment either enables 
of limits the implementation of microcredit program based on the monitoring and 
evaluation system and the enforcement of accountability measures. 
 
If the returns on investment on the loan are negative, or if the individual or 
household has experienced another kind of shock that has affected its income flow, it 
may be necessary to deplete assets or reduce consumption to make those loan 
repayments.  If a client defaults on a loan, he or she may risk falling out of the 
financial market altogether and may lose access to this mechanism that may allow him 
or her to cope with other types of risks. Moreover, clients may deplete social capital 
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by asking friends and relatives for money to repay loans. Being unable to repay on 
time or at all may strain or break relationships with other members of the credit group, 
may erode social standing, and may destroy good will. Defaulting on a loan also may 
cause loss of face, self-confidence, and self-esteem, all of which are important human 
assets.   The negative consequences of loan default are well recognized. As the field 
studies have shown, maintaining access to a source of credit is an important coping 
mechanism and a key factor that drives clients to repay their loans (Sebstad and Cohen 
2000:42). 
 
Microcredit grew out of two new ways to judge the repayment risk of the self-
employed poor: joint-liability groups and loan officers who make detailed personal 
and financial evaluations of individual borrowers and their homes, businesses, and 
collateral.  The challenge of microcredit is to judge the risk of whether the self-
employed poor will repay their debts as promised (Schreiner 2003:1-2).  
Generalizations about the length of the repayment period are somewhat tenuous.  
Loans from merchants, landlords, and traders are often linked to a relevant production 
cycle. On the other hand, the terms and conditions of the loan from the formal sector 
will include a specified repayment period and, where the size of the debt is large, that 
repayment period may extend over a fairly long period of time (Dunn 1996:10). 
 
On the whole, credit experience is generally confined to the cycle of 
borrowing, using the borrowed funds and loan repayment.  The cycle repeats after 
repayment and so on.  As the cycle of credit experience increases, mutual trust and 
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confidence for both the creditor and the borrower develop over extended periods of 
creditor-debtor relationships.  The nature of this relationship can also be viewed from 
the perspective of agency-client relationships which will eventually strengthen social 
capital and productive economic interdependence.   
 
The governance perspective in microcredit management involves debtor-
creditor relationship that develops in the participation of both parties in the debtor-
creditors’ economic and financial interchange and thus employs mechanisms of 
awareness of debtor activities and motives.  Despite fungibility of loan funds and 
dynamic motives, if the debtor still honors credit obligations and financial 
accountabilities, he/she enjoys continued access to loan funds as long as it is needed.   
 
    A.13.d.  Credit Providers  for the Poor 
Institutional providers of microcredit services utilize program designs and 
adopt alternative service delivery processes so as to ensure that microcredit programs 
reach the socially targeted beneficiaries.  Microcredit relies on peer group schemes 
that do not arouse the interest of the non-poor.  Such schemes further make the 
presence of rural elite intimidating to the poor.   
 
The governance perspective could help ensure that the intended beneficiaries 
are able to participate in microcredit programs through homogeneous self-help 
groupings; become fully aware of the processes, decisions, actions and motives of 
each other; implement credit discipline; and enforce and honor accountability 
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measures towards each other and to the creditor.  The ultimate goal of this effort is to 
ensure that long-term benefits of microcredit accrue to individual group members 
consistently and continuously.  
 
In general, the reasons for borrowing can be classified into two broad 
categories. Borrowing for consumption purposes is intended to meet the daily or 
seasonal needs of the household or to finance contingencies. The second category 
includes borrowing intended for production and investment purposes. Due to the 
fungibility of credit, these discrete categories may not be very useful in practice. Debt 
can be incurred from a number of sources, both formal and informal. The contrasts 
between the formal and informal sources can be at least partially understood by 
examining differences in the terms of debt. Formal sources of debt are characterized as 
being primarily for production purposes, secured by collateral, having high transaction 
costs, and with interest rates that are lower than many informal sources. Borrowing 
from the formal sector often involves larger loan sizes and longer repayment periods. 
Because of these characteristics, formal sources tend to be inaccessible to 
microentrepreneurs and low-income households (Dunn 1996:vii). 
 
Although some have identified an inadequate credit supply as a constraint on 
production, and hence channeling credit to the rural poor for productive purposes has 
been emphasized in many developing countries, formal financial institutions have 
hardly succeeded in reaching the poor. Several types of credit institutions (commercial 
banks, specialized agricultural credit agencies, rural banks, cooperatives and 
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government-supported projects) have been widely used to deliver rural credit.  
Because of deliberate policy and for other reasons the interest rates were held below 
the market-clearing rates and credit was thus rationed.  Evaluations have found that 
the rich rural elite have been the principal beneficiaries of these credit programs and, 
thus, the major portion of the credit did not reach the intended beneficiaries—the 
poorest rural households (World Bank 1975 in Pitt and Khandker 1996:v). 
 
An Asian Development Bank (2000) study concludes that most formal 
financial institutions do not serve the poor because of perceived high risks, high costs 
involved in small transactions, perceived low relative profitability, and inability of the 
poor to provide physical collateral usually required by such institutions.  The business 
culture of these institutions is also not geared to serve the poor and low-income 
households.  Lacking access to institutional sources of finance, most poor and low-
income households continue to rely on meager self-finance or informal sources of 
microfinance.  However, these sources limit their ability to actively participate in and 
benefit from the development process.  
 
The prevalence of informal creditors in the community reveals that the formal 
credit system is indifferent towards the analysis of poor clients and the inadequacy of 
its social targeting mechanisms.  This is because the formal credit system which is 
purely business-oriented and profit-motivated does not consider the poor as target 
clientele.   
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As a response to the gap between supply of credit funds from the formal sector 
and the poor’s demand for credit services, the semi-formal credit providers (e.g., 
NGOs, cooperatives and POs) are being utilized by the government as partners and 
channels for the delivery of microcredit services to socially targeted beneficiaries.  
Thus, the program design and implementation strategies of state-driven microcredit 
programs are intended to supply the necessary financial intermediation services that 
are appropriate to the impoverished target beneficiaries’ demand for credit services 
based on their credit needs and financial capabilities. 
 
     A.13.e.  Microcredit Preferences and Demand   
One of the challenges for MFIs is the extent to which microcredit programs 
can respond to the demand for individual loans rather than group loans among some 
borrowers. Some borrowers, especially those from better-off households, are not able 
or willing to bear the high borrower transaction costs associated with group lending 
systems. In some cases, high borrower transaction costs are related to weak group 
dynamics, cumbersome group size or processes, or the process of ‘weeding out’ the 
less credit-worthy group members that often goes on during the formation phase. In 
other cases, it relates to variations in the credit-worthiness of group members or loan 
terms and conditions that are too rigid. Nevertheless, many women highly value the 
opportunity to participate in credit groups. While the opportunity cost of their time is 
high, that cost is outweighed by the benefits of building social assets, developing new 
skills, and gaining other benefits through participation in credit groups (Sebstad and 
Cohen 2000:112). 
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One of the main issues in microcredit is loan size.  Small loans, it is said, are 
simply too costly to administer, and the profits from such lending are too meager to 
permit profitability. However, a study examining some of the best MFIs concludes 
that this conventional wisdom is quite wrong. The MFIs can and indeed need to be 
self-sustaining if they are to achieve their outreach potential providing rapid growth in 
access to financial services by poor people (Malhotra 1995).  Hence, financial viability 
objectives could be attained through economies of scale—by serving a large number 
of borrowers with good repayment record. 
 
The most obvious cost associated with a loan is the amount of the interest 
payment. There can be a wide variation in interest rates among the different sources of 
debt. In general, there will be a narrower range in the interest rates charged by 
different lenders in a given country’s formal sector, due in part to regulation. The 
interest rates charged by the formal sector will tend to be greater than the nominal 
interest rates charged by relatives and neighbors but less than the interest rates charged 
by other lenders in the informal sector (Dunn 1996).  That is, profitable interest rate is 
attainable through economies of scale by providing credit facilities to a large number 
of credit-worthy and good paying borrowers from the poor and disadvantaged sectors 
especially in the rural areas. 
 
Transaction costs represent another potentially significant cost of debt. 
Transaction costs are the costs associated with gathering information about a loan, 
applying for or requesting a loan, negotiating the terms of the loan, and carrying out 
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the terms and conditions of the loan agreement.  These costs may be in the form of 
direct cash outlays, such as for transportation or application fees.  Often, the most 
significant transaction costs occur in the form of the value of time spent. The 
borrower’s transaction costs are generally believed to be highest when borrowing from 
the formal sector, due to the amount of time expended in traveling to the location of 
the lender and in completing the loan application process (Ibid). 
 
Also important among the terms of debt are the nature of the assurances that 
the borrower will repay the lender and the sanctions that may be imposed in the event 
of default. The main feature of credit from the formal sector is its requirement that the 
borrower should offer restricted types of collateral (i.e. land and immovable assets) in 
order to receive a loan. In the informal sector, a collateral may sometimes be required, 
but there is a wider range in the types of pledges that will be accepted, including 
moveable assets, household items, and promissory notes. Many loans in the informal 
sector are extended without any type of collateral or pledge. However, the borrower of 
an unsecured loan may experience an equally strong (or stronger) incentive to repay 
the debt, due to the types of social pressures and social sanctions that can accompany 
default. Higher repayment rates in the informal sector are often attributed to the 
strength of social sanctions as well as to the higher quality of the information that 
informal lenders have regarding the credit-worthiness of potential borrowers. Default 
in either the formal or informal sectors can also be discouraged if it is associated with 
loss of access to future borrowing (Ibid). 
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Need for Support Services.  Unfortunately many schemes do not have the 
resources or the staff to provide more than the credit component. Many of the people 
working on microcredit schemes do not have the experience to properly advise the 
borrowers on the technical and business aspects of their intended activities. Hence, 
schemes with wider social and economic empowerment objectives for the participants 
have generally performed better. Particularly important are business development and 
business skills trainings in helping the borrower to identify a viable income-generating 
activity and how to run the activity properly (Liew 1997). 
 
The minimalist approach (just focusing on the provision of credit), while it has 
worked elsewhere, has not proven to be successful in the Pacific. A large number of 
schemes do not come with a comprehensive package of services and are just 
concerned with the disbursement and collection of money. Experience in the Pacific 
has shown that credit alone is not sufficient to ensure that borrowers succeed in their 
income generation projects. They require business skills training and on-demand 
technical and marketing advisory services to help them deal with unexpected 
problems. For schemes targeting women and the poor, many of whom come from a 
non-business background and culture and generally lacking self-esteem and 
confidence, it is even more important that skills and capacity-building support are 
available (Ibid). 
 
 The delivery of a comprehensive package of credit and support services could 
not be accomplished by the public service delivery system alone.  It requires the 
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participation of MFIs from the civil society and banks from the business sector.  
Although microcredit is normally delivered by non-government entities, they do not 
have the institutional capacity to provide support services such as trainings, technical 
and marketing assistance to their clientele.  The provision of not-for-profit support 
services has been the responsibility of the government because the business and the 
civil society sectors are not enthusiastic about lack of financial incentives if they 
participate in the welfare-oriented programs of the government.   
 
Since both microcredit and support services are simultaneously needed by the 
target beneficiaries, it is vital that the microcredit program is designed and 
implemented within a comprehensive and integrated program for poverty reduction 
and rural development.  Thus, appropriate government response to the heterogeneous 
poverty conditions and the different levels of credit needs, capabilities, preferences 
and demand of targeted beneficiaries will require institutional arrangements that will 
directly affect technical, entrepreneurial, marketing and economic capacity of partner 
organizations.  Since these are also linked to client analysis, social targeting, service 
delivery and the monitoring and evaluation, these factors either enable or limit 
program implementation that directly or indirectly affect the target beneficiaries and 
program outcomes.   
 
The good governance perspective further emphasizes appropriate response to 
the credit needs and financial capabilities of target beneficiaries.  Thus, the 
strengthening of the capacities of partner organizations towards collaborative 
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engagements is needed in ensuring responsive delivery of public services.  This 
institutional arrangements will help the government catalyze, promote and coordinate 
public services to ensure positive economic impact and outreach to impoverished 
target beneficiaries.   
 
     A.13.f.  Good Governance as Microcredit Strategies 
The emphasis on good governance is not that it is an end in itself.  Rather it is a 
means towards a certain end; the attainment of the ultimate goal of society—human 
well-being.  As a development intervention, microcredit strategies therefore, need to 
be firmly anchored on the principles of good governance for sustainable human 
development.   
 
According to Chalker (cited in Leftwich 1993:605), at the core of the 
contemporary development ideals is the confident assertion that ‘good governance’ is 
not simply desirable but an essential condition for development in all societies.  
Hence, the operationalization of good governance principles in the development of 
microcredit strategies is essential in order to make microcredit as a viable strategy for 
poverty reduction and an effective tool for rural development. 
 
Microcredit has been recognized as an effective tool and viable program for 
poverty alleviation (Satyamurti and Haokip 2002:8). However, many microcredit 
schemes do not carry out a realistic assessment of the income generation potential in a 
particular locality before implementation. It is often assumed that there are limitless 
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potential and that the availability of credit will unleash latent entrepreneurial potential. 
This assumption resulted to the failure of many outer island and rural village 
microcredit schemes (Liew 1997). 
 
To design successful products, the first step entails understanding the financial 
needs of clients (and potential clients) and how financial services fit into their money 
management strategies. Understanding clients requires an awareness of the economic 
goals of poor households, how people manage resources and activities, and how they 
deal with risk in their day-to-day lives.   Such a framework can be a useful starting 
point to better understand financial service preferences of poor households (CGAP 
2000:1).   Designing new delivery systems that can efficiently reach the poorest 
segments of society, therefore, makes up the biggest challenge of our governments in 
the coming years (Shams 1995:304).   
 
On the other hand, the replicability of Grameen’s credit delivery system rests 
on the following: 
1. The exclusive targeting of the bottom poor, based on clear-cut eligibility 
criteria for selection of clientele; 
2. The organization of borrowers into homogeneous groups and the building 
of group solidarity through a participatory organization development 
process; 
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3. The close rapport between the bank staff and the clientele groups.  All bank 
transactions are transparent and close to the customers.  With Grameen, 
‘the poor do not come to the bank, instead the bank goes to the poor;’ 
4. A professionally trained and motivated staff capable of establishing rapport 
and interacting with its clientele; special loan conditionalities, which are 
particularly suitable for the poor;  
5. A simultaneous social development agenda that can address the basic needs 
of the clientele; and 
6. The promotion of a problem-solving culture within the organization based 
on continuous experimentation and social learning (Ibid, p. 306-307). 
 
The application and appropriateness of good governance principles in 
replicating microcredit programs have to fully take into account the desired end 
result—which is sustainable human development—and the contexts that shape its 
attainment.  Any solution to the problems of rural people does not lie in uniform 
solutions which are decided at the top.  Rather, they must be found within the social 
capabilities of individual villagers who have intimate knowledge of their needs and 
problems, their resources, and their capabilities.  The adoption of a structure that is 
producer-oriented and a program suited to the needs and capabilities of the rural 
people ensure not only participation, but also two-way interaction between producers 
and the professionals who are responsible for implementing programs (Mascarenhas 
1993:486).   
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Hilton Root (1996:146) argues that development cannot exist without good 
governance.  Thus, microcredit as a strategy for poverty reduction and rural 
development requires the application and utilization of appropriate good governance 
mechanisms in microcredit programs.  The United Nations Development Program 
(1997:19) characterizes good governance as sustainable, participatory, accountable, 
legitimate and acceptable to the people, transparent, promotes equity and equality, 
able to mobilize resources for social purposes, strengthens indigenous mechanisms, 
efficient and effective in the use of resources and service-oriented, among others.   
 
The replicability of Grameen-type microcredit program design and 
implementation strategies for the rural poor in Western Mindanao necessitate the 
identification of strategies based on client’s needs, perspectives, preferences and 
capabilities.  These are intended to improve client analysis, social targeting, service 
delivery and monitoring and evaluation.  However, the program design, 
implementation strategies and processes need to operate within the framework of 
governance for sustainable human development (UNDP 1997) focusing on the 
principles of participation,   transparency, accountability and sustainability. 
 
     A.13.f.1.  Participation 
Participation lies at the heart of good governance (UNDP 1997).  The principle 
of participation derives from an acceptance that people are also at the heart of 
development. They are not only the ultimate beneficiaries of development, but are also 
the agents of development. In the latter capacity, they act through groups or 
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associations and as individuals.  For all economies, though, the benefits of 
participatory approaches can be considerable. These include improved performance 
and sustainability of policies, programs, and projects, as well as enhanced capacity and 
skills of stakeholders.  At the grassroots level, participation implies that government 
structures are flexible enough to offer beneficiaries, and others affected, the 
opportunity to improve the design and implementation of public programs and 
projects. This increases “ownership” and enhances results (The World Bank 2001).  
 
Good governance encourages actors to participate and take their demands to 
additional areas of concern.  It can target a variety of levels, from policy reform, to 
program and project delivery, at the central or local levels (Coston 1998:491).   The 
emerging participatory ‘paradigm’ in microcredit suggests two perspectives advanced 
by Britha Mikkelsen (1995).  The first of these consists of substantively involving 
local people in the selection, design, planning and implementation of programs and 
projects that will affect them, thus, ensuring that local perceptions, attitudes, values 
and knowledge are taken into account as fully and as soon as possible.  The second is 
to make more continuous and comprehensive feedback an integral part of all 
development activities.   
 
Popular participation is operationalized through a wide range of community-
based participatory planning methodologies.  As with the crystallization of all good 
ideas, ‘popular’ participation has turned from initial euphoria to reflection and 
innovation.  It is a basic principle of community participatory methods that the starting 
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point for empowerment should be the internal knowledge, priorities and perceptions of 
local people.  The problem is that, ignoring the external economic organizational and 
political context of community participation can undermine key components of local 
sustainability: livelihood security, social cohesion and environmental stability.  Hence, 
a more inclusive model of local participation is one that brings about local economic, 
social and environmental sustainability by drawing into the ‘popular’ participation 
process those stakeholders with institutional and political influence (Warner 1997:415-
417). 
 
In the realm of good governance perspectives for microcredit programs, 
people’s ability to draw on relationships with other people on the basis of trust and 
reciprocity is a social capital and an asset.  Social capital is central to peer-group 
lending inherent in microcredit programs.  Such reciprocal relationships are the 
essence of community organizations, which collectively work for the betterment of 
their community through collective action.  In providing an enabling environment for 
the poor to fight against poverty, these social assets have to be encouraged and 
groomed (UNDP in Satyamurti and Haokip 2002:6).   
 
Social capital in this context may include the reciprocal understanding of each 
other’s self-employment experience, the mutual support in words and actions, or even 
trust.  Without a minimum degree of social capital among members in the same group, 
they would not agree to stay together or even to form a group in the first place (Hung 
1999:5).  Thus, without social capital—being a building block of participatory 
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schemes in good governance and microcredit strategies—peer group will break apart 
and group-based microcredit programs may fail.  A more participatory approach to 
needs assessment and determination of “the way life is” in similarly situated 
communities will then provide vital inputs for needs-based and client-oriented 
program design and locally acceptable implementation strategies.    
 
     A.13.f.2.  Transparency 
Transparency is one of the core pillars of good governance (UNDP 1997, 
World Bank 2002, ADB 2003).  Transparency means that decisions taken and their 
enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that 
information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by 
such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is 
provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media (UN-
ESCAP 2002).  Transparency in microcredit programs means that information on the 
credit-worthiness of prospective borrowers takes a central place in loan appraisal.  
Transparency in client affairs and the ability of the prospective borrower to present a 
realistic investment plan and loan application are crucial elements for the lender 
(Klein, et. al. 1999:50-51). 
 
The benefits of transparency include:  (1) improved performance—the right 
information helps MFI managers to identify areas for improvement and make better 
decisions. Available information also allows managers to compare themselves to 
industry benchmarks and peers, thereby giving strong incentives to boost performance; 
(2) transparency attracts funders—accurate, standardized information lets donors and 
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other investors understand the performance of an MFI and make informed funding 
decisions. They can then track financial and social indicators to determine whether 
expected results are forthcoming; and (3) client protection—MFI clients deserve clear, 
straightforward disclosure of product terms, especially interest rates. In client-owned 
cooperatives and other deposit-taking institutions, published performance information 
tells clients about the quality of management and the safety of their deposits (CGAP 
2002). 
 
Peer group lending has gained worldwide recognition as a microlending 
technology.  It has been argued that one of the main factors for its success is weekly 
meetings which are far more important than the groups themselves; as they play a key 
role in increasing discipline, ensuring regular payments, and promoting the 
transparency of financial transactions with bank staff (Jain in Maclsaac 1997).   As 
one of the core principles of good and effective governance, the World Bank 
(2002:43) concludes that it is imperative to promote efforts to increase transparency 
and feedback among beneficiaries of government services.  This further includes the 
involvement of civil society organizations in the design, delivery, and monitoring of 
development projects and other activities. 
 
     A.13.f.3.  Accountability 
Accountability is also central to good governance (Sisk 2001:172).  An 
organization is accountable to those who will be affected by its actions. Who is 
accountable to whom varies depending on whether the actions taken are internal or 
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external to the organization.  Not only governmental institutions but also the private 
sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their 
institutional stakeholders. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and 
the rule of law (UN-ESCAP 2002).   
 
Accountability can be strengthened by promoting community participation in 
identifying priorities for social programs and in implementing them (The World Bank 
2002:40).  Accountability of program implementors and borrowers therefore, is a key 
requirement of microcredit programs.  
 
Accountability measures in group lending rely on peer pressure to monitor and 
enforce contracts, provide an incentive for borrowers to repay, and help screen good 
borrowers from bad borrowers.  In the Grameen Bank approach, while activities both 
at the borrower and bank levels are closely monitored, a certain degree of 
decentralization in operations is carried out which gives branches an opportunity to 
decide independently on matters that concern their area of operations.  Moreover, the 
scheme has adopted a system of record-keeping which appropriately suits their 
clientele.  Since most of the loanees are illiterate, paper requirements and loan 
procedures are kept to a minimum and are simply designed with built-in control 
mechanisms (Chan 1989:3-4). 
 
Successful microcredit operations rest on two basic accountability parameters: 
client discipline and institutional discipline.  Client discipline refers to the 
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accountability of borrowers to each other and to the creditor.  This means that the poor 
people take responsibility for their decisions, agreeing to and making timely payments 
of the principal and an amount of interest that will cover the full cost of the service.  
By living up to their contract, poor people discover their own capacity to direct their 
future.  As Grameen Bank founder Mohammad Yunus said in 1998; “Credit without 
discipline is nothing but charity.  Charity does not overcome poverty.”  Client 
discipline serves not only the individual client, but also other clients, future clients and 
microcredit institutions (CGAP 2002).    
 
Co-signing of loan contracts and moral persuasion are effective means to 
enhance good client discipline. Two types of guarantors can be used. The “moral 
guarantors” who have a close relationship with the borrower household used mainly as 
a prevention against moral hazards and “personal guarantors” who are appraised in the 
same way as the borrower and, in case of loan default, they are responsible to meet all 
the loan obligations (Klein, et. al. 1999:57, 61). 
 
 Institutional discipline, on the other hand, refers to the accountability of 
program implementors and partner organizations to each other, to the clients, to the 
government and to the donor.  In this context, institutional accountability refers to the 
set of principles that lead to sustainability of the program, quality of service, and 
efficiency of operations, including: 
1.) Charging of interest rates that cover all costs, even when adjustments are 
made for donations and subsidies to reflect market rate cost of funds; 
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2.) requiring full, on-time repayment from clients, and tracking repayments in 
regular and frequent manner; 
3.) Creating products and delivery techniques that are appropriate for clients; 
4.) Investing in management information systems that provide timely and 
appropriate guidance to staff and management; 
5.) Providing field staff with performance incentives; 
6.) Introducing sufficient decentralization to permit agility and eventual scale-
up; and 
7.) Planning from the start for capacity, growth and sustainability (CGAP 
2002). 
 
The microcredit approach of Grameen Bank, for example, promotes social 
development by making the poor individually and socially accountable.  Such 
intermediation improved the productivity and income of the poor (Khandker, Khalily 
and Khan 1995:ix).  Although credit is given to an individual member, the group is 
ultimately responsible for repaying loans, as well as for maintaining financial and 
social discipline (Ibid, p. 10).  The processes in mutual guarantee and enforcement of 
co-signing agreements are necessary to enforce accountability measures in a credit 
system with no collateral (Figura 2002:177).   
 
According to Pitt and Khandker (1996:12), group-based credit is packaged 
with both responsibilities (meeting attendance, forced saving, shared default risk) and 
benefits (training, insurance, consciousness-raising).  The cost of credit includes not 
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only the interest rate, but also the timing of repayment and the penalties associated 
with default.  In some sense, the monitoring of credit use makes all program 
participants “credit constrained.”  Moreover, if there is no monitoring of the use of 
borrowed funds and no group responsibility and decision-making in the lending 
program, individuals would likely want to borrow much more than they actually need 
in order to capture the premium associated with the soft terms of the loan.  Hence, 
accountability—in the form of institutional and client discipline and enforcement of 
legal measures—is a key determinant of good governance and a crucial performance 
indicator of microcredit programs. 
 
     A.13.f.4.  Sustainability 
Theories of development stressing strong local institutional capacity predict a 
strong correlation with sustainability (Snow 1999:66).  However, development 
programs are not sustainable if their costs cannot be met over a long period of time.  
Sustainability is not achieved if programs do not meet the needs of the people they are 
designed to help. In this context, microcredit programs can only evolve into 
sustainable institutions if they are linked or partnered with local institutions: churches, 
post-secondary schools, local governments, credit unions, banks, established non-
profit NGOs, service organizations, and job training programs.  Ultimately, 
microcredit programs become sustainable institutions only when net benefits to the 
community exceed total costs.  
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The sustainability of the credit institution, therefore, depends on recovering the 
cost of administration and services from the borrowers (Hossain and Diaz 1999:21).  
The term program sustainability means the ability of a program to continuously carry 
out the activities and services in pursuit of its objectives or the ability to continue 
operating as a development financial institution for the rural poor (Satyamurti and 
Haokip 2002:36). Financial sustainability embodies the institutional capacity to 
become independent of donor or government subsidies (Malhotra 1995). Hence, 
without a commitment to maintaining, evaluating, and improving programs, 
sustainability cannot be achieved (Snow 1999:66).   
 
Microcredit fills a niche that banks do not always fill.  Grassroots entities 
providing financial services at the farm level in the form of savings and loan facilities  
is one of the more promising approaches for building a viable and sustainable financial 
system for small farmers (FAO 1998).  Thus, Satyamurti and Haokip (2002:75) 
conclude that sustainability is about creating institutions that can provide positive flow 
of benefits for as long as they are needed.  If the people are using the program and 
graduating to commercial sources of credit, the program is successful and sustainable. 
 
Sustainable human development is the ultimate goal of good governance.  
Without good governance, development programs become devoid of substance and 
meaning.  In view thereof, microcredit as an instrument of good governance provides 
long-term socio-economic benefits for the sustainable human development of intended 
beneficiaries as long as they are needed; effectively and consistently. Thus, sustainable 
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microcredit programs require good social intermediation and prudent financial 
intermediation.  These are intended to ensure that poverty incidence is reduced 
effectively and the flow of positive social and economic benefits are received and 
enjoyed by the beneficiaries continuously and consistently. 
 
The good governance perspective emphasizes effective, responsive and 
consistent implementation of microcredit programs.  It focuses on the state’s functions 
in steering institutional triad of collaborative engagements among governance partners 
from the business sector and civil society.  This aims for the creation of an 
environment where microcredit can make a difference in the lives of the poor.  It also 
emphasizes the role of the state in providing incentives for participation in microcredit 
programs and in ensuring that the long-term benefits of microcredit accrue to the 
poverty alleviation and sustainable human development of intended beneficiaries. 
 
 Two world summits in 1997 and 2002 have clearly established that microcredit 
is indeed an effective strategy for poverty reduction especially in developing 
countries.  Microcredit further proves that the enterprising poor are not merely passive 
recipients of charity and dole-outs, but are also the primary market players in the 
microcredit arena and the active agents of economic development in general.  
However, microcredit is not a solution to all kinds of poverty problems because it is 
applicable only to the enterprising poor who are considered as the most affluent 
poverty groups whose income levels fall within the upper 50 percent below the 
nationally-defined poverty threshold. 
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 As a strategy for poverty reduction and rural development, several variants and 
innovations in program designs and implementation strategies of microcredit are 
manifested in the replication of the Grameen Bank approach to the delivery of small 
amounts of unsecured loans to the target beneficiaries.  Notable among the innovations 
in the original Grameen-type microcredit program is the BRAC’s graduated strategy 
for helping all types of poverty problems.  The BRAC combines both Grameen-type 
microcredit for the enterprising poor and a special poverty alleviation component for 
the non-enterprising poor, the poorest and the most vulnerable groups.  The BRAC’s 
strategy finally enables the beneficiaries to graduate into microcredit after a transition 
period and ultimately into the mainstream commercial banking system. 
 
 However, the application of profit-oriented microcredit as a social equity-laden 
strategy for poverty reduction is primarily state-driven, thereby emphasizing the 
proactive role of public administration in development.  This suggests the infusion of 
the financial viability value orientation of an “entrepreneurial government” into the 
social equity value premise of the “new public administration” within the context of 
managing poverty alleviation and rural development programs of the government. 
 
 The social equity value premise of new public administration is well-founded 
in the humanist and not-for-profit character of state interventions for poverty reduction 
and social development.  On the other hand, the financial viability value orientation of 
the entrepreneurial government is well-established in the state’s adoption of business 
philosophy while participating and competing in the mainstream commercial banking 
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system.  This is well-founded on the state-driven but capitalism-based and profit 
maximizing approaches to economic development.   
 
 Social equity and financial viability value orientations appear to be 
contradictory within the traditional context of social welfare-driven poverty alleviation 
initiatives of the government.  However, within the context of government-driven 
microcredit program, both social equity and financial viability are simultaneously 
attainable.  This suggests a public enterprise system that operates profitably within the 
microfinancial intermediation infrastructure and focuses on multiple-organizational 
collaboration between and among organized stakeholders and individual beneficiaries.   
 
In the administration of state-driven microcredit program, the pro-poor social 
equity value premise of new public administration and pro-capitalist financial viability 
objectives of the entrepreneurial government are simultaneously attainable through 
good governance.  Thus, the role of public administration and good governance in the 
administration of microcredit program as a strategy for poverty reduction and rural 
development focus primarily on state actions in concert with civil society and the 
business sectors.   
 
The good governance of microcredit program emphasizes the primary role of 
the state in creating a policy environment and an incentive system that catalyze viable 
economic engagements among all governance partners, market players and other 
stakeholders.  The viability of economic interactions further ensures the state-driven 
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microcredit programs’ positive and sustainable impact to local socio-economic 
conditions, especially on the overall quality of life of the poor and the vulnerable 
families in impoverished communities.  
 
The participation of stakeholders from the government, business and civil 
society sectors suggests the significance of the four principles of good governance 
(e.g., participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability) in development 
administration via the management of microcredit programs.  Since microcredit and 
good governance are aimed at poverty reduction and rural development, these include 
not only stakeholder participation but also conveniently available information about 
all microcredit providers, other collaborating organizations and the beneficiaries.  
These further require transparent procedures and processes in microcredit operations 
and transactions.  
 
Furthermore, the accountability system in the governance of microcredit 
program facilitates the enforcement of legal and administrative mechanisms to ensure 
full loan repayment by the borrowers.  The ideal consequence of 100 percent 
repayment rate determines the financial viability and sustainability of the microcredit 
program.  This emphasizes full recovery of the cost of microcredit operations plus 
positive profit margin and commercially acceptable rate of return on investment.   
 
The full repayment of borrowers’ loans is central to the profit maximizing 
objective of the microcredit program and its sustainability.  This means that the 
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profitability of the livelihood activities of a large number of borrowers from the poor 
and disadvantaged sectors results to a successful track record in full loan repayment, 
good credit reputation and bankability.  Profitability is likewise dependent on public 
support services provided by a consortium of development-oriented organizations 
from the government, civil society and business sectors.   
 
Sustainability suggests the need for continued profitability of the beneficiaries’ 
income-generating activities and the overall financial viability of the MFIs’ 
microcredit operations.  Thus, the microcredit program is considered sustainable for as 
long as it is profitable; for as long as support services are provided via public service 
delivery system; and for as long as it is needed and continuously benefiting the target 
beneficiaries.   
 
 The good governance of microcredit encompasses program design, processes 
and implementation strategies focusing on the attainment of market-dictated financial 
viability standards while effectively and consistently providing social equity-laden 
public support services.  Moreover, the administration of microcredit program as a 
strategy for poverty reduction and rural development envisions the attainment of 
sustainable human development.  This ultimate and desirable point of impact of 
microcredit is characterized by the beneficiaries’ household income above the poverty 
threshold, satisfaction of minimum daily requirements for the family’s survival and 
well-being, education for all members of the family and provision of durable as well 
as decent housing. 
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B.  THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 Strong microcredit programs are theoretically speaking, financially viable, 
social equity-laden and effective in providing long-term benefits to its impoverished 
beneficiaries as long as they are needed.  It is argued that the principles of good 
governance—participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability—will 
improve and strengthen program design and implementation strategies. 
 
The conceptual framework begins with the assertion of FAO (2000) that 
poverty is both a lifestyle and a trap. It is hard to escape from it.  It becomes a vicious 
cycle wherein the poor not only lack the means to rise above it—trapped in the 
struggle for day-to-day existence—but also lack the skills and confidence to succeed.  
Then this study proceeds alongside UNDP’s (1997) confident assertion that, since the 
ultimate goal of microcredit is to free the poor from the poverty trap, it is imperative 
that appropriate program design, processes and strategies are implemented within the 
framework of good governance for sustainable human development.    
 
The program design, processes and implementation strategies of microcredit 
and public support services should take into account the socio-economic and program 
design factors that enable or limit successful implementation.  These factors include 
specific factors generally classified as beneficiaries’ demographic attributes, 
household financial conditions, credit experience, preferences and demand as well as 
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the loan product design of microcredit facilities and delivery system of public support 
services.   
 
Program implementors, on the other hand, should likewise be cognizant of the 
enabling and limiting factors which could help define the terms and conditions of the 
loan and the target beneficiaries’ credit needs as well as their financial capabilities.  
These are deemed crucial in the efforts to simultaneously and effectively attain 
financial viability and social equity objectives.   
 
Furthermore, it is necessary that program design and implementation strategies 
are appropriate to specific household financial conditions, credit experiences, 
preferences and demand of the disadvantaged sectors and non-bankable groups.  These 
are facilitated by client analysis, social targeting, service delivery and monitoring and 
evaluation.  It is also necessary that these are applicable within the political, cultural, 
social, economic and institutional contexts that define the attributes of organized 
stakeholders, the different groups of impoverished beneficiaries and the poverty-
stricken as well as isolated barangays in the rural areas of Western Mindanao. 
 
Specifically, household financial conditions are characterized by the rural poor 
household that maintains adequate sources of income for the family.  This includes the 
use of locally available resources to generate income and to satisfy daily basic needs. 
The average monthly cash flow represents the ability of the household to meet survival 
requirements and to improve the well-being of all its members.  Since the household 
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of the rural poor is also the locus of microentrepreneurial or income-generating 
activities, the household’s financial conditions largely determine credit experiences.  
This also indicates the effort to meet their own credit needs by availing of the services 
offered by credit providers and moneylenders in the community. 
  
Credit experience determines how the household is able to access locally 
available credit services as well as how credit is utilized for productive purposes, for 
consumption expenditure requirements and livelihood or microentrepreneurial 
investments.  The extent and manner in which loan proceeds are utilized within the 
household is intricately linked to the borrower’s repayment experience and ability to 
pay future loans. 
 
The major actors in the credit experiences of poor households consist of credit 
providers, which include formal financial institutions (banks and lending investors); 
semi-formal credit providers (credit-granting NGOs and credit associations) and the 
informal sector (moneylenders).  Each type of credit provider employs different 
approaches in meeting the borrowers’ credit needs and ultimately in responding to the 
overall financial conditions of the rural poor’s household.  Credit providers supply the 
necessary funds to borrowers on demand but the availability of their services is 
influenced by borrower’s general credit-worthiness and agreed credit arrangements in 
the light of prevailing local socio-economic conditions. 
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Microcredit preferences and demand represent the beneficiaries’ perception 
and attitude toward credit services especially when they are aware as to who provides 
the credit services.  These could be gleaned from the amount of loan they want to 
borrow, the income-generating activities that need financing, the nature of assets they 
can provide as collateral to secure the loan, and the necessary support services needed 
to ensure productive use of loan funds, project profitability and the timeliness in 
paying back their loans. 
 
While the enabling and limiting factors are crucial for planning and 
formulating microcredit program design, good governance is equally important in 
identifying and developing guidelines for implementation via analysis of poverty 
conditions, social targeting mechanisms based on credit needs and financial 
capabilities, delivery of appropriate doses of microcredit and public support services 
and monitoring and evaluation of program outcomes.  These will help ensure that 
microcredit as a tool for poverty reduction is appropriate to local conditions as well as 
resources and acceptable based on needs and capabilities of program partners and 
target beneficiaries. 
 
The principles of good governance strengthen the microcredit program, 
improve the processes involved, develop the public support service delivery system 
and help ensure successful implementation. Participatory mechanisms help ensure that 
program design, implementation strategies encompassing the decision-making 
processes and transaction processes are appropriate to the needs as well as capabilities 
 147
and acceptable to program partners and target beneficiaries.  Meanwhile, transparency 
helps ensure that adequate information about all program partners and target 
beneficiaries are easily accessible and well-disseminated, the decision-making 
processes are transparent and transactions are documented and readily available.   
 
Accountability further ensures that roles, responsibilities, decisions and 
transactions are well-defined as well as administratively and legally enforceable based 
on contractual obligations.  Finally, sustainability helps ensure the continued 
profitability of beneficiaries’ income-generating projects and the long-term financial 
viability of the participating MFIs’ microcredit operations.  Ultimately, good 
governance ensures successful microcredit interventions for poverty reduction and 
rural development. 
 
Most important to microcredit as a tool for poverty reduction, rural 
development and sustainable human development is for the national and local 
government officials and the public service delivery system to provide incentives to 
stakeholders and create a favorable and comprehensive microcredit infrastructure.  
These should also promote collaboration among civil society and the business sectors 
either as subcontractors for the delivery of public support services or financially viable 
credit-retailing MFIs themselves.   
 
The collaborative and innovative financial intermediation scheme will help 
ensure needs analysis and social targeting geared towards large-scale outreach to 
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marginalized groups.  These further ensure the delivery of appropriate doses of public 
services to target beneficiaries excluded from the mainstream commercial banking 
system and those who are disconnected from municipal commercial and trading 
centers due to geographic remoteness or social distance.  It is necessary that these 
interventions should be monitored and evaluated along the overriding goals of poverty 
alleviation and rural development vis-à-vis impact on the living conditions of target 
beneficiaries and the attainment of program objectives outcomes 
 
The 1997 Microcredit Summit underscored that the key implications of 
microcredit to poverty reduction and rural development is in its name itself:  ‘micro.’  
A number of issues come to mind when 'micro' is considered: the small size of the 
loans made, small size of savings made, the frequency of loans, shorter repayment 
periods, the micro/local level activities, the community-based immediacy of 
microcredit, and other principles and processes.  Hence, microcredit is not the 
solution, but is a menu of available options and benefits, that has to be put together, a 
la carte, vis-à-vis local poverty conditions and the needs as well as capabilities of 
target beneficiaries and partner organizations. 
 
Figure 2 shows the conceptual framework indicating the interplay of poverty 
and the general socio-economic conditions of target beneficiaries.  This includes 
factors that enable or limit successful implementation in relation to the program 
design, strategies and processes of microcredit facilities and public support services.  
The financial viability and social equity goals of the entrepreneurial government and 
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new public administration provide the theoretical anchors for determining the 
appropriateness of microcredit program design to actual needs and capabilities of 
target beneficiaries.   
 
The financial viability and social equity goals of microcredit are 
simultaneously attainable through good governance.  This suggests the delivery of 
microcredit and public support services directly to the homes of target beneficiaries or 
to the site of income-generating activities while generating net profits.  This also 
requires utilization of not-for-profit and equity-laden social development services of 
LGUs and civil society organizations as public support services without increasing the 
cost of microcredit operations.  The implementation strategy also ensures the delivery 
of microcredit and public support services to the marginalized beneficiaries and 
enables their active participation in the microcredit program of the government.  
  
The viability of microcredit program further requires transparency as a 
necessary tool for formulating and managing monitoring and evaluation system as 
well as for tracking the financial transactions of the impoverished beneficiaries and 
organized stakeholders.  Monitoring and evaluation system depends on readily 
available data and information for the periodic appraisal of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of social equity-laden public services infused into the microcredit program.  
Transparency also facilitates proper utilization of project funds in relation to the 
financial viability requirements of the pro-poor microcredit program.  
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Central to the financial viability goal of the social equity-laden microcredit 
program of the government is enforcing accountability for the collection of small 
amounts of daily or weekly loan amortizations from the impoverished but enterprising 
borrowers.  Accountability mechanisms ensure that credit-related social development 
services are part of the social equity-laden public support services of the regular 
microcredit program.  Accountability paves the way for the proper utilization of loan 
proceeds, regular loan repayment and profitability of the income-generating activities. 
  
Project viability, the impoverished borrower’s financial capacity to repay the 
loan and the net profit generated from the microcredit-funded livelihood activities 
determine the sustainability of the microcredit program.  Furthermore, the availability 
of equity-laden social development services increases loan repayment rate and the 
overall profitability of the project.  
 
In general, good governance provides a framework for designing and 
implementing government-sponsored and profitable microcredit program for poverty 
reduction and rural development.  Microcredit not only provides social equity-laden 
development services to the impoverished sectors but also builds the capabilities of the 
beneficiaries to be entrepreneurial, business-oriented and economically competitive.   
 
The good governance strategies of microcredit likewise improve processes that 
encompass client analysis, social targeting, service delivery and monitoring and 
evaluation.  Client analysis and social targeting mechanisms represent the core of 
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social equity.  These include the identification and classification of target beneficiaries 
according to poverty conditions, credit needs and financial capabilities.  Service 
delivery, on the other hand, encompasses the financially viable transfer and recovery 
of small amounts of working capital loans at a pace consistent with credit needs and 
repayment capabilities of the borrowers.  Monitoring and evaluation system facilitate 
the regular tracking of the program’s profitability vis-à-vis viability objectives and 
appraisal of impact based on beneficiaries’ household financial conditions. 
 
As a strategy for poverty reduction, microcredit programs involve not only 
working capital loans for livelihood activities but also skills training, livelihood 
development, technology transfer, marketing and other forms of public support 
services.  The net profit generated from microcredit-funded livelihood activities 
ensures full loan repayment, increases household income above the poverty threshold 
and ultimately sustains the financial viability of microcredit program as a tool for 
poverty reduction.  Thus, continuous viability of the program allows the government 
to earn money from social equity-laden poverty reduction interventions.   
 
Evidently, the success or failure of microcredit as a tool for poverty reduction 
and rural development remains subject to the interplay of specific political, cultural, 
social, economic and institutional factors surrounding the target communities, the 
beneficiaries and the program itself. 
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The desirable impact of good governance in donor-funded and government-
driven microcredit facilities and public support services demonstrates multiple 
organizational partnerships and the steering functions of the state in regulating and 
providing incentives to participating organizations.  The good governance of 
microcredit as a state-driven and social equity-laden poverty reduction intervention 
demonstrates social equity, appropriateness and financial viability of program design, 
implementation strategies and the processes involved.  Furthermore, an increasing 
trend in the beneficiaries’ household income above the poverty threshold, 
independence from microcredit and their regular access to commercial banking 
facilities determine the successful impact of governance-based microcredit program on 
the household financial conditions of target beneficiaries and the socio-economic 
conditions of their communities. 
 
 153
Figure 2.  Conceptual Framework showing the contextual factors and the interplay of socio-economic characteristics of target 
beneficiaries; the factors that enable or limit the program design, processes and implementation of microcredit facilities 
and public support services; and the application of good governance principles that are intended to attain desired 
outcomes.  
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C.   OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
 
The definitions of the major variables being used in this study are as follows: 
 
Access generally refers to the borrowers’ experiences in availing a loan and 
other credit services from LBP, cooperatives, NGOs, POs and other MFIs as well as 
their experiences in borrowing money from relatives, friends and other moneylenders. 
 
Accountability refers to the enforcement of the terms and conditions of the 
loan and the specific provisions in the creditor-debtor agreement. 
 
Applicability refers to the extent to which a credit program “model” is 
accepted by LCCs, LPCIs and other implementing partners of WMCIP. 
 
Appropriateness refers to the extent to which a credit program “model” and 
pertinent credit standards are accepted, complied with, utilized and benefited by the 
WMCIP beneficiaries. 
 
Credit Experience refers to the survey respondents’ personal and direct 
experiences of borrowing money from local creditors, utilization of borrowed funds 
and repayment of debts and other financial obligations. 
 
Collateral refers to any tangible and durable property accepted by mainstream 
commercial banks and other creditors as a guarantee for loan repayment.   
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Credit Needs refer to the survey respondents’ personal experiences under 
specific money-related situations and events that may enable the borrowing of money 
from any creditor. 
 
Credit Providers refer to creditors such as LBP, LCCs, LPCIs, private lending 
companies and individual persons who are engaged in providing credit and other 
money-lending activities. 
 
Deficits refer to the survey respondents’ personal experiences pertinent to 
shortage of cash and being determined by the negative cash balance after subtracting 
total expenditures from gross income. 
 
Effectiveness refers to the attainment of pre-determined objectives of the EDC 
sub-component and the terms and conditions of the loan being set forth and agreed 
upon by IFAD, GOP-DOF, LBP, WMCIP, LCCs, LPCIs and the beneficiaries. 
 
Efficiency refers to the extent to which the microcredit program and the 
beneficiaries are able to accomplish the IFAD-approved objectives of the WMCIP’s 
EDC sub-component while recovering administrative costs, generating net cash 
savings from its operations and net cash earnings generated from the interest charged 
on the loan. 
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Financial Viability refers to the net profit earned from a microcredit project or 
an income-generating activity after subtracting the gross expenses from gross income. 
 
Foreclosure refers to the legal process whereby ownership of properties used 
as loan collateral is automatically transferred to the creditor upon the borrower’s 
failure to pay the loan. 
 
Household Financial Conditions refer to the WMCIP beneficiaries’ overall 
household conditions affecting money matters and their money-management activities. 
 
Income-Generating Activities refer to the livelihood and 
microentrepreneurial activities of the beneficiary from which money or household 
income is generated. 
 
Loan Size generally refers to the desired amount to borrow from the creditor 
or the amount of micro-loan granted by the LCC or LPCI to the individual borrowers 
usually ranging from a minimum of PhP1,000.00 to a maximum of PhP25,000.00. 
 
Microcredit refers to the granting of small amounts of loan ranging from a 
minimum of PhP1,000.00 to PhP25,000.00 without any physical collateral but secured 
under mutual guarantee or peer-group lending scheme of PCFC and QUEDANCOR. 
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Microcredit Preferences and Demand refer to the desired amount survey 
respondents want to borrow, the collateral to be used, the project proposed for 
financing and the public support services they need in order to make their loan-funded 
projects profitable. 
 
Microcredit Strategies refer to the responses concerning specific processes 
and activities involved in the administration and management of a microcredit 
program.   This utilizes specific activities and indicators of the four good governance 
principles—participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability—as 
implementation guidelines and specific sets of activities to be followed in managing a 
microcredit program. 
 
Net Household Cash Flow refers to the estimated amount of cash left when 
the estimated total amount of household expenditures (outflow) is subtracted from the 
total cash equivalent of all household revenues (inflow).  
 
Non-poor refers to the WMCIP beneficiaries with estimated average monthly 
income higher than PhP4,602.50. 
 
Participation refers to responses concerning the processes and activities 
involved in the consultation and decision-making that encompasses the management 
of WMCIP and the implementation of the EDC sub-component in coordination with 
IFAD, DAR, GOP-DOF, LBP, LCCs, LPCIs and beneficiaries. 
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Poor refers to the WMCIP beneficiaries with estimated average monthly 
income falling below PhP4,602.50. 
 
Poverty Reduction refers to the decrease in the number of households with 
estimated average monthly income falling below PhP4,602.50. 
 
Poverty Threshold refers to the Western Mindanao-based estimated average 
monthly income of PhP4,602.50 for a household with a maximum of five members or 
PhP920.50 per individual per month. 
 
Public Support Services generally refer to other non-credit public support 
services being provided or should be provided by DA, DAR, DENR, DSWD and other 
government line agencies, LGUs, NGOs and other organizations to WMCIP 
beneficiaries (e.g., social safety nets—food, medicines and healthcare; farm 
production subsidies—planting materials, small equipment and facilities and other 
farm inputs; livelihood development services—demonstration farms, skills trainings, 
seminars, community organizing, technology transfer, marketing services, inter-
organizational linkages, farm-to-market roads and other public services). 
 
Repayment refers to the borrowers’ personal experiences of fully paying a 
debt from any creditor.  
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Savings refer to the estimated amount of cash and non-cash possessions being 
left to the household after subtracting total expenditures from gross income.  
 
Sources of Income refer to the livelihood or income-generating activities of 
the head or “breadwinner” of the WMCIP-assisted household. 
 
Sustainability refers to the continuity of public services delivered through any 
project initiated by WMCIP and being benefited by the target beneficiaries for a 
minimum of five years. 
  
Transparency refers to convenient access, openness and free flow of all 
pertinent information across stakeholders in Western Mindanao especially partner 
organizations and the beneficiaries; free and unlimited access to official documents; 
and transparency in all loan-related transactions, processes and activities. 
 
Utilization refers to the borrowers’ personal experiences relative to the manner 
of directly spending and consuming the loan proceeds or its cash equivalent in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the loan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 160 
CHAPTER III 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 The research methodology used in the study includes a combination of sample 
survey, interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), direct observations and document 
analysis. 
 
A.  Research Technique 
 This study used both descriptive survey and field techniques in order to 
understand and shed light on the uniqueness and field-level circumstances in the 
selected barangays, the organized stakeholders and the WMCIP beneficiaries.  Thus, 
pertinent activities were able to ferret out and highlight local issues and concerns 
regarding available credit program designs, public support services that are needed 
and the strategies for implementing anti-poverty and rural development interventions.  
These were further analyzed in the light of the respondents’ needs, capabilities, 
preferences and locally available resources.   
 
 The survey was used to generate data from sampled WMCIP beneficiaries 
covering their household financial conditions, credit experiences, credit preferences 
and demand, and their preferred strategies for implementing a pro-poor credit program 
under WMCIP-EDC conditions.  Furthermore, the survey results were reinforced and 
enriched with information obtained from key informant interviews and group 
discussions involving beneficiaries and personnel from WMCIP and partner 
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organizations, interactions with respondents, review of documents, direct observation 
and field visits.   
 
 On the whole the research techniques provided the venue wherein different 
groups of respondents were able to analyze their own situations, articulate their needs, 
preferences, interests, viewpoints and perceptions, and engage in direct interactive 
exchange among themselves and with the officials and representatives of the national 
and LGUs as well as civil society organizations and other local institutions. 
 
   A.1.  Data Gathering   
Data gathering was primarily based on the survey which was reinforced by 
selected key informant interviews, separate scenario workshop-conference and group 
discussions among the respondents and between the beneficiary-respondents and 
representatives of the government (e.g., WMCIP, line agencies and LGUs) and civil 
society representatives (e.g., NGOs, POs and cooperatives) and private moneylenders.       
 
The mixed methodologies in data gathering were used to enable the WMCIP 
beneficiaries to unravel and analyze their own situation, and in optimal cases, to plan 
and act on their own premises in collaboration with the representatives of different 
government agencies and civil society organizations operating in their respective 
barangays. 
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The main purpose of the data gathering activities was to enable the participants 
to act on local microcredit availability and delivery systems as an opportunity, a 
problem and issue in increasing the income and livelihood opportunities of WMCIP 
beneficiaries in selected communities.  The purposively selected interviews were 
likewise conducted to enrich responses and elaborate on the issues raised by the 
respondents. 
 
   A.2.  Survey Questionnaire, Translation, Validation and Pilot Testing 
The survey questionnaire for WMCIP beneficiaries was divided into seven 
parts: 
1. Demographic Information (gender, ethnicity, religion, household role, number 
of children and age); 
2. Household Financial Conditions (type of dwelling unit, sources of income, 
estimated average monthly income and expenditure items, savings and 
deficits); 
 3.  Credit Needs (situations that cause overspending); 
  4.  Credit Providers (the usual creditor in the barangay); 
5. Credit Experiences (availment of credit in the last 2 years, the creditor, 
amount borrowed, purpose, interest rate, repayment scheme, loan utilization, 
repayment, amount of unpaid balance and reason why debt was not paid); 
6. Credit Preferences and Demand (desired income-generating activity, desired 
amount to borrow, collateral, needed loan-related support services, profit 
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utilization plans, preferred amortization period and mode of amortization); 
and 
7.  Microcredit Strategies (participation in credit program; transparency of credit 
and financial rules, processes and procedures; borrower’s accountabilities to 
each other and to the creditor; and profitability of the loan-funded project). 
 
The survey questionnaire for WMCIP beneficiaries—mostly poor and barely 
educated (i.e., elementary level or unable to read and write)—was translated into four 
dialects; Cebuano, Tausug, Yakan and Subanen.  To facilitate common understanding, 
the enumerators were further trained to rephrase the questions in case some 
respondents could not understand the translated questions.  Moreover, briefings were 
conducted for facilitators, enumerators and volunteers in order for them to provide 
adequate assistance to the beneficiary-respondents in rephrasing and translating their 
responses into a language (Filipino or English) understandable to the representatives 
from local agencies and the researcher.   
 
In every barangay, the survey questionnaires were administered to the sampled 
WMCIP beneficiaries.  In selected barangays, the entire data gathering process—
which included the administration of questionnaires, key informant interviews, group 
discussions, field visits and observations—were facilitated by a minimum of two NGO 
personnel and at least one NGO volunteer under the direct supervision of designated 
WMCIP field officers.  
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Other data gathering techniques were further used to validate and enrich the 
responses in the questionnaires and to provide thorough understanding of the 
respondents’ reactions, opinions, viewpoints, perceptions and preferences.  These 
activities consisted of the following: 
1. Review of library and internet materials and official documents used and 
compiled by WMCIP, DAR, LBP, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Philippine 
Institute of Development Studies, cooperatives, and NGOs; and  
2. Interactions with individuals from other municipalities and cities who have 
sufficient knowledge about WMCIP, the beneficiaries and the concerned 
communities. 
 
The questionnaire and other documents used to gather data and information 
from the respondents were validated with the participation of three WMCIP field 
officers and staff who served as inter-rater for each item in the questionnaire.   
 
Since the main objective of validation was to arrive at a complete agreement 
among the raters, each item in the questionnaire and pertinent documents were revised 
and rephrased until all validators arrived at a consensus on each item both in the 
original and translated versions.  After arriving at a consensus on each item of the 
translated questionnaires, the same were pretested using three WMCIP beneficiaries 
who were native speakers of concerned dialects and who lived with other WMCIP 
beneficiaries in the same neighborhood.  However, they were no longer included in the 
sample of the study.  Feedbacks on the comprehensibility of the items in the 
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questionnaire were immediately obtained and each item was revised accordingly based 
on their suggestions and in consultation with the validators and translators.   
 
All the translated items in the questionnaires were considered final and ready 
for administration to the sampled respondents after the validators, translators and pre-
tested beneficiaries arrived at a consensus on the understandability, simplicity and 
clarity of the questionnaire and other documents used to gather data and information 
from the respondents. 
 
   A.3.  Data Triangulation 
According to Robert Chambers (cited by Ortiz 2002:57), data triangulation 
means sharing of information and ideas between and among the participants in the 
process; i.e., between rural people, rural people and facilitators and between 
facilitators.  Data triangulation in selected group discussions included the sharing of 
ideas and opinions between and among WMCIP beneficiaries, program implementors 
from LGUs, NGOs and peoples organizations (POs) and private moneylenders. 
 
The data and information from group discussions and sharing of ideas and 
opinions among all participants in group discussions were used to validate and further 
enrich the research results derived from the survey instruments and used to elaborate 
the prevailing local conditions, problems and issues raised by the respondents.   
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 In its totality, the data gathering techniques used in this study and the 
application of corresponding procedures were able to identify some indicators of good 
governance in microcredit operations, experiences and perceptions of the respondents.  
Moreover, the study was able to generate good governance-based implementation 
strategies which were  anchored on the prevailing local poverty conditions and 
primary inputs from the sampled WMCIP beneficiaries.  The sampled beneficiaries 
were considered poor and vulnerable; and who were either not involved at all or 
marginally involved in local development efforts due to their geographic remoteness, 
isolation and local security problems.   
 
B.  Difficulties Encountered 
The lack of transportation facilities and road network were the immediate 
problems encountered in accessing the poorest and most remote barangays.  These 
were compounded by volatile peace and order situations due to the presence of armed 
groups such as the New People’s Army (NPA), breakaway groups of the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) and other lawless elements such as bandits and pirates.    
 
The security risks involving bandits and pirates were high especially for travels 
to island barangays and other communities locked by giant rivers and dense forests.  
The said barangays could only be traversed by motorized canoes, in addition to two to 
eight- hour travel on foot or on horseback in order to reach the nearest barangay hall 
or the barangay captain’s house. 
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The major constraints in the selection of barangays and respondents pertain to 
the frequency of reported armed confrontations between military troops and armed 
groups in WMCIP-covered barangays or adjacent communities and other difficulties 
caused by local politics. 
 
Thus, the selection of barangays and the conduct of this study adequately took 
into consideration geographic issues and local peace and order problems of the 
selected barangays as well as the cultural practices and religious beliefs of the 
respondents.  Moreover, previously selected barangays were automatically substituted 
with another barangay once negative feedback (e.g., peace and order concerns, 
security issues, political interference and other inconveniences) as reported by key 
personnel and other reliable sources reached the regional headquarters in Zamboanga 
City.  
 
C.  Population and Sampling 
 Based on its legal mandate, WMCIP collaborates with line agencies, LGUs, 
NGOs and other organizations in order to provide agricultural and fishery-based 
technical assistance to a maximum of 200 beneficiaries representing the same number 
of households in each of the 81 barangays.  Hence, in addition to the survey 
respondents, key informants and other participants were included in the study. 
 
This study covered one city and 22 municipalities in Western Mindanao spread 
across the four provinces—Basilan, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Sibugay and 
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Zamboanga del Sur.  This represents 25 percent of the five cities and 30 percent of the 
74 municipalities in Region IX.  In its totality, the 95 percent of the municipalities in 
the Western Mindanao region is  classified as 5th and 6th class (NSO 2002), indicating 
that they are among the poorest and least developed in the country.    
 
The main justifications for the selection of the 81 WMCIP-covered barangays 
as the geographic coverage of this study are as follows: 
1. The region is the third poorest in the country;  
 
2. Familiarity of the researcher on the socio-economic, political and cultural 
landscape of the region;  
 
3. Resource constraints ; and  
 
4. Availability of support from WMCIP Management 
 
 
 The working population of the study consisted of the 16,000 WMCIP 
beneficiaries, from which the first group composed of 390 survey respondents was 
drawn.   The second set of respondents were key informants and participants in group 
discussions who were purposively selected based on their availability, involvement in 
development programs and credit-related activities in the WMCIP-assisted 
communities.   
 
 Table 4 shows the distribution of the 390 survey respondents across the 
provinces of Basilan, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Sibugay and Zamboanga del 
Sur. 
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Table 4.  Distribution of Survey Respondents 
 
Province Respondents Percent (%) 
1.  Basilan 74   18.9 
2.  Zamboanga del Norte 104   26.7 
3.  Zamboanga Sibugay 107   27.4 
4  Zamboanga del Sur 105   26.9 
TOTAL 390 100.0 
 
 
 
The sample size of at least 390 respondents is considered as directly related to 
the accuracy of the sample mean as an estimate of the true population mean.  
According to Gay (cited in Leedy 1997), the sampling distribution of means is very 
normal for more than 30 respondents, even when the population is not normal.   
 
 In addition to the sampled survey respondents, representatives from 
cooperating institutions and personalities enthusiastically participated and shared their 
ideas and opinions in the group discussions as well as in the key informant interviews.  
The key informants and other participants were purposively selected based on their 
involvement in the implementation of credit projects and activities as well as their 
participation in rural development programs in their respective municipalities or 
barangays. 
 
Aside from informants from WMCIP, DAR and LBP, other key informants 
were local residents and representatives from the following institutions and LGU 
departments3 (see Appendix E for a complete list of stakeholders who participated): 
                                                 
3 invited participants who refused to participate or were not available were substituted with other 
officials or employees from the same department or representatives from other departments. 
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1. Barangay Council 
2. Municipal Development Office  
3. NGO operating in the barangay/municipality 
4. Municipal Development Team (Agriculture and Fisheries) 
5. Cooperative operating in the barangay/municipality 
6. Private individual duly recommended by the Barangay Council 
7. Credit Officer, Municipal Agrarian Reform Office 
  
  Originally, it was intended to obtain a representative sample from the working 
population based on the masterlist of WMCIP beneficiaries.  However, due to the 
difficulties encountered in conducting the study (see scope and limitation), the 
convenience and purposive sampling methods were used.  Thus, the sample was not 
representative of the target population because some of the randomly selected 
respondents were substituted based on the convenience and availability of the 
respondents, local peace and order problems, Ramadan religious celebration of the 
Muslims, geographic isolation, refusal, and illness.  
 
But despite the problems encountered, data and information obtained were 
considered sufficient for the description and analysis of prevailing WMCIP conditions.  
Thus, the survey, interviews and group discussions were able to ferret out and clarify 
the issues and concerns pertinent to credit delivery systems, livelihood options and 
public support services intended for the beneficiaries, the administrative and 
implementation problems concerning WMCIP and partner organizations, their 
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possible solutions and other options available for the implementation of the EDC sub-
component.    
 
D.  Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 The data and information generated were sufficient for the evaluation of 
available resources in the communities, the capabilities of target beneficiaries and the 
general capability of the local public service delivery system to respond to income-
generating livelihood assistance, credit and support services needed by the target 
beneficiaries and their communities. 
 
     D.1.  Statistical Procedures 
The study utilized the Statistical Package for Social Sciences version 11 (SPSS 
ver. 11) for the tabulation of the responses pertinent to each question asked in the 
questionnaire.  Statistical treatment of data involved only the use of frequency 
distributions, percentages, means and medians.  
 
     D.2.  Discussion and Interpretation 
   Primary data and other inputs representing the sampled WMCIP beneficiaries’ 
demographic attributes, financial status and capabilities, local creditors, credit needs 
and experiences as well as perceptions and preferences on microcredit strategies were 
obtained through a survey which was reinforced with group discussions, informal 
interviews, researchers’ interactions with respondents and visits to their homes, 
neighborhood and farms.   
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  Preferred microcredit strategies using the principles of good governance were 
also obtained through group discussions, interviews and interactions with respondents 
other than the sampled WMCIP beneficiaries.  The responses were primarily 
generated from actual experiences, viewpoints, perceptions and preferences of key 
informants and group discussants.   
 
  Other pertinent discussions presented in the results of the study were likewise 
culled from other primary and secondary sources of data.  These methodologies were 
utilized in order to understand and appreciate traditional management systems, 
livelihood systems, indigenous technologies, and the ways and reasons which indicate 
how beneficiaries and local program implementors feel, see, think and act. 
 
The general socio-economic conditions of the sampled WMCIP beneficiaries 
were analyzed to determine their credit needs and general financial capabilities as well 
as their viewpoints, perceptions and preferences pertinent to the attributes of 
microcredit programs that were applicable and appropriate to their credit needs, 
financial capabilities and locally available resources.  These were analyzed to 
determine if these factors could affect the administration of microcredit program.  The 
factors are further used to determine whether they are likely to enable or limit the 
design and successful implementation of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component. 
 
The views, perceptions and preferences of local program implementors from 
WMCIP and its partner government agencies, sub-contracted NGOs, LCCs, LPCIs, 
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cooperatives and other local creditors were further used to determine preferred 
implementation strategies.  These are likewise used to determine the applicable, 
appropriate and workable program design and implementation strategies based on the 
prevailing credit needs and financial capabilities of WMCIP beneficiaries, the local 
socio-economic conditions of communities and the administrative capacities of 
WMCIP’s partner organizations.   
 
Table 5 presents the summary of the research questions and corresponding data 
gathering methods, analytical techniques used and research outputs. 
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Table 5.  Summary of research questions, data gathering methods, analytical techniques and expected outputs. 
Research Question Data Gathering Methods Analytical Technique Research Outputs 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
 
1.  What is the design of 
WMCIP’s EDC sub-
component that would 
adequately address the 
needs of the poor and the 
non-bankable beneficiaries 
of WMCIP? 
 
 
 
 
9 questionnaire 
9 interviews 
9 group discussions 
9 official documents and 
reports 
 
 
 
 
 
9 frequency 
distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
9 poverty conditions of WMCIP 
beneficiaries. 
9 appropriate microcredit program 
designs as credit options for 
beneficiaries vis-à-vis their 
household financial conditions, 
credit needs and financial 
capabilities. 
9 needed enterprise development 
services, microcredit, and/or social 
safety net provisions. 
 
2.  What are the enabling and 
limiting factors to a 
successful design and 
implementation of the EDC 
sub-component? 
 
 
 
9 questionnaire 
9 group discussions 
9 interviews  
 
9 frequency 
distribution 
 
 
 
9 credit needs and financial 
capabilities. 
9 credit providers/creditors. 
9 income-generating activities/ 
sources of income. 
9 savings and deficits. 
9 identification of enabling and 
limiting factors. 
9 microcredit services based on credit 
experiences, credit needs and 
financial capabilities. 
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Research Question Data Gathering Methods Analytical Technique Research Outputs 
 
3.  How do the principles of 
good governance—
participation, transparency, 
accountability and 
sustainability—apply in a 
microcredit program for the 
reduction of poverty 
incidence among WMCIP 
beneficiaries? 
 
 
9 questionnaire 
9 group discussions 
9 interviews with  
representatives  from 
LGUs, NGOs, and 
WMCIP implementors 
 
 
 
 
9 frequency 
distribution 
 
 
9 good governance principles applied 
and operationalized as 
implementation strategies  of 
microcredit program. 
9 recommended program design and 
implementation strategies. 
9 lessons for the integration of good 
governance principles in designing  
and implementing microcredit 
program for poverty reduction and 
rural development. 
9 implications on the role of 
microcredit and good governance to 
public administration, poverty 
alleviation and rural development. 
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CHAPTER IV 
  
PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION  
OF FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS  
 
 
 The presentation of findings and observations covers existing credit options 
based on the microcredit program designs of LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR.  The 
chapter also identifies and analyzes the factors that enable or limit the successful 
implementation of the appropriate program design based on socio-economic 
conditions, credit needs and financial capabilities.  It also focuses on the application of 
good governance principles—participation, transparency, accountability and 
sustainability—as specific implementation strategies of the microcredit program for 
poverty reduction and rural development.  
 
A.  Credit Options for WMCIP Beneficiaries 
Available credit programs were examined and used as options to determine the 
appropriateness of program design to the credit needs and financial capabilities of 
target beneficiaries.  The results serve as basis for answering the first research 
question—“What is the design of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component that would 
adequately address the needs of the poor and the non-bankable beneficiaries of 
WMCIP?” 
 
The review of documents, discussions and interviews with WMCIP officials 
reveal that there were only four credit options available to target beneficiaries: (1) 
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LBP’s cooperative credit program; (2) LBP’s Credit Assistance Program for Program 
Beneficiaries Development (CAP-PBD); (3) PCFC’s credit window for Grameen 
Bank Approach Replication (PCFC-GBAR) which is intended for eligible NGOs, rural 
banks, cooperatives, POs and SHGs; and (4) QUEDANCOR’s microcredit program 
for the same type of clientele.   
 
However, PCFC refused to participate in WMCIP’s EDC sub-component 
despite having passed the initial review of its eligibility as LCC based on LBP credit 
standards.  Meanwhile, QUEDANCOR’s application for accreditation as LCC was 
disapproved for lack of successful track record in microcredit operations involving the 
same type of target end-borrowers—the poor farmers, fishermen and 
microentrepreneurs.  Other qualified LCCs such as MASS-SPEC and PADAP-PSDC 
officially declined to participate in the program for the same reasons cited by PCFC.   
 
Although LBP has the credit facility, resources and administrative capability to 
reach out to the same type of target clientele, it could not provide the services directly 
to LPCIs and WMCIP beneficiaries because this is not allowed under the original 
IFAD-GOP-LBP financing agreement.  The framework for implementing the EDC 
sub-component under the original IFAD-GOP-LBP financing agreement states that 
LBP could provide credit services (loans for re-lending and institutional development) 
only to accredited LCCs.  The LCCs, in turn, could only provide the same credit 
services to accredited LPCIs.  Finally, only LPCIs are allowed to re-lend directly to 
qualified individual end-borrowers.  
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In this context, cooperatives which are interested to directly access LBP credit 
facilities should first be accredited as LCCs; otherwise, they shall be accredited as 
LPCIs.  The LPCIs could only be accredited based on LBP benchmarks and scope of 
operations either at the barangay, municipal, city or provincial levels.  Contrary to 
LPCIs,  LCCs are required to have extensive experience in managing development 
projects and credit and re-lending  operations in at least one region with at least a 
three-year successful operation based on LBP benchmarks (e.g., national or regional in 
scope, financial track record, no loan default experience, increasing profitability, 95 
percent loan recovery and repayment rates, loan portfolio quality, etc.).   
 
Direct retail lending programs of LBP and LCCs are not covered by the EDC 
implementation guidelines.  The qualified LPCIs such as rural banks, cooperatives, 
NGOs and POs are allowed access to the credit facility only through accredited LCCs.   
Individual end-borrowers, on the other hand, are allowed access to EDC facility only 
through the direct-retail lending programs of LPCIs; otherwise, they are referred to the 
LBP commercial banking department or other special credit windows based on their 
ability to satisfy minimum credit standards.   
 
  A.1.  Credit Option #1:  LBP Assistance to Cooperatives   
  
  The LBP is the financial arm of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program 
(CARP).   Its primary role in rural development is the delivery of low-cost credit 
facility to finance the livelihood activities and operations of small farmers and 
fishermen through cooperatives.  Under the original IFAD-approved implementation 
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framework for the EDC sub-component, however, LBP is not authorized to engage in 
any direct retail lending activities to WMCIP-accredited cooperatives.  But outside the 
EDC, this credit option is open to all qualified cooperatives whether WMCIP-assisted 
or not.   
 
Since LBP only provides profit-oriented credit assistance, other not-for-profit 
support services to the cooperatives and their members (e.g., farming and livelihood 
systems development, capability-building programs, technology transfer, marketing 
assistance and other public support services) are provided mostly by the line agencies 
(e.g., DA, DAR, DENR, etc.), LGUs, the NGOs and congressmen or senators through 
their Countrywide Development Fund (CDF), otherwise known as “pork barrel.” 
 
The LBP and partner organizations provide credit and support services to 
cooperatives as follows: 
1. Organization and management of farmer's cooperatives; 
 
2. Agricultural credit extension in the countryside; 
 
3. Teaching of farm technology; 
 
4. Technical assistance on latest farming techniques and agricultural 
technologies; 
 
5. Provision of marketing channels for farm products; 
 
6. Supply of post harvest facilities like rice mill, threshers, etc.; and  
 
7. Fund and donor sourcing and generation of additional resources for the 
individual farmer or cooperative. 
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Before a cooperative can avail of assistance from LBP, it must be able to fully 
comply with all requirements for accreditation. It has two parts: (a) the minimum 
credit requirements for existing Bank-Assisted Cooperatives (BACs) classified 
according to their earning asset level, and (b) the pre-qualification requirements for 
cooperatives wishing to access credit from Land Bank for the first time: 
 
(a) Minimum Credit Re-Availment Requirements for Existing BACs.  Existing 
BACs applying for loan re-availment must comply with the following 
requirements: 
1. Active farmer/fishermen membership of: 
* up to 100 for class D BACs 
* 101 to 200 for class C BACs 
* 201 to 300 for class B BACs 
* more than 300 for class A BACs 
 
2. Attendance of all eligible member-borrowers in at least one 
membership education  seminar (MES), values, rights and 
responsibilities of members and review of cooperative principles, in 
addition  to the pre-membership education seminar (PMES) for all 
members. 
 
3. Continuous capital  build-up  program  resulting in an increased paid-
up share capital of at least PhP 500.00 per member per year. 
 
4. Updated books of accounts consisting of general and special journals  
and ledgers as evidenced by the availability of updated monthly 
financial statements. 
 
5. Qualified core management team and additional management staff as 
may be required. 
 
6. Cooperative officers and management staff have attended basic, 
refresher, intermediate, or advanced trainings relevant to their positions 
in the cooperative. 
 
7. Written and continuously refined/updated systems, procedures, 
policies, and short/long-term plans on: 
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* Membership management 
* Capital build-up and savings mobilization 
* Credit including loan pricing and collection 
* Accounting, internal control system and budgeting 
 
8. Engaged in diversified, progressively expanding and profitable 
livelihood activities which may include crop production, livestock, 
marketing, and provision of post harvest facilities. 
 
9. Debt to equity requirements of 6:1. 
 
10. Repayment of at least 95 percent on Land Bank loans. 
 
11. Affiliated or showing willingness in affiliating with cooperative 
federation. 
 
12. Must be conducting semestral internal performance review. 
 
13. Existing BACs which fail to meet the requirements for a particular  
coop class shall submit a written undertaking to comply with the time 
frame prescribed for each specific requirement. 
 
 
(b) Pre-qualifying Requirements for Newly Accessing Cooperatives (NACs).  
Selected criteria and indicators are already summarized and presented in 
Chapter I. Specifically, the following requirements are intended to equip 
newly accessing cooperatives with the necessary competence to conduct 
business profitably and, at the same time, provide LBP with certain degree 
of confidence to extend credit assistance: 
1. Must be duly registered with the Cooperative Development Authority 
(CDA). 
 
2. Must have a membership of at least 60 small farmers and/or fishermen. 
 
3. All members have attended PMES; all eligible borrowers should have 
attended an MES. 
 
4. With minimum paid-up share capital of PhP30,000.00. 
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5. With an ongoing capital build-up program resulting in an increase in 
paid-up share capital of at least PhP500.00 per member per year. 
 
6. With written policies, systems, procedures, and short/long-term plans 
on: 
 
* Membership management including continuous membership 
expansion 
* Capital build-up and savings mobilization 
* Credit including loan pricing and collection 
* Accounting and internal control systems 
* Budgeting 
 
7. With updated financial statements duly certified by the coop's audit 
committee resulting from the proper installation and maintenance of 
cooperative bookkeeping/accounting system. 
 
8. Board of Directors, Manager, Audit Committee, and Bookkeeper must 
have attended training on basic courses relevant to their positions. 
 
9. With core management team composed of a qualified full or part-time 
manager; full or part-time and duly bonded treasurer, and qualified full-
time bookkeeper. 
 
10. Must be at least break-even with its operations. 
 
 
Cooperatives availing of credit assistance from LBP are classified as newly 
accessing cooperatives, or those availing of LBP financing for the first time; existing 
BACs with fixed asset financing; and existing BACs without fixed asset financing.  
Existing BACs are further classified according to Earning Asset Level (EAL) for 
purposes of this criteria, EAL includes all assets used by the coop to earn income: 
 
 
 
 
 183
CATEGORY     EARNING ASSET 
Without Fixed Asset Financing 
* Class A     over P 5.0 million 
* Class B     over P 2.5 million to P 5.0 million 
* Class C     over P 1.0 million to P 2.5 million 
* Class D     P 1.0 million and below 
With Fixed Asset Financing 
 * Class A     over P 5.0 million 
* Class B     over P 3.0 million to P 5.0 million 
* Class C     over P 1.0 million to P 3.0 million 
* Class D     up to P 1.0 million  
  
In general, the regular LBP assistance to cooperatives is limited to the 
provision of credit services to qualified cooperatives.  Those who do not meet credit 
standards are automatically disqualified and excluded from its program.  For the 
eligible cooperatives, the credit services include mostly production loans that are 
related to agriculture and fisheries.  These loans are secured by the assets of the 
cooperative and the lands owned by the members.   
 
The focus group discussions (FGDs) involving the Credit and Enterprise 
Development Officers (CEDOs) reveal that only three WMCIP-assisted cooperatives 
are qualified under LBP’s minimum accreditation criteria but still classified as Class D 
cooperatives.    Moreover, these cooperatives have been reluctant to avail of credit 
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services due to unfavourable experience with LBP.  One of the cooperatives went 
bankrupt after being subjected to the legal accountability processes of LBP. 
 
The said cooperative was fully self-sufficient and operating profitably when 
LBP offered its credit services.  It availed of credit assistance but the volume of loan 
was too much for its management cadre to handle.  Shortly, the cooperative 
experienced repayment problems from its re-lending operations and it could no longer 
amortize LBP loan.  While it was still experiencing financial problems, it came to a 
point that LBP foreclosed the collateral which comprised the valued assets of the 
cooperative.  Coop officers blamed LBP for being too harsh in enforcing loan 
repayment policies. 
 
The experience spread to neighboring barangays and other cooperatives in the 
provinces of Zamboanga del Sur and Zamboanga Sibugay.  Other line agencies, 
NGOs, donors and WMCIP have provided grants and other necessary financial, 
administrative and technical assistance to rehabilitate said cooperative and other 
similarly-situated cooperatives in the region.   
 
At the time this study was conducted, the cooperative was already rehabilitated 
and has already regained financial viability and self-sufficiency. The LBP 
representatives wooed the officers and offered again the same credit assistance.  The 
cooperative’s board of directors repeatedly refused the offer.  Other cooperatives 
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which had sufficient information about the unfavourable experiences have become 
apprehensive and reluctant to avail of any credit services from LBP.   
 
It is further revealed in group discussions and interviews that cooperatives and 
POs are interested in credit through the livestock dispersal and farm inputs distribution 
program similar to that of DA being implemented through the LGUs.  However, EO  
138 issued by then President Joseph Estrada in 1999 prohibits WMCIP, LGUs and all 
other non-credit granting government instrumentalities from carrying out similar 
activities under the EDC sub-component. 
 
 Using the good governance principles of participation, transparency, 
accountability and sustainability in analyzing the program design of the LBP regular 
assistance to cooperatives reveal a host of credit standards and criteria that must be 
complied with before a cooperative and its members could benefit from this credit 
assistance program. 
 
In terms of participation, although membership in the cooperative is highly 
voluntary and open to all, access to small amounts of credit for agriculture-and 
fishery-related production loans is open only to members who are capable of 
complying with the minimum requirements and credit standards. Participation in the 
cooperative is also manifested by the different forms of financial and technical 
assistance they receive from the government, politicians, NGOs and foreign donors.   
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In terms of transparency, all transactions entered into by cooperative officers 
and all information about the financial status and projects of the cooperative are 
reported and presented to all members in monthly or weekly general assembly 
meetings usually attended by a large majority of members.  In credit management, for 
example, the final approval or disapproval of loan applications is usually carried out 
during the general assembly meetings. 
 
Moreover, in terms of accountability, all members are required to follow rules 
and regulations approved by the general assembly and enforced by the cooperative 
officials.  Final approval or disapproval of the decisions and actions of the cooperative 
officers and sanctions against erring members or officers are voted by the majority (75 
percent) of the members and carried out during the general assembly meetings.  In 
terms of sustainability, the financial viability of the cooperative or the profitability of 
its credit operations are primarily dependent on the managerial capabilities of its 
officers and the profitability of the member-borrowers’ loan-funded production loans 
and other income-generating activities. 
 
 It is observed that the presence of good governance principles in the structures 
and administrative processes and procedures of the cooperative facilitates 
effectiveness, self-sufficiency and viability of its credit operations and other poverty 
alleviation and development programs being implemented.  This suggests that good 
governance principles should be embedded in the structures, operations, processes and 
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management of the cooperative to make it functional, effective and responsive to the 
needs and capabilities of its members.   
 
 However, despite the ideals of good governance that could make the credit 
operations of the cooperative successful and financially viable, many attempts have 
failed.  Ideally, for example, in the 81 barangays covered by WMCIP, there should 
also be 81 cooperatives or at least one self-sufficient and financially viable 
cooperative in every WMCIP-assisted barangay.  However, LBP records show that 
many cooperatives have failed since 1987 (the post-Marcos era and starting from the 
administration of President Corazon C. Aquino) under the regular LBP credit program 
for cooperatives; many of them are facing legal sanctions via LBP’s accountability 
mechanisms.   
 
Thus, only three WMCIP-assisted cooperatives in three out of 81 barangays 
are readily qualified to avail of LBP’s credit assistance to cooperatives but 
consistently refused to avail of any LBP credit services.  In other barangays where 
cooperatives had previously failed, WMCIP has initiated the rehabilitation and 
strengthening of the failed and “not-so-strong” cooperatives.  Simultaneously, 
WMCIP organizes and provides public support services to POs and neighbourhood 
associations in lieu of the cooperatives that could neither be rehabilitated nor 
strengthened. 
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 Since most (96 percent) of the WMCIP-assisted cooperatives and POs in 81 
barangays could not pass minimum credit standards, LBP’s regular cooperative 
lending program remains as a credit option that is open to all types of qualified 
cooperatives whether WMCIP-assisted or not.  For LBP, the disqualification of many 
cooperatives is part of its effort to maintain quality loan portfolio and part of its 
argument that under the poverty conditions of certain WMCIP-assisted barangays, 
organizations and beneficiaries, credit may not be the correct instrument for poverty 
alleviation (see 2002 IDAD-DAR-WMCIP Supervision-Mission Report).   
 
Since LBP’s regular credit assistance to cooperatives—being applied as a 
credit option—automatically excludes the “not-so-strong” cooperatives and the POs. 
This credit option also automatically disqualifies target beneficiaries who do not pass 
minimum credit standards.  Meanwhile, the introduction of microcredit into the 
regular credit operations of cooperatives remains unclear due to lack of pertinent LBP-
supported microcredit policies and implementation guidelines.  Thus, a less-stringent 
credit program for the less qualified target beneficiaries is necessary.   
 
A.2.  Credit Option #2: Credit Assistance Program for Program Beneficiaries  
                                       Development (CAP-PBD)   
 
Among special lending windows operationalized by DAR and LBP, the CAP-
PBD is less stringent than Credit Option #1 or the regular cooperative credit program.  
The implementation of the CAP-PBD program design is dependent on multiple-
organizational collaboration that is largely participated in by DA, DAR, LBP, NGOs 
and LGUs.  It is likewise nearest to the financial capabilities of WMCIP-assisted 
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LPCIs and target end-borrowers.  Microcredit, however, still remains not covered by 
this credit option. 
 
The CAP-PBD is a special lending window specifically designed for Agrarian 
Reform Beneficiary (ARB) cooperatives and farmer-organizations (FOs) in Agrarian 
Reform Communities (ARCs) which are deemed not eligible under LBP’s regular 
accreditation criteria, but are ready to avail of external financial assistance.  It is a 
“transition credit program” for the cooperatives/FOs/POs who would eventually 
access financing from LBP and other formal lending institutions. 
 
The CAP-PBD makes available credit for agricultural production inputs, 
acquisition of pre and post-harvest facilities and fixed assets to ARB cooperatives or 
FOs in the identified ARCs.  Eligible borrowers are ARB cooperatives/FOs which 
should be accredited by DAR on the basis of the following criteria: 
1. Registered either with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
CDA, Bureau of Rural Workers (BRW), with a membership base of at least 
30 small farmers of which 50 percent plus one are actual ARBs; 
 
2. All members have attended PMES or similar training; 
 
3. With a minimum paid-up capital of PhP15,000.00; 
 
4. With a core management team composed of a manager, treasurer/cashier 
and bookkeeper; 
 
5. With updated financial statement; and 
 
6. Must be holding regular meetings based on its Constitution and By-Laws. 
 
 
 190
Eligible Projects for financing are: 
 
1.) Purchase, construction and installation cost of pre and post-harvest 
facilities such as dryers, threshers, shellers, mills, warehouse, bins, farm 
tools, equipment, draft animals and fishing/aquaculture facilities, 
equipment and related production inputs; 
 
2.) Agricultural crops/livestock production inputs and fishing/aquaculture 
inputs; and 
 
3.) Operating capital including initial  operating cost such as insurance and 
other start-up costs. 
 
Non-eligible Borrowers are Cooperatives/POs which are: 
1. Considered eligible by banks, other special credit programs and/or other 
formal financial institutions; and 
 
2. Blacklisted by DAR—those which have unsettled obligations under 
various financing programs administered by DAR, LBP and/or other 
financing institutions. 
 
 
Terms and Conditions.  Loans extended under the program shall have the 
following interest rates per annum (p.a.): 
 
1. Agricultural production/operating capital - 12% p.a. 
 
2. Fixed assets/medium- and long-term loans - 14% p.a. 
 
3. Supervision cost     -   2% p.a. 
  
 For projects with long gestation period, the term of the loan is based on the 
projected cash flows and economic useful life and a maximum of seven years of grace 
period.  For short gestating projects and production loans, loan maturity shall be short-
term or not exceeding one year, based on the production cycle. 
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The loan shall be collateralized by the following: 
1. Promissory note (with Joint and Several Security provision); 
 
2. Deed of assignment of expected produce/Philippine Crop Insurance 
Corporation (PCIC) policy/guarantee, and 
 
3. Chattel mortgage on purchased equipment 
 
The above may be supplemented by any or a combination of the bank’s 
acceptable collateral, e.g., real estate mortgage, etc., if deemed necessary by the 
Provincial Project Management (PPMC) or Regional Project Management Committee 
(RPMC) of DAR. 
 
Financing of projects shall be based on actual needs and cost of the projects 
under a cost-sharing scheme as follows: 
1. For long gestating agro-industrial crops production and processing: 
 
9 Loan amount is up to 85 percent of the total project cost, and 
 
9 The difference between the project cost and the amount financed shall 
be provided by the proponent as equity in the form of cash or labor and 
other assets of the proponent. 
 
2. For other projects, particularly involving traditional crops, the proponent’s 
equity should not be less than 5 percent of the total project cost. 
 
 
Although the CAP-PBD lending program enforces less stringent credit 
standards, it does not cover Grameen-type microcredit operations for the poorer and 
less qualified member-beneficiaries.  The CAP-PBD is a transition credit program 
aiming to strengthen the less qualified cooperatives.  It also requires the conversion of 
POs and other credit-granting organizations into cooperatives within an LBP-
 192
determined timeframe depending on the overall financial performance of the CAP-
PBD-funded projects and beneficiaries.  
 
Since the CAP-PBD does not cover microcredit, it is apparently responsive 
only to the credit needs and financial capabilities of the non-enterprising, production-
oriented and less qualified beneficiaries.  The LBP further requires that the loan-
funded projects of CAP-PBD should reach at least the financial breakeven point or the 
no-profit-no-loss situation.  Financial viability of the credit facility and the 
profitability of the loan-funded livelihood activities of individual beneficiaries 
expedite the conversion of POs into cooperatives and strengthen the institutional and 
financial capacities of not-so-strong cooperatives.   
 
Although CAP-PBD adequately responds to the less qualified and apparently 
poorer target beneficiaries, the LBP still requires that target beneficiaries are able to 
meet the breakeven point as the minimum financial viability requirement for continued 
access to the CAP-PBD facility.  The beneficiaries are also required to graduate into 
regular credit facilities for cooperatives as soon as they pass credit standards or 
immediately after the transition period.  However, the application of CAP-PBD to the 
WMCIP-assisted cooperatives, POs and agrarian reform beneficiaries is not authorized 
under the original IFAD-approved EDC implementation framework and guidelines.   
 
The CAP-PBD program design requires intensive capability-building and 
institutional interventions from the government.  It is applicable only to the newly-
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organized and very young cooperatives with poorer members as well as POs that are 
financially capable but could not readily comply with the minimum standards for 
accreditation as cooperatives being required by the Cooperative Development 
Authority (CDA).  The CDA is a government agency that specializes in the regulation 
and development of cooperatives in the Philippines.  Finally, LBP imposes a transition 
period for the conversion of CAP-PBD beneficiaries into cooperatives depending on 
demonstrated financial viability of credit operations, the managerial capabilities of 
cooperative officers and nature of public support services needed by the organization 
and its members. 
 
The ideals of good governance are also applicable to cooperatives and POs that 
qualify under the CAP-PBD credit program of LBP.  Similar to the strong 
cooperatives, the infusion of good governance into the cooperatives and POs through 
the CAP-PBD will facilitate institutional strengthening, organizational development 
and improvement of financial viability, managerial capabilities of the officers and 
technical skills as well as business capabilities of the poorer and the least qualified 
target beneficiaries. 
 
A.3.  Credit Option #3:  PCFC’s Credit Program for Grameen Bank  
       Approach Replication (GBAR) 
 
Through the GBAR credit window and using SHGs as credit delivery 
channels, PCFC provides several loan products to different types of target clientele 
(poor and non-poor).  The PCFC is also a subsidiary of LBP specializing in the 
replication of the Grameen-type microcredit in the Philippines.  The PCFC wholesale 
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credit funds intended for its re-lending operations under the GBAR program are 
borrowed from LBP based on the prevailing market rate for loans under a special 
financing arrangement between GOP-DOF, IFAD and ADB.   The GBAR microcredit 
scheme could further be incorporated as a component of the cooperative’s regular 
credit program.   
 
Under the original IFAD-approved implementation framework of the 
WMCIP’s EDC sub-component, the application of the PCFC-GBAR microcredit 
program has been well-recognized and strongly recommended by the IFAD.  
Moreover, as an LCC, PCFC has passed all the minimum credit standards and 
accreditation criteria imposed by LBP such as a minimum of three years of successful 
track record in microcredit operations, paid-up capitalization and other industry-based 
financial ratios and viability indicators. 
 
The PCFC offers a variety of loan products to both poor and non-poor 
clientele.  Its credit program that is nearest to the credit needs and financial 
capabilities of WMCIP beneficiaries and partner LPCIs is the Rural Micro-Enterprise 
Finance Project (RMFP) which is funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
IFAD.  The PCFC’s wholesale credit funds under the RMFP are also borrowed from 
LBP at cost based on inter-bank lending rate.  The PCFC-RMFP provides credit 
facilities to NGOs, POs and Financial Institutions (FIs) which utilize the Grameen 
Bank Approach (GBA) in delivering microcredit services to the poor as defined by 
NEDA.  Its characteristics are as follows: 
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1. An exclusive focus on the entrepreneurial poor, preferably women; 
 
2. Formation of target clients into small SHGs with each SHG federated into 
centers.  The SHGs undergo training on principles, rules and procedures of 
the GBA credit scheme; value formation, microenterprise management and 
livelihood skills; 
 
3. Initial end-borrower (individual) loans range from PhP1,000.00 to 
PhP6,000.00 with subsequent loans gradually increasing to a maximum of 
PhP25,000.00; 
 
4. Joint and several liability (mutual guarantee) for members of SHGs; 
5. Emphasis on end-borrower savings generation; 
 
6. Simple and sound credit delivery system; and 
 
7. Frequent monitoring and collection. 
 
 
Eligible borrowers are NGOs and POs duly organized with either track record 
of lending operations or with relevant capabilities in implementing microcredit 
programs for the poor.  To qualify for accreditation, the NGO/PO must initially pass 
the following criteria: 
1. Duly registered with SEC, CDA or Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP); 
 
2. Track record of at least three years of operation in livelihood lending.  For 
NGOs and POs with less than three years experience, the management 
must have experience in livelihood development and lending; 
 
3. Working capital of at least PhP250,000.00; 
 
4. Has at least 150 existing clients; 
 
5. Presence in the organizational setup of a specialized lending group or its 
equivalent, and a training group/program on community organizing; 
 
6. Past due rate (payments made after due date) of not more than 20 percent 
on its lending operations; 
 
7. No loans in arrears (unpaid loans) with any public or private lending 
institution; 
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8. Must have a full-time office head, bookkeeper and cashier/treasurer; and 
 
9. Must have established systems for accounting, internal control and 
documentation. 
 
The PCFC requires that the projects to be funded by GBAR depend on the 
needs and capabilities of the end-borrower.  The end-borrower decides on the type of 
project to be undertaken with the program partner advising him/her in determining the 
viability of the project.  The end-borrower’s project must be: 
1. Viable with a ready market for the product or services; 
2. Able to generate income for the clients within a short period of time 
3. Within the capability of the clients to manage 
4. Able to generate savings for the clients; and  
5. In compliance with all government rules and regulations 
 
Examples of projects eligible for financing under PCFC-GBAR are as follows: 
1. Small sari-sari stores, peddlers, small market vendors (i.e., small stall 
owners and ambulant vendors); 
 
2. Home-based handicraft manufacturers; 
 
3. Small traders; 
 
4. Small food processors; 
 
5. Cooked food vendors and small eatery owners; and 
 
6. Service providers (i.e., beauticians, barbers, etc.) 
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Overall, the PCFC-GBAR microcredit program design and implementation 
strategies are strongly recommended by LBP, DAR and IFAD given its profitability, 
viability and sustainability potentials.  But despite being highly recommended, this 
credit option could not be implemented under the poverty conditions of WMCIP 
beneficiaries.  That is, among the four credit options, PCFC-GBAR enforces the most 
stringent credit standards which may disqualify at least 90 percent of the target 
beneficiaries.   
 
Most LPCIs may not be able to meet the required capitalization, membership 
base and financial viability requirements.  The PCFC-GBAR’s social targeting 
mechanism is limited only to the enterprising poor who could amortize a loan on a 
daily or weekly basis and those who have daily access to commercial and trading 
centers mostly in highly-urbanized municipalities and cities.  Thus, under the poverty 
conditions of WMCIP beneficiaries, their organizations and communities, an excellent 
credit program design with superior implementation strategies like the PCFC-GBAR 
may not be an applicable instrument for poverty alleviation. 
  
A.4  Credit Option #4.  QUEDANCOR’s Responsive Microcredit Program  
     (Grameen Replication).   
 
The minimum requirements for availment of QUEDANCOR’s credit facilities 
are the easiest to comply with. Although QUEDANCOR’s microcredit program is 
strikingly similar to the PCFC-GBAR, the WMCIP-assisted LPCIs and target 
beneficiaries find credit option #4 as most appropriate to their needs and capabilities.   
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Aside from PCFC-GBAR, the QUEDANCOR also provides microcredit 
facilities for Grameen Bank replicators using SRTs.  Similar to PCFC, 
QUEDANCOR’s wholesale credit facilities are borrowed from LBP at cost based on 
the prevailing market rate for loans under a special financing arrangement with the 
GOP-DOF and ADB.   The QUEDANCOR-SRT microcredit scheme could likewise 
be implemented as a component of the regular lending program of cooperatives and 
other credit-granting organizations under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani—
Countrywide Assistance for Rural Employment and Services (GMA-CARES) 
microcredit program.   
 
However, under the IFAD-approved EDC implementation guidelines, 
QUEDANCOR’s application as LCC was disapproved by LBP for reasons that 
QUEDANCOR did not meet the required three-year successful track record in credit 
operations; LBP considers the SRT microcredit program as too risky to be profitable; 
and the financial viability requirements could not be ascertained due to its newness in 
the microcredit industry. 
 
But despite the disapproval of QUEDANCOR’s application for LBP 
accreditation as an LCC, it was willing to use its own funds for the pilot-testing of 
microcredit in three selected barangays covering the WMCIP beneficiaries who are 
considered as the most credit-worthy and the most respectable in the selected 
barangays.   However, since QUEDANCOR did not possess sufficient information 
about the target borrowers, it agreed to forge a partnership agreement with WMCIP 
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for the provision of support services to the borrowers including WMCIP assistance in 
loan repayment collection. 
 
The WMCIP-QUEDANCOR partnership falls under the GMA-CARES 
program of QUEDANCOR wherein it provides a maximum loanable amount of 
PhP15,000.00 per individual end-borrower and up to PhP75,000.00 for 
cooperatives/associations/NGOs depending on the requirements of the project with an 
interest rate ranging from 9.5 to 12 percent per annum.  The minimum criteria for 
accreditation of cooperatives/POs/SRTs are as follows: 
1.  For Individual Borrowers 
 
a.  must be residing in the community for at least one year; and 
b. must have undergone value-orientation training conducted by   
    QUEDANCOR 
 
      2.  For SRTs 
       
a.  must be composed of members who are residing in the same 
community/barangay for at least one year as certified by the 
barangay chairman; 
 
        b.  must have undergone values-orientation training with  
                             QUEDANCOR; and 
 
c. prospective borrowers who belong to the same 
community/barangay shall be encouraged to form a group of at 
least three members and up to a maximum of nine members and 
elect from among themselves a team leader who shall be 
responsible for the collection and remittance of the group’s loan 
amortizations to QUEDANCOR. 
 
3.  For Cooperatives/Associations/POs 
 
a. must be operational for at least one year as evidenced by 
registration with appropriate government agency; 
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b. must have undergone values-orientation training with                        
QUEDANCOR;  
 
c. must have juridical personality with authority to 
contract/borrow/lend money; 
 
d. must have current officers with positive moral reputation and have 
not been involved in irregularities; 
 
e. must have viable project proposal (agri-fishery/livelihood or re-
lending project); and 
f. list of prospective borrowers, amount of loan applied and addresses 
(if re-lending project). 
 
 
The eligible projects are intended to augment borrowers’ income and to create 
employment for their families and relatives.  The projects include agri-fishery and 
other livelihood projects such as, but not limited to: 
1. swine and/or poultry raising; 
2. vending of fish, meat, poultry, vegetables, fruits and other food products; 
3. bakery and operations of sari-sari store 
 
The QUEDANCOR has a wide array of credit facilities that respond to the 
credit needs and financial capabilities of different types of poor and non-poor 
clientele.  Similar to other social equity-laden and pro-poor credit programs, financial 
viability is the minimum requirement for continued access to QUEDANCOR’s credit 
facilities.  Among the poor, QUEDANCOR provides different credit facilities to 
different poverty groups through cooperatives, POs, associations and direct retail 
lending to individual target borrowers depending on credit needs and capability to pay 
the loan.  Under WMCIP conditions, however, only the SRT group lending model is 
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apparently applicable given the credit needs and financial capabilities of most target 
beneficiaries and the LPCIs. 
 
Nevertheless, while QUEDANCOR’s entry into the microcredit arena is yet 
too early for evaluation and its financial records were not yet available when this study 
was conducted, PCFC has shown profitable operations.  As of December 31, 2001, 
PCFC served 482,243 clients nationwide; total resources stood at PhP2.065 billion; 
and earned a net income of PhP50 million.  However, little is known, if any, on 
specific financial viability benchmarks for the microcredit operations of PCFC’s 268 
institutional borrowers (GBARs).  
 
A.5  Summary of Findings and Observations: Credit Program Design 
The four credit options analyzed as credit program designs are open to all 
qualified credit-granting organizations and individual borrowers.  Hence, even without 
the EDC sub-component, the regular cooperative credit facility and CAP-PBD of LBP, 
PCFC-GBAR and QUEDANCOR-SRT are open to all kinds of individual end-
borrowers and MFIs (whether LCCs and LPCIs or not) provided they pass the 
minimum accreditation standards.   
 
A comparative analysis of the four credit program designs reveals that 
QUEDANCOR’s minimum accreditation requirements are the least stringent vis-à-vis 
LBP and PCFC criteria.  These are much easier to comply with based on the credit 
track record, needs and financial capabilities of NGOs, cooperatives, POs, SRTs and 
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individual WMCIP beneficiaries.  Thus, QUEDANCOR’s microcredit program design 
and implementation strategies is the most appropriate credit program design  for 
WMCIP, its partner organizations and the target beneficiaries. 
 
However, under the original IFAD-approved implementation framework of the 
EDC sub-component, only PCFC is fully qualified under LBP criteria.  However, 
PCFC refused to participate in the implementation of the EDC sub-component citing 
viability constraints and unacceptable credit risk.  The other three credit options are 
also applicable under WMCIP conditions this requires the reformulation of the 
original IFAD-approved implementation framework to accommodate the application 
of other credit options under WMCIP’s EDC sub-component.   
 
Using five selected key organizational criteria, an analysis of the difference 
between the four credit options treated as program designs is presented in Table 6.  In 
the required paid-up share capital, QUEDANCOR’s microcredit program is ranked 
first while PCFC-GBAR is ranked fourth and last.  In terms of track record in credit 
operations, QUEDANCOR is ranked first while LBP’s regular cooperative credit 
program and the PCFC-GBAR are ranked last.  When it comes to the annual savings 
generation requirement for each member, the three credit programs emphasize annual 
savings except the LBP cooperative credit program which requires each member to 
deposit to the cooperative a minimum of PhP500.00 every year.  Profitability is also 
required across the four credit options but the minimum acceptable profit levels from 
the loan-funded projects are not specified.  In terms of membership base, 
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QUEDANCOR only requires at least five like-minded persons to directly avail of its 
microcredit services.  The PCFC-GBAR meanwhile, requires a minimum of 150 
members before an LPCI could access its microcredit facility.    
 
Table 6.  Key Eligibility Criteria of Existing Credit Programs 
Credit Options (Existing Program Designs) 
Minimum Criteria QUEDANCOR 
(Rank #1) 
CAP-PBD 
(Rank #2) 
LBP Coop 
(Rank #3) 
PCFC-GBAR 
(Rank #4) 
1. Paid-up share   
    capital (PhP) not specified 15,000.00 30,000.00 250,000.00 
2. Track record in  
     credit  operations 1 year not specified 3 years 3 years 
3. Annual savings   
    mobilization per  
    member (PhP)  
emphasized Emphasized 500.00 emphasized 
4. Profitability  viable project proposal not specified breakeven 
no loan in 
arrears 
5. Membership base not specified 50 60 150 
6. Conversion to  
     coops not required 
required for 
POs/FOs - not required 
 
 
 Across the six eligibility criteria used in evaluating the difference in the 
program designs of the four credit options, the analysis shows that most of the PCFC 
clientele belong to larger, very strong and well-capitalized MFIs.  These MFIs are 
mostly composed of non-poor and enterprising poor who are engaged in trading, 
processing, and vending activities to generate income.  On the contrary, 
QUEDANCOR’s program design is also directly applicable to smaller groups of 
borrowers and requiring little capitalization.  The LBP regular cooperative credit 
program and the CAP-PBD are less stringent than the PCFC-GBAR but more 
stringent than the QUEDANCOR-SRT credit facility. 
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A further analysis of the income-generating projects eligible for financing 
under the four credit options reveals that PCFC-GBAR and QUEDANCOR’s 
microcredit models are mostly applicable to the livelihood projects of the enterprising 
poor.  These include mostly processing, trading, vending and other projects with short 
gestation periods that can generate daily or weekly positive net cash flows. 
 
In terms of credit program design and implementation strategies, 
QUEDANCOR’s SRT borrower-groups are not different from the SHGs under PCFC-
GBAR.  Both SRT and SHG are composed of at least five members with an elected 
leader who manages the activities of the group and coordinates with QUEDANCOR 
for SRT and with PCFC for SHG.  The PCFC and QUEDANCOR implement the 
same credit delivery and loan recovery strategies using the peer-group lending scheme 
of the Grameen methodology.   
 
The loan ceiling of PhP15,000.00 or PhP25,000.00 per project cycle indicates 
its social equity value orientation because the target poor beneficiaries normally do not 
possess the financial capabilities to pay loan amounts higher than PhP15,000.00 and 
they do not possess the managerial capabilities to manage bigger projects.  On the 
other hand, well-capitalized entrepreneurs usually find the small loan ceilings 
unattractive and not viable.  However, despite the small loan amounts, financial 
viability remains a requirement for social equity-laden credit programs.  The small 
livelihood activities must demonstrate profitability based on a feasibility study that 
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shows positive net profit for the project and based on actual evaluation by the loan 
officers from the concerned MFI.    
 
On the other hand, the credit options under the cooperative credit assistance 
program of LBP (e.g., regular cooperative credit program and CAP-PBD) shows that 
the income-generating projects eligible for financing under the two credit options are 
production-oriented with long-gestation periods of at least three months.  That is, the 
borrowers can pay the loan only after profitably selling the yield from the loan-funded 
projects.  For example, in rice production loans common among cooperatives, the 
member’s loan repayment can only be accomplished after selling the harvested and 
dried “palay” or the milled white rice. 
  
Among the four credit options, QUEDANCOR’s microcredit program design 
and accreditation criteria are the most appropriate and most likely to be responsive to 
the credit needs and financial capabilities of “not-so-strong” LPCIs and target 
beneficiaries.  However, credit risk is also highest in this program design because the 
eligibility criteria especially financial requirements are not very specific.  For 
example, the SOU Manager in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay revealed that all project 
proposals they recommended are viable or profitable at least in paper or in the 
proposal.  But still, there is no guarantee that the proposed project will really generate 
net profits.  For example, the agriculture and fishery-related livelihood projects 
proposed for financing depend on favorable weather conditions that are beyond human 
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control.  Moreover, social, economic and other factors may similarly contribute to the 
success or failure of the loan-funded project at any stage of project implementation. 
 
Although QUEDANCOR’s credit program is the best option, it is not yet open 
to WMCIP beneficiaries.  The second best option is CAP-PBD.  But it is likewise not 
yet open to WMCIP-assisted cooperatives, POs and beneficiaries because most of 
them could not raise the needed PhP15,000.00 paid-up capital and have not 
successfully started the savings mobilization and capital build-up schemes.  The 
members of cooperatives and POs at the barangay level are too poor to generate 
enough cash to meet the minimum capital requirements.  Group discussions reveal that 
most of the economic transactions of the beneficiaries in far-flung and isolated 
communities do not involve cash because they commonly practice bartering of goods 
among neighbors.  
 
While some cooperatives have generated sufficient resources, they remained 
disqualified from LBP due to repayment problems.  They were further beset with 
operational and other administrative problems within the organization.  On the other 
hand, sub-contracted NGOs were likewise reluctant to participate because their 
previous credit programs did not yield desirable results.   
 
A representative of the Xavier Agricultural Extension Services (XAES)—
NGO component of Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City and a sub-contractor of 
WMCIP—for example, revealed that they were given a grant for piloting a microcredit 
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program but it did not yield favorable results.  Hence, the program was terminated and 
the foreign donor did not provide additional financial support for microcredit 
operations.  Under the EDC sub-component, it was feared that the anticipated results 
may not also be favorable to the implementors and creditors. 
 
A representative of the Kasanyangan Foundation, Incorporated (KFI), 
meanwhile, averred that their microcredit program was doing well.  Loan recovery 
rate was high but largely attributed to the daily collection of amortizations from the 
borrowers.  It was further revealed most of their borrowers were urban poor who live 
in densely populated urban areas; and whose livelihood activities depend on economic 
activities in market places locally known as “tiangge.” 
 
For some poor KFI borrowers, the points of production for the crop, livestock 
and poultry farmers as well as fishermen were within the 50-kilometer radius of the 
commercial trading center and could be reached within a travel time of two to three 
hours via public utility vehicle (hauling trucks or jeepneys) plying the route at least 
once a day.  In this case, the borrowers could carry their products at midnight; could 
reach the marketplace around 3:00 o’clock in the morning; and could sell their 
products to regular traders and buyers.  At around 6:00 o’clock in the morning, 
products that could no longer be sold to their regular buyers could be peddled in the 
sidewalks and sold to other buyers.  Finally, before going home, daily or weekly loan 
amortization repayment schedules could be complied with. 
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However, the above situation does not hold true in other distant barangays 
where market day (locally known as “tabô”) happens only once a week or none at all.  
This problem is common among upland barangays where there are no transportation 
facilities or no farm-to-market roads at all.  As elaborated by a Community Organizer 
(CO) in Barangay Sibatog—an upland indigenous community in the town of President 
Manuel Roxas in the province of Zamboanga del Norte—the beneficiaries carry 
mostly root crops, poultry, pigs/piglets, copra and other products on their shoulders or 
using carabao for at least three hours every Friday (market day).  Then their products 
are sold to interested buyers and traders from the town center or “poblacion” who also 
sell their goods in the barangay on a particular market day.  Once the products are 
already sold, the beneficiaries start buying basic commodities (cooking oil, soy sauce, 
salt, spices, condiments, salted/dried fish, sardines, medicines, etc.) that the household 
could consume for one week or until the next market day. 
 
It is noted that data and information generated from the survey, interviews and 
group discussions reveal a variety of socio-economic conditions among target 
beneficiaries.  That is, no credit option for target beneficiaries and no single program 
design of any development or anti-poverty intervention would be comprehensive 
enough to cover all types of socio-economic conditions of target beneficiaries and 
administrative capabilities of WMCIP’s partner organizations.   
 
For example, some of the poor beneficiaries produce goods for home 
consumption or for the local market while others work as laborers in stores and as 
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household helpers.  It is also commonly known that not all WMCIP beneficiaries are 
poor.  This is because some of the study’s participants and respondents are local elites 
or the most affluent persons in the community such as local traders and businessmen, 
teachers, and those who were supporting children in private colleges either in Manila, 
Cebu City or in the provincial capital.  Some beneficiaries themselves or their adult 
children are educated and employed, or are working abroad and regularly sending 
money to support their parents or families. 
 
Meanwhile, the QUEDANCOR credit program design is only applicable to the 
enterprising poor who do not pass the accreditation criteria of PCFC-GBAR while the 
CAP-PBD automatically disqualifies LPCIs who are eligible for assistance under the 
regular LBP credit assistance program for cooperatives.  The highly qualified, very 
strong and highly viable cooperatives, on the other hand, may opt to access all credit 
facilities except CAP-PBD, depending on the socially targeted member-borrowers’ 
credit needs and general capability to pay a loan.  That is, the cooperative may operate 
simultaneously the regular LBP cooperative credit facility for production-oriented, 
non-enterprising and bankable members; PCFC-GBAR for the less poor, non-poor and 
highly enterprising members; and QUEDANCOR credit facility for its poorer but 
enterprising members.  
 
On a positive note, if the four credit program designs are made available, 
WMCIP-assisted LPCIs and beneficiaries will have more options to choose from, 
thereby, empowering them to make better decisions on which program best suits their 
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needs and capabilities.  In the long-run, this will enable policy-makers and program 
planners to determine which credit program design works best for the poor under 
particular conditions.  However, one of the most critical factors in the four credit 
program designs is the limited support for livelihood and skills development as well as 
institutional strengthening for small organizations.  Hence, LCCs, LPCIs and target 
end-borrowers should be provided with adequate support services. 
 
In general, the four program designs (PCFC-GBAR, regular LBP credit 
program for cooperatives, CAP-PBD and QUEDANCOR’s SRT microcredit program) 
are profit-oriented credit programs for the poor.  They do not provide not-for-profit 
public support services such as farming systems and livelihood development, 
capability-building and technology transfer, marketing assistance and other support 
services.  The support services could only be provided in collaboration with the 
government’s line agencies, LGUs, NGOs and other charitable institutions.   
 
Thus, the provision of microcredit plus public support services is necessary for 
the reduction of poverty incidence in the rural areas.  But this requires the participation 
of different organizations from the government, civil society and the business sectors.  
Multiple-organizational collaboration suggests the need for good governance in the 
implementation of microcredit program with public support services.  
 
A further analysis of the financial aspects of the four program designs shows 
that all these are donor-funded and state-driven.  The PCFC-GBAR and 
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QUEDANCOR’s microcredit programs are supported by loans from LBP.  The 
cooperative credit and CAP-PBD facilities of LBP are supported by loan funds from 
CARP and foreign creditors.  In its totality, the state-driven and pro-poor credit 
programs administered under different special financing agreements between LBP and 
international creditors such as IFAD and ADB are secured by sovereign guarantee via 
the Philippine government.  Although the credit programs are designed for the 
impoverished sectors in the rural areas, investment recovery and profitability of the 
credit program are the major criteria for the participation of international creditors in 
credit programs for the poor. 
 
Specifically, LBP wholesale credit funds for cooperatives are loans from 
international creditors, secured by sovereign guarantee, re-lent through PCFC or 
QUEDANCOR, cooperatives, NGOs or POs and then delivered as small individual 
loans to qualified and interested beneficiaries.  Since the loans are targeted at the 
impoverished groups in the agriculture and fisheries sectors, the program designs 
could not be implemented without the public support services from the national 
government through DA, DAR, DSWD and other line agencies,  the LGUs and the 
NGOs.   
 
Evidently, the granting of small amounts of loans from foreign donors and 
creditors to the impoverished sectors passes through several layers of financial 
intermediation processes involving several government agencies—DOF, LBP and 
other GFIs.  Financial intermediation for the impoverished sectors also demonstrates 
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multiple-organizational collaboration through national and local inter-agency steering 
committees participated by different government agencies (e.g., DA, DENR, DAR and 
LGUs) and government financial intermediaries (e.g., LBP, QUEDANCOR and 
PCFC).  The financial intermediation further requires adequate administrative and 
financial capabilities of MFIs from the civil society (NGOs, POs and cooperatives) 
and the capitalist philosophy of the business sector (rural banks and thrift banks). 
 
The diverse socio-economic conditions of WMCIP beneficiaries suggests for 
the provision of as many credit options as possible based on credit program designs 
and implementation strategies that are best suited to the credit needs and financial 
capabilities of the impoverished but enterprising target beneficiaries and the financial  
capabilities of the participating GFIs and MFIs. 
 
The presence of inter-agency linkages in the administration of poverty 
reduction and rural development programs—such as microcredit—suggests that the 
take-off point for implementation primarily depends on the first good governance 
principle of participation.  This encompasses several organizations and stakeholders at 
all levels—from the international donor community to the individual beneficiaries.  
This is followed by transparency of actions, decisions, transactions and motives 
among the participating organizations.  Accordingly, multiple organizational 
partnerships require the assignment of accountability centers and identification of 
roles, duties, responsibilities and sanctions for non-compliance with the contractual 
obligations among partner organizations.  Ultimately, sustainability defines the 
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expected outcomes and impact of the specific poverty reduction or rural development 
program on the financial viability of profit-oriented GFIs and MFIs as well as the 
household financial conditions of target beneficiaries and the socio-economic 
conditions of their communities.   
 
Apparently, the administration of government programs via multiple 
organizational partnerships requires integration of good governance into the program 
design and implementation strategies.  Good governance strategies are also necessary 
in ensuring the success of microcredit programs.  Thus, good governance provides the 
framework for effectively attaining the financial viability and social equity goals of 
the profit-oriented government program for the impoverished sectors.  It also intends 
to ensure appropriateness of the processes involved in implementing and managing 
comprehensive and integrated programs for poverty reduction and rural development. 
 
The good governance-based program design should be social equity-laden and 
financially viable.  This will make the EDC sub-component of WMCIP appropriate 
and responsive to the credit needs and capabilities of the impoverished and non-
bankable target beneficiaries.  Good governance will help the poor beneficiaries in 
managing their own livelihood activities profitably.  It will also help LBP, 
QUEDANCOR and other partner LCCs or LPCIs generate sufficient profits from 
microcredit operations and attain the financial viability of microcredit program.  Since 
the wholesale providers of credit for the poor are profit-oriented GFIs (e.g., LBP, 
QUEDANCOR and PCFC), the overall net profit generated from the small and 
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frequent loan amortizations from the impoverished and non-bankable sectors provides 
additional net revenue collections for the Philippine government. 
 
B. Limiting and Enabling Factors in Microcredit Program 
In the administration of microcredit program as a development tool and as a 
strategy for poverty reduction in WMCIP-assisted barangays, there are factors that 
may directly or indirectly affect the success or failure of the program.  The factors that 
characterize the credit needs and financial capabilities of target beneficiaries and the 
loan product design itself may enable or limit successful program implementation.  
Thus, designing and implementing microcredit programs—under the EDC sub-
component—necessitate the identification of certain performance benchmarks and 
other factors that will guide implementors in program administration and risk 
management as well as in attaining performance targets, program objectives and 
desired outcomes.   
 
 In reference to the second research question—“What are the factors that 
enable and limit the successful design and implementation of the EDC sub-
component?”—the beneficiaries’ demographic attributes, household financial 
conditions, credit experiences, preferences and demand were examined in order to 
identify which factors are likely to facilitate or limit successful microcredit program 
design and implementation strategies. 
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 In view of the difficulty in ascertaining who among the beneficiaries actually 
need what, it is necessary to examine the general household financial conditions, 
credit experiences, needs and financial capabilities of target beneficiaries.  This will 
facilitate identification of social and economic factors needed as crucial inputs for 
deciding the best option for the target clientele; thereby making microcredit program 
effective and responsive.  
 
 The factors analyzed and used to describe the credit needs and financial 
capabilities were based on demographic attributes, household financial conditions, 
credit experience, and microcredit preferences and demand.     
 
     b.1.  Demographic Attributes  
 The demographic attributes of respondents refer to the basic biological, 
sociological and cultural references of the target beneficiaries.  These attributes either 
directly of indirectly affect the analysis of the poverty conditions of target 
beneficiaries, the kind of public services they actually need, the delivery of these 
services and the determination of program objectives and desired outcomes.  Thus, the 
program should also be designed and implemented in accordance with these 
demographic attributes.   
 
 The study scrutinized five attributes across the four provinces of Western 
Mindanao:  (a) gender, (b) age, (c) ethnicity, (d) religion, (e) household role, and (f) 
number of children. 
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 b.1.a.  Gender   
 Female respondents slightly outnumber their male counterparts by 3 percent.  
However, the difference is negligible. Table 7 presents the provincial distribution of 
respondents by gender.  There are 198 female respondents (50.8 percent) and 192 male 
respondents (49.8 percent).     
 
Table 7. Distribution of Respondents by Gender 
 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Male 
Female 
192 
198 
  49.2 
  50.8 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 Generally, microcredit programs are intended to provide financial and 
technical assistance to women from poor households for their income-generating 
livelihood and microentrepreneurial activities.  The borrowers of Grameen Bank, 
BRAC, ASA, BRI, CRBLI, CARD, TSPI and NWFTF are mostly women.  
Information from group discussions and interviews, however, do not support the 
premise that microcredit should benefit more women than men.  It is further revealed 
that it should be targeted at increasing the income of the household head or the 
family’s breadwinner whether male or female. 
 
 b.1.b. Age 
  Most of the respondents (84 percent) belong to the productive age bracket 
between 20 and 59 years old.  Table 8 shows the age distribution of respondents.  The 
mean age of respondents is 41 years old; the youngest respondent is 11 years old; and 
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the oldest is 77 years old.  Respondents aged between 20 to 39 years old are the 
dominant group in the sample.  The second largest group are between the ages of 40 
and 59 years old and followed by senior citizens aged 60 years old and above.  The 
smallest group of respondents comes from the group aged 19 and younger.   
 
 
Table 8.  Age of Respondents  
 
Age Frequency Percent (%) 
Up to 19 
20 - 39 
40 - 59 
60 and above 
  15 
173 
156 
  46 
    3.8 
  44.4 
  40.0 
  11.8 
Total 390 100.0 
Oldest      -  77 years old               Mean -  41 years old   
Youngest -  15 years old 
  
 The age factor determines the economic and productive capacity of an 
individual.  Legally, only adults (18 years old and above) are allowed to enter in any 
legal transactions.  On the other hand, senior citizens (60 years old and above) are 
normally placed under social welfare programs regardless of economic status.  This 
study, however, does not show that age should be included as a factor for microcredit 
programs despite well-defined legal mandate for the social protection of 
disadvantaged and vulnerable sectors such as children and elderly. 
  
 b.1.c. Ethnicity 
  The Cebuanos are the dominant ethnic group in the sample as presented in 
Table 9.  The Cebuanos represent 39.7 percent of the sample with 155 respondents, 
followed by 74 Subanens (19.0 percent), 34 Ilonggos (8.7 percent), 32 Yakans (8.2 
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percent), 26 Tausugs (6.7 percent), 25 Sama Lutangans (6.4 percent), and 22 Sama 
Bangingis (5.6 percent).  There are 22 respondents (5.6 percent) from other ethnic 
groups such as Maguindanao, Sama Kalibugan, Ilocano, Boholano, Tagalog, 
Siquihudnon and Waray.   
 
Table 9.  Ethnic Groupings of Respondents 
 
Ethnicity Frequency Percent (%) 
Bisaya 
Subanen 
Ilongo 
Yakan 
Tausug 
Samal Lutangan 
Samal Bangingi 
Other ethnic groups (Maguindanao, 
   Kalibugan, Ilocano, Boholano, Tagalog,   
   Siquihudnon, Waray) 
155 
  74 
  34 
  32 
  26 
  25 
  22 
  22 
39.7 
19.0 
  8.7 
  8.2 
  6.7 
  6.4 
  5.6 
  5.6 
Total 390 99.9* 
 * error due to rounding off 
 
 The WMCIP-covered communities are primarily defined by ethnic 
composition.  This study reveals that ethnic groupings within and across poor 
communities are significant to poverty alleviation and microcredit programs.  Poverty 
is a source of inter- and intra-ethnic discrimination.  For example, some (but not all) 
members of the dominant Tausug Muslim group believe that Badjao or Samal groups 
are poor and dirty.  On the other hand, some members of the dominant Cebuano group 
in Zamboanga del Norte likewise believe that Subanens (locally known as “Suban-
on”) are poor and ignorant. 
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 Moreover, a field staff who refused to be identified remarked that some (but 
not all) Muslim households are really difficult to deal with especially when it comes to 
collection of loan repayments.  Since some households in conflict-ridden and 
indigenous communities (especially among Muslim communities) are armed, the 
enforcement of loan repayment schedules may prove to be problematic. 
 
   b.1.d.   Religion 
  More than half of the survey respondents are Catholic as shown in Table 10.  
There are 207 Catholic respondents (53.1 percent), followed by 116 Islam respondents 
(29.7 percent) and 67 Protestants (17.2 percent).   
 
 
Table 10. Respondents' Religion 
 
Religion Frequency Percent (%) 
Catholic 
Islam 
Protestant 
207 
116 
  67 
  53.1 
  29.7 
  17.2 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 Religion is significant to both microcredit and poverty alleviation.  Poverty 
incidence in the country is highest among Islam believers or among Muslim 
communities in Mindanao.  Credit is likewise a religious issue since some Muslim 
respondents believe that credit should be interest-free.  From the group discussions, it 
is also revealed that religious gatherings and related activities are the most effective 
channels for information dissemination especially in areas where modern 
communication facilities are apparently lacking or actually missing. 
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 b.1.e.  Household Role 
  Wives comprise the largest group of respondents in the sample as shown in 
Table 11.  There are 174 wife-respondents (44. percent), followed by 160 husbands 
(41.0 percent), 32 sons (8.2 percent) and 24 daughters (6.2 percent).   
 
Table 11. Respondents' Household Role 
 
Household Role Frequency Percent (%) 
Wife 
Husband 
Son 
Daughter 
174 
160 
  32 
  24 
  44.6 
  41.0 
    8.2 
    6.2 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 
 Poor families generally pool limited resources for their survival and well-
being.  However, this study does not support household role classification as 
significant to microcredit programs for the poor.  In case of loan repayment problems, 
for example, family members could contribute their share in order that the loan could 
be paid.   
  
 Nevertheless, the group discussions and interviews further show that 
microcredit programs should take the entire household as a single unit of analysis in 
the effort to utilize microcredit as an anti-poverty intervention.  That is, the expected 
benefits from microcredit are not only intended for the benefit of one borrower from 
the same household, but for the benefit of all household members.   
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 b.1.f.   Number of Children 
  Majority of the respondents have at least one child but not more than five 
children.   Table 12 shows the frequency distribution of sampled respondents by 
number of children.  The average number of children is four, the minimum is zero for 
childless respondents while the highest is two respondents with 11 children.  There are 
seven respondents (1.8 percent) who are childless couples and 52 unmarried 
respondents (13.3 percent).  Among the respondents who have children, the largest 
group is composed of 237 respondents (60.8 percent) with one to five children, and 
followed by 94 respondents (24.1 percent) with more than five children.     
 
Table 12. Distribution of Respondents by Number of Children 
 
Number of Children Frequency Percent (%) 
None (childless couple) 
None (single and lives with parents) 
1 – 5 children 
More than 5 children 
    7 
  52 
237 
 94 
    1.8 
  13.3 
  60.8 
  24.1 
Total 390 100.0 
Minimum  -  childless couple                        Mean -  4 children  
Maximum  - 11 children     
 
 The number of children per family primarily determines the amount of 
resources needed to support them.  For example, the international absolute poverty 
threshold is pegged at US$1.00 per capita per day (UNDP 1997).  For a household 
composed of five members, this means that the household head will have to generate 
US$5.00 per day to support the entire household.  Converting this to Philippine peso at 
PhP55.00 per US$1.00, this means that a family of five must have an average daily 
income of at least PhP275.00 or PhP8,364.58 monthly.  The household is considered 
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as living in absolute poverty if income falls below the poverty threshold. This study, 
however, does not show ample evidence to prove that a target borrower’s number of 
children should be considered in the design and implementation strategies of pro-poor 
microcredit programs. 
 
 b.1.g.  Summary of Findings: Demographic Attributes 
 The six demographic attributes—gender, age, ethnicity, religion, household 
role, and number of children—could be considered as either enabling or limiting 
factors.  These factors may facilitate successful program implementation or may 
hamper the flow of the processes involved in implementation. 
 
 Gender.  It remains unclear whether women should benefit more from 
microcredit than men; or whether women tend to be better borrowers than men.  
Although microcredit programs (Grameen Bank, BRAC, BRI, ASA, CRBLI, CARD, 
TSPI and NWFTF) serve mostly women (at least 90 percent of active borrowers), 
gender appears to be a limiting factor if WMCIP’s EDC will be gender-biased.  The 
sensitivity of microcredit to gender should be evaluated later (e.g., five years after first 
loan availment) in terms of impact to income and benefits derived from the program 
by both the creditors and the borrowers. 
 
 Age.   Microcredit is a legal transaction that requires legal age.  Since some of 
the beneficiaries are old (60 years and older) and considered as less economically 
productive, appropriate social protection for the elderly would be appropriate.  Age 
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should be considered a limiting factor because a large number of ARBs are senior 
citizens with DAR-granted landholdings waiting to be divided among the adult and 
married children once the ARB dies due to illness or old age.  Hence, microcredit 
should be assigned to a beneficiary-household member who is at least 18 years of age 
but not more than 60 years old, still economically active, and physically capable to 
meet the demands of loan-funded activities. 
 
 Ethnicity is considered as an enabling factor for microcredit and for poverty 
alleviation especially among indigenous and minority groups.  For example, the social 
targeting of the Muslim and Subanen ethnic communities facilitates outreach and 
enables the identification of the enterprising poor from the marginalized ethnic 
communities.  This will also enable the designing and implementation of microcredit 
program and public support services that are responsive to traditional livelihood 
systems, entrepreneurship and artisanship.  These include ethnic artistry and culture 
such as handicrafts and exotic food preparations.     
 
 Religion is considered as an enabling factor for microcredit and for poverty 
alleviation.  For example, the poor Christian groups may save more money in 
preparation for the fiesta and then spend even more than the amount they have saved 
during fiestas.  This is because the fiesta is a way of life among the rural poor and a 
form of thanksgiving for the blessings they received from “God” and to pray for more 
blessings and good luck in the next harvest seasons.  On the other hand, the Muslims 
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spend more money on dowry and rituals for the son’s wedding, the Ramadan 
celebration and pilgrimages to Mecca in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.   
 
 Microcredit program design and implementation strategies need to be sensitive 
to tradition, religious beliefs and practices because these may directly affect household 
money-management strategies and the profitability of the loan-funded livelihood 
projects.  Thus, the timing of the inflow of net benefits from microcredit or the loan 
proceeds itself is likely to directly influence their spending habits during religious 
celebrations. 
 
 Household Role.  Obviously, the assignment of household roles has something 
to do with gender and appears to be a limiting factor.  It appears that the main issue is 
not the household role but the economic responsibility of the household head or the 
family’s “breadwinner” (disregarding the role of being wife, husband, son or daughter) 
which is heavier than that of other members in terms of generating enough income to 
support the family’s basic daily needs.   
 
 It is noted that for poor families, whoever controls the money also controls the 
household decision-making.  In this case, household role does not appear to be a sound 
criterion.  That is, microcredit can become more responsive to the needs of the entire 
household if it is aimed at increasing the income opportunities of the household head.   
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 Number of Children. This appears to be directly related to poverty but is 
considered a limiting factor.  Reyes (2002:9) finds that poverty incidence is highest 
among families with at least nine members and lowest for single-person households. 
That is, poverty is directly correlated with size of family.  However, the target 
borrower’s number of children could not be used as a criterion because one of the 
main criterion for successful microcredit program is the profitability of the loan-
funded project; not the number of borrower’s children.  The analysis of literature and 
information generated from interviews and discussion could not point to a valid 
justification on the relevance of the number of children on microcredit.   
 
 In view of the demographic attributes, only ethnicity and religion are 
considered as enabling factors because both are directly related to the income-
generating activities and money-management strategies of target beneficiaries.  The 
income-generating activities are also the main focus of the design and implementation 
strategies of the microcredit program and other poverty reduction initiatives of the 
government. 
 
 In terms of ethnicity as an enabling factor, the application of microcredit and 
public support services as a tool for poverty reduction and rural development should 
be geared towards developing and enhancing micro-entrepreneurship via traditional 
livelihood systems, particularly handicrafts.  In terms of religion as an enabling factor, 
the timing in the inflow of benefits from microcredit and other anti-poverty initiatives 
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of the government should likewise be congruent with household money-management 
strategies which are directly relevant to religious celebrations.   
 
 On the other hand, gender, age, household role and number of children are 
considered as limiting factors.  In the case of gender, it is still uncertain whether 
women are better loan-payers than men.  In terms of age, a large number of the actual 
agrarian reform beneficiaries are too old, sickly or dying.  Household role, on the other 
hand, has nothing to do with any loan product design.  Although the number of 
children of the target beneficiary is directly related to household poverty conditions 
(see Reyes 2002), it shows no direct relevance to the loan products being offered by 
creditors whether informal (moneylender), semi-formal (cooperatives, NGOs and 
POs) or formal (banks and private lending agencies). 
 
     b.2.  Household Financial Conditions 
Poverty reduction and other rural development interventions generally aim to 
increase household income above the poverty threshold.  However, microcredit as a 
poverty alleviation initiative is not capable of completely responding to the diverse 
household financial problems and poverty conditions of target beneficiaries.  Thus, it 
is necessary that the microcredit program is designed and implemented based on 
household financial conditions and their need for appropriate public services that 
WMCIP or any other government agency can provide. 
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For example, the poorest and the most vulnerable groups are too poor they 
could not meet the minimum requirements for participation in microcredit programs.  
These groups actually need subsidies and public support services; not microcredit.  
Thus, household financial conditions need to be examined more closely in order to 
determine how each indicator of household financial conditions may enable or limit 
the design and implementation strategies of the microcredit program. 
 
 Microcredit and other anti-poverty programs are anchored on household 
financial conditions because these represent the cash and non-cash resources that flow 
in and out of the household.  These are also viewed as the major determinants of an 
individual’s capability for income generation, evidence of accumulated wealth, ability 
to put up collateral and to meet financial obligations as they fall due, and the economic 
capacity to satisfy the survival and well-being needs of the family.  Hence, the 
appropriateness of microcredit program interventions could also be based on the 
household financial conditions of the target beneficiaries.   
 
 Since investment requisites for livelihood and other income-generating 
activities of the family are embedded in their household finances and assets, the 
estimated net monthly household cash flow is used to determine the appropriateness of 
microcredit program interventions to the general credit needs and financial capabilities 
of target borrowers or end-beneficiaries classified as poor and credit-worthy. 
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 Eight factors were analyzed based on the target beneficiaries’ household 
financial conditions.  The factors were further used to determine the appropriateness of 
microcredit program design: (1) type of house; (2) main source of income; (3) other 
sources of income for the family; (4) estimated average monthly income, (5) average 
monthly expenses, (6) net household cash flow, (7) action towards savings, and (8) 
action towards cash shortages.   
  
  b.2.a.  Type of House 
  Respondents living in wooden houses are the dominant group in the sample as 
shown in Table 13.  There are 182 respondents (46.7 percent) who live in wooden 
houses.  This is followed by 124 respondents (31.8 percent) who reside in houses 
made of a combination of bamboo, nipa and cogon grass.  The smallest group 
composed of 83 (21.3 percent) of the respondents live in houses made of concrete 
floor and wall; while only one respondent did not answer said item in the 
questionnaire.     
 
Table 13. Respondents' Type of House 
 
Type of House Frequency Percent 
Bamboo/Nipa/Cogon 
Wood 
Concrete(floor & wall) 
No response 
124 
182 
  83 
    1 
  31.8 
  46.7 
  21.3 
     0.3 
Total 390 100.1* 
   * error due to rounding off 
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 One of the readily visible indicators of poverty or affluence is type of house or 
dwelling unit.  Because only concrete houses are normally accepted as collateral for 
bank loans, type of house represents the social and economic status of families and a 
borrower’s capability to present tangible security for a loan as a hedge against possible 
default.  This study shows that the type of house or dwelling unit of target borrowers is 
a ready indicator of capability to put up collateral based on ownership and quality of 
the dwelling unit.  However, standard banking policies for acceptable collateral 
(concrete house) automatically exclude the poor who live in dwelling units not 
acceptable to banks as collateral; or those who may live in concrete houses they do not 
actually own.  Thus, microcredit programs need to be cognizant of the poor’s credit-
worthiness and eligibility for microcredit services based on the type of house that they 
own and where they live. 
 
b.2.b.  Main Source of Income   
  This study does not show that a single main source of income is significant to 
microcredit programs.  Although there is a wide diversity of income-generating 
activities and projects, households generally rely on a single economic undertaking as 
the main income-generating activity that provides sufficient economic support for the 
household.  Other economic activities provide additional economic returns that 
augment the financial benefits derived from the main economic activity of the 
household.  Thus, eligibility to microcredit services are conditioned by a composite of 
household income sources covering more than a single income-generating or 
livelihood activity. 
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  Farming and fishing remain as the major livelihood activities of the 
respondents as shown in Table 14.   Majority of the respondents (71.8 percent) support 
themselves and their family’s needs from income derived from farming (57.7 percent) 
and fishing (14.1 percent).   There are 44 respondents (11.3 percent) who are engaged 
in microenterprises to support their families; 33 respondents (8.5 percent) are locally 
employed; 16 respondents (4.1 percent) are laborers; 16 respondents (4.1 percent) are 
pensioners; and 14 respondents (3.6 percent) do not have any regular source of 
income.   
 
Table 14.  Main Source of Income 
 
Source of Income Frequency Percent (%) 
Farming 
Fishing 
Microenterprises 
Employee 
Laborer 
Pensioner 
No regular source of income 
225 
  55 
  44 
  33 
  16 
    3 
  14 
  57.7 
  14.1 
  11.3 
    8.5 
    4.1 
     0.8 
     3.6 
Total 390  100.1* 
  * error due to rounding off 
 
  Households and their income-generating activities are indicative of the state of 
target beneficiaries’ financial conditions.  The lump of money generated from the 
livelihood and microentrepreneurial activities of the head of the family and other 
family members constitute the household’s capacity to meet financial obligations and 
the overall survival and well-being needs of all household members.  On the other 
hand, this study does not support the argument that loans should be based on the single 
main source of income suggesting that one economic activity would not be sufficient 
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for evaluating the financial capability of the target borrower.  This finding is contrary 
to standard commercial banking practices, which normally look at one economic 
activity as a basis for loan financing.  The results of the study suggest that the entire 
economic activities and all income sources of poor households could be used as basis 
for evaluating the credit-worthiness and financial capabilities of target beneficiaries.  
Microcredit programs could be more responsive to the needs of the poor if microcredit 
arrangements are based on the composite of household income sources. 
 
  b.2.c.  Other Sources of Income for the Family 
  In addition to regular source of income to support the family, 33 respondents 
(8.5 percent) enjoy income transfers from their economically active children as shown 
in Table 15.  There are 18 (54.5 percent) who regularly receive money from their sons 
while 15 respondents (45.4 percent) regularly receive monthly financial contributions 
from their daughters.  The average amount (using the median amount) received by the 
parents from their sons was PhP1,974.06 while the daughters regularly send an 
estimated amount of PhP1,200.00.   
 
Table 15.  Other Sources of Monthly Income for the Family 
 
Source of Income Frequency Percent (%) Average (PhP) 
Son  
Daughter 
18 
15 
54.5 
45.5 
1,974.06 
1,200.00 
Total 33 100.0   
 
  Income transfers from sons and/or daughters provide additional household 
revenues.  However, available loan product designs from the formal and semi-formal 
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credit systems do not normally cover incomes which are generated from other sources 
and beyond the net income derived from the loan-funded project.  On the other hand, 
the results also suggest that the family may have crossed the poverty threshold due to 
income transfers and other forms of support provided by economically active children.  
Hence, they may be eligible for certain development programs other than microcredit. 
 
  Income transfers from sons who make regular financial contributions to meet 
their parents’ and siblings’ basic needs are presented in Table 16.  Six sons (33.3 
percent) work as laborer in order to earn additional income to support their parents and 
siblings.  Four sons (22.2 percent) are engaged in fishing in order to regularly send 
money to their parents.  Two sons (11.1 percent) are engaged in vending or buy-and-
sell livelihood activities to help their parents financially.  The other respondents (one 
respondent each) are engaged in operating a passenger van, hired as a male household 
help, employed in a private company, and as an electrician in order to help their 
parents financially, while two respondents do not know the livelihood activities of 
their sons who are helping them financially. 
 
Table 16.  Source of Son’s Income 
 
Son's Source of Income Frequency Percent (%) 
Laborer 
Fishing 
Vending/buy and sell 
Operator (Passenger Van) 
Household Help 
Employee 
Electrician 
No response 
6 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
  33.3 
  22.2 
  11.1 
    5.6 
    5.6 
    5.6 
    5.6 
  11.1 
Total 18 100.1* 
  * error due to rounding off 
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  The son’s sources of income do not show enough evidence that it should be 
included as a basis for eligibility to microcredit programs since economically active 
sons may not be the pre-identified beneficiaries of pro-poor microcredit programs.  
Only eligible household heads or heads of family who are also agrarian reform 
beneficiaries are pre-identified as beneficiaries.    The income generated from the 
son’s economic activities is only added to the household head’s gross income.  Hence, 
this could not be considered as the main criterion for eligibility to microcredit services 
because the target borrower is a beneficiary who may not be the son.   However, the 
son’s income could be considered for loan repayment under conditions that income 
from the loan-funded project may not be sufficient to cover the amount needed for full 
loan repayment. 
 
  Table 17, on the other hand, lists the sources of income for respondents’ 
daughters who regularly contributed financially to their parents in order to help the 
family meet financial obligations as they fall due.   Five daughters (33.3 percent) who 
are helping their parents financially derive their income from vending or buy-and-sell 
activities, three (20 percent) are employed as teachers, while two (13.3 percent) are 
household helpers.  The rest (one respondent each) consists of an Overseas Filipino 
Worker (domestic helper), dressmaker, fisherfolk, saleslady, and one respondent does 
not know where her daughter gets the money that she sends to them regularly.   
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Table 17.  Source of Daughter’s Income 
 
Source of Income Frequency Percent (%) 
Vending/buy and sell 
Teacher 
Household Help 
OFW 
Dressmaking 
Fishing 
Saleslady 
No Response 
5 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
33.3 
20.0 
13.3 
  6.7 
  6.7 
  6.7 
  6.7 
  6.7 
Total 15 100.1* 
      * error due to rounding off 
 
  Daughter’s sources of income do not show enough evidence that it should be 
included as a basis for eligibility to microcredit programs since economically active 
daughters may not be the pre-identified beneficiaries of pro-poor microcredit 
programs.  The income generated from the economic activities of the beneficiary’s 
daughter is only added to the household head’s gross income. Moreover, income 
transfers from income-earning daughters suggest the economic dependency of the 
household.  Hence, this could not be considered as a criterion for eligibility to 
microcredit services because the target borrower is a beneficiary who is legally a 
different person.  However, daughter’s income could be considered for loan repayment 
under conditions that income from the loan-funded project may not be sufficient to 
cover the amount needed for full loan repayment. 
 
  b.2.d.  Estimated Average Monthly Income 
  Taking into consideration the household’s main source of income and all other 
livelihood activities undertaken by household members as well as income transfers 
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from working children, the respondents have provided an estimate of the monetary 
value of their non-cash income and added to their estimated monthly cash revenues.   
 
  The 2000 poverty threshold for rural areas in Western Mindanao stood at 
PhP11,046.00 per capita per year (NEDA 2003).  This suggests that in WMCIP-
covered barangays, a household with five members is considered poor if average 
household monthly income amounts to PhP4,602.50 and below or an average income 
falling below PhP151.33 per day.   
 
  Table 18 shows 157 respondents (40.3 percent) who are classified as non-poor 
with an estimated average monthly income higher than the regional poverty threshold 
of PhP4,602.50.  On the other hand, 233 respondents (59.7 percent) are classified as 
poor with an estimated average monthly income falling below PhP4,602.51.   
 
  Using Joe Remenyi’s (1999) poverty pyramid, the poor are divided into four 
quartiles arranged from lowest to highest.  The poorest (4th quartile) represent four 
percent; the very poor group (3rd quartile) comprise 14 percent; moderately poor (2nd 
quartile) represents 28 percent; and the less poor (1st quartile) comprises 14 percent of 
the poor respondents.    
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Table 18. Respondents' Average Monthly Income 
 
Monthly Income* Frequency Percent (%) 
Poorest                (PhP1,150.64 and below) 
Very Poor           (PhP1,150.65 – PhP2,301.26) 
Moderately Poor (PhP2,301.27 – PhP3,451.88) 
Less Poor            (PhP3,451.89 - PhP4,602.50) 
Non-poor              (PhP4,602.51 and above) 
  17 
  55 
108 
  53 
157 
   4.4 
  14.1 
  27.7 
  13.6 
  40.2 
 Total 390 100.0 
Minimum — PhP      500.00                          Median     — PhP   3,750.00**  
Maximum — PhP23,500.00 
  *   based on 2000 poverty threshold (NEDA 2002) 
  ** median income was used because it is not sensitive to extreme values 
 
  The median income is estimated at PhP3,750 every month which is 19 percent 
lower than the poverty threshold for a family of five.  Meanwhile, the lowest income 
of PhP500.00 means that the concerned family of five could only satisfy 11 percent of 
their minimum basic needs for survival and well-being.  Apparently though, the 
highest income is PhP23,500 every month suggesting that some of the WMCIP 
beneficiaries are not actually poor. 
 
An analysis of the average monthly income using Joe Remenyi’s (1999) 
poverty pyramid would enable the identification of the needs and capabilities of the 
poor and the provision of appropriate and timely doses of assistance.  For example, the 
poorest families who belong to the fourth quartile are likely to have seasonal income, 
big families, more children and also most vulnerable to illnesses, accidents, loss of 
income and other economic shocks.  That is, income may not be sufficient to support 
the survival of all household members.  For this group, any amount of credit as an 
anti-poverty intervention will be used for survival (e.g., food and medication); not for 
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capital investment in income-generating activities. Providing microcredit to this group 
would be a mistake.  Hence, social safety nets are more appropriate (see Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3.  Western Mindanao Household Poverty Pyramid  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The poverty pyramid suggests the need for public support services and a 
graduated strategy in the application of microcredit as a tool for poverty reduction and 
rural development.  The poverty pyramid likewise reinforces the BRAC-IGVGD 
model for helping the different poverty groups.  The graduated model is considered as 
a more appropriate intervention for heterogeneous poverty conditions.  The process of 
graduation starts from the fourth group where safety nets provisions and capability-
building programs for the poorest of the poor or the most vulnerable are provided until 
they graduate to the third level.  The laboring poor comprise the third group who need 
a combination of subsidies and microcredit services until they graduate to the second 
Micro-entrepreneur 
(PhP3,451.89—4,602.50) 
Self-employed/Enterprising   
(PhP2,301.27—3,451.88)
 Laborer (PhP1,150.65—2,301.26) 
No regular income: poorest/most vulnerable   
(PhP1,150.64 and below)
 1st Quartile (13.6% of  the 
respondents) 
   2nd Quartile (27.7% of the 
respondents) 
 3rd Quartile(14.1% of 
 the respondents) 
 4th Quartile    
    (4.4%  of the  
        respondents) 
Non-poor 
(PhP4,602.51 and above) 
40.2% of the respondents 
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level—the self-employment level; and then to the highest level—the 
microentrepreneurial level.   
 
The poor and non-bankable ultimately graduate out of microcredit and onto 
mainstream commercial banking and finance when their economic activities are 
classified as commercially viable and their projects bankable. At this ultimate stage, it 
is envisioned that microcredit beneficiaries have already crossed the poverty threshold 
and their levels of bankability and credit-worthiness have already satisfactorily passed 
conventional standards required by the mainstream commercial banking system. 
 
  In summary, this study shows that average monthly income represents the 
gross financial receipts of the household including the cash equivalent of non-cash 
transactions estimated at prevailing prices when the study was conducted.  The 
poverty pyramid and the BRAC-IGVGD models are likewise applicable to average 
monthly income.  However, the average monthly income does not show the net 
benefits that accrue to all household members.  The average monthly income only 
provides an incomplete picture of the general economic status of households.   Gross 
income does not provide an estimate of how much money is actually left when 
expenditures are incurred.  Hence, this is not a sound criterion to determine eligibility 
to credit programs either regular commercial credit or microcredit facilities. 
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  b.2.e.  Average Monthly Expenses  
  The monthly expenditure of PhP4,620.50 every month represents the minimum 
amount needed for the satisfaction of basic needs for a family of five. The families 
who spend a maximum amount of PhP1,150.64 are considered poorest of the poor 
since they could barely satisfy one-fourth of the required average monthly 
expenditures for the family’s basic needs.   
 
  Table 19 shows the estimated average monthly expenses of respondents’ 
households. The largest group is composed of 161 respondents (41.3 percent) who 
regularly spend between PhP2,301.25 and  PhP4,620.50 every month  for their 
respective households.  The second largest group of respondents composed of 148 
respondents (37.9 percent) spend at least PhP4,620.50 every month for their household 
needs.  The smallest group of 81 respondents (20.8 percent) spend PhP2,301.50 and 
less every  month. 
 
  The median expenses is estimated at PhP3,800 every month which is 18 
percent lower than the poverty threshold for a family of five while the lowest 
expenditure is PhP500.00 which means that the concerned family of five could only 
satisfy 11 percent of their minimum basic needs for survival and well-being.  
Apparently though, the highest household expense is PhP25,360 every month 
suggesting that some of the WMCIP beneficiaries are not actually poor.  This confirms 
the findings in the average monthly income.  Based on both income and expenditures 
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of sampled WMCIP beneficiaries, it is noted that some of the pre-selected WMCIP 
beneficiaries are not actually poor. 
 
Table 19.  Average Monthly Expenses 
 
Monthly Expenses Frequency Percent (%) 
PhP2,301.25 and below 
PhP2,301.25  -  PhP4,620.50 
Above PhP4,620.50 
  81 
161 
148 
  20.8 
  41.3 
  37.9  
Total 390 100.0 
Minimum –  PhP   500.00         Median —  PhPP3,800.00 
Maximum – PhP25,360.00 
 
   
  The average monthly expenses represent the actual lump of money needed and 
used to support a family.  This study reveals that household expenditures also include 
the target borrower’s investments for income-generating activities which are normally 
lumped together with other household expenditure items.  This finding is consistent 
with the findings of other studies showing that for the poor, their expenses related to 
business and microentrepreneurial activities are not separate from the household’s 
regular expenses for food, health, nutrition, education and other expenses.  
 
  Expenditure Items.  Table 20 shows the monthly household expenditure items 
of the respondents.  The expenditure items were computed independently from other 
items.  In the first and second columns are the frequency distribution and percentages 
concerning respondents who provided the data for every expenditure item while the 
“no response” frequencies were no longer presented.  The third column indicates the 
average monthly income in Philippine peso (PhP).  This is computed based on the 
median income because the median it is not easily affected by extreme values (see Rea 
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and Parker 1992 and Norusis 2002).  The fourth column presents the each of the 
average expenditure item as a proportion to the average monthly income of 
PhP3,750.00 (see median income presented in Table 18). 
 
  Food expenses account for the largest household expenditure item.  Food 
consumption of the family approximately eats up 45 percent of the family’s monthly 
income. This is followed by land preparation (25 percent of income), 
medicines/hospitalization (13 percent of income), clothing, miscellaneous expenses 
and children’s tuition fees (12 percent of income, respectively), children’s allowance 
(11 percent of income) and other expenditure items such as livestock feeds, board and 
lodging, transportation, electricity and water. 
 
Table 20. Monthly Expenditure Item as a Proportion of Monthly Income   
 
Expenditure Item Frequency
Percent 
(%) 
Average 
(PhP) 
Proportion to 
Income (%) 
1.Food 
2.Land Preparation 
3.Medicines/Hospitalization 
4.Clothing 
5.Miscellaneous Expenses 
6.Children's Tuition Fees 
7.Children's Allowance 
8.Livestock Feeds 
9.Board and Lodging 
10. Transportation 
11. Electricity 
12. Water 
379 
194 
225 
349 
250 
206 
270 
175 
  64 
314 
221 
153 
97 
50 
58 
89 
64 
53 
69 
45 
16 
81 
57 
39 
1,500 
  500 
  200 
  300 
  300 
  220 
  275 
  250 
  275 
  200 
  120 
   58 
45 
25 
13 
12 
12 
12 
11 
10 
  9 
  9 
  4 
  2 
 
 
 
  It is cautioned, however, that some respondents do not normally compute 
household expenses while others do not have an accurate estimate of their expenses.  
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This is primarily because they are mostly engaged in non-cash transactions concerning 
their food requirements or simply they barter items with neighbors, friends or traders.  
That is, in remote upland and indigenous communities, household economic 
transactions are not defined by the monetary or numerical value of commodities being 
bartered.  During a market day, for example, a WMCIP beneficiary and a trader may 
exchange one sack of freshly harvested sweet potato with one pack of dried fish or 
perhaps a pack of detergent bars as may be agreed by both parties. 
 
  Nevertheless, household expenditure items reveal that poor families do not 
separate their regular home consumption expenditures from their investment expenses 
for small businesses or microenterprises.  Hence, microcredit programs need to 
include the overall household expenditures to determine cash outflow and to monitor 
how the borrowers actually utilize the loan proceeds obtained through their 
participation in microcredit programs. 
 
  b.2.f.  Household Cash Flow 
  The positive net benefits of all transactions that accrue to the families of the 
respondents are used to meet other expenditure requirements taken from extra amount 
saved every month.  On the other hand, cash shortages are quite evident among poor 
families because the inflow of revenues to their households is barely enough to meet 
their basic requirements for survival.  This is measured in terms of the estimated net 
household cash flow every month.    
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  Table 21 shows that the average monthly financial inflow to the households 
(based on median income) is reported to be PhP3,750.00 every month, while the 
estimated average outflow (based on median expenditures) is PhP3,800.  
Consequently, the estimated average net household cash inflow every month is 
negative PhP89.00.   Moreover, fifty-two percent (204 respondents) reveal that their 
households are able to generate extra cash or savings in the amount of PhP1,183.50 
since their incomes are higher than their monthly expenses, while 45 percent (174 
respondents) regularly incur deficits every month usually around PhP1,085.50 
monthly.  Only three percent (12 respondents) indicate that they are neither able to 
save nor had problems regarding cash shortages. 
 
Table 21. Monthly Household Cash Flow 
Cash Flow Frequency Percent (%)  
Average 
(PhP) 
Estimated monthly income (Inflow) 
Estimated monthly expenses (outflow) 
With surplus/savings 
With shortage (deficit) 
No shortage/no deficit 
390 
390 
204 
174 
  12 
100 
100 
  52 
  45 
   3 
3,750  
3,800  
1,184  
(1,086) 
- 
 
 
 
 The household cash flow is the ultimate determinant of a household’s socio-
economic status, credit needs and financial capabilities.  Thus, the applicability and 
appropriateness of microcredit programs are determined by their sensitivity and 
responsiveness to actual household cash flow conditions.  This reflects whether the 
target borrowers have sufficient net disposable income to be used for small business 
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investments; or net cash shortages which may result to the borrowers’ utilization of 
loan proceeds other than those specified in the terms and conditions of the loan. 
 
 The analysis of the average household cash flow suggests that despite poverty, 
small amounts of savings could still be generated from other income-generating 
activities undertaken by household members to augment the income derived from the 
family’s main occupation or main source of income.  This group of respondents could 
be better helped through provision of advisory services and other capability building 
initiatives for the utilization of their savings as capital investments applicable to 
microenterprises or income-generating activities; and appropriate to their socio-
economic conditions, credit needs and financial capabilities. 
 
 Loan proceeds are likely to be diverted and used to satisfy unmet family needs 
for health, nutrition, education, house repairs and the like.  Thus, target borrowers who 
experience frequent cash shortages are considered as high credit risks.  The application 
of microcredit programs to this group of beneficiaries may push them further into 
debts they could no longer repay.  This may result to harsh enforcement of 
accountability measures and legal actions by creditors.  The poor who are in constant 
shortage of money may not be readily helped by microcredit programs.  That is, they 
could be better helped by non-credit-based poverty alleviation initiatives such as 
provision of farm inputs, food for work programs, livelihood assistance and 
microentrepreneurship trainings which are geared towards generating additional 
income for all capable family members. 
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  b.2.g.  Actions Toward Savings   
Actions toward savings reveal the attitude pertaining to the accumulation of 
money or any form of assets and the general intention of keeping these assets.  Table 
22 shows that among the 204 respondents (52 percent) out of the 390 sampled 
beneficiaries who could generate regular cash savings, 33.3 percent (68 respondents) 
just keep their extra money in anticipation of any emergency situations affecting their 
loved ones.  Twenty-eight respondents (13.7 percent) indicate that they are 
accumulating their savings for future investments in small businesses or micro-
enterprises while twenty-two respondents (10.8 percent) prefer to deposit the savings 
in the bank.   
 
Other purposes for saving money every month include: to purchase additional 
livestock, to use as additional capital for business, to pay debts, to purchase additional 
farm equipment or home appliances, to spend for the repair of house, banca, store and 
other repairs needed, to buy medicines, to satisfy other household needs and to pay the 
monthly insurance premium.  On the other hand, twenty-eight percent (57 
respondents) do not have any idea on what to do with the amount saved every month. 
 
  Since 52 percent of the respondents admitted that they are able to save every 
month, they also revealed their usual activities relative to the amount of savings they 
are able to accumulate.    
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Table 22.  Actions Toward Savings 
 
Action Frequency Percent (%) 
Saved for emergency 
Engage in small business 
Deposit in the bank 
Purchase additional livestock 
Use as additional capital for business 
Pay debt 
Purchase equipment/appliances 
For educational expenses 
Repair (house/banca/store) 
Other actions (for medicines, other household needs  
  and for payment of monthly SSS contribution) 
Don’t know 
  68  
  28  
  22  
    5  
    4  
    4  
    4  
    4  
    3  
    5  
   
  57 
33.3 
13.7 
10.8 
  2.5 
  2.0 
  2.0 
  2.0 
  2.0 
  1.5 
  2.4 
      
27.9 
Total 204 100.1* 
 * error due to rounding off 
 
   The result of the study shows that cash savings are likely to be used for 
economically productive and financially rewarding activities such as capital for small 
business and income-augmenting projects.  For a microcredit program to be applicable 
and appropriate to the prevailing conditions of the poor, it needs to provide advisory 
services for capital investments in small enterprises.   
 
  Furthermore, interviews with NGO field personnel reveal that with the 
provision of microcredit facilities to target borrowers whose cash savings are not 
adequate as start-up capital, microcredit facilities may be made available based on 
credit needs and capability to pay a loan and based on the profit-potential of the loan-
funded microenterprises or livelihood projects.  Finally, this type of assistance needs 
to go hand-in-hand with support services such as technical, marketing and other 
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capability-building interventions to ensure profitable operations of the beneficiaries’ 
economic activities. 
 
  b.2.h.  Actions Toward Cash Shortages 
Cash shortages reveal that the family is unable to generate income sufficient to 
satisfy the basic requirements for survival of all household members.  Likewise, this 
presents available options for solving the cash flow problems of households.  Table 23 
shows that the 174 respondents (45 percent) who frequently encounter cash shortages 
every month employ different strategies and actions to cope with household financial 
problems.   
 
Seventy respondents (40.2 percent) from the cash deficit group prefer to 
borrow money during financial difficulties; 38 respondents (21.8 percent) say they 
will do manual labor for a fee; 27 respondents (15.5 percent) prefer to sell snack items 
to neighbors; 22 respondents (12.6 percent) opt to sell whatever properties they have 
in order to solve household cash shortage problems.  Other preferred actions to cope 
with the family’s financial shortages include becoming a household help, selling dried 
fish and doing laundry for a fee.   Nine respondents (5.2 percent) have no idea what to 
do in times of financial difficulties. 
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Table 23.  Actions Toward Cash Shortages 
 
Action Frequency Percent (%) 
Borrow money 
Do manual labor for a fee 
Sell snacks 
Sell properties 
Be a household help 
Sell dried fish 
Do laundry for a fee 
No response 
70 
38 
27 
22 
3 
3 
2 
9 
40.2 
21.8 
15.5 
12.6 
 1.7 
 1.7 
 1.2 
 5.2 
Total 174 99.9* 
  * error due to rounding off 
 
  The activities frequently resorted to by the poor especially under conditions of 
financial stress, tend to be directly related to the survival of the family.  The presence 
of affluent relatives, friends and local moneylenders provide temporary relief to their 
financial dilemma.  Microcredit is likely to fail under the abovementioned conditions.  
Microcredit is about profit-oriented business and therefore not intended to finance the 
actual needs for the survival of the borrower’s family.  This suggests that microcredit 
programs are likely to fail if loan proceeds are used for non-profit generating survival 
activities.  Hence, the credit only strategy of Grameen Bank is not likely to alleviate 
the poverty conditions of borrowers who are in constant cash-deficit situations.    
 
  Social safety net provisions such as direct food subsidy, food for work 
programs, farm inputs, technology transfer programs, skills trainings and other 
entrepreneurial capability-building interventions should be provided within a 
transition period.  After the transition period, subsidies are automatically withdrawn 
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and the beneficiaries are deemed graduated into being provided with profit-generating 
livelihood projects. 
 
b.2.i.  Summary of Findings: Household Financial Conditions 
 Microcredit scholars argue that the credit needs and financial capabilities of the 
poor are too small to be bankable based on commercial banking standards.  However, 
it is argued that the poor and non-bankable are nevertheless credit-worthy in the sense 
that they are able to honor and meet financial obligations as they fall due.  Hence, 
microcredit program becomes appropriate only if it is able to respond to the very small 
amounts of money invested by the poor in their home-based income-generating 
activities.  Otherwise, other government assistance should be provided to enable the 
target beneficiaries to increase household income and accumulate savings that are 
normally required by the credit-granting MFIs prior to the delivery of credit and other 
support services.  
 
 Type of house includes the lot where it stands and ownership thereof represent 
the most readily visible indicator of poverty or affluence.  This is considered as an 
enabling factor especially in the creditor’s background investigation (BI) of the 
borrower’s capability to pay because creditors normally accept land titles and concrete 
houses as collateral.  Inside the house are other properties that could be used to secure 
a loan.  It is observed that the big and concrete houses belong to the most affluent 
households in the community. 
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 Main source of income indicates the major economic activity that supports the 
basic needs of the household and it could be considered as an enabling factor.  This is 
because microcredit programs intend to increase the income of households by 
providing support to income-generating activities which is normally based on the main 
source of income.  But it is recommended that other sources of income should also be 
considered given their income-augmenting potentials.   
 
 Other sources of income for the family are normally lumped together with the 
main source of income.  This is normally the financial support (income transfers) 
provided by adult sons, daughters or close relatives who earn from livelihood 
activities, employment and other occupations.  Hence, this should also be considered 
as an enabling factor especially in applying remedial measures for enforcing loan 
repayments from sources other than the net income of the loan-funded project. 
 
 Average monthly income of the household indicates gross revenues from 
economic activities.  Since this may come from several sources and may be depleted 
based on spending habits and lifestyle of family members, this serves only as a partial 
indicator for measuring the family’s well-being.  Besides, it is observed that 
beneficiaries do not keep any record of their financial transactions and do not file 
income tax returns.  The monetary value of their economic activities is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine accurately.  Hence, this should be considered as a limiting 
factor because this is already accounted for in the household cash flow analysis. 
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 Average Monthly Expenses indicate the cost of poor households’ economic 
activities but again these are not recorded and are difficult to monitor.  But this is 
observed as a limiting factor because loan delinquencies and defaults are normally 
caused by household expenditures that are not related to the operating expenses of 
loan-funded projects.  Although difficult, this should also be monitored to ensure that 
loan funds are utilized as intended.  Otherwise, the borrower must have other sources 
of income to cover unauthorized use of loan proceeds.  Moreover, this is already 
accounted for in the overall household cash flow analysis. 
 
 Household Cash Flow indicates the net benefits derived from a composite of 
economic activities covering all sources of income and all expenditure items.  Group 
discussions, interviews and observations reveal that this should be the first enabling 
factor to be considered in evaluating the eligibility of poor borrowers to any 
microcredit program.  Unlike formal businesses, the poor normally lump together all 
expenditures whether regular household expenditures or capital investments or 
operating expenses pertinent to income-generating activities.  Furthermore, the 
household cash flow situations indicate their money management strategies—
involving loan proceeds—as gleaned from their activities toward savings and actions 
in resolving cash shortages or deficits. 
 
 Actions toward savings indicate where extra money actually goes and should 
be considered as an enabling factor especially in savings generation and mobilization, 
 252
profit-motivated economic investments and in instilling credit discipline among 
borrowers. 
 
 Actions toward cash shortages indicate household financial stress suggesting 
that the family’s top priority is survival.  This is considered as a limiting factor 
because credit risk is quite high.  Hence, it is highly possible that borrowers suffering 
from financial stress will divert loan proceeds to meet survival-related expenses (food 
and medicines).  In an interview, a local five-six credit scheme operator disclosed that 
anticipating legal and police actions or violent confrontations with creditors, some 
poor borrowers opted to migrate and join their relatives in Cebu City, Manila and 
other distant places.   
 
 In summary, the determinants of household financial conditions could be 
classified as factors that may enable or limit the design and implementation strategies 
of microcredit program and other anti-poverty interventions of the government.  The 
enabling factors facilitate social targeting and provision of public support services that 
enable more financially viable and economically productive entrepreneurial activities 
and business investments.  The limiting factors, on the other hand, help in risk 
management and identification of specific household conditions that are likely to be 
the cause of the failure of the loan-funded projects and the microcredit program in 
general.  The enabling or limiting factors include (1) type of house, (2) main source of 
income, (3) other sources of income, (4) average monthly income, (5) average 
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monthly expenses, (6) net household cash flow, (7) actions toward savings, and (8) 
actions toward cash shortages. 
 
 As enabling factors, the ownership of a house acceptable to mainstream 
commercial banks as loan collateral also helps in securing a small loan through 
microcredit facilities because this could also be used as a security for repayment to co-
makers under the mutual group-guarantee schemes common in Grameen-type 
microcredit programs. 
 
 On the other hand, the loan product designs of most credit providers focus on 
the borrower’s main source of income because it is considered as a direct indicator of 
prevailing skills, expertise and experience in the management of a loan-funded 
livelihood project.  Furthermore, the identification of other sources of income could be 
used as a security in a worst-case scenario such as the failure of the object loan to 
generate profits needed for loan repayment.  In such case, household income from 
other sources could be used for loan repayment just in case the loan-funded project 
fails to yield net profits.   
 
 In the case of household cash flow, this determines the net benefits from all 
economically productive activities of family members that accrue to the household.  
Since the household activities of the poor are lumped together with business and 
entrepreneurial investments and activities, this enables the design and implementation 
strategies of microcredit program.  Actions toward savings, on the other hand, 
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manifest the money-management strategies of the household members when extra 
cash is still available after subtracting total expenditures from overall household 
revenues.  Thus, microcredit programs normally give priority to target beneficiaries 
who possess the financial capacity to save and to utilize their savings for income-
augmentation, more profitable and more financially viable livelihood options. 
 
 In the limiting factors, the average monthly income provides an incomplete 
picture of the general household financial conditions of the target beneficiaries.  This 
does not take into account the expenditure items that could be more significant to the 
target beneficiaries.  Both income and expenses are also accounted for in determining 
the net household cash flow.  Consequently, the actions toward cash shortages further 
reveal their attitude towards money, spending habits, lifestyle, and the priorities of the 
family in general.  Thus, the limiting factors are also important in the program design 
and implementation strategies of microcredit especially in terms of credit risk 
management, in ensuring that the loan proceeds are put to good use, and in ensuring 
that the target beneficiaries possess adequate entrepreneurial skills and the positive 
attitude towards money. 
 
 In view of the enabling or limiting factors that determine the state of household 
financial conditions, it is recommended that the net household cash flow be used as the 
main basis for evaluating the credit-worthiness of target borrowers as well as the 
applicability and appropriateness of a microcredit program.   
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 Since microcredit is only applicable to the enterprising poor who are likely to 
generate savings from their existing income-generating activities, only those who 
belong to the poverty groups who possess the financial capacity to accumulate 
monthly savings are likely to be readily and immediately helped by microcredit.  
Furthermore, these poverty groups have the tendency to use their extra money for 
more productive economic endeavors and other income-augmenting activities beyond 
their household basic needs.    
 
  Meanwhile, the cash-deficit group is less likely to meet the loan repayment 
benchmarks enforced by LBP and other creditors.  The group may not be able to 
maximize credit funds for profit-oriented livelihood activities.  Diversion of loan 
proceeds for family needs resulting to loan defaults is highly likely among the cash-
deficit groups.  Thus, the cash-deficit groups should be placed under a special program 
covering social safety nets, capability-building or other anti-poverty interventions 
within a maximum transition period of six months to one year combining credit 
discipline, values orientation, food transfer programs, medical missions, direct subsidy 
for production inputs and technologies and other social safety net provisions.   
 
 The interventions should be geared towards making the cash-deficit 
beneficiaries bankable and more credit-worthy.  These activities are geared towards 
enabling the capabilities of cash-deficit beneficiaries to handle and manage income-
augmenting as well as profit-oriented economic activities.  At the end of the transition 
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period, their capabilities and resources should already be sufficient for them to be able 
to qualify and access the regular microcredit programs in their respective barangays.   
 
  In summary, the variety of household financial conditions is indicative of the 
general socio-economic well-being of families.  This suggests the need for a 
classification of WMCIP beneficiaries according to their socio-economic conditions 
and financial capabilities.  This further suggests the need for a comprehensive and 
multi-pronged approach to rural development that combines social safety net 
provisions for the poorest of the poor and the vulnerable groups; additional livelihood 
options, credit and support services, entrepreneurial trainings, income-enhancement 
and investments program; and business advisory services for those with adequate and 
stable income.  
 
b.2.j.    Appropriateness of Microcredit Program based on  Household Financial  
            Conditions 
 
Based on the Joe Remenyi’s (1999:6-7) framework, it is recommended that 
beneficiaries be classified into five groups.  The classification of beneficiaries is based 
on computed net average monthly household cash flow, which is obtained by 
subtracting household income from expenses.  Poverty classification is based on the 
NEDA-defined poverty threshold applied to the net household cash flow. 
 
The application of the poverty pyramid facilitates identification of poverty 
conditions and the administration of appropriate anti-poverty interventions based on 
needs and capabilities of target beneficiaries.  Eventually, beneficiaries graduate into 
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the next higher level in the classification immediately after the recommended 
transition period of preferably six months to one year.  Graduation is based on the five 
groupings of WMCIP beneficiaries.  The classification and recommended poverty 
alleviation interventions are arranged from the lowest to the highest quartile (highest 
to lowest group) as follows: 
5th group—Poorest of the Poor—represents the lowest 25 percent (4th Quartile) 
of poor beneficiaries placed at the bottom of the poverty pyramid.  This 
group is typically composed of beneficiaries who are economically 
dependent on other family members for survival such as the physically 
or mentally handicapped, children, elderly, pregnant women, the sick, 
the infirm, etc.  The recommended forms of assistance include 
confidence, skills and capability-building services plus social safety 
nets provisions such as direct food transfer services, health care and 
medicine subsidies, educational assistance, neighborhood-assisted 
housing and house repairs, etc. Graduation is geared towards being a 
laboring poor or any household member to enable the provision of 
socio-economic support to dependents.  
4th group—Laboring Poor—represents second from the lowest group 25 
percent (3rd Quartile) of poor beneficiaries whose main source of 
income to support the family is the sale of manual labor.  The 
recommended forms of assistance include capability-building such as 
vocational skills, credit-worthiness and microentrepreneurship 
development services, production-oriented livelihood/income-
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generating activities, farm input subsidies, technology transfer services, 
marketing, food for work programs, etc.  Graduation is geared towards 
being an enterprising poor. 
3rd group—Enterprising Poor—represents the third from the lowest 25 percent 
(2nd Quartile) of poor beneficiaries whose main income-
generating/livelihood activity is production for home consumption 
and/or for the local market often on a part-time basis.  The 
recommended forms of assistance include microcredit plus credit-
worthiness enhancement services, savings mobilization, continuous 
entrepreneurial skills development and livelihood support services such 
as marketing assistance, farm input subsidies, technology transfer 
services, equipment and facilities among others.  Graduation is geared 
towards operating a microenterprise. 
2nd group—Microenterprise Operators—representing the highest 25 percent 
(1st Quartile) of poor beneficiaries whose engagement in livelihood 
activities and microenterprise operations require the employment of not 
more than three persons.  The recommended forms of assistance 
include microcredit plus marketing, bankability-development and 
enhancement services, microenterprise development and management 
as well as microentrepreneurial capability-building services.  
Graduation is geared towards access to commercial banking and 
mainstream credit facilities. 
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1st group—Non-poor—represents the beneficiaries who are not actually poor 
and therefore placed outside the poverty pyramid.  They are the 
beneficiaries whose regular monthly cashflow falls above the poverty 
threshold as defined by NEDA.  The recommended forms of assistance 
include business referral, market linkages, business management, 
enterprise development and entrepreneurship-enhancement services 
intended for sustained access to local commercial banking facilities and 
other mainstream financial services. 
  
 The variety of household financial conditions across WMCIP beneficiaries 
could not be addressed by a single strategy for poverty alleviation.  This serves as the 
primary input for developing and strengthening institutional partnerships and for 
designing and implementing poverty alleviation and rural development programs.  
This approach combines a variety of development interventions such as microcredit, 
social safety nets provisions, farm subsidies, facilities and equipment, infrastructure, 
trainings, new production technologies, product processing and storage and market 
linkages. 
 
 The four program designs of LBP, CAP-PBD, PCFC and QUEDANCOR are 
applicable to the poverty pyramid using the main source of income of target 
beneficiaries.  The analysis shows that they cover only the top two quartiles 
representing the upper 50 percent of the target beneficiaries indicating further that the 
four credit options are only open to the enterprising poor who are financially capable 
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and credit-worthy.  The income-generating activities are mostly trading, processing or 
vending with daily turnover of cash.  The daily turnover of cash enables net profit 
generation on a daily basis and the scheduling of the borrowers’ loan amortization also 
on a daily basis.  Thus, since the four pro-poor credit program designs are likewise 
profit-oriented, they cater only to the financial needs of the poverty groups who could 
generate the highest profit and provide the highest return on investment within the 
shortest time possible.   
 
Meanwhile, the remaining 50 percent of the beneficiaries at the bottom of the 
poverty pyramid are not enterprising and too poor for microcredit.  Their livelihood 
activities are the combined sale of labor, part-time vending, and caring for one or two 
heads of livestock and few heads of poultry.  This combination of income sources 
suggests that one livelihood activity is not sufficient to meet the daily requirements for 
the family’s survival.  Thus, they have very limited options under any credit program 
design applicable to WMCIP’s EDC sub-component.  Nevertheless, if they are eligible 
for microcredit within a transition period, they require appropriate doses of public 
support services to enable them to meet credit standards because they could not readily 
comply with the minimum credit standards imposed by the creditors.   
 
Finally, the poorest and most vulnerable target beneficiaries at the bottom of 
the poverty pyramid could not participate in microcredit programs because they only 
have very limited financial capabilities and they are not as credit-worthy as the 
enterprising poor.  Microcredit, under this condition, could not be applied as an 
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instrument for poverty alleviation because this poverty group actually needs social 
safety nets (food transfers, medicines, etc.) and subsidies (fertilizers, planting 
materials, etc.) which could be provided under public support services.  Therefore, 
microcredit is not a solution to the problems plaguing the poorest and most vulnerable 
groups. 
 
 For the state-driven administration of a comprehensive and integrated approach 
to poverty alleviation and rural development, microcredit should only be part of a 
larger donor-funded and national government-orchestrated rural development program 
which encompasses all the stages involved in undertaking viable economic activities 
from the point of production to the point of consumption.  These include 
infrastructure, facilities and equipment, social safety nets, microcredit and pertinent 
support services, technical support, microenterprise development services, marketing 
assistance, microentrepreneurial, and other skills and institutional capability-building 
interventions.  Finally, sufficient marketing strategies and programs should be put in 
place for the products of WMCIP beneficiaries within and outside respective local 
markets. 
 
 The implementation of the four microcredit program designs and public 
support services should be comprehensive, integrated and should encompass a wide 
variety of capability levels or lack of it among target beneficiaries and program 
partners.  This further suggests the need for a public service delivery system that is 
 262
capable of dispensing a comprehensive package of poverty alleviation and rural 
development initiatives (see Figure 4).    
 
 
Figure 4.  Application of Credit Program Designs to the Poverty Pyramid  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 Moreover, a microcredit-only strategy is not the appropriate solution to all 
poverty conditions of target beneficiaries because this only applies to the enterprising 
poor. The application of microcredit to the laboring poor, the poorest and most 
vulnerable would be a wrong solution to their poverty problems because microcredit 
cannot help them move out of the poverty trap.  The legality of financial obligations 
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and accountability standards that accompany microcredit and any other credit 
programs may push them deeper into the poverty trap and may destroy goodwill and 
reputation among friends and neighbors. 
 
 The diversity of WMCIP beneficiaries’ household financial conditions 
suggests the need to classify target beneficiaries according to the poverty pyramid and 
the application of a graduated strategy—patterned after the BRAC-IGVGD model—
for helping the poor.  This encompasses a program design and implementation 
strategies for the administration of a state-driven and comprehensive package of 
microcredit program and public support services for sustainable human development.   
 
 The necessary public support services include social safety nets, farm 
production subsidies, facilities and equipment, skills enhancement and entrepreneurial 
trainings, technology transfer and other services normally provided by the 
government’s line agencies, LGUs and NGOs in impoverished barangays.  Thus, 
microcredit program as a tool to reduce poverty incidence in particular geographic 
pockets of interest is only possible within the public service delivery system and 
implemented through community-based NGOs and POs.   
 
 Finally, the appropriateness of microcredit program to the credit needs and 
financial capabilities of WMCIP beneficiaries based on their household financial 
conditions necessitates appropriate tools for client analysis, social targeting 
mechanisms, delivery of appropriate doses of public services and the monitoring and 
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evaluation of program outcomes and impact.  These processes are crucial to program 
design and implementation strategies within a good governance-based framework for 
an integrated and comprehensive program for poverty reduction and rural 
development.  This framework requires collaboration among institutional partners to 
manage risks and to resolve implementation problems.  This will further facilitate the 
utilization of locally available resources and enhancement of local capabilities and 
institutional capacities for community-owned and community-managed microcredit 
programs for the poor. 
 
     b.3.  Credit Experience 
 A large majority of beneficiaries do not qualify under the lending programs of 
LBP and PCFC.  However, PCFC does not intend to provide social outreach 
mechanisms to those who are disqualified from its GBAR program.  In view of this, 
LBP offers other special credit windows which serve as credit options and are likely to 
be appropriate to the poverty conditions of WMCIP beneficiaries and administrative 
capacities of partner organizations. 
 
 It is revealed that LBP is reluctant to accommodate new borrowers who are 
less credit-worthy and are unlikely to be able to repay their loan obligations with the 
bank.  Moreover, other beneficiaries were simply blacklisted from the bank’s credit 
program due to previous loan default records and legal actions pursued by the bank 
against them.  Hence, LBP recommends that WMCIP and its partner agencies 
implement a specific project for the rehabilitation and capability-building of the 
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potential group of borrowers until they are able to pass the minimum requirements for 
availment of LBP credit facilities. 
 
  Since LBP’s retail credit program for the poor remains unfavorable to most 
beneficiaries, this leaves the peer group lending model inherent in Grameen Bank’s, 
BRAC’s and ASA’s microcredit models as viable alternatives.  These Bangladeshi 
small-group lending models are the principal microcredit mechanisms replicated by 
PCFC and QUEDANCOR.  Both credit wholesalers are classified as Government 
Financial Institutions (GFIs) with an array of accredited MFIs such as rural banks, 
cooperatives, NGOs, POs/associations, SHGs, SRTs and individual end-borrowers.  
However, these Philippine microcredit replications remain dependent on the target 
borrowers’ credit experience. 
 
 Ten situations were included in the analysis of respondents’ credit 
experience.  The situations include: (1) credit experience in the last two years, (2) 
experience relative to overspending or spending beyond household means, (3)  causes 
of over or spending beyond financial capability, (4)  creditor, (5)  access to loan and 
other credit services in the last two years,  (6) uses of the amount borrowed,  (7) 
monthly interest rate on borrowed amount,  (8)  mode of payment or periodic 
amortization, (9)  utilization of the loan or the borrowed amount, and (10)  repayment 
of amount borrowed, amount of unpaid balance, and reasons for non-repayment.   
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b.3.a.   Credit Experience in the Last Two Years 
  Credit experience explains the specific socio-economic conditions resulting to 
the indebtedness of households.  The availability of creditors conveniently accessible 
to poor households experiencing financial stress facilitates resolution of their financial 
problems.  Table 24 shows that 198 respondents (50.8 percent) are credit availers in 
the last two years while 192 respondents (49.2 percent) have not incurred any form of 
indebtedness in the same period.  
 
Table 24.  Credit Experience within the Last Two Years 
 
Credit Experience Frequency Percent (%) 
Yes (Credit Availers) 
No  (Non-credit availers) 
198 
192 
50.8 
49.2 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 
 Credit experience reflects credit needs during situations when the family is 
forced to spend more than the amount it is capable of spending as well as the 
availability of local creditors that could readily respond to such need.  The cycle of 
credit experience includes the borrower’s access to credit, utilization of credit funds 
and repayment.   The cycle repeats with succeeding access to the same credit services 
after full repayment of previous indebtedness. 
 
b.3.b.   Credit Needs: Overspending Situations 
 Overspending manifests situations of extreme financial need that could not be 
met by the household’s available inventory of assets and other resources.  These are 
also reflective of events and situations when the family is forced to acquire additional 
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amounts to spend for a particular activity that involves the entire family or any 
household member.   
 
 Table 25 shows that 155 respondents (39.7 percent) experienced situations 
wherein they have to spend more than the amount that the family is capable of 
spending while 235 respondents (60.3 percent) reveal that they have not spent beyond 
their family’s financial capability.    
 
Table 25.  Experienced Spending Beyond Capability to Spend 
 
Experience Frequency Percent (%) 
Yes 
No 
155 
235 
  39.7 
  60.3 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 Target borrowers’ overspending experience is significant to microcredit 
programs because payment collection problems may be encountered as a result of 
borrower’s diversion of loan proceeds and utilization of loan funds for other activities 
that do not produce cash revenues sufficient to repay their loans.  Furthermore, 
overspending experiences determine how the borrower uses loan funds for non-profit 
generating activities which may eventually result to loan defaults. 
 
 Certain special occasions and specific situations force the family to spend 
beyond their family’s regular budgetary requirements. Religious celebrations are the 
dominant activities that drain the households’ financial resource base.    
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 Table 26 further shows that among the 155 respondents who admitted to have 
experienced overspending, 76 respondents (49 percent) usually run short of financial 
resources especially during religious celebrations.  This is followed by 42 respondents 
(27.1 percent) who admitted overspending for special family occasions; 30 
respondents (19.4 percent) who overspend especially during emergency situations; 
four respondents (2.6 percent) who admitted to have overspent for the repairs of their 
house; and three respondents (1.9 percent) who overspent in order to finance their 
children’s educational pursuits. 
 
Table 26.  Situations for Spending Beyond Capability to Spend 
 
Situation Frequency Percent (%) 
Religious celebrations 
Special family occasions 
Emergencies 
House repair 
For children's education 
76 
42 
30 
 4 
 3 
 49.0 
 27.1 
  19.4 
    2.6 
    1.9 
Total     155                100.0 
 
 
 This study reveals that overspending experiences are generally caused by non-
profit generating social and cultural celebrations and other expenditures not related to 
the purpose of the loan.  This suggests the need for an effective monitoring and 
feedback system to ensure that the borrowers’ financial obligations and loan payment 
commitments to creditors are not jeopardized.  Except for emergencies, non-loan 
related expenditures for family and religious celebrations that may adversely affect 
scheduled loan repayment timeframes are annually predictable.  Hence, diversion of 
loan funds due to these activities can be avoided and can be effectively managed once 
adequate feedback and monitoring system is properly put in place. 
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b.3.c.   Creditor 
 Interviews with non-availers reveal that they have not encountered any 
circumstance that could justify borrowing money from any source.  The availability of 
local creditors, especially during unanticipated situations, always form a very 
important function in the socio-economic conditions of the sampled WMCIP 
beneficiaries.   
 
 Nevertheless, from the 198 respondents who are classified as availers of credit 
services in the last two years, Table 27 shows that informal credit dominates the credit 
experience of respondents.  Seventy-six respondents (38.4 percent) usually obtain 
credit funds from informal creditors such as friends, relatives and other local 
moneylenders.  This is followed by 62 respondents (31.3 percent) who frequently avail 
of credit from semi-formal financial institutions such as cooperatives, NGOs and other 
credit-granting grassroots institutions and then by 52 respondents (26.3 percent) who 
are regular availers of loan and credit from formal financial institutions such as banks, 
lending companies and other formal financial intermediaries.  Only eight respondents 
(4 percent) did not reveal their creditors.   
 
Table 27. Type of Creditor 
 
Creditor Frequency Percent (%) 
Formal 
Semi-formal 
Informal 
No response 
  52 
  62 
  76 
    8 
 26.3 
 31.3 
 38.4 
   4.0 
Total 198 100.0 
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 The type of available local credit providers significantly determines the supply 
and demand of credit funds in a particular community.  However, bureaucratic 
procedures and number of documents required by formal and semi-formal credit 
systems could not match the speed, ease and convenience of the informal credit 
system.   
 
 Despite higher interest rates charged by the informal creditors, the flexibility of 
the terms and conditions of credit is one of the main reasons why the informal credit 
system prevails among the poor and thus, dominates the credit market in impoverished 
communities.  Hence, during difficult situations, the cost of money does not matter 
anymore to the poor.  What is most important to them is that, money is accessible as 
the need arises.  
 
b.3.d.  Access to Loan and Other Credit Services 
 The poor usually borrow small amounts commensurate to their capability to 
pay.  The largest group of credit availers borrowed PhP5,000 or less.  These amounts 
are considered too small to be categorized as profitable by commercial financial 
intermediaries.    
 
 Table 28 shows the magnitude of indebtedness of credit availers.  Ninety-two 
respondents (46.5 percent) have experienced borrowing less than PhP5,000;  36 (18.2 
percent) experienced borrowing PhP15,000 and above; 34 (17.2 percent) availed of 
PhP5,000 and above but less than PhP10,000; 31 respondents (15.6 percent) received 
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not less than PhP10,000 but also less than PhP5,000.  Five respondents (2.5 percent), 
meanwhile, did not reveal their amount of debt but admitted they incurred debts. 
 
 The amount of indebtedness (based on median) of the respondents averaged 
PhP5,000 while the minimum amount borrowed was PhP100.  The highest amount 
borrowed by a respondent was PhP80,000.    
 
Table 28.  Amount of Debt Incurred 
 
Amount of Debt Frequency Percent (%) 
Less than PhP5,000 
PhP5,000   -  PhP9,999 
PhP10,000 -  PhP14,999 
PhP15,000 and above 
No response 
  92 
  34 
  31 
  36 
   5 
  46.5 
  17.2 
  15.6 
  18.2 
    2.5 
 Total 198 100.0 
Maximum – PhP80,000.00             Average—PhP5,000.00*  
Minimum –  PhP   100.00 
            * median amount was used because it is not sensitive to extreme values 
 
 
 
 The loan size normally availed of by the poor and the non-bankable is 
generally too small and too costly for commercial banks to handle.  This study reveals  
the applicability and appropriateness of microcredit to the enterprising poor and to the 
impoverished communities.  The poor only need small amounts of credit appropriate 
to their credit needs and their financial capabilities to repay loans and to meet other 
financial obligations as they fall due. 
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 b.3.e.  Uses of Amount Borrowed  
 Prevalent among the respondents are their availment of credit services for the 
operation of small businesses or microenterprises.  Table 29 shows the different 
reasons why respondents borrow a certain sum of money.  The largest group of 
respondents (35.9 percent) availed of credit to finance their microenterprises, followed 
by 45 respondents (22.7 percent) who benefited from production loans offered by 
credit-granting entities in their locality; 20 respondents (10.1 percent) obtained a loan 
to finance much needed household expenditure requirements; 18 respondents (9.1 
percent) borrowed to purchase equipment for their livelihood activities; and 16 
respondents (8.1 percent) availed of credit services for their children’s school fees.  
Other reasons for indebtedness include hospitalization, house repairs, payment of 
other debts, motorcycle maintenance, housing loan, and wedding.  However, 10 
respondents (5.1 percent) did not reveal the reasons for their indebtedness although 
they had admitted to have been in debt. 
 
Table 29.  Uses of Amount Borrowed 
 
Purposes of Loan Frequency Percent (%) 
Micro-enterprise purposes 
Production loan 
Family expenses 
Purchase of equipment 
For children's school fees 
Hospitalization 
Other purposes with less than 5 responses 
each (house repair, payment of debt 
motorcycle maintenance, housing  loan and 
wedding) 
No response 
  71 
  45 
  20 
  18 
  16 
    7 
  11 
 
 
 
  10 
  35.9 
  22.7 
  10.1 
    9.1 
    8.1 
    3.5 
    5.6 
 
 
 
    5.0 
Total 198 100.0 
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 This study reveals that the purpose of the loan should be profitable or the 
object of financing should be used for profitable income-generating activities.  Thus 
the use of the amount borrowed should be in accordance with the terms and conditions 
of the loan.  However, the intended use of loan proceeds should not be the sole 
criterion for loan approval.  It could further be used as one of the main criteria for 
eligibility to microcredit programs and subsequent availment of credit services.  This 
finding suggests that, in addition to the intended use of the loan, other factors 
surrounding the borrower’s credit needs and financial capabilities should be identified 
and given sufficient weights in determining their participation in microcredit programs 
and their eligibility to microcredit services. 
 
 b.3.f. Interest Rate   
 The cost of money is represented by the interest rate charged on the amount of 
debt incurred.  A five percent monthly interest rate (60 percent per annum) on 
borrowed funds is estimated by the Center for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(CARD) in San Pablo, Laguna as sufficient to cover the full cost of operations and to 
ensure the financial viability of a microcredit program. 
 
 Shown on Table 30 are the monthly interest rates charged on the debts incurred 
by the respondents. The largest group is composed of 84 respondents (42.4 percent) 
who paid a monthly interest rate of at least five percent.  This is followed by 59 
respondents (29.8 percent) who did not pay any interest for the amount they borrowed; 
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and 55 respondents (27.8 percent) who paid a monthly interest rate of less than five 
percent. 
 
Table 30.  Monthly Interest Rate on Debt Incurred 
 
Interest Rate Frequency Percent (%) 
Less than 5 percent 
5 percent and above 
No interest paid 
  55 
  84 
  59 
  27.8 
  42.4 
  29.8 
Total 198 100.0 
 
 The interest rate of the loan is a major means to determine the financial 
viability and sustainability of microcredit programs.  The average 60 percent interest 
rate per annum is rather more expensive than the interest rates on commercial loans.  
This is largely because of the administrative cost associated with outreach to the poor 
clientele, the credit risk and salaries of loan collection agents and other operating 
costs.   
 
 The results of the study show that the interest rate charged to borrowed funds 
should reflect the full cost of the microcredit program operations plus a considerable 
margin of profit.  These pre-conditions will ensure that the program is able to generate 
a positive rate of return on investments for the credit providers.  Once attained, the 
microcredit program becomes financially profitable and sustainable. 
 
 b.3.g.  Mode of Payment  
 The mode of amortization representing periodic cash payments for the 
liquidation of indebtedness determines the borrowers’ capability to pay based on the 
 275
inflow of cash from livelihood activities and into the household as shown in Table 31.  
Almost half of the respondents (46.5 percent) have paid their loans based on the 
income generated from their harvest while 62 respondents (31.3 percent) paid their 
debts when enough money was available.  Similarly, 7.6 percent of the respondents 
have paid weekly installments until their debts were fully paid; 5.6 percent made daily 
installments to reduce their indebtedness and 4.6 percent opted for the monthly 
amortization arrangement.  Nine respondents (4.4 percent) did not reveal the manner 
in which they paid their debts/loans. Based on periodic payments of debt until fully 
paid, only 13.2 percent of the credit availers who experienced making either daily or 
weekly amortizations have had access to credit programs much similar to that of the 
Grameen Bank.  
 
Table 31.  Mode of Payment/Amortization 
 
Mode of Payment Frequency Percent (%) 
Daily 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Upon harvest 
When money is available 
No response 
  11 
  15 
    9 
  92 
  62 
    9 
    5.6 
    7.6 
    4.6 
  46.5 
  31.3 
    4.4 
Total 198 100.0 
 
 
 This study reveals that daily or weekly loan repayment which is typical of the 
Grameen Banking model is unlikely to generate positive results given the financial 
capabilities of sampled WMCIP beneficiaries.  The borrowers’ capability to pay due 
debts is primarily dependent on the inflow of revenues derived from the proceeds from 
the sale of their harvest.  Hence, the frequency of loan repayments/amortizations is 
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dependent on the time and frequency of harvest and the seasonality of the agricultural 
and fishery-based livelihood activities.  For short-term production projects, harvest 
time is normally within three to six months after release of the loan.  The Grameen 
Banking model may not be applicable and appropriate under these conditions. 
 
 The repayment schedule for Grameen Bank clients are applicable and 
appropriate only to merchandising and trading activities of market vendors and other 
enterprising poor; from which capital are recovered and profits are generated on a 
daily or weekly basis.  Thus, the heterogeneity of the livelihood activities of the poor 
needs a comprehensive microcredit program composed of a variety of credit facilities 
with flexible terms and conditions and support services.  The credit facilities further 
need to be very flexible in order to be appropriate to the different types of livelihood 
activities undertaken by different groups of target borrowers. 
 
 b.3.h.  Loan Utilization 
 How well the loan proceeds are put to good use reflects the traditional credit 
paradigm of formal financial institutions that loan funds should be used as intended 
based on the terms of agreement between the creditor and the debtor.  This is likewise 
a predictor of the financial viability of the loan-funded project.  Table 32 shows that 
most of the credit-availing respondents (97.5 percent) are able to utilize their borrowed 
amount as intended and based on the terms and conditions agreed upon by both 
parties.  Only five respondents (2.5 percent) admit that they failed to utilize loan 
proceeds as intended. 
 277
Table 32.  Utilization of Previously Borrowed Amount 
 
Utilization Frequency Percent (%) 
Yes 
No 
193 
   5 
  97.5 
    2.5 
Total 198 100.0 
 
  
 This study does not support conventional banking and commercial lending 
practices that the loan funds should be utilized based on the terms and conditions of 
the loan.  For the poor, the fungibility of money is significant.  This means that 
microcredit services and facilities should be flexible enough to accommodate a variety 
of the borrowers’ ways of utilizing the loan proceeds.  However, their ways of loan 
utilization may not be strictly in accordance with the standard commercial banking 
criteria. Thus, how the loan proceeds were utilized may have no significant effects on 
loan repayments because the borrowers can use other resources and means by which 
periodic loan amortizations may be paid as they fall due. 
 
 b.3.i.  Repayment 
 Full repayment of debt represents the last stage in the respondents’ credit 
experience and further determines the borrowers’ eligibility for succeeding loans.  
Table 33 reveals that among the 198 respondents who are credit-availers, majority 
64.1 percent (127 respondents) were able to repay their loans funds while 32.3 percent 
(64 respondents) have admitted that they were not able to pay their loans.  On the 
other hand, seven respondents (3.5 percent) did not respond to this specific item in the 
questionnaire.   
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Table 33.  Repayment of Amount Borrowed 
 
Repayment Frequency Percent (%) 
Yes 
No 
No response 
127 
  64 
   7 
  64.1 
  31.8 
    4.1 
Total 198 100.0 
 
 Obviously, repayment rate represents the core of a microcredit program’s life 
cycle.  The attainment of the ideal level of repayment rate which is 100 percent 
annually is practically impossible.  However, a desirable minimum level of repayment 
rate of 90 percent is generally sufficient to keep a microcredit program financially 
viable and sustainable.  Consequently, it is adequate to produce a positive impact on 
the general social and economic well-being of the poor beneficiaries in the long-run. 
 
 Among the 198 respondents who are credit-availers, 31.8 percent (64 
respondents) have not paid their previous loan obligations yet as shown in Table 34 
(data taken from “no” responses in Table 33).   Almost half of those who have not 
fully paid their loans (42.2 percent) still have unpaid loan balances not exceeding 
PhP5,000.00.  Two groups with eight respondents each (12.5 percent respectively) still 
owe their creditors the following amounts; at least PhP5,000.00 but less than 
PhP10,000.00; and PhP15,000.00 and above, respectively.  Unpaid loan balances 
among respondents averaged PhP2,400.00; while the minimum amount of unpaid 
indebtedness stood at PhP100.00 and the highest unpaid debt was PhP50,000.00.   
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Table 34.  Amount of Unpaid Balance 
 
Amount of Debt Frequency Percent (%) 
Less than PhP5,000 
PhP5,000   -  PhP9,999 
PhP10,000 -  PhP14,999 
PhP15,000 and above 
No response 
27 
 8 
 2 
 8 
19 
  42.2 
  12.5 
    3.1 
  12.5 
  29.7 
 Total 64 100.0 
Maximum – PhP50,000.00     
Minimum –  PhP   100.00           Average   --  PhP2,400.00*  
                 * median amount was used because it is not sensitive to extreme values 
 
 The amount of unpaid balance manifests the extent of the target borrowers’ 
indebtedness.  This study reveals that indebtedness is a significant determinant of the 
target borrowers’ credit-worthiness, bankability, financial capability to pay loans and 
their eligibility to participate as beneficiaries of microcredit programs. 
 
 Finally, the largest group of 24 respondents (37.5 percent) who did not repay 
their loans explained that the profit they were able to generate from the loan-funded 
project was not enough to repay the loan.  The second major reason for non-repayment 
of loan with 13 respondents (20.3 percent) is that there was not enough time or the 
amortization period was too short to enable them to repay.  Other reasons for non-
repayment of loan include utilization of profit for the children’s education, budget for 
payment was not enough and that payment schedule is not yet due.   Twenty one 
respondents (32.8 percent) did not explain why they were not able to pay their debts as 
shown in Table 35.   
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Table 35.  Reasons for Non-repayment of Debt 
 
Reason Frequency Percent (%) 
Profit was not enough 
Not enough time 
Profit was utilized for children’s education 
Budget was not enough 
Payment schedule is not yet due 
No response  
24 
13 
  2 
  2 
  2 
21 
37.5 
20.3 
  3.1 
  3.1 
  3.1 
32.8 
Total 64 99.9* 
 * error due to rounding off 
 
  The findings suggest that administrative mechanisms and loan policies should 
be enforced immediately to remedy and solve the pertinent problems as soon as they 
arise.  Thus, loan diversion can be prevented by frequent contact with the borrowers 
and the provision of support services from other partner organizations.  In view of this, 
eventual loan repayment problems could be prevented, mitigated and managed 
effectively to minimize its adverse effects on the overall financial performance of the 
microcredit program. 
 
 b.3.j.  Summary of Findings: Credit Experience 
 Credit and public support services are delivered via a consortium of 
organizations acting in concert within the public service delivery system.  However, 
the anti-poverty and development interventions they provide have to be appropriate 
and responsive to the target beneficiaries’ credit needs and financial capabilities.  
Hence, these interventions should address the factors pertinent to money-management 
strategies and how the target beneficiaries have used credit in the past or the lack of 
credit experience.  These factors indicate the credit-worthiness or bankability of target 
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beneficiaries which are also the focus in the management of a microcredit program
  
 In general, target beneficiaries’ experiences pertinent to the availment of credit 
services indicate both bankability and credit-worthiness.  However, this may change 
over time as others may increase or decrease their credit-worthiness based on how 
they are able to meet financial obligations.  Bankability and credit-worthiness-
enhancing initiatives will enable target beneficiaries to qualify for pro-poor credit 
programs for farmers, fishermen and micro-entrepreneurs in the rural areas.  These 
credit facilities are normally implemented by credit-granting MFIs; the wholesale 
credit facility provided by LBP or other wholesale market-driven financial 
intermediaries; and public support services provided by other government agencies 
and development organizations in collaboration with LBP.  The credit experiences or 
lack of it are summarized below: 
 
 Credit experience.  The experience in availing of credit services is a major 
determinant of the bankability and credit-worthiness of the borrower.  This is 
considered as an enabling factor.  Only LBP’s CAP-PBD special credit window and 
QUEDANCOR’s microcredit programs could adequately respond to the credit 
experiences of target borrowers in the immediate term.  However, both microcredit 
providers do not give support services that are sufficient to respond to the non-credit 
needs of target borrowers. This suggests partnership with other government 
instrumentalities like the WMCIP, DA, LGUs and other agencies to provide the 
necessary support services that will help ensure that borrowers are provided with 
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technical services and other production inputs and marketing assistance.  This type of 
comprehensive and integrated package of assistance to beneficiaries is likely to enable 
them to repay their loans as scheduled. 
 
 Overspending.  The respondents’ overspending experiences suggest that they 
spend beyond the family’s financial capabilities.  This is considered as a limiting 
factor needing serious attention and should be addressed through specific government 
interventions for the development and enforcement of strong accountability measures 
which are geared towards credit and household financial discipline.  Thus, thrift and 
the schemes for increasing the beneficiaries’ propensity to save will enable them to 
prepare for unanticipated but inevitable events that require spending hefty sums of 
money.  Support services need to help beneficiaries identify their priorities and 
disregard unnecessary expenditure items. 
 
 Causes of Overspending.  The situations that result to spending beyond 
household financial capability are mostly due to religious celebrations and special 
family affairs.  Hence, this is considered as a limiting factor.  Adequate coordination 
with the religious groups for counseling purposes would be necessary.  Neighborhood 
associations could also facilitate the mapping out of specific strategies to minimize 
lavish and excessive family preparations especially during religious celebrations.  
Specific initiatives will be needed to facilitate the diversion of planned expenditures 
into other profit-oriented investments. 
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 Creditor.  The borrowers’ access to creditors likewise defines his/her 
bankability and credit-worthiness.  The prevalence of informal creditors manifests low 
bankability of target beneficiaries.  The lack of semi-formal and formal creditors in the 
barangay is a limiting factor since this will entail higher administrative costs (in terms 
of outreach) for the MFI. 
  
 Although some respondents may be credit-worthy, but their inability to access 
the credit facilities of the local formal financial system makes them not bankable 
enough based on traditional credit criteria espoused by banks and other commercial 
financial institutions.  Hence, the group-based and collateral-free microcredit model 
will be appropriate.  As such, this microcredit model, together with credit-worthiness-
enhancing support services via public service delivery system will enable them to have 
access to government-supported creditors who operate credit schemes which 
approximate the credit services provided by the informal sector. 
 
 Access to loan and other credit services.  This represents magnitude of 
indebtedness based on the amount of debt incurred over the last two years.  This is the 
most important factor that reflects credit experience.  The amount borrowed further 
determines the borrower’s capability to pay.  This is considered as a limiting factor 
because it is observed that magnitude of indebtedness of the target borrower is a major 
challenge for the target beneficiaries and the MFIs.  Moreover, most important to 
MFIs is the liquidation of debts or full repayment based on the terms and conditions of 
the loan. 
 284
 Uses of amount borrowed.  In the case of government credit programs, the 
main purpose for obtaining loans should be identified and validated according to the 
present income-generating activities of the borrower.  This is considered as an 
enabling factor because this helps ensure that the borrower possesses adequate 
knowledge and skills to manage the proposed project. 
 
 Interest rate.  The monthly interest rate paid is less important to the poor.  
Hence, this is considered as an enabling factor which provides MFIs with the 
opportunity to recover administrative costs plus profit from interest earnings.  
Contrary to subsidized programs now prohibited by EO 138, higher interest rate means 
that loans are not subsidized by the government or the donor.    
 
 Furthermore, group discussions with beneficiaries reveal that they are not even 
conscious about the interest rate.  In the five-six scheme for example, the borrower 
pays PhP600.00 for every PhP500.00 borrowed every month.  This is roughly 
equivalent to 240 percent interest rate per annum.  But despite the usurious interest 
rate, five-six lending scheme is commonly practiced among the poor.  Group 
discussion with some beneficiaries reveals that availability of credit when it is needed 
is more important.   
 
 Since subsidy in interest rate is officially prohibited by the Philippine 
government, the provision of pertinent support services (e.g., project monitoring and 
supervision, enforcing repayment and collection) by subcontracted civil society 
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organizations will help reduce the creditor’s administrative cost in the delivery of 
financial services to target clientele, thereby reducing the interest rate charged to the 
end-borrowers. 
  
 Mode of debt payment.  For MFIs, the mode of payment or frequency of 
periodic amortization increases the administrative costs which are normally charged to 
the interest earned from the loan.  This is considered as an enabling factor because this 
will facilitate identification of projects that could provide the fastest possible turnover 
of profits.   
 
 Moreover, providing support services via public service delivery system or 
through participating local institutions will be of great help in cost-reduction schemes 
in favor of the creditor especially in the initial stages of the program.  This is within 
the first five years of operation as determined by the WB-CGAP. 
 
 Loan utilization.   The usual terms and conditions of loans stipulate that loan 
proceeds should be used as intended; otherwise, the possibility of loan default may be 
inevitable.  This is considered as an enabling factor because under normal conditions, 
loan proceeds are used as intended.  But inevitable circumstances may force the 
borrowers to utilize the loan proceeds to meet other obligations.  In this context, other 
income sources should be identified and used for alternative loan repayment 
mechanism while the borrowers’ financial activities should also be closely monitored 
and supervised. 
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 Repayment rate.  Repayment of amount borrowed is considered as an enabling 
factor.  It is vital in ensuring the success of succeeding cycles (repeat loans) in the 
borrowers’ credit experience.  In group-based microcredit programs, the use of peer 
pressure in enforcing accountability measures contributes positively to high repayment 
rates.  But making the group of borrowers mutually responsible and fully accountable 
for each other’s indebtedness would mean support services via public service delivery 
system which are geared towards enabling the borrowing groups to strictly enforce 
measures that will ensure repayment of their individual and group loans.    
 
 There are also borrowers who fail to make full repayments of their loans or 
debts.   The amount of unpaid balance further manifests the borrowers’ extent of 
indebtedness.   Support services via public service delivery system are most needed by 
this group for them to take advantage of available livelihood options and undertake 
additional income-generating options in order to attain three objectives; first, to satisfy 
household financial requirements, second, to pay unpaid debts, and third, to increase 
income beyond satisfaction of the minimum requirements for survival. 
 
 In the totality of the target beneficiaries’ credit experiences, the program 
designs and the implementation strategies of most of the pro-poor and commercial 
credit facilities rely on the credit experience of the target borrowers as a determinant 
of their entrepreneurial skills, project management capabilities, credit-worthiness and 
bankability.  Thus, the determinants of credit experiences could either limit or enable 
the design and implementation of microcredit programs—the LBP regular cooperative 
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credit program, CAP-PBD, PCFC and QUEDANCOR—that are potentially available 
to WMCIP beneficiaries include: (1) purpose of borrowing, (2) interest rate, (3) mode 
of payment, (4) loan utilization, (5) repayment, (6) overspending, (7) causes of 
overspending, (8) lack of semi-formal and formal creditors, (9) uses of the amount 
borrowed, and (10) incapability to pay debts. 
 
 The enabling factors are normally part of the program designs of all pro-poor 
and commercial credit programs and are provided for in the terms and conditions of 
the loan.  The intended use of the amount borrowed is normally the object of 
financing; the interest rate represents the cost of money; the mode of payment 
represents the frequency, schedule and the manner in which the loan should be paid; 
loan utilization refers to how the loan proceeds should be spent; and the repayment of 
all financial obligations with the creditors.  The enabling factors are normally 
explicitly stipulated in the terms and conditions of the loan. 
 
 On the other hand, the limiting factors represent the conditions that may 
adversely affect program design and successful implementation of microcredit.  The 
target beneficiaries’ overspending conditions and their causes, the creditors in the 
community, magnitude of indebtedness and incapability to pay debts are normally part 
of the creditor’s background investigation concerning the credit reputation, bankability 
and credit-worthiness of the target borrowers.   
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 Thus, credit experience determines how the poor borrowers are able to manage 
their finances as well as their indebtedness.  Hence, it is vital for microcredit 
interventions to assist beneficiaries to establish their household needs and priorities 
affecting their family’s general socio-economic conditions.  These are crucial inputs 
for developing and designing microcredit strategies that address the financial options 
available to target clientele.   
 
 Microcredit interventions further need to assist the poor based on how they had 
used credit funds in the past, the credit and livelihood options available and the 
borrowers’ capability to meet financial obligations as they fall due.  It is also crucial 
that support services via public service delivery system are aimed at strengthening the 
credit-worthiness and bankability of target beneficiaries in all the relevant stages 
within the cycle of their credit experience and the overall cycle of the loan-funded 
livelihood or income-generating activities. 
 
     b.4.  Microcredit Preferences and Demand 
 The EDC sub-component intends to provide loans to the beneficiaries’ 
profitable livelihood activities such as crop production, livestock raising, fishing 
activities, food processing, vending, trading and other microentrepreneurial activities.  
The EDC is the business component of WMCIP and it does not intend to create a new 
lending scheme.  It only utilizes existing credit programs that are applicable given the 
existing conditions of the WMCIP beneficiaries.  That is, the funds are only intended 
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to augment the credit facilities of LCCs and LPCIs already operating in WMCIP-
covered areas.   
 
On the part of the beneficiaries, WMCIP field personnel opined that the “dole-
out” mentality still prevails.  Some respondents think that the credit programs of the 
government are a form of social amelioration.  For example, reexamination of a 
married woman-respondent’s desired loan size of PhP500,000.00 showed that she 
owns only one (1) hectare of land, has six children most of whom are not attending 
grade school, and the entire family lives in a shanty—a dwelling unit made of bamboo 
and nipa shingles.   
 
A loan size of PhP500,000.00 fits commercial scale and should be supported 
by conventional banking requirements such as collateral, feasibility study and existing 
business with an asset base worth at least twice the value of the proposed loan size.  
Hence, it is impossible for a creditor to approve such a loan when the borrower neither 
possesses adequate collateral to secure the loan nor the capability to manage the 
project.   
 
On the other hand, those who are financially capable and qualified to avail of 
credit facilities higher than PhP25,000.00 especially for small and medium enterprises 
could be referred to government-sponsored credit programs outside microcredit.  This 
includes other credit programs of cooperatives, rural banks and other retail credit 
windows of LBP designed for small and medium-enterprises. 
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Hence, a loan ceiling of PhP25,000.00 per individual borrower is deemed 
appropriate in the light of poverty conditions and profit-potential of livelihood and 
other microentrepreneurial capabilities of the poor and non-bankable, but nevertheless 
credit-worthy target borrowers.  Moreover, since the poor generally lacks the 
confidence, entrepreneurial skills, technical and financial capabilities, loan-related 
support services are deemed necessary.  Support services are intended to enable the 
borrowers to manage the loan-funded project efficiently and effectively to ensure loan 
repayment rate acceptable to the creditor. 
 
 In general, industry-based financial viability or project’s financial standards 
are the major reasons why the poor are automatically excluded from commercial credit 
facilities.  The monetary value representing the size of credit needs and financial 
capabilities of the poor and non-bankable target clientele are not the commercially 
viable options for commercial bankers and financial intermediaries.   
 
 Viable financial intermediation for the low-income groups necessitates 
profitable but social equity-laden preferential state action to enable the poor to 
increase their income and move out of poverty.  Thus, the appropriateness of a 
government-sponsored market-driven but pro-poor credit delivery program need to be 
anchored on the program’s responsiveness to the credit needs and financial capabilities 
of intended beneficiaries.   
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 Four factors were included in the analysis of the appropriateness of a credit 
program for the poor and non-bankable which are primarily based on the credit needs, 
preferences and demand of target clientele.  These factors include the target 
borrowers’ preferred income-generating activities if loan will be available, preferred 
loan amount to finance planned income-generating activities, collateral to offer to 
secure the loan as well as provision of complementary public services. 
 
 b.4.a.  Income-Generating Activities for Financing 
The profit potential of an income-generating activity normally attracts 
investments.  Sari-sari store and other livelihood activities generally undertaken by the 
enterprising poor comprise the bulk of income-generating activities preferred by the 
respondents to be financed by a government-initiated credit facility.   
 
Table 36 shows that 117 respondents (30 percent) prefer to operate a sari-sari 
store if loan funds are made available to them.  This was followed by swine raising 
(19.2 percent), goat raising (10.5 percent), ferrying passengers via motorcycle (9 
percent) and chicken raising (8.7 percent).  Other preferred income-generating 
activities for funding by a government-sponsored credit program include rice or corn 
production, feeds formulation, food processing, duck raising, seaweeds production, 
construction of a boarding house, growing organic-based high-value crops, fishing, 
and buy-and-sell or trading.  On the other hand, 10 respondents (2.6 percent) do not 
have any idea what livelihood activities to undertake if ever they will be eligible for 
any credit facility. 
 292
Table 36.  Preferred Income-Generating Activities if Loan will be Available 
 
Income-Generating Activities Frequency Percent (%) 
Sari-sari store 
Swine raising 
Goat raising 
Passenger motorcycle/tricycle 
Chicken raising 
Rice/corn production 
Feeds formulation  
Food processing 
Duck raising 
Seaweeds production 
Boarding house 
Growing high-value crops  
Fishing (e.g., fishnet) 
Buy and sell/trading 
Don’t know 
117 
  75 
  41 
  35 
  34 
  25 
  17 
  11 
   6 
   6 
   5 
   4 
   2  
   2  
  10 
30.0 
19.2 
10.5 
 9.0 
 8.7 
 6.4 
 4.4 
 2.8 
 1.5 
 1.5 
 1.3 
 1.0 
 0.5 
 0.5 
 2.6 
Total 390 99.9* 
  * error due to rounding off 
  
 Livelihood and microentrepreneurial activities are vital to poverty alleviation.  
However, the lack of capital and inadequacy of low-cost credit facilities limit the 
microentrepreneurial undertakings of the poor.  The size of capital needed by the poor 
is too small to be commercially bankable.  Hence, private commercial banks do not 
cater to the needs of the enterprising poor and they are reluctant to venture into 
microcredit.  Thus, government interventions become necessary in order to enable 
microcredit to become an important weapon against poverty. 
 
b.4.b.  Loan size 
 The poor generally need small amounts of credit that is appropriate to their 
socio-economic conditions and their capability to meet financial obligations.  Table 37 
shows that the largest group of 191 respondents (49 percent) prefer a loan size of 
 293
PhP25,000 or less.  This is followed by 168 respondents (43.1 percent) who prefer to 
borrow loan amounts not less than PhP25,000 but not more than PhP150,000, while 18 
respondents (4.6 percent) would like to avail of loan not less than PhP150,000.  Only 
13 respondents (3.3 percent) indicate that it is up to the creditor to decide the loan size 
they are entitled to. 
 
Table 37.  Preferred Amount to Finance Desired Income-Generating Activities 
 
Amount of Debt Frequency Percent (%) 
PhP25,000 and below 
PhP25,001  -  PhP150,000 
Above PhP150,000 
Depends on the creditor 
 191 
168 
  18 
  13 
  49.0 
  43.1 
    4.6 
    3.3 
 Total 390 100.0 
Maximum – PhP500,000.00         Average—PhP25,000.00*  
Minimum –  PhP  1,000.00   
                  * median amount was used because it is not sensitive to extreme values 
  
 The amount of loan needed by the poor for their income-generating livelihood 
and other microentrepreneurial activities is small, just enough for capitalization and 
appropriate to their credit needs and financial capability to pay loans as scheduled.  
Specifically, credit facilities for medium-sized enterprises cover loan amounts above 
PhP150,000.00 while credit programs for small-sized enterprises cover loanable 
amounts not more than PhP150,000.00 but not less than PhP25,000.00.  Microcredit 
programs, on the other hand, cover a maximum loanable amount of PhP25,000.00.   
 
 Microcredit programs have a loan ceiling of PhP25,000 for PCFC and 
PhP15,000 for QUEDANCOR; while small enterprise credit programs have a loan 
ceiling of PhP150,000 for the  small and medium enterprise credit program of the 
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Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).  Hence, the preferred amount needed to 
finance livelihood activities of most of the sampled WMCIP beneficiaries are well 
within the microcredit and small enterprise programs of the government which are 
implemented through LBP and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).   
 
b.4.c.  Collateral 
 Traditional credit standards in the commercial banking system require 
borrowers to put up collateral to secure their loans.  Table 38 lists the type of 
properties that respondents can readily present as collateral if a credit facility is made 
available to them.  
 
 The largest group of 134 respondents (34.4 percent) is willing to use their titled 
lot/land as collateral. This group is composed of beneficiaries who inherited small 
chunks of land from their parents or had obtained landholdings through the land 
transfer program of DAR.  This is followed by 62 respondents (15.9 percent) who are 
willing to use their houses as guarantee for their indebtedness; others are willing to use 
the following as collateral:  home appliances (55 respondents or 14.1 percent),  
facilities and equipment, i.e.,  pump boat, banca, motorcycle, jeep and farm equipment 
(48 or 12.3 percent), and domestic animals, i.e., livestock and poultry (46 or 11.8 
percent) as collateral to secure their loans.  Forty five respondents, meanwhile, (11.5 
percent) indicate that they do not have any property that can be used as collateral to 
secure any loan. 
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Table 38.  Collateral to Offer to Secure the Loan 
 
Collateral Frequency Percent (%) 
Lot/Land Title 
House 
Home appliances 
Facilities/equipment (pump 
boat, banca, motorcycle, 
jeep, farm equipment, etc.) 
Livestock, poultry, etc. 
Can't provide collateral 
134 
  62 
  55 
  48 
 
 
  46 
  45 
  34.4 
  15.9 
  14.1 
  12.3 
 
 
  11.8 
  11.5 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 
 
 It is observed that the poor who could provide collateral (e.g., lot, house 
appliances and facilities/equipment) that are acceptable to mainstream commercial 
banks are not poor at all.  If they are indeed poor, they are the most affluent among the 
poverty groups in the community.  Thus, the poorer groups could only present less 
tangible collaterals they normally possess as part of their daily household and 
economic activities such as raising poultry and birds (chicken, duck, turkey) and 
livestock (swine, goat, carabao, etc).  Finally, the poorest and most vulnerable could 
not afford to shoulder the cost of raising and feeding small animals or even poultry.   
 
 Conventional banking procedures, on the other hand, require tangible collateral 
such as land, buildings and other real properties.  For chattel mortgage, the facilities, 
equipment and other real properties being acquired through a loan are normally 
accepted by the creditors as collateral.  For agricultural loans, these include livestock, 
poultry and other objects acceptable to the creditor under chattel mortgage policies 
and other creditor-debtor agreements.   
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 Furthermore, other special financing agreements and microcredit programs 
cover various schemes recognizing non-financial collaterals in lending especially if 
the target borrowers are the poor.  These mechanisms are common among lending 
programs for multi-purpose cooperatives under LBP credit program for cooperatives.  
However, microcredit is collateral-free, and therefore, employs alternative credit 
delivery and recovery schemes such as mutual-guarantee or the peer-group lending 
model.  These microcredit models utilize other implementation strategies not 
acceptable under the conventional pro-poor lending models under the regular 
cooperative credit program of LBP or even the CAP-PBD.   
 
 Thus, the poor’s inability to provide collateral normally accepted by LBP’s 
regular cooperative credit program and CAP-PBD should be placed under the pro-poor 
and collateral-free microcredit program of the QUEDANCOR or PCFC whichever is 
applicable to their credit needs and financial capabilities.   
 
b.4.d.  Public Support Services 
 It is finally noted that target beneficiaries who are readily eligible under PCFC, 
QUEDANCOR microcredit programs or LBP’s regular cooperative credit program 
may still need public support services to ensure the profitability of their micro-
enterprises and other income-generating activities.  Due to the target beneficiaries’ 
poverty and lack of technical know-how, support services via public service delivery 
system are normally needed in government-administered pro-poor credit programs 
especially in the fisheries and agriculture sectors especially in the rural areas.  
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Table 39 shows the type of credit and complementary public services needed 
and desired by the respondents.  The largest group of 183 respondents (46.9 percent) is 
willing to accept any form of assistance that will be given to them.  Interactions and 
discussions with the target beneficiaries reveal that almost half of them, especially 
those who live in isolated and far-flung barangays have not received a single 
assistance from any government agency or any charitable institution.  Thus, they will 
be thankful if any government assistance such as farm inputs, small farm equipment or 
facilities will be given to them. 
 
Specifically, the focus group discussion in an isolated Muslim community—
Barangay Mamagon in Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay—reveals that residents and 
Barangay leaders are not even aware that DA has been distributing free farm inputs 
such as fertilizers, pesticides, seeds and other planning materials.  The same holds true 
with other credit programs of the Department of Social Welfare and Development 
(DSWD).  Since they have not received any material assistance from DA or DSWD, it 
has been agreed upon that the Barangay Captain will coordinate with DA for the 
procurement and transport of said farm inputs from the Municipal Agriculture Office 
(MAO) located in the town’s capital for distribution to Mamagon residents.  This also 
suggests that DSWD and DA need to strengthen social targeting and outreach 
mechanisms so as to improve the delivery of necessary public services to remote 
areas. 
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The second group of 154 respondents (39.5 percent) prefers trainings and 
seminars relevant to the income-generating projects they are engaged in.  The third 
largest group of 26 respondents (6.7 percent) is in need of any form of financial 
assistance or credit for them to be able to meet their financial obligations. Other 
support services sought include new farming technologies and farm inputs, project 
monitoring services and regular consultation with technicians. 
  
Table 39.   Needed Public Support Services 
 
Support Service Frequency Percent (%) 
Any form of assistance 
Seminar/training 
Financial/credit 
New farming technologies and farm inputs 
Project monitoring services 
Regular consultation with technicians 
183 
154 
  26 
  12 
    8 
    7 
  46.9 
  39.5 
    6.7 
    3.1 
    2.1 
          1.8 
Total 390   100.1* 
 * error due to rounding off 
 
  The provision of credit and support services via public service delivery system 
is vital to the success of microcredit programs.  This can be facilitated through 
responsiveness of the program to the target borrowers’ income-generating livelihood 
and microentrepreneurial activities as well as their experiences relative to access to 
credit funds, loan utilization and repayment.   
 
  Credit experience reveals the credit-worthiness of the poor based on 
microcredit criteria and not based on the criteria enforced by commercial banks.  
Given the special lending program of the government, commercial banks can venture 
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into microcredit under a special lending window of the LBP where low-cost wholesale 
credit facility is made available to interested commercial banks and other private 
lending agencies.  This special lending window will enable their participation in credit 
programs for the poor. 
 
  The small size of loans that the poor actually need could be adequately 
addressed by a microcredit program which is basically designed for the poor.  But a 
careful screening of target borrowers would be necessary in order to ensure that only 
those who have the capability for loan repayment are prioritized.  The main criteria for 
eligibility to the microcredit program are credit discipline, profitability and 
economically productive potential of the beneficiary’s project.  Credit discipline 
instills in the target borrowers an accountability mindset which will enable him/her to 
honor and repay financial obligations as defined in the terms and conditions of the 
loan.   
 
  Profitability of the loan-funded project will enable the generation of sufficient 
profits to repay the loan and adequate net income to be used to satisfy necessary 
household expenditure requirements for the family’s survival and improvement of 
their living conditions.   
 
  However, those who are too poor to be credit-worthy could be placed under a 
special program that adequately responds to their needs and financial capabilities. That 
is, those who cannot readily qualify for microcredit could be placed under special 
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poverty alleviation projects that provide capability-building interventions and social 
safety nets within a maximum transition period of two years; afterwhich, they are 
deemed eligible for credit facilities designed for the poor.  Those who are classified as 
non-poor could be placed under business advisory services designed for small- and 
medium enterprises.  The analysis of the credit experiences of the sampled WMCIP 
beneficiaries is an important input for designing a credit program that responds to the 
need for credit and support services as well as the general financial capabilities of 
target beneficiaries. 
 
 Finally, the potential profitability of the object of financing which normally 
refers to the income-generating activities or business of the borrower is first on the 
mind of the creditor.  This should be supported by the applicable loan size based on 
the borrowers’ economic resource base, entrepreneurial skills and capacity to meet 
financial obligations as scheduled.   
 
 The respondents’ preferred loan size can be validated using their household 
cash flow and tangible properties acceptable as collateral.   
 
 In general, the pro-poor credit programs need substantial volume of support 
services via public service delivery system to ensure productive use of investments, 
project viability and payment of loan amortizations as scheduled. 
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b.4.e.  Summary of Findings: Microcredit Preferences and Demand 
 Although it is evident that the poor need credit to finance profitable livelihood 
and microentrepreneurial activities, the amount of financing will have to be suited to 
the capability to pay based on the profit potential of the object of financing.   
Moreover, credit-related public support services are necessary in order to ensure that 
the target borrowers are able to comply with credit standards and requirements 
commonly demanded by existing loan product designs. 
 
 The four factors—income-generating activities, preferred loan amount to 
finance planned income-generating activities, collateral and needed support services—
are currently part of the existing credit program designs of LBP, PCFC and 
QUEDANCOR.  Thus, it is necessary to ascertain the “highest degree of fit” between 
the four factors and the credit options as well as the appropriate implementation 
strategies.    
 
 Income-generating activities for financing refer to the economic activities of 
beneficiaries.  This is considered an enabling factor because MFIs can decide easily as 
to which project the borrower could properly handle including the applicable loan 
ceilings. 
 
 Loan size is dictated by the program design and the borrower’s capability to 
pay.  This is also considered as an enabling factor because based on LBP documents 
and informants, loan size decisions fall on the hands of the MFIs and are dictated by 
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the profit-potential of the project, the capability of the borrower to manage the project; 
not the loan size preferences of the borrowers.   
  
 On the other hand, a collateral-free maximum loan size of PhP25,000 is 
deemed significantly appropriate to the investment requirements of the livelihood and 
microentrepreneurial projects of the poor.  Loan size preferences above PhP25,000 is 
no longer appropriate for microcredit.  It is recommended to be backed up by 
collateral acceptable to the creditor and subjected to regular credit facilities available 
for small enterprises.  In case the preferred loan size is not supported by the 
borrowers’s capability to pay, the PhP25,000 microcredit ceiling should be applied.  
Support services for microcredit-funded projects, however, still need technical, 
training, marketing and other support services channeled through the public services 
delivery system of LGUs or the sub-contracted NGOs. 
 
 Collateral are tangible properties of value to both creditor and debtor.  This is 
also considered by MFI representatives as an enabling factor because if collateral is 
available, loan recovery is assured. 
 
 Public support services such as trainings, seminars, staff support, technical, 
and institutional development assistance provided by partner LGUs, NGOs and other 
agencies increase the capabilities of the borrowers and administrative capabilities of 
MFIs.   The presence of public support services in the barangays is considered as an 
enabling factor. 
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  Since the poor are generally excluded from mainstream commercial credit 
facilities, they are not capable of exploring market opportunities available only to non-
poor entrepreneurs.  These include lack of opportunities for linkages with potential 
buyers of their products and suppliers of production inputs such as technology and raw 
materials.   
 
 In this view, government’s pro-poor interventions in the local microfinancial 
intermediation infrastructure will have to include support services via local public 
service delivery system.  This will help ensure integration, convergence and 
comprehensiveness of microcredit programs to ensure the attainment of desirable 
outcomes and positive impact to the poor and non-bankable beneficiaries in 
impoverished communities.  This further means that the comprehensiveness of 
microcredit programs encompasses the convergence of different interests and sectoral 
priorities attainable only through an integrated and credit-led approach to poverty 
alleviation and rural development. 
 
b.4.f.  Appropriateness of Credit Program Design to Preferences  and Demand 
 
 The appropriateness of the designs and implementation strategies of the four 
credit programs (e.g., LBP regular cooperative credit program, CAP-PBD, PFCF-
GBAR and QUEDANCOR’s microcredit model) is examined and analyzed based on 
target beneficiaries’ preferences and demand.  The results reveal that, since the target 
borrowers do not possess the necessary technical know-how and the entrepreneurial 
capabilities, microcredit-related support services could neither be underemphasized 
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nor left to be discovered at will and through experimentation by the borrowers 
themselves. 
 
 The results further show that the design and implementation strategies of pro-
poor credit programs necessitate a closer scrutiny of the possible highest “degree of 
fit” (appropriateness) between loan products offered and the nature as well as viability 
of the income-generating project to be financed vis-à-vis the credit needs as well as 
the financial and technical capabilities of target borrowers.   
 
 A credit-only strategy of the four government-sponsored credit program that 
combines the social equity-based outreach to the rural poor and profitable operations 
will be appropriate only to the poor and enterprising target beneficiaries.  In the light 
of their financial capabilities, credit needs, preferences and demand, more than 50 
percent of WMCIP beneficiaries cannot be readily helped by any credit program under 
the EDC sub-component.    
 
 Thus, a comprehensive microcredit program that is anchored on the profit 
potential of the object of the loan, credit needs and financial capability of target 
borrowers will have to include support services via public service delivery system 
(e.g., technical inputs, marketing assistance, new technologies, etc.) from LGUs, other 
government agencies and civil society organizations.  Support services should further 
be attached to the loan product design and credit management strategies of credit-
granting institutions. 
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 The projected financial viability of the project proposed for financing may be 
different from the loan size desired and preferred or demanded by the borrowers.  
Hence, a sufficient evaluation of the borrower’s credit needs, financial and 
entrepreneurial capabilities, credit-worthiness, as well as the economic potential or 
market value of the proposed livelihood projects should be used as basis for approval 
of loan size.  Since most beneficiaries of pro-poor credit programs do not have 
adequate access to technical inputs and marketing services, support services via public 
service delivery system along this line are deemed necessary. 
 
 The market value of economic activities for each beneficiary is beyond the 
feasibility of “economies of scale.”  Since economies of scale require large volumes of 
production outputs to reduce cost of production, this is applicable only under 
collective undertakings of the beneficiaries.  Thus, economies of scale under this 
condition is only attainable through organized actions by the beneficiaries themselves 
either through cooperatives or POs; provided, however, that sufficient technical, 
financial and marketing assistance are adequately put in place by NGOs and 
concerned government instrumentalities such as WMCIP, DAR, LBP, DA, DTI, 
LGUs and other agencies. 
 
 Although the program design of microcredit are anchored on the poverty 
conditions of target beneficiaries, it is not intended to provide pure social welfare 
services.  It is designed as economic investments for the very small business activities 
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of the poor.  Hence, profits should be generated from the very small livelihood 
activities of the impoverished but enterprising target beneficiaries. 
 
 On the other hand, the implementation strategies of microcredit programs are 
also formulated in accordance with the manner in which the impoverished sectors 
would be able to participate in the program.  The credit program may not at all be in 
accordance with the preferences and demand of target beneficiaries because the loan 
product design that they prefer may be beyond their credit needs and overall financial 
capability to pay a loan.  Thus, one of the main objectives of the program is to slowly 
build the financial capabilities and bankability of the participating beneficiaries, 
slowly graduate them into the mainstream commercial banking system and ultimately 
out of poverty. 
 
 The series of processes involved in the utilization of microcredit as a tool for 
poverty reduction enable the poor and non-bankable groups to have access to 
commercial banking facilities.  This will further enable the beneficiaries to meet 
standards of transparency required by commercial creditors.  These include 
information, transactions, processes, and decisions that are openly conducted and 
conveniently available to interested stakeholders.  These standards are apparently are 
normally required by businesses and other profit-oriented organizations.  Microcredit 
programs likewise facilitate the institutionalization of credit discipline and 
accountability measures among participating organizations and beneficiaries 
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themselves especially in terms of managing financial transactions.  Accountability also 
enables compliance of contractual obligations between the creditors and borrowers.   
 
 The application of good governance principles into microcredit facilitates the 
attainment of the profit objective of the livelihood projects and the microcredit 
program.  Furthermore, the profitability determines the sustainability of the 
microcredit program itself and the continuity of benefits that the beneficiaries, 
participating organizations and other stakeholders receive through their participation 
in the program.  Ultimately, the application of good governance in microcredit will 
enable the recovery of capital investments and generation of net revenues for the 
beneficiaries, microcredit providers and the government in the process of helping the 
poor and the non-bankable sectors improve their living conditions. 
     
     b.5.  Summary of Findings: Enabling or Limiting Factors 
 
 
 The enabling or limiting factors provide a vital link between microcredit 
design, capability conditions and beneficiaries’ poverty problems that the program is 
trying to address.  The factors also serve as crucial inputs for formulating appropriate 
implementation strategies and processes that provide a roadmap towards the 
attainment of program goals and desirable impact.   
 
 Credit programs face different factors that may enable or limit successful 
implementation.  The identified enabling or limiting factors may directly come from 
certain conditions (e.g., demographic attributes, household financial conditions, credit 
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experiences, preferences and demand) that affect the target beneficiaries or the 
program itself.  These factors likewise facilitate decision-making in terms of 
identifying who among the impoverished and non-bankable target beneficiaries are 
actually in need, readily eligible for microcredit and those who could not be helped by 
microcredit.  Consequently, the factors may enable or limit the identification and 
formulation of the most effective and most economical processes and strategies of 
delivering appropriate doses of microcredit and needed public support services (e.g., 
farm input subsidies and social safety nets) to the target beneficiaries. 
 
 However, being an enabling or a limiting factor may vary across specific 
geographic conditions, type of creditors, socio-economic conditions, institutional 
contexts, local political leadership and culture.  Thus, one limiting factor may become 
an enabling factor or vice versa under different contexts and under different 
mechanisms of investigation or examination.  This is also primarily dependent on the 
motives of stakeholders such as program donors, creditors, planners and 
implementors.  Finally, this largely depends on which factors they want to emphasize 
and which factors they do not want to examine in order to protect the organized 
interests of other stakeholders who may be adversely affected. 
 
 Specifically, the enabling factors—except ethnicity and religion—are normally 
part of the design and implementation strategies of LBP’s cooperative credit program 
(regular cooperative credit and CAP-PBD) and the Grameen-type microcredit models 
of PCFC and QUEDANCOR.  Ethnicity and religion are considered as enabling 
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factors especially in terms of social targeting and risk management especially in the 
indigenous or Muslim communities.  For example, swine raising is commonly part of 
the loan product designs for LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR.  However, swine raising 
is banned among the Muslims and may also be prohibited among the Seventh Day-
Adventist group.  Furthermore, the charging of interest rate on a loan is also banned by 
Muslim religious leaders.   Hence, the application of the enabling factors should be 
carefully planned in consonance with tradition, religion and other socio-cultural 
conditions. 
 
 The limiting factors are usually part of the creditor’s background investigation 
concerning the credit-worthiness, reputation or bankability of the target beneficiaries.  
These are likewise the primary bases for credit risk management under the LBP, 
PCFC and QUEDANCOR credit program designs.  The limiting factors are crucial for 
the compliance and social preparation of non-bankable beneficiaries with financial 
viability requirements of the project and the credit standards of the MFIs.  Finally, 
these are important in the application of social equity in microcredit via the provision 
of social development-related public support services to target beneficiaries who could  
not be readily and immediately helped by microcredit. 
 
 
 Taking the enabling and limiting factors altogether, these are manifested and 
incorporated in existing pro-poor credit programs of LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR 
either directly or indirectly.  The enabling factors once incorporated in program design 
and implementation strategies, provide specific guidelines for making the program 
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effective and responsive.  The limiting factors provide opportunities for identifying 
credit risk factors and areas of concern needing special attention or immediate solution 
from program planners and implementors. 
 
 Beyond microcredit, the enabling and limiting factors will help identify 
beneficiaries who need capability-building interventions prior to accessing credit 
facilities.  Likewise, it will help the two groups of non-enterprising and impoverished 
beneficiaries who may not need microcredit at all.  The first group is composed of 
those who do not need microcredit because they are too poor to engage in any 
financial transactions and who actually need social safety nets.  The second group is 
composed of beneficiaries who are not actually poor and need only support for small 
or medium-sized businesses (e.g., new technology, marketing, etc.) for expansion or 
for tapping new market opportunities locally and abroad. 
 
 Table 40 shows the different factors that may enable or limit the successful 
design and implementation of microcredit programs for poverty reduction.  It is noted 
that these factors are only considered as either enabling or limiting within the context 
of this study and the specific situations and conditions under which they were 
observed and investigated.   
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Table 40.  Enabling or Limiting Factors 
Category Enabling/Limiting Factors 
A. Demographic Attributes 1. Gender 
2. Age 
3. Ethnicity 
4. Religion 
5. Household role 
6. Number of children 
B. Household Financial  
     Conditions 
7. Type of house 
8. Main source of income 
9. Other sources of income for the family 
10. Average monthly income 
11. Average monthly expenses 
12. Household cash flow 
13. Actions toward savings 
14. Actions toward cash shortages 
C.  Credit Experience 15. Credit experience 
16. Overspending 
17. Causes of overspending 
18. Creditor 
19. Access to loan and other credit services 
20. Uses of amount borrowed 
21. Interest rate 
22. Mode of debt payment 
23. Loan utilization 
24. Repayment rate 
D. Microcredit Preferences   
     and Demand 
 
25. Income-generating activities for financing 
26. Loan size 
27. Collateral 
28. Pubic support services 
 
 Generally, microcredit has a built-in preferential bias towards the poor as 
indicated by the small amount of individual loan sizes (maximum of PhP25,000 per 
borrower) and the homogeneity of target clientele based on household income falling 
below the poverty threshold.  Thus, the enabling or limiting factors provide the context 
for operationalizing social equity in the microcredit program exclusively designed to 
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address the poverty conditions, skills and experiences of impoverished and non-
bankable target beneficiaries.   
 
 On the other hand, financial viability provides the context for developing self-
reliance among the poor by enabling them to generate sufficient income from the 
activities they normally do or from the skills, capabilities and material inputs that the 
government provides.  The small amounts of investments or loan sizes ranging from 
PhP1,000 to PhP25,000 needed in the livelihood activities of the poor are not 
commercially attractive.  However, the small amounts of net profit generated from the 
microcredit-funded livelihood activities would sufficiently enable the poor to satisfy 
basic needs of the family and ultimately increase household income above the poverty 
threshold. 
 
 The enabling or limiting factors serve as determinants of social equity and 
financial viability.  These could also help determine the appropriateness of the 
microcredit program design to the conditions that define the credit needs and financial 
capabilities of the target beneficiaries.  Similarly, the factors provide the contexts for 
the formulation of strategies and processes for implementing the microcredit program.  
  
 Furthermore, the factors that may enable or limit successful program 
implementation likewise serve as positive or negative determinants for the application 
of good governance principles in microcredit programs.  Demographic attributes, 
household financial conditions, credit experience, preferences and demand determine 
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the type of target clientele who will be encouraged to participate and those who will be 
disqualified from the program.   
 
 The factors likewise allow program planners and implementors to identify and 
formulate activities and rules that indicate openness of motives, adequacy of 
information about transactions and the general transparency of processes and 
procedures.  Similarly, the type of livelihood projects, financial activities and related 
transactions entered into by stakeholder help in determining the nature and extent of 
accountability measures that are appropriate to the contractual obligations between 
microcredit providers (e.g., MFIs) and the borrowers. 
 
 Central to the application of good governance in microcredit programs is the 
borrowers’ loan repayment.  Microcredit programs solely earn profit from the 
collective amount of interest income earned from the small amounts of loan 
amortizations from the non-bankable, impoverished but enterprising borrowers.  
Profitability determines the overall financial viability of the microcredit program, the 
continuity of its operations and the sustainability of benefits that the impoverished 
sectors may receive from the government and partner organizations. 
 
 In its totality, since EDC sub-component of WMCIP is primarily IFAD-
sponsored and state-driven via DAR and LBP, the good governance for sustainable 
human development framework is necessary for its successful implementation.  
However, the successful application of good governance in the microcredit program— 
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via the EDC sub-component—remains subject to the interplay of various factors that 
may enable or limit the effective delivery of microcredit and public support services to 
the impoverished and non-bankable target beneficiaries.   
 
 The good governance of microcredit determines the appropriateness and 
sustainability of the EDC sub-component thereby enabling the attainment of pre-
determined program outcomes and desired impact.  Ultimately, these will demonstrate 
profitable microcredit operations of the credit providers and the profitable livelihood 
activities, increased household income above the poverty threshold, improved living 
conditions and better quality of life among beneficiaries and end-borrowers. 
 
 C.  Good Governance in Pro-poor Microcredit Strategies  
The good governance framework is applicable as implementation strategies for 
the four pro-poor credit program designs under EDC sub-component of WMCIP.  In 
reference to specific research problem #3—“How do the principles of good 
governance—participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability—apply in 
a microcredit program for the reduction of poverty incidence among WMCIP 
beneficiaries?—all the four principles are found to be applicable as strategies for the 
implementation of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component. 
 
In the light of the applicability of the good governance principles under 
WMCIP-EDC conditions, specific indicators and sets of activities were generated 
from the results of the study.  Thus, good governance offers new perspectives which 
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will help improve the design and implementation strategies of WMCIP’s EDC sub-
component.  As a tool for poverty reduction and rural development, the good 
governance of the EDC sub-component will make it effective and responsive to the 
needs and capabilities of target beneficiaries.   
 
The main program administration dilemma being addressed by the 
recommended good governance-based solution is the non-implementation of the EDC 
sub-component.  This is primarily caused by participation failure as is evidenced by 
the refusal of partner LCCs and LPCIs to participate in the program.  This is further 
caused by lack of information about other program design options which are suited to 
the needs and capabilities of target clientele.  Furthermore, the inadequate enforcement 
of accountability mechanisms in the context of failure to deliver desirable results 
appears to be evident in terms of “passing the buck” or blaming other partner agencies.  
Finally, the participation failure is attributed to the program design’s inability to 
address the program sustainability issue at its core—project profitability at the level of 
the beneficiaries and LCCs/LPCIs.   
 
Since microcredit is an anti-poverty intervention, good governance for 
sustainable human development suggests that its application to microcredit strategies 
could provide an alternative for resolving the mismatch between the microcredit “blue 
print” of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component vis-à-vis the credit needs and financial 
capabilities of target beneficiaries.  Thus, the good governance framework is 
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applicable as implementation mechanism of microcredit programs within the 
government-driven microfinancial intermediation infrastructure.   
 
The applicability of the good governance principles—participation, 
transparency accountability and sustainability—to the implementation strategies of 
microcredit programs under WMCIP’s EDC sub-component was scrutinized using a 
sample survey reinforced by indepth interviews, group discussion, interactions and 
literature review.   
 
The main objective of said activities is to identify the indicators of good 
governance in the light of the pro-poor microcredit program design and the WMCIP-
EDC implementation framework that are applicable under Western Mindanao 
conditions and workable as well as acceptable to project implementors and target 
beneficiaries.  Thus, this study is able to identify the specific and doable indicators for 
the principles of good governance for sustainable human development.  The indicators 
are vital to the management of WMCIP and its EDC sub-component both from the 
perspective of the individual and group of target borrowers as well as from the 
perspective of the participating LCCs and LPCIs.  
 
It is argued that good governance is a viable solution to the program 
administration dilemma of the EDC sub-component.  Thus, the possible application of 
the four principles of good governance—participation, transparency, accountability 
and sustainability—is examined under WMCIP conditions and within the context of 
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the two cooperative credit programs of LBP, the Grameen Bank-replication models of 
PCFC and QUEDANCOR.   
 
In view of the four good governance principles based on the sampled WMCIP 
beneficiaries’ perspectives, the first principle of beneficiary participation in a 
microcredit program through the EDC sub-component is examined on two 
occasions—before and after the release of loan proceeds.  Second, the requisite 
transparency principle is also investigated based on what the respondents consider to 
be the best way to ensure transparency among and between borrowers and 
implementors.  Third, accountability measures are likewise scrutinized to identify 
strategies that will help ensure that borrowers will be able to pay their loans as 
scheduled and the program properly managed.  Fourth, sustainability is also analyzed 
in terms of how to ensure that sufficient profit will be generated from the project and 
utilized appropriately for the satisfaction of both human well-being and livelihood 
development needs of the target beneficiaries. 
 
The designs of the four pro-poor credit programs of LBP, PCFC and 
QUEDANCOR and the corresponding implementation strategies are highly 
participatory in nature because they encompass productive, profitable and sustainable 
collaboration with MFIs and other development-oriented organizations.  Thus, it is 
argued that good governance is necessary to make this collaboration work better for 
the benefit of the impoverished target beneficiaries.   
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c.1.  Participation 
 Taking the four credit programs of LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR as 
microcredit programs, their social targeting mechanisms what will ensure the 
participation of target beneficiaries will require a lot of capability-building 
interventions.  Consequently, this will ascertain the high frequency of contact and 
interactions between and among target beneficiaries and program implementors from 
WMCIP and partner organizations.  Hence, increasing the participation of the poor 
and the vulnerable groups in microcredit programs relies on the adequacy and 
frequency of contact and interactive mechanisms, more so after the release of the loan. 
These should likewise be specifically designed to increase outreach to target 
beneficiaries. 
 
 In this study, strategies to facilitate beneficiary participation in microcredit 
programs under WMCIP’s EDC sub-component are examined based on two 
situations: before and after the release of loan proceeds.  The first situation involving 
beneficiary participation before the release of loan proceeds is shown on Table 41.  
The largest group is composed of 120 respondents (30.8 percent) who identify that 
trainings and seminars are necessary to ensure proper management of loan proceeds 
and the loan-financed project and to further help increase participation in WMCIP’s 
pro-poor credit program.   This is followed by regular consultation with loan officers 
and technicians with 107 respondents (27.4 percent).  The third group of 89 
respondents (22.8 percent) opts for regular meetings to ensure that loan purposes 
would be attained.   
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 Other identified strategies include problem-sharing among co-borrowers (3.1 
percent); deduction of interest from loan proceeds (0.8 percent); and skills-sharing 
among co-borrowers (0.5 percent).  Forty-eight respondents (12.3 percent) believe that 
all the identified strategies are equally important in making target borrowers 
participate in a microcredit program especially in complying with the requirements of 
a loan before the same will be released to the borrower while nine respondents (2.3 
percent) do not know how to ensure participation before the release of loan proceeds. 
 
Table 41.  Strategies for Beneficiary Participation Before Loan Release 
 
Strategy Frequency Percent (%) 
Training/seminar for managing loan  
  proceeds and project management 
Regular consultation with loan  
  officers/technicians 
Regular meetings for loan purposes 
Problem-sharing among co-borrowers 
Creditor deducts interest from loan proceeds 
Skills sharing among co-borrowers 
All strategies are equally important 
Don't know 
120 
 
107 
 
  89 
  12 
    3 
    2 
  48 
    9 
  30.8 
 
  27.4 
 
  22.8 
    3.1 
    0.8 
    0.5 
  12.3 
    2.3 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 
 The availability of credit funds is viewed as a major inducer and primary 
motivator of the poor to participate in any government program.  However, the 
eligibility requirements and other credit criteria of LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR 
may automatically exclude the poorest of the poor and some interested target 
beneficiaries.  The information on the availability of credit from the government 
aroused the enthusiasm of almost everyone: congressmen, governors, mayors, NGOs, 
businessmen and even non-beneficiaries.  Hence, it is also vital that target borrowers’ 
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participation in credit programs especially before the release of loan should be 
ascertained.  This will help ensure that program benefits will accrue to the target 
beneficiaries, the program design is responsive based on needs analysis, and that 
implementation strategies are acceptable to all stakeholders. 
 
 The second aspect of participation in a pro-poor microcredit program is on the 
situation after the loan proceeds would have been released to borrowers as shown in 
Table 42.  The highest frequency of contact and interaction between and among 
program implementors and beneficiaries are most necessary after loan proceeds are 
released to the borrowers.  Various modalities of ensuring contact and interactions are 
significantly identified by the respondents. 
 
The largest group which consists of 159 respondents (40.8 percent) prefers 
close and strict monitoring of borrowers’ activities and status of the project.  The 
second largest group of 68 respondents (17.4 percent) prefers continuous group 
training for the management of loan-financed income-generating activities.  The third 
group of 21 respondents (5.4 percent) prefers to just strictly follow their budget and 
plan of activities based on the terms and conditions of the loan.  Moreover, 12 
respondents (3.1 percent) indicate that proper recording of financial transactions and 
related activities are necessary in order to facilitate participation after the release of 
loan proceeds.  On the other hand, 114 respondents (29.2 percent) identify the 
abovementioned strategies as equally important while 16 respondents (4.1 percent) do 
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not know any strategies that could help facilitate beneficiary participation in a 
microcredit program especially after the release of loan proceeds. 
 
 
Table 42.  Strategies for Beneficiary Participation After Loan Release 
 
Strategy Frequency Percent (%) 
Close and strict monitoring of borrowers’  
  activities and project status (frequency of    
  contact) 
Continuous group training for project  
  management 
Strict adherence to the budget and plan of  
  activities 
Proper recording of financial transactions and 
  related activities 
All strategies are equally important 
Don't know 
159 
 
  68 
 
  21 
  12 
 
114 
  16 
  40.8 
 
  17.4 
 
    5.4 
    3.1 
 
  29.2 
    4.1 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 
 
 Beneficiary participation in the microcredit programs of LBP, PCFC and 
QUEDANCOR especially after the release of loan becomes compulsory and 
significant to the success of the program.  This is due to the borrowers’ accompanying 
financial accountabilities to their creditors.  Since debt has to be repaid, ensuring 
participation after loan release is vital to the attainment of the microcredit program’s 
financial viability and overall goals and objectives. 
 
c.2.  Transparency 
 Information is central to transparency.  It is also a critical factor in the 
administration of the microcredit programs of LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR.  
Information about financial transactions concerning microcredit program operations 
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and the loan-related activities of target beneficiaries are similarly crucial to the 
monitoring and evaluation of program performance and outcomes.  Thus, the 
availability of information to any stakeholder who may be affected by particular 
decisions or actions encourages participation and facilitates enforcement of 
microcredit policies, needs assessment, analysis of available options, and monitoring 
and evaluation of their consequences.   
 
 However, transparency may become a problem to microcredit operations when 
target beneficiaries do not keep any record of their financial transactions.  Ensuring 
transparency of transactions, procedures and processes is apparently costly to the 
credit providers because this depends largely on personal contact between the 
beneficiaries and representatives of the creditors.  Considering the distance of the 
remote barangays from the town center and the required frequency of personal contact 
(e.g., daily or weekly), this will require additional loan officers and related 
administrative costs.  Evidently, the enforcement of transparency mechanisms via 
monitoring and evaluation will increase the cost of microcredit operations.  Any 
increase in the cost of microcredit operations directly reduces the profitability of the 
program. 
 
 Although the EDC sub-component of WMCIP is a government project, 
profitable operations is a major requirement imposed by IFAD and GOP-DOF on the 
microcredit programs of LBP, LCCs, LPCIs and target beneficiaries.  However, 
information about the financial implications of implementation bottlenecks and 
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processes that took place at the field level is either lacking or not officially reported.  
For example, officially reporting the effects of the political interventions of 
congressmen, governors, mayors and other political groups on overall project 
management, field operations, personnel administration, financial management and 
selection of beneficiaries may prove to be too risky and too dangerous for WMCIP’s 
field implementors and management. 
 
 Nevertheless, despite the risks associated with the enforcement of transparency 
mechanisms in field operations, the enforcement of rules, regulations and the 
maintenance of feedback mechanisms are crucial in the management of microcredit 
programs.  Under the implementation framework of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component, 
the transparency of financial transactions among credit providers, beneficiaries and 
other stakeholders facilitates the attainment of its goals and objectives and the goals of 
WMCIP in general.  Thus, transparency facilitates the attainment of social equity and 
financial viability of the EDC sub-component via monitoring and evaluation of 
program performance and outcomes. 
 
 Table 43 highlights the strategies preferred by the respondents to ensure 
transparency among the group of borrowers.  The largest group of 103 respondents 
(26.4 percent) prefers monthly reporting to the group and to the creditor regarding the 
performance of their loan-funded income-generating activities.  This is the regular 
group audit of the project’s performance with 65 respondents 16.7 percent).  The third 
group of 34 respondents (16.4 percent) prefers regular group meetings or discussions 
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to ensure frequent contact among group members.  Other preferred strategies include 
background investigation (8.7 percent), regular loan-related group seminars or 
trainings (3.8 percent), and group problem-solving (0.8 percent).  On the other hand, 
93 respondents (23.8 percent) think that all the abovementioned strategies are equally 
important in ensuring transparency in a microcredit program while 13 respondents (3.3 
percent) do not know what strategy could help ensure transparency in the 
administration of any microcredit program. 
 
Table 43.  Strategies to Ensure Borrower-group Transparency 
 
Strategy Frequency Percent (%) 
Monthly report to the group and creditor 
Monthly group audit of the project 
Monthly group meetings/discussions to  
  ensure frequent contact 
Background investigation 
Regular group seminars/trainings 
Group problem-solving 
All strategies are equally important 
Don't know 
103 
  65 
  64 
 
  34 
  15 
    3 
  93 
  13 
26.4 
16.7 
16.4 
 
  8.7 
  3.8 
  0.8 
23.8 
  3.3 
Total 390 99.9* 
 * error due to rounding off 
 
 Transparency is crucial to the microcredit program designs and implementation 
strategies of LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR under the implementation framework of 
the EDC sub-component of WMCIP which primarily relies on the mutual group-
guarantee delivery and recovery schemes of cooperative credit assistance and 
Grameen replications.   
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 Since members of cooperatives, SHGs and SRTs are equally accountable to 
each others’ loans, transparency becomes significant in ensuring that loan funds are 
properly utilized based on the terms and conditions of the loan and to prevent loan 
delinquencies or defaults.  Transparency helps strengthen trust and confidence among 
the borrowers and facilitates compliance with lending policies as well as rules and 
regulations governing their access to microcredit facilities and participation in 
government-initiated microcredit programs. 
 
    c.3.  Accountability 
 Within the implementation framework of the EDC sub-component, 
accountability mechanisms are already embedded in the microcredit programs of LBP, 
PCFC and QUEDANCOR as creditors.  These are designed to ensure the borrower’s 
compliance with the terms and conditions of the loan as defined by the lending 
policies enforced by the abovementioned credit providers.  Accountability further 
provides a framework for microcredit delivery and recovery as well as enforcement of 
the terms of agreement of the loan.  Thus, making the borrower accountable to the 
creditor is a critical factor in ensuring loan repayment.   
  
 Ultimately, loan repayment rate is considered as a fundamental indicator for 
measuring the performance of credit programs.  The profitability, financial viability 
and sustainability of the microcredit program under the WMCIP-EDC implementation 
framework rely on the borrowers’ full repayment of their loans.  However, it is 
cautioned that the strict enforcement of accountability measures—such as legal action 
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and confiscation of the borrower’s properties—may result to undesirable 
consequences and may run counter to the democratic values and human development 
goals espoused by the good governance paradigm.   
 
 Accountability measures in microcredit programs include strategies to be 
pursued if it becomes impossible for the borrower to repay his/her loan and the 
borrower’s action towards the guarantor if it becomes impossible for the borrower to 
repay his/her loan.  On the other hand, preferred action towards a defaulting co-
borrower will help identify appropriate measures in preventing loan defaults or in 
imposing penalties to those who violate rules and regulations agreed upon among 
borrowers and creditors. 
 
 In situations where it becomes impossible for a borrower to repay his financial 
obligation to the creditor, Table 44, shows the strategies preferred by respondents in 
order to deal with their inability to repay a loan as it falls due.  The largest group of  
137 respondents (35.1 percent) prefers to sell or pawn their landholdings or farm lot.  
The second group of 80 respondents (20.5 percent) says that their collateral be 
foreclosed by the creditor.  The third group of 48 respondents (12.3 percent) requests 
for a restructuring or extension of the loan payment schedule.  The fourth group of 32 
respondents (8.2 percent) opts for a separate agreement with the loan guarantor so that 
their guarantor or co-maker will pay the loan first.  The guarantor will then collect 
payment from the delinquent co-borrower based on their agreement.    
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 Moreover, five respondents (1.3 percent) prefer to allocate a portion of their 
monthly pension or salary to pay their loan in case it becomes impossible to obtain 
payments from the loan-financed livelihood project.  Eighty-eight meanwhile (22.6 
percent), do not know what to do in case the borrower could no longer meet loan 
payments as they fall due. 
 
 
Table 44.  Strategies to Pursue if Unable to Pay the Loan 
 
Strategy Frequency Percent (%)
Sell or pawn landholdings/farm lot 
Foreclose collateral 
Request for restructuring/extension 
Request guarantor/s to pay and be paid later 
Allocate monthly pension/salary for  
  loan payment 
Don't know 
137 
  80 
  48 
  32 
    5 
 
  88 
  35.1 
  20.5 
  12.3 
    8.2 
    1.3 
 
  22.6 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 
 
 The strategies to pursue if loans cannot be paid are vital to the enforcement of 
accountability measures that are used as an alternative solution to failure to pay loans.  
These accountability indicators suggest that the loan can still be paid despite 
borrowers’ inability to make cash payments based on schedule of amortization.  
Moreover, in collateral-free group lending scheme, a co-maker is required.  In the 
event that the borrower fails to pay his/her loan, the co-maker or the guarantor will be 
forced to pay the loan.   
 
 Table 45 shows what the delinquent borrower prefers to do to his/her co-maker 
in case the borrower becomes unable to pay the loan.  More than half (223 respondents 
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or 57.2 percent) said they will request their respective guarantors to pay their 
obligations first.  Then, the defaulting borrower prefers to pay the obligation to the 
guarantor at a later date depending on what they agree upon.  The second group of 43 
respondents (11 percent) prefers to present any property with monetary value 
equivalent to the amount borrowed as collateral to the guarantor.  The third group of 
36 respondents (9.2 percent) would rather ask for assistance from relatives and friends 
in order to comply with the loan obligations.  The fourth group of 23 respondents (5.9 
percent) prefers to render manual labor or services as payment to the guarantor in case 
the guarantor is obliged to pay the co-borrower’s loan.  Sixty-five respondents (16.7 
percent), on the other hand, have no idea how to deal with their guarantors in 
situations when the guarantors will be forced to pay their loan obligations as they fall 
due. 
 
Table 45.  Actions Toward Guarantor if Unable to Pay the Loan 
 
Action Frequency Percent (%) 
Request guarantor to pay first then be paid later 
Present property/collateral to guarantor 
Ask for help from relatives and friends 
Render services as payment to guarantor 
Don't know 
223 
  43 
  36 
  23 
  65 
  57.2 
  11.0 
    9.2 
    5.9 
  16.7 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 
 
 Under the mutual-guarantee scheme common among collateral-free 
microcredit programs, the guarantor’s financial capabilities are vital to the SHGs’ 
continued access to credit facilities.  Alternative arrangements then among borrowers 
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for loan repayments could be encouraged to ensure that members are able to help each 
other and be able to honor financial obligations to their creditors.   
 
Whichever agreement is acceptable to all group members will need to be 
facilitated and enforced by the creditor under mutual-group-guarantee and collateral-
free microcredit programs for the poor.  Finally, the enforcement of accountability 
measures in a microcredit program requires that delinquent borrowers are penalized 
and dealt with accordingly.  Imposing penalty on defaulting co-borrower means 
commensurate action towards the loan defaulters.   
 
Table 46 shows the respondents’ preferred actions toward co-borrowers who 
default from financial obligations to the creditor.  The largest group of 132 
respondents (33.8 percent) prefers that enforcement of loan repayment scheme be 
done during a regular meeting.   This is followed by 86 respondents (22.1 percent) 
who consider foreclosing the defaulting borrower’s collateral or other properties of 
sufficient monetary value so that loan repayments could be made.  The third group of 
60 respondents would rather impose penalty based on rules and regulations as well as 
on conditions agreed upon.  Other responses include making contributions to cover the 
unpaid loan balance of the defaulter (15.4 percent); monitoring of the defaulter’s 
activities (8.2 percent); and requesting the creditor for restructuring or extension of 
loan payment schedule.  Four respondents (1.0 percent) indicate that all the 
abovementioned actions toward defaulting co-borrowers are equally important while 
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16 respondents (4.1 percent) do not know what to do with co-borrowers who default 
from their loan obligations. 
 
 
Table 46.  Actions toward Defaulting Co-borrower 
 
Action Frequency Percent (%) 
Regular meeting to enforce loan payment 
Foreclose collateral or other properties 
Impose penalty based on rules and group agreement 
Contribute to cover unpaid loan balance 
Monitor defaulter's activities 
Request the creditor for restructuring/ 
  Extension of loan  
All actions are equally important 
Don't know 
132 
  86 
  60 
 
  59 
  32 
    1 
 
    4 
  16 
  33.8 
  22.1 
  15.4 
 
  15.1 
    8.2 
    0.3 
 
    1.0 
    4.1 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 
 Accountability measures towards defaulting co-borrowers are manageable at 
the group level.  This will need the full support of the creditor.  Based on borrowing-
group consensus, the credit providers can impose penalties to defaulters without 
necessarily resulting to the group breaking apart.  In ensuring appropriate actions 
towards defaulting group members, the actions could be preventive and corrective so 
as to enable compliance with the terms and conditions of the loan.  Ultimately, it is 
assumed that this will generate a positive impact on the socio-economic well-being of 
the borrowers.  Moreover, this will need the installation of adequate mechanisms for 
institutional, group and individual credit discipline in all the phases of implementing 
microcredit programs. 
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 The strict enforcement of accountability measures based on the assumption 
that “microcredit is  business; charity is something else”—as encouraged by the 
Grameen Bank’s founding chairman—may push the poor borrowers further into 
poverty and indebtedness they could no longer repay, out-migration, or escalation of 
conflicts in the concerned communities.  Hence, appropriate governance mechanisms 
for enforcing accountability measures and instilling strong credit discipline among 
borrowers are the key indicators to enable microcredit to have a positive and 
significant impact on the lives of the poor.   
 
      c.4.  Sustainability 
 Using the microcredit program designs of LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR 
within the WMCIP-EDC implementation framework, the sustainability of state-driven 
but market-led mechanisms of delivering small amounts of credit to the non-bankable 
sectors is anchored on the profitability of microenterprises and other income-
generating livelihood activities undertaken by the non-bankable poor.   
 
 According to the WB-CGAP (2002), financial viability (measured by net profit 
and other financial indicators commonly used by banks) as the main indicator of 
sustainability may require at least 60 percent interest rate per annum charged on 
borrowed funds and a maximum of five years of good program management despite 
unprofitable operations. Hence, sustainable and commercially viable micro-financial 
intermediation schemes primarily depend on full-cost recovery plus a considerable 
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margin of profit effectively and consistently.  This determines sustainability especially 
five years after the microcredit program has become fully operational.   
 
 Table 47 shows the microcredit strategies that are necessary to ensure 
profitability of the loan-financed livelihood project or income-generating activities of 
the target beneficiaries.  The first preferred strategy that borrower should be the one to 
be involved and should personally manage the loan-financed project is identified by 
62 respondents (15.9 percent).  The second strategy preferred by 37 respondents (9.5 
percent) includes the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and keeping the profit for 
future use.  Thirty-six respondents (9.2 percent) meanwhile, opted for proper record 
keeping, accounting and auditing system appropriate to the financial transactions 
entered into by the borrower.  Other preferred strategies include strict adherence to 
creditor-approved plan of activities and other terms and conditions (5.9 percent); 
weekly or monthly assessment of the status and progress of the project (4.4 percent); 
and sharing of ideas and new technologies among co-borrowers (0.5 percent).   
 
 On the other hand, 204 respondents (52.3 percent) believe that all the 
abovementioned strategies are necessary to ensure the profitability of the loan-
financed livelihood project while only nine respondents (2.3 percent) do not know 
what strategy can ensure the profitability of any loan-financed income-generating 
activity or livelihood project.  
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Table 47.  Strategies to Ensure Profitability of Loan-financed Project 
Strategy Frequency Percent (%) 
Borrower should personally manage the project 
Avoid unnecessary expenses and keep profit  
  for future use 
Proper record keeping, accounting and auditing 
  system 
Strict adherence to creditor-approved plan of  
  activities and other terms and conditions 
Weekly or monthly assessment of project status 
Share ideas and new technologies with  
  co-borrowers 
All strategies are equally important 
Don't know 
  62 
  37 
 
  36 
 
  23 
 
  17 
    2 
 
204 
    9  
  15.9 
    9.5 
 
    9.2 
 
    5.9 
 
    4.4 
    0.5 
 
  52.3 
    2.3 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 
 
 The profitability of a loan-financed project primarily determines its financial 
viability.  The project’s ability to recover full cost of operations plus a considerable 
margin of profit ensures its positive impact on the lives of the poor through additional 
net income that can be disposed of to meet the needs of the family.  The continuity of 
profitable operations of loan-funded projects indicates its sustainability in the long-run 
even without further support from the government and international donor community.  
Thus, the profitability of the project itself ensures its sustainability especially 10 years 
after donor support has been withdrawn or even long-after the phase-out of the ODA-
funded poverty alleviation program. 
 
 The second aspect of the sustainability of a microcredit program is focused on 
how the profit should be utilized as shown in Table 48. The largest group of 166 
respondents (42.6 percent) prefers to use the profit for the payment of their loans.  The 
next largest group of 131 respondents (33.6 percent) would rather use the profit as 
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additional capital for expansion of their livelihood project.  The third group of 53 
respondents (13.6 percent) would like to go for the use of profit for educational 
support of their children, while 31 respondents (7.9 percent) would rather keep the 
profit as savings for their family’s future needs.  On the other hand, nine respondents 
(2.3 percent) do not know what to do in situations when they will be able to generate 
profits or additional income from their loan-financed livelihood projects or income-
generating activities. 
 
Table 48.  Activities for Profit Utilization 
 
Activity Frequency Percent (%) 
Use profit for payment of the loan 
Use profit as additional capital for  
  project’s expansion 
For educational support of children 
Keep the profit for future needs 
Don’t know 
166 
131 
 
  53 
  31 
    9 
  42.6 
  33.6 
 
  13.6 
    7.9 
    2.3 
Total 390 100.0 
 
 
 
 The preferred microcredit strategies that will lead to sustainable and 
commercially viable micro-financial intermediation schemes for the poor and non-
bankable are examined based on two points.  The first is on the mechanisms of 
ensuring profitability of the loan-financed livelihood or income-generating activities 
of the poor and the non-bankable target beneficiaries and the second is on how the 
profit should be utilized.  This directly relates to the repayment rate of the borrowers 
that serves as a major indicator and main parameter of the microcredit program’s 
financial viability and sustainability.  
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 Profit utilization assumes the use of the project’s net income for household 
expenditures related to improvement of living conditions of all family members.  
Since the highest success rate for microcredit programs is measured by 100 percent 
loan repayment rate, the utilization of net profit generated by the borrowers is subject 
to his/her own discretion.  This goes beyond the confines of the microcredit program 
itself.  This could also provide information on how the living conditions of household 
members could be improved a consequence of increased income through microcredit.  
However, it is still subject to business or investment advisory services so that excess 
money and other forms of disposable income are used for more economically 
productive and other income-augmenting undertakings and investments.   
 
 The role of good governance under this condition would be to provide the 
environment within which such benefits could be sustained for the attainment of better 
quality of life for the entire family.  This can be gleaned from better livelihood options 
and investments, nutrition and health care provisions and practices, children’s 
education, more decent and more durable housing and ultimately, the satisfaction of 
all the beneficiaries’ needs for human development way beyond the minimum 
requirements for survival and above the poverty threshold. 
 
c.5.  Summary of Findings: Good Governance in Pro-poor Microcredit Strategies 
 The greater volume of financial benefits derived from the good governance of 
the microcredit programs of LBP, PCFC, and QUEDANCOR—under the 
implementation framework of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component—eventually boils 
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down to the reduction of poverty incidence among target beneficiaries in agrarian 
reform and indigenous communities in Western Mindanao.   
 
 The desirable program outcome and impact should be manifested in the 
borrowers’ increased income and improved living conditions.  However, the road 
towards this end is long, arduous and winding.  Hence, this will require continued 
provision of adequate public services that will help beneficiaries cross the poverty 
line.  Finally, the government has to cope with the poor family’s demand for poverty 
alleviation initiatives caused by a rapidly expanding number of families needing 
similar public services on a year-to-year basis. 
 
The utilization and operationalization of the good governance principles into 
specific and doable activities embedded in the design and implementation strategies of 
pro-poor and financially viable microcredit programs advance the concept of 
“microcredit governance.” This provides a revitalized perspective that will help 
resolve the implementation dilemma encountered in the WMCIP-EDC financial 
intermediation framework.  The good governance of the EDC sub-component will 
further enable the application and implementation of the four pro-poor credit programs 
of LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR plus public support services that are responsive to 
the credit needs and financial capabilities of the LPCIs and the WMCIP beneficiaries.  
Making these happen will require the revitalization and reformulation of the original 
IFAD-approved EDC implementation framework. 
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D.  Good Governance Strategies in Microcredit Program for Poverty Reduction 
 Within a revitalized EDC implementation framework, the good governance 
strategies are applicable to the microcredit programs of LBP, PCFC and 
QUEDANCOR as anti-poverty and rural development initiatives for the impoverished 
households and communities in Western Mindanao.   
 
 The application of the principles of good governance for sustainable human 
development to the microcredit programs of LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR and to 
the implementation framework of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component is analyzed using 
two perspectives—the borrowers’ and program implementors.’  From the borrowers’ 
perspective, all the four principles of good governance for sustainable human 
development—participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability—are 
found to be very relevant to the design and implementation of microcredit strategies 
for poverty reduction across the WMCIP-assisted barangays in the four provinces of 
Western Mindanao.   
 
     d.1.  Beneficiary Perspectives 
 The good governance strategies for microcredit programs at the beneficiary 
level focus more on the management of the microcredit-funded project.  This pertains 
to how a beneficiary manages the income-generating project in relation to the 
attainment of his/her own profit objectives and in close coordination with the credit 
provider.  The involvement of SHGs and other grassroots organizations where a 
borrower belongs provides a guarantee and a mechanism for the creditor to administer 
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a collateral-free microcredit facility.  This provides an environment that enables the 
profitability of the borrower’s project and the attainment of 100 percent repayment 
rate.  These are the pre-conditions that will assist the poor in generating sufficient 
income for the family and for the microcredit provider to recover the full cost of 
operations plus a considerable margin of profit. 
 
 Table 49 details the specific activities for each of the seven indicators of the 
good governance strategies for microcredit programs at the micro-level or at the level 
of the individual borrower.  The six indicators and corresponding activities are 
considered applicable and appropriate to the ongoing efforts to use microcredit as a 
strategy to reduce the poverty incidence of a particular geographic pocket of interest. 
 
Table 49.  Beneficiary’s Indicators for Good Governance in Microcredit Strategies 
Good Governance in 
Microcredit Strategies Indicators and Activities for Program Beneficiaries 
 
1.)  Beneficiary participation before loan  
       release: 
a. Training/seminar for managing loan 
proceeds and project management 
b. Regular consultation with loan 
officers/technicians 
c. Regular meetings for loan purposes 
d. Problem-sharing among co-borrowers 
e. Creditor deducts interest from loan proceeds 
f. Skills sharing among co-borrowers 
I. Participation  
 
 
2.)  Beneficiary participation after the release of loan 
proceeds: 
a. Close and strict monitoring of borrowers’ 
activities and project status (frequency of 
contact) 
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Good Governance in 
Microcredit Strategies Indicators and Activities for Program Beneficiaries 
 
 
b. Continuous group training for project 
management 
c. Strict adherence to the budget and plan of 
activities 
d. Proper recording of financial transactions and 
related activities 
 
II.  Transparency     
 
3.) Within the borrower-group transparency: 
a. Monthly reporting to the borrower’s group 
and to the creditor 
b. Monthly group audit of the project 
c. Monthly group meetings/discussions to ensure 
frequent contact 
d. Background investigation 
e. Regular group seminars/trainings  
f. Group problem-solving 
 
4.)  Strategies to pursue if loan cannot be paid: 
a. Sell or pawn landholdings/farm lot 
b. Foreclose collateral 
c. Request for restructuring/extension 
d. Request guarantor/s to pay and be paid later 
e. Allocate monthly pension/salary for loan 
payment 
 
5.)   Actions towards guarantor if loan cannot be paid: 
a. Request guarantor to pay first then be paid 
later 
b. Present property/collateral to guarantor 
c. Ask for help from relatives and friends 
d. Render services as payment to guarantor 
 
III.  Accountability 
 
6.)   Actions toward defaulting co-borrower: 
a. Regular meeting to enforce loan payment 
b. Foreclose collateral or other properties 
c. Impose penalty based on rules and group 
agreement contribute to cover unpaid loan 
balance 
d. Monitor defaulter's activities 
e. Request the creditor for 
restructuring/extension of loan 
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Good Governance in 
Microcredit Strategies Indicators and Activities for Program Beneficiaries 
IV. Sustainability 
 
7.) Strategies to ensure profitability of loan-financed   
     project: 
a. Borrower should personally manage the 
project 
b. Avoid unnecessary expenses and keep profit 
for future  use 
c. Proper record keeping, accounting and 
auditing system 
d. Strict adherence to creditor-approved plan of 
activities and other terms and conditions 
e. Weekly or monthly assessment of project 
status 
f. Share ideas and new technologies with co-
borrowers 
 
 
 For the sampled WMCIP beneficiary-respondents, the following good 
governance parameters are found to be applicable and appropriate to the design and 
implementation of microcredit programs as follows: 
A. Participation 
1.) Strategies for beneficiary participation before loan release 
2.) Strategies for beneficiary participation after loan release 
B. Transparency 
3.) Strategies to ensure transparency among borrowers’ group or organization 
C. Accountability 
4.) Strategies to pursue if loan cannot be paid 
5.) Actions towards guarantor/co-maker if loan cannot be paid 
6.) Actions toward defaulting members of borrowers’ group or organization 
      D. Sustainability 
7.) Strategies to ensure profitability of loan-funded income-generating projects 
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The principles of good governance are applicable to microcredit operations at 
the level of the individual borrowers and borrowing SHGs or cooperatives. Central to 
this is the capability of the individual to properly manage the loan-funded project in 
order to generate substantial net profit which will enable full loan repayment.   
 
Indigenous and neighborhood-based small-group leadership is apparently a 
crucial element in microcredit programs at the individual and SHG or cooperaive 
levels.  Specifically, the SHGs are much more fragile than cooperatives because they 
easily disband due to lack of trust by group members, dubious financial transactions of 
group leaders or other members, and inability of the group leader to facilitate 
resolution of interpersonal conflicts among members.  The group leader likewise 
provides the major link between creditors and the borrowers and further helps ensure 
that all the terms and conditions of the loan are adequately complied with. 
 
     d.2.  Program Implementors’ Perspectives 
 The second perspective in the utilization of good governance as the core 
implementation strategy of the microcredit program designs of LBP, PCFC, 
QUEDANCOR and the EDC sub-component for poverty reduction and rural 
development comes from group discussions with the program implementors of 
WMCIP, line agencies, LGUs, NGOs and other local stakeholders. 
 
 Good governance strategies at the program implementor’s level focus more on 
the soundness of the credit management practices covering groups of borrowers within 
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a specific geographic scope that can be effectively and efficiently handled by the 
creditor’s staff.  Its main objective is to ensure that microcredit-funded projects and 
activities are carried out in accordance with the terms and conditions of the loan under 
the close supervision of the creditors and to ensure that mutual interests are protected 
and common objectives are attained. 
 
 Program implementors’ perspectives provide concrete indicators and doable 
activities that aim to operationalize the principles of good governance for sustainable 
human development in the design and implementation of microcredit programs in 
order to reduce poverty incidence in impoverished communities as shown on Table 50.    
 
Table 50.  Program Implementor’s Indicators of Good Governance 
   in Microcredit Strategies 
 
Good Governance in 
Microcredit Strategies Indicators and Activities for Program Implementors 
 
I.  Participation 
(access) of target 
clientele in 
microcredit 
programs 
 
1. Regular meetings for loan/project-related purposes 
2. Regular monitoring of each group member's activities 
3. Strict enforcement of approved Project Plan and Budget 
2. Submission of monthly performance report 
3. Values formation/orientation geared towards credit discipline 
1. Adequate information dissemination system 
2. Clear and simple policies and guidelines   
3. Impose penalty for absences during meetings 
4. Member's equity contribution                  
5. Membership in peoples’ organization/cooperatives/NGOs         
6. Create  Microcredit Advisory Committee in the Barangay 
Council 
 
 
II.  Transparency of 
borrowers’ 
transactions 
 
1. Regular meetings, trainings and seminars   
2. Active information dissemination and feedback system 
3. Audit of borrowers' financial conditions and evaluation of 
project status 
4. Regular inspection/monitoring of group activities 
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Good Governance in 
Microcredit Strategies Indicators and Activities for Program Implementors 
 
 
5. Regular inspection of book of accounts 
6. Submission of monthly performance report   
 
III. Accountability of    
      Borrowers 
 
a.) Proper loan utilization: 
1. Regular seminars/trainings on livelihood management 
2. Strict and regular monitoring of loan utilization by  
borrower 
3. Regular visits and actual ocular/physical inspection 
4. Provision of technical/extension services and assistance 
5. Regular meetings to share problems, advise and solutions 
6. Assessment of borrower's entrepreneurial capability 
7. Designation of one member to handle group's financial 
transactions 
8. Requiring insurance for the object of loan 
9. Sufficient communication system between creditors and 
borrowers 
10. Loan release in kind (object of loan), not cash Group 
agreement, decisions and activities based on consensus 
11. Require guarantor/co-maker for those without collateral  
12. Enforce inventory requirements 
13. Regular audit of borrowers’ transactions 
14. Enforcement of collateral requirements 
15. Require promissory note                      
16. Trainings on credit risk management and prevention of 
loan delinquency 
17. Organic/socio-cultural clustering of target borrowers 
18. Sufficient background investigation of each borrower 
 
b.) Loan repayment: 
1. Putting in place multi-agency field monitoring 
team/committee 
2. Assignment of at least one personnel to manage 
microcredit-financed projects per barangay 
3. Monthly evaluation of group's repayment performance 
4. Strict enforcement of loan amortization schedule 
5. Enforcement of collateral requirements 
6. Requiring co-maker/guarantor for borrowers without 
collateral 
7. Tie-up of production and marketing through inter-agency 
assistance 
8. Field-level or house-to-house collection 
9. Incentive scheme 
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Good Governance in 
Microcredit Strategies Indicators and Activities for Program Implementors 
 
c.) Penalty for non-repayment of outstanding loan balances: 
1. Case conference regarding any defaulting group member 
2. Referral of defaulter to barangay captain for appropriate 
action 
3. Strict enforcement of penalty rules for defaulting 
borrowers 
4. Restructuring the loan to reduce amortization based on 
borrower's capability to pay 
5. Allow creditor to take over the delinquent borrower's 
project 
6. Foreclosure of collateral, equity, savings, capital, and 
other properties or appropriate legal action 
7. Serving of collection reminders/notices on time 
8. Notarization of loan documents 
9. No repeat loan if group loan is not fully paid 
10. Defaulting borrower will be automatically excluded from 
group/program 
11. Requiring co-makers to contribute to fully pay defaulter's 
loan balance 
 
IV. Sustainability 
through inter-
agency 
collaboration to 
ensure profitability 
of loan-funded 
livelihood project 
 
1. Regular trainings on new technologies, marketing strategies, 
networking and linkages 
2. Entrepreneurship and livelihood trainings 
3. Exploring new profitable livelihood options 
4. Trainings on local supply-demand analysis 
5. Continuous technical/support services  from line agencies 
6. Regular loan/project evaluation, monitoring and supervision 
7. Preparation and enforcement of approved budget and 
activities 
8. Requiring book of accounts for financial transactions 
9. Replication of successful livelihood projects 
10. Establishment of market linkages/networks outside 
municipality 
11. Requiring member's patronage of group's products 
12. Involvement of housewives in husband's livelihood activities 
and vice-versa 
13. Product promotion through government agencies (e.g., trade 
fairs) 
14. Putting up of trading and livelihood center/beneficiary’s 
product showroom 
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 The operationalization of the good governance indicators in the administration 
of the credit program designs of LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR as well as the 
program management of the revitalized EDC sub-component of WMCIP and the 
implementation of pertinent activities are apparently costly to the creditors.  
Interviews and discussions with program implementors and stakeholders show that the 
administrative costs associated with putting in place the good governance mechanisms 
will consequently be reflected in the cost of credit funds.  This will eventually 
constrain the financial viability of credit programs in general.   
 
 Three options emerged as possible solutions to the aforesaid constraint.  The 
first option is to increase the interest rate being charged on the loan.  This will enable 
the creditor to recover the full cost of the loan covering the cost of money and cost of 
financial intermediation plus considerable profit margin.   The second option is 
mobilization of grants and partnership with grant-giving organizations which will, in 
turn, absorb the additional administrative cost of microcredit operations.  The third 
option is partnership with government instrumentalities which will provide the 
administrative machinery for microcredit programs especially if the financial 
implications of microcredit operations are beyond the project’s viability and if said 
operations constrain the overall financial position of the concerned MFIs. 
 
 The delivery of microcredit services to poverty groups who actually need 
social safety net provisions, however, will ultimately result to loan default due to 
diversion of interest-bearing loan proceeds in favor of the non-income-increasing 
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needs of the borrower’s family members such as food purchase, medication, 
hospitalization, house repair and children’s education.  Thus, indicators and specific 
activities for microcredit management at the borrower’s level are applicable only to 
homogenous credit needs and financial capabilities of target clientele within specific 
poverty clusters and categories where they belong.   
 
 In its totality, the uniform implementation of microcredit 
(PCFC/QUEDANCOR) or the LBP cooperative credit programs (regular/CAP-PBD)  
to all poverty conditions of WMCIP beneficiaries will not be possible.  For example, 
the granting of microcredit to the economically dependent and non-enterprising groups 
could result to diversion of loan funds to finance food expenses, children’s education 
and medicines.  A mistake like this will eventually result to loan accounts that could 
no longer be paid.  Finally, unfavorable repayment situations could render the entire 
microcredit program vulnerable and may eventually result to program failure. 
 
 The diversity of poverty conditions, credit needs and financial capabilities of 
target borrowers and the comparative advantage of respective communities suggest the 
use of multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral approaches to the design and 
implementation strategies of microcredit programs.  This necessitates a comprehensive 
package of rural development initiatives which can only be implemented through the 
local public service delivery system covering anti-poverty projects that include social 
safety nets, microcredit, support services, capability-building, business advisory 
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services and other forms of assistance not only for microenterprises but also for small- 
and medium enterprises.  
 
 Furthermore, microcredit strategies anchored on good governance principles 
necessitate selected indicators and specific activities that are applicable under specific 
socio-economic and cultural contexts of concerned communities and appropriate to the 
credit needs and financial capabilities of target beneficiaries who are capable of 
generating net profits from loan-financed livelihood projects.  Thus, making the 
indicators and specific activities doable for the poor and the non-bankable groups will 
need adequate site-specific assessment of existing community conditions as well as 
individual and institutional capabilities to satisfy existing creditor requirements in 
favor of the target borrower’s participation in a microcredit program.   
 
 The good governance principles are likewise applicable to microcredit program 
administration based on the perspectives of potential governance collaborators and 
other potential program implementors.  These principles are important to creditors in 
the analysis of the needs and capabilities of target beneficiaries; the social targeting of 
the different poverty groups, the delivery of appropriate doses of microcredit and other 
anti-poverty interventions; and the monitoring and evaluation of program performance 
based on pre-determined objectives and desired outcomes.   
 
 These processes involved in microcredit operations are essential to the 
management of microcredit programs, the provision of necessary public support 
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services and the supervision and monitoring of the loan-related financial activities of 
individual borrowers.  Thus, the delivery and recovery of credit funds depend largely 
on the enforcement of the terms and conditions of the loan as well as borrower’s 
compliance with creditor-imposed minimum standards of credit-worthiness, loan 
utilization scheme, repayment rate and repeat access to credit facilities. 
 
 The core principles of good governance for sustainable human development 
are equally important in revitalizing and improving pro-poor credit programs such as 
the EDC sub-component of WMCIP.  However, client-specific approaches based on 
the diverse socio-economic conditions and religious beliefs of the target beneficiaries 
will make the microcredit program more responsive and effective in terms of meeting 
the twin goals of social equity and financial viability.  Thus, the utilization of the good 
governance principles to develop needs-based and client-specific microcredit program 
and the preparation of corresponding plans of action and specific activities will make 
the program more appropriate to the credit needs and financial capabilities of the poor 
and non-bankable target beneficiaries. 
 
E.   Summary of Findings and Observations 
 The analysis of the data and information reveals that the EDC sub-component 
of WMCIP does not affect the operations of  the four existing credit program 
designs—LBP’s regular credit assistance to cooperatives, the CAP-PBD, PCFC-
GBAR and QUEDANCOR’s microcredit facility.  The four credit programs are 
actually open to all qualified borrowers—whether there is WMCIP or not—provided 
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they pass the minimum accreditation requirements and credit standards imposed by 
LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR.   
 
 For both PCFC-GBAR and the regular cooperative credit program of LBP, the 
qualified LPCIs and WMCIP beneficiaries could continue their access to these pro-
poor credit facilities.  The primary role of WMCIP and partner organizations in the 
income-generating activities of qualified LPCIs and beneficiaries is to provide the 
necessary public support services to ensure effective and viable LPCI operations and 
the profitability of the beneficiaries’ loan-funded projects.  On the other hand, the 
CAP-PBD and QUEDANCOR’s microcredit facilities could only be applicable under 
the condition that the WMCIP-assisted LPCIs and beneficiaries could not 
satisfactorily comply with the minimum accreditation criteria and credit standards of 
LBP’s regular cooperative credit and the PCFC-GBAR microcredit facilities.  
 
 Although the four credit program designs are applicable under WMCIP 
conditions, only the CAP-PBD and QUEDANCOR’s Grameen-type microcredit 
facility are the most appropriate programs designs vis-à-vis the household financial 
conditions, income-generating activities, credit needs and financial capabilities of the 
impoverished but enterprising target beneficiaries.  However, for the WMCIP 
beneficiaries who are classified as non-enterprising poor, the poorest and most 
vulnerable, the WMCIP-EDC implementation framework or any other state-sponsored 
but market-driven and profit-oriented credit program for the poor is considered as a 
wrong instrument for poverty alleviation. 
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 The analysis of the data gathered from the beneficiaries reveal a variety of 
income-generating livelihood and entrepreneurial activities.  The results further show 
that there are two groups of beneficiaries: the non-poor and the poor.  The non-poor 
groups are the employed sub-group, the pensioners and the owners of small and 
medium enterprises based on DTI and DBP classification.  On the other hand, the poor 
beneficiaries could be classified into four poverty groups; (1) poorest of the poor, (2) 
laboring poor, (3) enterprising poor, and (4) micro-entrepreneurs.  These should be 
used as basis for client analysis, the formulation of social targeting mechanisms, 
service delivery strategies and monitoring and evaluation system that are responsive to 
the different needs and capabilities of the four groups of impoverished target 
beneficiaries. 
 
 Based on the analysis of the four program designs and the four poverty 
conditions of the beneficiaries, it is concluded that microcredit cannot respond to all 
the poverty conditions of target beneficiaries because it is only applicable and 
appropriate to the working capital needs of the enterprising poor.  The delivery of 
microcredit and public support services should be based on the needs and capabilities 
of target beneficiaries.  The graduated strategy of BRAC and the poverty pyramid 
should be used as tools for monitoring and evaluating the effects of the anti-poverty 
and development interventions.  These  are intended to determine the changes in the 
general socio-economic conditions of target beneficiaries within a period of five years 
after the first availment of WMCIP assistance and five years after the official 
termination of WMCIP. 
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In terms of client analysis, which is based on the estimated average monthly 
household income and income-generating activities, two groups (44.6 percent) of 
target beneficiaries may automatically be disqualified from any pro-poor credit 
program of the Philippine government because they are either too poor for microcredit 
or they are not poor at all.  Thus, social targeting mechanisms and service delivery 
should include subsidies and social safety nets for the ultra-poor and business referrals 
or provision of other investment opportunities for the non-poor.  Finally, monitoring 
and evaluation should focus on the impact of the different doses and various forms of 
assistance on the living conditions and entrepreneurial activities of the beneficiaries. 
 
Specifically, any pro-poor credit programs of the Philippine government may 
not at all be able to improve the living conditions of an estimated 4.4 percent of the 
target beneficiaries.  That is, microcredit4 may not be the appropriate solution to their 
poverty problems suggesting that this poverty group at the bottom of the poverty 
pyramid actually needs social safety nets and direct subsidies.  Meanwhile, an 
estimated 40.2 percent of WMCIP beneficiaries could be disqualified from any pro-
poor credit programs of LBP, PCFC and QUEDANCOR because they may not be 
poor at all.  
 
On the other hand, out of the estimated 55.4 percent of target beneficiaries who 
are deemed qualified to avail of any cooperative or microcredit services, an estimated 
13.6 percent of target beneficiaries are qualified but may be reluctant to avail of the 
                                                 
4 pertinent discussions are earlier presented in section b.2.j. Appropriateness of Microcredit Program based on   
   Household Financial Conditions and illustrated in Figure 3. 
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PCFC-GBAR microcredit facility due to stringent credit standards and strict 
accountability mechanisms.  On the other hand, an estimated 27.7 percent of the target 
beneficiaries are qualified under LBP’s regular cooperative credit facility but may be 
reluctant to avail of the same services for similar reasons. Moreover, an estimated 14.1 
percent of the target beneficiaries could benefit from CAP-PBD but may not access 
the program at all because it enforces stringent credit standards and strict 
accountability mechanisms common to LBP and PCFC.   
 
In this view, an estimated 55.4 percent of the target beneficiaries may opt to 
avail of the credit services from QUEDANCOR’s microcredit facility because the 
credit standards are not as stringent as LBP’s and PCFC’s.  The QUEDANCOR’s pro-
poor credit programs encompasses agriculture-and fishery-related production projects 
similar to the projects that are eligible for financing under the cooperative credit 
assistance and CAP-PBD programs of LBP as well as the micro-enterprises similar to 
those that are acceptable to PCFC under the GBAR microcredit facility. 
 
For the target beneficiaries, WMCIP field personnel, NGO field staff and other 
stakeholders, the QUEDANCOR accreditation criteria and credit standards are much 
easier to comply with especially when provided with adequate public support services 
by WMCIP and partner organizations.  Thus, the beneficiaries who could access 
QUEDANCOR’s services may include those who are qualified under the LBP’s 
regular cooperative and CAP-PBD credit facilities and PCFC-GBAR microcredit 
services but may be reluctant to avail of any credit programs from LBP and PCFC.    
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Only the pro-poor credit program design of QUEDANCOR can adequately respond to 
the credit needs and financial capabilities of this enterprising poverty group.  The 
QUEDANCOR microcredit facility is applicable and appropriate only to LPCIs and 
beneficiaries who are disqualified from the microcredit facility (GBAR) of the PCFC. 
 
 On the other hand, the CAP-PBD is applicable only to the “not-so-strong” 
cooperatives and POs in transition into becoming cooperatives that are disqualified 
from LBP’s regular cooperative credit program but are eligible for external financing.  
This suggests that the CAP-PBD is appropriate only to the production-oriented but 
non-enterprising poor needing public support services such as institutional 
development support and other intensive capability-building interventions from the 
government. 
 
 While the not-so-poor WMCIP beneficiaries could adequately handle profit-
oriented microcredit-funded projects, the other poorer beneficiaries simply do not have 
the capability to handle similar undertakings.  That is, some beneficiaries could be 
helped better with subsidies and other social safety nets provisions because 
microcredit standards and accountability requirements may push them further into 
indebtedness and deeper into the poverty trap.   
 
 The acceptability of the four program designs primarily depends on the final 
choice of the target beneficiaries if these are made available to them as credit options 
under the WMCIP-EDC implementation strategies. Thus, the EDC sub-component 
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should be revitalized and reformulated to make it a larger, more comprehensive and 
integrated program design that combines microcredit and public support services (e.g., 
subsidies and social safety nets).  These services should further be provided based on 
an indepth analysis of the credit needs and financial capabilities of target beneficiaries. 
 
 On the other hand, the study reveals that the business sector is a recipient of 
the joint efforts of the government and civil society for poverty alleviation and rural 
development.  This is largely because once the credit-worthiness and bankability of 
the impoverished beneficiaries would have been fully developed, they are deemed 
graduated out of microcredit and into mainstream commercial banking facilities.  
Thus, an organized effort from the business sector is apparently absent in all WMCIP-
assisted communities being examined.   
 
 Meanwhile, the NGOs who are WMCIP’s sub-contractors for the delivery of 
public services to the agrarian reform beneficiaries are mostly kept afloat and 
sustained by donor and government funds.  These civil society organizations who are 
WMCIP’s partners are mostly donor-driven and likely to withdraw operations in a 
community when donor funds and government support are exhausted.   
 
 Thus, the more comprehensive program design of the EDC sub-component 
should be financially supported by international donors and redesigned following the 
BRAC-IGVGD graduated framework for helping the poor.  The implementation 
strategies of this framework should be anchored on the four principles of good 
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governance—participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability.  
Furthermore, it is argued that this framework should start with the inter-organizational 
participation of civil society, the government sectors and the international donor 
community.    
 
 Under the mandate of DAR, the responsibility for poverty alleviation of 
WMCIP beneficiaries and the development of their rural-based agrarian reform and 
indigenous communities are the primary responsibilities of the Philippine government 
in collaboration with civil society.  However, in the light of the limited financial 
resources of the national government, the financial support of the international donor 
community is absolutely necessary. 
 
 Furthermore, the increasing poverty incidence in the rural areas represents the 
rapidly expanding need for pertinent public services.  However, the delivery of 
adequate volume of public services to those who need them the most is constrained 
primarily by the limited financial resources of the national government and the LGUs.   
In order for the government to adequately respond to the rapidly expanding need for 
public services, poverty alleviation and rural development could only be made 
possible through the financial support of the international donor community. 
 
 While the four credit programs are considered as applicable and appropriate to 
the credit needs and financial capabilities of the target beneficiaries, these are likewise 
influenced and affected by general socio-economic, political, cultural and institutional 
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factors that either enable or limit successful implementation.  Thus, these factors 
should also be considered in designing and implementing microcredit program to 
make it effective and responsive to the prevailing contexts that define the needs and 
capabilities of target beneficiaries and the administrative capacities of partner 
organizations. 
 
 The enabling or limiting factors are normally part of the terms and conditions 
of most credit program designs and are also part of the implementation strategies, 
terms and conditions of the loan.  Careful attention should be given to the two 
enabling factors—ethnicity and religion—in the implementation of the program 
designs, especially in Muslim communities.  The target beneficiaries from the Muslim 
communities, for example, do not accept any interest-bearing loan because this is 
prohibited by their religion.  Moreover, swine raising is not considered as a livelihood 
option for Muslims.   
 
 In general, the provision of public support services is emphasized across all 
program designs and across all poverty groups.  This is intended to ensure the 
financial viability of the credit program for the poor, the profitability of the 
beneficiaries’ loan-funded income-generating activities and the provision of social 
safety nets and subsidies to those who are not capable of complying with the minimum 
requirements demanded by market-driven loan product designs. 
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 The factors that may limit successful implementation of appropriate credit 
program designs for the poor are crucial to the management of credit risks and the 
prevention of circumstances that may lead to program failure.  A review of the causes 
of the failure of government-subsidized credit programs in the past reveals the 
inadequate attention given to the management of risks (see FAO 1998) associated with 
money-management strategies of the borrowers particularly their spending habits, 
attitude towards money and the “dole-out mentality” especially if the creditor is a 
government agency.  Thus, the limiting factors should be considered in the credit risk 
management to prevent and minimize loan defaults and to ensure the attainment of 
acceptable loan repayment rate and the maintenance of a desirable loan portfolio 
quality. 
 
 Finally, the design and implementation strategies applicable to the income-
generating livelihood and microentrepreneurial activities of the target beneficiaries 
necessitate a “microcredit governance” model that could be used for the reformulation 
and revitalization of the WMCIP-EDC program design and implementation 
framework.  This would make it applicable under the socio-economic conditions of 
WMCIP-assisted communities and the administrative capabilities of partner 
organizations and appropriate to the needs and capabilities of the target beneficiaries    
 
 The new EDC implementation framework should allow the target 
beneficiaries’ direct access to LBP cooperative credit facilities, PCFC’s GBAR and 
QUEDANCOR microcredit facilities based on the choices they will make as to which 
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credit program suits best their needs and financial capabilities.  Simultaneously, public 
support services should be provided by WMCIP and partner organizations including 
social safety nets and subsidies to beneficiaries who could not pass credit standards 
and livelihood support systems as well as capability-building interventions to 
beneficiaries who are qualified to avail of the credit service of their choice. 
 
 In its totality, the good governance model as applied to the EDC design and 
implementation strategies utilizes the four good governance principles (participation, 
transparency, accountability and sustainability).  This further necessitates the delivery 
of microcredit and pertinent support services via public service delivery system which 
are geared towards attaining the vision of sustainable human development for WMCIP 
beneficiaries. 
 
 Thus, the application of the four good governance principles as guidelines in 
planning, decision-making and formulating specific and doable activities will facilitate 
the successful administration of WMCIP’s EDC sub-component as a state-driven 
comprehensive, integrated and sustainable microcredit-based program for poverty 
alleviation and rural development.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 359
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION   
 
 This chapter summarizes the results of this study.   It highlights the general 
findings; accomplishments in relation to the research problems; and its contributions 
to the epistemology of public administration, good governance, microcredit, poverty 
alleviation and development. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The non-implementation of the EDC sub-component of WMCIP is largely 
attributed to the gaps in its credit program design and implementation strategies vis-à-
vis the needs and capabilities of target beneficiaries and the organizational capacities 
of partner LCCs and LPCIs. 
 
The original IFAD-approved program design and implementation strategies of 
the EDC sub-component are anchored on the existing credit program and relevant 
implementation guidelines of LBP.  This involves the re-ending of the credit funds to 
LBP-accredited LCCs, which in turn, re-lend the funds to qualified LPCIs.  Finally, 
the LPCIs provide the credit facilities to qualified individual or organized groups of 
WMCIP beneficiaries such as SHGs or SRTs. 
 
 360
However, the EDC sub-component could not be implemented because the 
qualified target credit partners (e.g., LCCs and LPCIs) as well as target borrowers are 
reluctant to participate in the credit program.  While the qualified target borrowers 
consistently refused to avail of the credit assistance program, those who are interested 
to avail of credit assistance are disqualified because they could not pass the minimum 
requirements for availment of the credit services based on LBP criteria for 
accreditation. 
 
In view of the EDC implementation dilemma, this study identifies the 
alternative credit program designs and pertinent implementation strategies that could 
be used for reformulating and revitalizing the original and IFAD-approved program 
design and implementation strategies of the EDC sub-component. 
 
Four credit program designs are identified as credit options that are likely to be 
applicable to the socio-economic conditions, credit needs and financial capabilities of 
the target beneficiaries and the administrative capabilities of partner LCCs and LPCIs.  
The best credit program design being ranked as the first credit option is 
QUEDANCOR’s Grameen-type microcredit model using SRTs.  Its accreditation 
requirements and credit standards are the easiest to comply with based on the target 
beneficiaries’ needs and capabilities.  However, QUEDANCOR’s microcredit 
program is also considered as having the highest credit risk among the four credit 
options because its credit standards are not very specific and also considered as least 
stringent.    
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The second best credit program design is the CAP-PBD.  It is a cooperative 
credit program intended for the “not-so-strong” cooperatives and the POs with credit 
operations that are considered as being in transition to becoming cooperatives.  The 
third best credit option is the regular cooperative credit program of LBP while the 
fourth and least applicable credit program design is the PCFC-GBAR which is readily 
applicable only to the very strong and highly viable cooperatives and MFIs. 
 
Among the four credit program designs, only QUEDANCOR’s microcredit 
model and the CAP-PBD are readily implementable under existing conditions of the 
WMCIP beneficiaries and their organizations.  The two credit programs are also 
readily appropriate to the needs and capabilities of target beneficiaries and partner 
LCCs and LPCIs.  However, both QUEDANCOR and CAP-PBD provide credit 
services only to qualified target beneficiaries.  Those who are not readily qualified are 
automatically excluded from the program.  This justifies the provision of support 
services via the public service delivery system so as to enable the less qualified 
WMCIP beneficiaries to benefit from credit services through the EDC sub-component.  
The necessary support services include social safety nets, farm subsidies, technology 
transfer, livelihood and farming systems development, capability-building and other 
interventions that will help ensure the profitability of the MFI’s credit operations and 
the loan-funded projects of the beneficiaries. 
 
The implementation of WMCIP’s reformulated and revitalized EDC sub-
component needs to be anchored on the overriding goals of financial viability and 
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social equity.  That is, the microcredit program should be responsive to the credit 
needs and financial capabilities of the enterprising poor and simultaneously generating 
positive returns on investment and net profit.  These are the primary determinants of 
the appropriateness of microcredit program design and implementation strategies vis-
à-vis the needs and capabilities of target clientele and partner organizations. 
 
The program design of the EDC sub-component should likewise be cognizant 
of the factors that may enable or limit successful implementation.  These factors 
include the target beneficiaries’ demographic attributes, household financial 
conditions, credit experiences, preferences, and demand. Some of these factors are 
normally part of the terms and conditions of the loan.  These are also crucial in the 
delivery of microcredit services and the provision of pertinent public support services 
to ensure that the social equity-laden microcredit program is also financially viable 
and appropriate to local conditions as well as the credit needs and financial capabilities 
of target beneficiaries and WMCIP’s partner organizations. 
 
The nature of the program design of the EDC sub-component covering the pro-
poor credit facilities and public support services emphasizes the collaboration of 
various organized stakeholders such as government, NGOs and MFIs from civil 
society and the rural banks and lending companies from the business sectors.  This 
type of multi-organizational collaboration suggests the significance of good 
governance in the design and implementation strategies of the EDC sub-component 
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and other government-sponsored credit programs for the impoverished but 
enterprising WMCIP beneficiaries. 
 
In this view, the application of the good governance principles of participation, 
transparency, accountability and sustainability are considered as crucial elements in 
the management cycle of microcredit programs.  The good governance of the EDC 
sub-component starts with ensuring that all stakeholders including the target 
beneficiaries participate in the different phases and processes involved in program 
planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.  Transparency, on the other 
hand, promotes openness of motives, articulation of interests and convenient access 
and availability of all information and pertinent documents.  Accountability further 
helps ensure compliance with policies, enforcement of contractual and legal 
obligations between partner agencies and the enforcement of the terms and conditions 
of the loan between partner MFIs and the target borrowers.  Finally, sustainability 
mechanisms ensure that MFI operations are continuously profitable while the target 
borrowers’ loan-funded projects are also financially viable, thereby enabling full cost 
recovery plus considerable margin of profit. 
 
Theoretically, the application of microcredit as a tool for poverty reduction is 
clearly established among the poor and enterprising women-borrowers of Grameen 
Bank.  Its impact on wages and household income is higher among the enterprising 
women-borrowers.  Microcredit programs are normally implemented by government 
financial institutions as a strategy to increase the incomes of the enterprising poor 
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especially women.  It is likewise considered as a government interventions for poverty 
alleviation and rural development.  Since microcredit programs are implemented 
through MFIs from the civil society and rural banks from the business sectors, this 
strategy for the delivery of credit services emphasizes the role of good governance in 
implementing microcredit program.  This is further intended to make the program 
effective and responsive to the needs and capabilities of target clientele and partner 
organizations. 
 
As a state-driven program, microcredit emphasizes the role of public 
administration in development.  The twin goals of social equity and financial viability 
manifest the integration of humanist approaches to social development with the 
business philosophy of profit-driven approaches to economic development. Social 
equity represents the normative value premise of new public administration and the 
core feature of social development.  On the other hand, financial viability or earning 
money for the government is one of the core principles of the entrepreneurial 
government.   
 
Both social equity and financial viability are simultaneously attainable though 
good governance and via the entry of the government and the public enterprise system 
into the microfinancial intermediation infrastructure.  Thus, the administration of 
state-driven microcredit program for poverty reduction and rural development requires 
the application of the good governance principles—participation, transparency, 
accountability and sustainability—as implementation strategies. 
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The good governance strategies for implementating the microcredit programs 
are intended to improve the processes involved in client analysis, social targeting, 
service delivery, monitoring and evaluation.  Client analysis enables the identification 
of needs and capabilities of target beneficiaries and partner organizations.  Social 
targeting mechanisms enhance the delivery of appropriate doses of credit and pertinent 
public support services as long as they are needed.  Service delivery facilitates the 
provision of credit or public support services at the right time, with minimum cost and 
at the fastest possible means of delivering public services to the homes and farms of 
target beneficiaries.  Finally, the monitoring and evaluation system ensures that the 
program sis effective and appropriate.  It also helps determine the impact of the 
program on wages, household income and the general living conditions of the 
beneficiaries within a period of at least five years starting from the receipt of the first 
microcredit services and other forms of assistance from the program. 
 
In view of the need to reformulate and revitalize the EDC sub-component of 
WMCIP, it is necessary that the program will be enabled to become a financially 
viable tool for poverty reduction and rural development of the WMCIP-assisted 
beneficiaries and their agrarian reform and indigenous communities.  It is also equally 
important that the local conditions should be the primary basis in formulating the new 
EDC program design and implementation strategies.   
 
 In the application of microcredit as a strategy for poverty reduction and rural 
development, the government catalyzes by initiating and setting the stage for the 
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participation of civil society and business organizations.  Likewise, the national 
government creates structures and organizations that will help ensure that wholesale 
credit funds are adequately provided by profit-oriented MFIs while not-for-profit 
public support services are simultaneously provided by participating government 
agencies.  On the other hand, the government steers by dismantling policies that 
inhibit competition among MFIs and other governance actors.  The government 
further steers by prohibiting government programs that compete with private sector 
and civil society initiatives within the micro-financial intermediation infrastructure. 
 
 In view of LBP’s cooperative credit program and existing Grameen replication 
programs being examined (e.g., PCFC-GBAR and QUEDANCOR), their outreach 
mechanisms remain limited to the financially capable.  Following this approach, credit 
appears to be a wrong solution to the poverty and social exclusion problems of the 
poorest and most vulnerable WMCIP beneficiaries.  Outreach to said groups requires 
improvement in social targeting.  This will also need special poverty alleviation 
initiatives such as social safety nets, subsidies, capability-building and other enabling 
interventions aimed at mainstreaming the sector by bringing these initiatives to their 
neighborhoods, to their farms and to their homes. 
 
 The public service delivery system further helps ensure that microcredit and 
other financial services for the poor are effective and responsive to the organizational 
capacities of participating LCCs and LPCIs and the natural resources of communities.  
It is likewise necessary that microcredit and other anti-poverty interventions are 
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appropriate to household financial conditions, credit needs, experience, preferences 
and demand as well as the microentrepreneurial skills and financial capabilities of the 
impoverished target beneficiaries.  These socio-economic factors should likewise be 
considered as either enabling or limiting factors that need to be incorporated in 
program design and implementation strategies because they are deemed vital to the 
success or failure of microcredit and other poverty reduction programs of the 
government. 
  
 The poverty pyramid fits well as a framework wherein the BRAC-IGVGD’s 
graduated strategy for poverty alleviation can be designed and replicated under 
WMCIP-EDC conditions.  The BRAC-IGVGD formula integrates the Grameen 
microcredit model with anti-poverty mechanisms and public support services in a 
comprehensive program that enables the beneficiaries to graduate into the next higher 
levels and eventually into commercial banking facilities and out of the poverty trap.    
 
 The application of BRAC-IGVGD method under WMCIP-EDC conditions 
requires more integration and close coordination among all WMCIP components and 
partner organizations from the government, civil society and the business sector. Thus, 
it is necessary to design and implement a graduated program encompassing social 
safety nets for the poorest and most vulnerable, farm input subsidies for the 
production-oriented but less credit-worthy, microcredit for the enterprising poor, 
business and commercial credit referral services for the non-poor. 
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 On the other hand, the integration of the principles of good governance for 
sustainable human development—participation, transparency, accountability and 
sustainability—into the implementation strategies of BRAC-IGVGD-based 
microcredit program for poverty reduction provides a platform that will make 
microcredit governance applicable to local socio-economic conditions of 
impoverished beneficiaries and their communities.  This will also make the program 
appropriate to the credit needs and financial capabilities of target beneficiaries in 
Western Mindanao.   
 
 The ultimate goal of increasing income beyond the poverty threshold is 
embodied in the twin objectives of MFIs; first is to ensure outreach to the poor, and 
second is to ensure the financial viability of the poor’s livelihood and income-
generating activities.  Consequently, the outcomes will be reflected in the net income 
of MFIs and net household cash flow of beneficiaries.  
 
 The good governance framework adequately responds to both the goals of MFI 
and the diverse poverty conditions, credit-worthiness and bankability of target 
beneficiaries.  It also enables appropriate institutional arrangements necessary for the 
administration of development program via public service delivery system.  Thus, 
good governance provides a working framework for the reformulation and 
revitalization of the program design and implementation strategies of the WMCIP-
EDC sub-component.  Microcredit is likewise applicable as a tool for operationalizing 
good governance.   
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 Through good governance, microcredit can be used as a viable strategy for 
poverty reduction and sustainable human development.  This framework emphasizes 
small amounts of credit and pertinent support services that are appropriate to the needs 
and capabilities of the poor.  More importantly, it also reiterates the delivery of public 
services via multiple partnerships involving a network of development-oriented 
organizations within one microcredit program.  Finally, given the financial and 
technical support from the international donor community, only the administrative 
machinery of the government is fully capable of ensuring that microcredit can indeed 
reduce poverty and consequently sustain rural development. 
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CONCLUSION 
  
 The reformulation and revitalization of the program design of WMCIP’s EDC 
sub-component facilitate the accomplishment of its mandate and objectives.  
Meanwhile, the integration of good governance in the implementation strategies of the 
EDC sub-component will enable the attainment of desired outcomes and sustainable 
impact on the financial conditions of households and beneficiaries across agrarian 
reform and indigenous communities in Western Mindanao.   
 
 The good governance framework of microcredit as applied to the EDC sub-
component suggests the need for a larger, comprehensive and integrated program 
design that encompasses both pro-poor credit facilities for the enterprising poor and 
public support services for those who cannot pass minimum credit standards.  This 
scheme is likely to be effective and responsive to various needs and diverse 
capabilities of the impoverished target beneficiaries and organized stakeholders.   
 
 Theoretically, the governance of microcredit as a strategy for poverty reduction 
illustrates that both the social equity value premise of “New Public Administration” 
(Frederickson 1971) and the financial viability value orientation of “Entrepreneurial 
Government” (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) are simultaneously attainable through good 
governance.  Thus, program design and implementation strategies based on the 
working framework of microcredit governance will only be considered successful if 
the long-term results will effectively and consistently show the graduation of 
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impoverished beneficiaries out of the poverty pyramid, the profitable operations of 
MFIs, and the desirable program outcomes of collaborating government agencies and 
other development-oriented organizations. 
 
 Existing credit programs are designed only for those who are capable of 
meeting minimum credit standards.  The Grameen microcredit model therefore, is 
replicable under WMCIP conditions through QUEDANCOR’s microcredit program 
using SRTs.  Based on the poverty pyramid, however, this will only benefit the 
impoverished target beneficiaries who are considered as the enterprising poor and the 
poor micro-enterprise operators.  These groups who belong to the first and second 
quartiles of the poverty pyramid are likewise considered as the most affluent poverty 
groups and are the richest among the poor.   
 
 On the other hand, the CAP-PBD credit option is also applicable under 
WMCIP conditions and could be operationalized alongside QUEDANCOR’s 
microcredit model.  That is, the impoverished production-oriented groups but who are 
less enterprising or not enterprising at all, may opt to avail of cooperative credit 
program under the transitory conditions of CAP-PBD.  The CAP-PBD will enable the 
strengthening of their “not-so-strong” cooperatives prior to their access to LBP’s 
regular cooperative credit assistance.  
  
 However, the existing pro-poor credit program designs of LBP, 
QUEDANCOR or PCFC are not intended for the poorest and most vulnerable sectors 
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because they could not be readily helped by microcredit.  Enabling their access to any 
pro-poor credit facilities necessitates the application of the BRAC-IGVGD model of 
helping the poorer groups graduate from the lower to the higher quartiles of the 
poverty pyramid.  The replication of the BRAC-IGVGD model under WMCIP-EDC 
conditions requires the administration of appropriate doses of microcredit and public 
support services to the poor in accordance with their dynamic movement out of the 
poverty trap. 
 
 Furthermore, the not-so-strong cooperatives wishing to start microcredit 
operations can be strengthened through CAP-PBD while qualified cooperatives may 
continue to access LBP’s regular cooperative credit program and introduce 
microcredit into its existing lending operations.   In this approach, the on-time 
availability of public support services from partner government agencies and NGOs is 
widely emphasized. 
  
 It is noted that there are factors that enable or limit the successful 
implementation of microcredit programs plus public support services and the WMCIP-
EDC sub-component, in general.  The incorporation of enabling factors in program 
design will increase outreach towards the poorest and most vulnerable beneficiaries, 
improve participation of other institutional stakeholders and facilitate the attainment of 
program objectives and desired outcomes.  On the other hand, the limiting factors will 
help in planning and carrying out strategies to manage, control and prevent the 
 373
occurrence of circumstances that may adversely affect the attainment of targets and 
desired outcomes.   
 
  A reformulated and revitalized program design of the EDC sub-component 
should be patterned after the BRAC-IGVGD model.  Meanwhile, its implementation 
strategies should be anchored on the good governance framework using the principles 
of participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability.  The reformulated and 
revitalized EDC sub-component should further remain donor-funded and state-driven.  
It should also encompass the larger and more comprehensive program for poverty 
alleviation and rural development of Western Mindanao.   
   
 Thus, the good governance of microcredit program plus public support services 
as a tool for poverty reduction and rural development emphasizes the proactive role of 
the government in the management of economic development programs via 
microcredit and social development administration via delivery of public support 
services.  The government then steers, regulates and balances the capitalistic 
tendencies of profit-oriented MFIs and business entities with the humanist and social 
development visions of the government and development-oriented NGOs.  
 
 The governance of microcredit programs for poverty reduction is further 
enshrined in the Philippine government’s development thrusts and priorities along the 
lines of self-employment generation, food for the family, children’s education and 
decent housing.  The attainment of these goals through microcredit programs, 
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however, emphasizes institutional arrangements for the transfer of wholesale credit 
funds from the international donor community to the retail microcredit facilities 
administered by credit-granting civil society organizations in the barangays and finally 
to individual borrowers.   
 
 Anchored on the principles of good governance for sustainable human 
development (participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability), this study 
contributes to the epistemology of public administration by providing research-based 
evidences that financial viability objectives are attainable within the context of social 
equity-laden and government-driven poverty alleviation and rural development 
interventions.  The findings are sufficient to encourage organized business sector 
participation in pro-poor microcredit programs in collaboration with the government 
and civil society organizations. 
 
 This study is able to explore, analyze and identify the indicators of the good 
governance principles in the design and implementation strategies of microcredit 
program intended to alleviate the plight of the poor and non-bankable beneficiaries 
especially in agrarian reform and indigenous communities of Region IX.  
 
 In the final analysis, the diversity of poverty conditions could not be addressed 
by a uniform program design and implementation strategies enshrined in the 
“blueprint” approach to development.  Good governance, microcredit and all other 
development tools and interventions could only be implemented effectively and 
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consistently if they are applicable and responsive to local conditions and community 
resources and the administrative capacities of partner institutions.   
 
 Moreover, government-driven development interventions will only be 
appropriate if they are needed and accepted by the target beneficiaries.  Finally, these 
development initiatives could only be sustainable in the long-run if the intended 
outcomes and impact accrue to the intended beneficiaries and continuously benefit 
them.  The long-term benefits will be manifested in the beneficiaries’ household 
income levels above the poverty threshold.  Therefore, this will ultimately enable them 
to attain and exploit their full human potential.    
 
 Thus, the program design of the EDC sub-component should be reformulated 
and revitalized through the replication of the BRAC-IGVGD model and the poverty 
pyramid under the WMCIP-EDC conditions.  The graduated program design for 
helping the poor help themselves should be administered alongside the target 
beneficiaries’ dynamic movement out of the poverty trap.  This will enable the 
identification of factors that facilitate the attainment of program goals and objectives 
together with the factors that should be integrated with the mechanisms for managing 
credit risks and in preventing the occurrence of circumstances that may lead to 
program failure.   
 
 The good governance principles—participation, transparency, accountability 
and sustainability—are applicable as project implementation strategies of the 
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reformulated and revitalized BRAC-IGVGD-based program design of the EDC sub-
component.  This is aimed at ensuring the participation of individual and organized 
stakeholders in the administration of microcredit plus support services as sustainable, 
state-driven and market-oriented interventions for poverty reduction and rural 
development. 
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CHAPTER VI 
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 This chapter presents the lessons learned from the study which can be used for 
similar undertakings and other credit-related government programs in the future.  It 
also showcases the recommended microcredit program design and implementation 
strategies for the EDC sub-component of WMCIP.  
 
A.  LESSONS LEARNED 
 
 Four lessons were generated from the results of this study.  The lessons are 
attempted and directed towards the identification of key conditions that are most likely 
to influence the replication of microcredit programs.  The lessons learned could be 
used in planning, designing and implementing similar programs and related 
undertakings in the future. 
 
 Prior to the integration of good governance principles in microcredit programs, 
four general conditions need to be scrutinized.  This will help in client analysis and 
social targeting so as to ascertain the nature and extent of availability as well as the 
shortfalls of the existing public service delivery system vis-à-vis the needs and 
capabilities of target borrowers and their communities.  This will also help in 
improving social preparedness for participation in profit-oriented but pro-poor credit 
programs, the delivery of pertinent public services and the monitoring and evaluation 
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of program performance and outcomes.   Thus, an assessment of existing resources 
and capabilities—or their inadequacy—are needed to make microcredit work better 
for the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the poor and non-bankable 
groups in target communities.   
 
 The lessons learned are considered crucial in making the good governance 
strategies in microcredit programs effective and responsive to the needs and 
capabilities of the poor and the non-bankable sectors.  The five lessons include:  (1) 
productive potential of target beneficiaries, (2) resources and capabilities of potential 
governance partners, (3) natural resource endowments of communities, (4) direct 
involvement of the national government and the international donor community, and 
(5) risks involved which are associated with the beneficiaries, their projects as both 
business and economic undertakings and environmental conditions.   
 
A.1  Productive Potential of Target Beneficiaries 
 The productive potential is determined by client analysis and social targeting 
vis-à-vis the existing skills, capabilities and “mindsets” of target beneficiaries.   It is 
also affected by the interplay of socio-economic, cultural, political, institutional and 
geographic factors surrounding their “way of life” and attitude towards government.  
These factors may affect program design and implementation strategies in the sense 
that some target beneficiaries may readily accept government assistance while others 
who reside in specific barangays may opt to preserve their “way of life” rather than 
accept any form of government assistance that may sound foreign to them.  Refusal to 
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accept government assistance may result if the interventions are contrary to traditional 
leadership systems and the assignment of traditional social roles among barangay 
residents or target beneficiaries. 
 
 Geographic isolation due to lack of infrastructure and other facilities shows the 
inability of the public service delivery system to meet the overall developmental needs 
of poor and non-bankable groups in impoverished communities.  The diversity of 
poverty conditions and variations in income-generating activities of the poor and non-
bankable sectors suggests for the delivery of different poverty alleviation and rural 
development services from the government that are directly related to agriculture and 
fisheries.  The initiatives further need to be consistent with the development of 
traditional livelihood systems that are highly specific to concerned barangays or 
cultural communities. 
 
 The poor and non-bankable families living in far-flung and inaccessible 
communities are engaged in survival-oriented livelihood activities and other economic 
activities geared towards production for family consumption. In these barangays, 
agricultural crops, fruits, domestic animals and other products that could be sold in the 
town center were left unutilized, kept for home consumption or reserved for special 
family occasions and religious celebrations.  Thus, making use of the productive 
economic potential of poor families will increase their income on the condition that 
adequate technical inputs, facilities and other public services are provided so that 
 380
production can be improved and products stored, transported and sold profitably to 
appropriate buyers in the nearest trading centers. 
 
 The socially targeted beneficiaries usually lack the technical know-how and 
the capability to increase household income above the poverty threshold.  The analysis 
of needs and capabilities of the impoverished groups tend to show the need for 
fishery-and-agriculture-related technical and marketing assistance and other 
capability-building services. The delivery of pertinent public services to the socially 
targeted beneficiaries will be better accomplished through the collaboration of 
development-oriented organizations. 
 
 The existing productive potential of target beneficiaries further suggests the 
need to pool together the different expertise of collaborating institutions in order that 
sufficient microcredti funds and poverty alleviation services are delivered to target 
beneficiaries more effectively and consistently.  The collaborating institutions that are 
needed to make good governance work for the poor and non-bankable include the 
government agencies, the network of development-oriented NGOs, cooperatives, 
peoples’ organizations and neighborhood associations and entities from the business 
sector such as merchants and traders.   
 
A.2.  Resources and Capabilities of Potential Governance Partners 
 State-sponsored poverty reduction initiatives and rural development programs 
are normally implemented and managed by a specific government agency or through 
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the participation of a consortium of subcontracted development-oriented organizations 
from the civil society or the business sector.  But the administrative capabilities of 
implementing partners are directly constrained by the limited availability of resources 
and the discontinuity of the flow of technical and financial support especially from the 
national government and the international donor community.  
 
 Remote barangays generally do not have adequate infrastructure facilities that 
can connect them to commercial and rural banking facilities, to trading activities of 
local merchants and even to available public services offered by government line 
agencies or LGUs.  For example, despite fiscal constraints and inadequate resources, 
LGUs have implemented technology transfer programs, provided fisheries and 
agricultural inputs and services, as well as other public services only to communities 
where incumbent officials won in the last election and to beneficiaries who voted for 
the incumbent LGU officials.  These public services, however, were available only in 
barangays conveniently accessible to public service providers and project 
implementors.  Despite availability of limited public services, some constituents of 
incumbent local officials have not availed of these benefits due to problems 
concerning access to their barangays such as inadequate transportation and 
infrastructure facilities, geographic remoteness and peace and order problems. 
 
 Moreover, civil society organizations operating in the impoverished 
communities are primarily dependent on donor and government funds and most likely 
to discontinue operations when external fund sources are exhausted.  Their 
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institutional capacities are anchored on perpetual dependence on external sources of 
development funds.  Without donor funds, the sustainability of development programs 
could not be ascertained.  Thus, these conditions add up to the responsibility of the 
national government to deliver poverty alleviation and capability-building services 
that it promises to deliver to the target beneficiaries and governance partners 
effectively, consistently and sustainably.   
 
 An organized effort of the business sector to provide assistance to poor 
communities and to the poor and non-bankable families is apparently absent.  The 
involvement of the business sector in economic development of the poor and far-flung 
communities are primarily limited to profit-motivated business investments and 
activities.  These include the money-making activities of merchants and traders mostly 
from the nearest municipal commercial centers.   
 
 However, the economic activities of local entrepreneurs are not directly related 
to the poverty alleviation and agricultural development activities of government 
agencies and civil society organizations.  In the local credit arena, for example, banks 
and other commercial lending institutions cater only to selected clientele who possess 
adequate financial resources and tangible assets that can readily be used as collateral 
regardless of whether they are beneficiaries of any government project or otherwise.   
 
 The resources and administrative capabilities of potential local institutional 
partners still directly point to the need for the expertise, resources and direct 
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involvement of the international donor community and the national government. 
Specifically, the inability of the concerned LGUs for revenue generation make them 
dependent on internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the national government to meet 
their own annual fiscal requirements.  Thus, the good governance of microcredit 
program provides an alternative strategy for designing and implementing a 
comprehensive and integrated rural development program that enhances credit-
worthiness, self-help initiatives, self-reliance and self-sufficiency among target 
beneficiaries, grassroots organizations and communities. 
 
A.3.  Natural Resource Endowments 
 Natural resource availability of the community determines the size and 
magnitude of the economic and micro-entrepreneurial activities of the poor and non-
bankable groups as well as their access to the public service delivery system.  Despite 
the natural resource endowments of impoverished communities, substantial 
government-initiated development interventions are still necessary in order to enable a 
financially viable utilization of locally available natural resources. 
 
 In the far-flung and impoverished rural communities, however, livelihood and 
other income-generating activities are generally geared towards the satisfaction of the 
poor family’s basic needs for survival especially food and medicines.  Furthermore, 
geographic and social isolation as well as lack of external linkages limit the 
capabilities of the poor and non-bankable sectors to explore other livelihood options 
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where additional income can be generated by selling products outside their respective 
barangays and municipalities.   
 
 A credit-only strategy for poverty reduction may not be appropriate to 
survival-oriented livelihood activities of impoverished families. The full utilization of 
the communities’ natural resources for economic productivity necessitates both 
technical assistance and capability-building initiatives of the government.  These will 
have to focus on the processing of locally available raw materials into semi-processed 
and processed commodities which could be profitably marketed and sold through 
government-driven livelihood assistance programs for poverty alleviation and rural 
development. 
 
 The governance-based design and administration of microcredit program need 
support services being delivered through the public service delivery system (e.g., 
technical, entrepreneurial, marketing and other forms of assistance).  The overall 
project cycle for the income-generating activities of the impoverished target 
beneficiaries starts from the point of natural resource-based point of production and 
ends in the market-driven point of consumption.  Making this possible will create a 
desirable impact on the well-being conditions of target beneficiaries.   
 
A.4.  Direct Involvement of the National Government and International Donors 
 Poverty alleviation programs, being part of the overall development 
interventions in the Philippines, have been historically attached to sovereign loans and 
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donations from international creditors and donors.  These programs are normally 
administered by the national government in collaboration with development NGOs, 
LGUs and the business sector.  Meanwhile, the provision of pertinent public services 
to end-beneficiaries is normally channeled through their own grassroots organizations 
which are mostly cooperatives and POs. 
 
 The provision of pertinent public services for rural development will only be 
accomplished when an appropriate network of collaborating organizations from 
different sectors are adequately put in place.  For example, enhancing the income 
potential of the natural resource-based livelihood activities of the poor and non-
bankable families in the impoverished rural communities necessitates the provision of 
a comprehensive package of credit and support services via public service delivery 
system.   
 
 Within the good governance perspective (see Cariño 2000), the public service 
delivery system encompasses the government, civil society and the business sectors.  
Thus, aside from donor support, the administration of a microcredit program as one of 
the strategies to reduce poverty incidence in impoverished communities suggests the 
initiative, resources and direct involvement of the national government.  That is, needs 
analysis and social targeting mechanisms are formulated based on the poverty pyramid 
while pertinent public services are delivered, monitored and evaluated in accordance 
with the program objectives and desired outcomes.  Consequently, these processes can 
be accomplished through collaboration among LGUs, the network of different 
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organizations from the civil society (NGOs, POs and cooperatives) and the business 
sectors (rural banks and other commercial credit and finance companies).   
 
 Since the business sector is unlikely to participate in endeavors that cannot 
provide adequate profit for their investments, their actions are primarily dependent on 
development funding and initiatives of the government.  The NGOs are likewise 
dependent on donor and government funds as sub-contractors of the government’s 
anti-poverty programs.  Furthermore, the barangay-based grassroots organizations 
mostly existed only because government funding is available.  Hence, poverty 
alleviation and other rural development programs undertaken by LGUs and civil 
society organizations are unlikely to be sustainable once support and incentives from 
the international donor community or the national government is withdrawn or 
exhausted. 
 
 The results of the study also reveal that only cooperatives have shown potential 
for sustainability through their own organized efforts.  Leadership factors are crucial 
in ensuring that operations and finances are managed properly.  However, the 
cooperatives break apart and start to fail in their business activities once financial 
transactions could not be fully accounted for and when financial records could no 
longer be found.   
 
 The smaller POs and neighborhood associations, meanwhile, are more 
vulnerable than cooperatives since this type of organization easily disbands as a result 
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of character differences and disagreements among members or dubious financial 
transactions of any member.  Thus, continuous government support is needed in all 
aspects to ensure that the grassroots organizations will continue their operations at 
least within the barangay.   
 
 Government support may not come from the national government or 
international donor community all the time.  The capability of LGUs to continue and 
sustain local institutional strengthening initiatives of donors and other well-funded 
organizations primarily depends on their capacity to absorb pertinent projects and 
activities.  This depends on their administrative capabilities to integrate the donor-
funded or national government-initiated projects (e.g., microcredit programs, technical 
assistance, technology transfer schemes and marketing linkages among others) into the 
regular local public service delivery system.  However, in the light of the LGUs’ long 
history of fiscal deficits, this possibility will again require the resources and direct 
hand of the national government and the international donor community. 
 
 On the whole, the four lessons generated from the study still point to the need 
for a comprehensive and integrated rural development program design participated in 
by stakeholders at all levels and locally accepted by target beneficiaries based on their 
needs, capabilities and the specific communities’ “way of life.”   
 
 The specific contexts within which the development programs can become 
operational finally determines whether or not the program benefits ultimately redound 
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to the beneficiaries.  This is likewise determined by the administrative capabilities of 
partner organizations and individual capacities of target beneficiaries, whether or not, 
they can sustain the development interventions initiated by foreign donors or the 
national government. 
 
 The continuous and sustainable efforts for enabling the poor and the non-
bankable sectors to be more economically productive necessitate that microcredit be 
significantly embedded as one of the main components of anti-poverty services.  
These efforts need to be attached further to a much larger and more integrated rural 
development program that is spearheaded by the national government and fully 
supported by foreign donors and other benefactors. Consequently, the corresponding 
implementation strategies will need a strong focus on appropriate institutional 
landscape that will facilitate collaborative actions and interactions among different 
organizations in communities identified by the national government as priority areas.   
 
 Thus, the good governance perspective offers a framework for stakeholder 
participation in the administration of the comprehensive and integrated poverty 
alleviation and rural development approaches for the poor and non-bankable sectors in 
impoverished communities.  The integration of the principles of good governance for 
sustainable human development—participation, transparency, accountability and 
sustainability—into pro-poor microcredit programs largely depends on the technical 
expertise and financial resources provided by the national government and the 
international donor community.  Thus, direct involvement of the national government 
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remains central to making microcredit and the requisite public support services work 
better to alleviate the plight of the poor and the non-bankable sectors in impoverished 
communities.  
 
 In view of the four lessons learned from the conduct of this study, the social 
equity value orientation—sans profit motive—could only be enshrined in 
government’s actions toward the poor and the vulnerable.  While the operation of 
NGOs is premised on the social equity value orientation, their institutional strengths 
and administrative capabilities remain subject to external fund sources.  On the other 
hand, the outreach goal of microcredit could not generate the enthusiasm of the 
business sector to participate in microcredit programs.  Thus, only the attainment of 
the financial viability goals could encourage business sector participation in 
government-driven and social equity-laden microcredit programs. 
 
 Institutional arrangements through good governance collaboration firstly 
requires the government to formulate the necessary policies and administrative support 
services to ensure outreach to the poor and the vulnerable as well as implement 
programs that do not compete with private sector and civil society initiatives.  
Moreover, government actions need to further ensure outreach to the poorest and the 
most vulnerable groups in identified communities.   
 
 Secondly, government actions are likewise needed to ensure that outreach 
programs are financially viable so as to enable business sector investments in 
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microcredit and to strengthen the institutional capacities of participating civil society 
organizations.  Hence, both New Public Administration’s (see Frederickson 1971) 
social equity value premise and the Entrepreneurial Government’s (see Osborne and 
Gaebler 1992) financial viability objectives in microcredit programs are 
simultaneously attainable within the context of institutional arrangements enshrined in 
the good governance framework for sustainable human development. 
 
 Good governance in microcredit strategies for poverty reduction, therefore, 
remains a primary responsibility of the national government through the requisite 
microcredit-related support services only the public service delivery system can 
provide.  These are needed by the target beneficiaries even after financial viability 
objectives are fully attained by the service-oriented credit-granting civil society 
organizations.  Meanwhile, the business sector could actively participate in pro-poor 
microcredit programs only under conditions of full-cost recovery plus considerable 
positive returns on profit-motivated investments.   
 
 Microcredit governance will only work better for the poor and the non-
bankable sectors when implemented as part of poverty alleviation initiatives which are 
further embedded in a much larger national government-orchestrated and more 
comprehensive approach to rural development.   
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B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Since the original IFAD-approved program design and implementation 
strategies of the EDC sub-component could not be implemented under existing 
conditions of WMCIP, partner organizations and target beneficiaries, the EDC needs 
to be reformulated based on a combination of program designs and implementation 
strategies that approximate the credit needs and financial capabilities of target 
beneficiaries and partner organizations. 
 
Although the four pro-poor credit program designs (e.g., LBP cooperative 
credit assistance, CAP-PBD, PCFC-GBAR and QUEDANCOR-SRT), public support 
services and other development interventions are potentially applicable to different 
poverty groups, it is still necessary to determine which program design is most 
appropriate to the credit needs and financial capabilities of target beneficiaries.   
 
While the enterprising poor could be readily helped by microcredit, the 
cooperative credit assistance program is much more effective and more appropriate to 
the production-oriented and the “not-so-enterprising” poor.  The poorest of the poor 
and the most vulnerable, on the other hand, could not be readily helped by microcredit.  
They could be helped more appropriately through the provision and direct transfer of 
social safety nets and subsidies from the government. 
 
 392
Therefore, it is recommended that microcredit, cooperative credit and public 
support services be combined and operationalized simultaneously so as to complement 
each other while responding to the diverse poverty conditions, credit needs and 
financial capabilities of the non-bankable target beneficiaries.  Since PCFC has 
consistently refused to participate in the implementation of the EDC sub-component, 
the LPCIs and beneficiaries who are readily eligible could be placed under appropriate 
credit arrangements with WMCIP, LBP and QUEDANCOR.  
 
In the meantime, those who are not readily eligible for credit shall be classified 
under the special poverty alleviation sub-component that specializes in the provision 
of public support services to all WMCIP-EDC beneficiaries.  This group of 
beneficiaries and partner organizations shall be provided with appropriate assistance to 
enable them to comply with minimum credit standards imposed by participating LBP, 
QUEDANCOR and accredited LPCIs.  Furthermore, agriculture and fisheries-based 
production and other micro-entrepreneurial projects as well as organizational 
membership expansion shall be provided with full support services under the special 
poverty alleviation sub-component.   
 
The recommended design of the EDC sub-component should cover 
microcredit, cooperative credit and public support services.  This is based on five 
grounds:  
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1. The dilemma that no LCC is willing to borrow from LBP due to high 
interest rates but are willing to participate in WMCIP’s credit program 
using their own funds;  
2. The problem with WMCIP-assisted cooperatives, POs/associations, 
beneficiaries and partner NGOs is that, in addition to beneficiaries’ 
negative attitude towards loans, they could not satisfactorily meet LBP 
credit standards; 
3. Direct lending by LBP to LPCIs could not eventually make the LPCIs 
eligible for credit from LBP because of its stringent accreditation 
standards;  
4. Target beneficiaries who are qualified to avail of credit services from 
cooperatives may actually opt to avail of microcredit services; while others 
may opt to access the cooperative credit facilities instead of microcredit; 
and 
5. Roughly a quarter of the poor beneficiaries could be readily helped by 
social safety nets provisions and other forms of subsidies; not microcredit. 
 
It is further recommended that the poverty pyramid be applied as the basis for 
classifying the poverty conditions, client analysis and the social targeting of the 
various poverty conditions of WMCIP beneficiaries.  It is further suggested that the 
BRAC-IGVGD model be integrated into the poverty pyramid as a strategy for delivery 
of microcredit and other public support services.  This scheme will help determine and 
enable the graduation as well as the dynamic movement of the impoverished target 
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beneficiaries from the lower to the higher quartiles, and ultimately out of the poverty 
pyramid. 
 
The project cycle in the reformulated and revitalized WMCIP-EDC program 
design and implementation strategies is recommended to commence with the 
participation of stakeholders, followed by the required procedures and processes for 
ensuring transparency and then, the enforcement of accountability mechanisms.  
Finally, the project cycle ends in sustainability with specific activities that encompass 
the profitability of individual loan-funded projects and the credit program as a whole.  
The project cycle repeats with the target beneficiaries’ re-availment of credit and 
public support services.   
 
Finally, since LBP is the credit program’s executing agency while WMCIP is 
the provider of public support services, the independence of beneficiaries and LPCIs 
from support services largely determines the sustainability of the pro-poor 
interventions under the EDC sub-component.  Ultimately, the participation of 
beneficiaries in the mainstream commercial banking system suggests their final exit 
from poverty being demonstrated by their graduation out of microcredit and their 
independence from grants or public support services. 
 
It is therefore recommended that the original and IFAD-approved program 
design and implementation framework of the EDC sub-component be reformulated 
and revitalized through the creation of two special credit windows.  In addition to this, 
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public support services for credit operations and the provision of subsidies and social 
safety nets is further recommended to be administered through the creation of a 
Special Poverty Alleviation Sub-component (SPAS).  Finally, the new implementation 
strategies for the EDC sub-component shall be based on the specific activities 
embedded in the project management cycle that encompasses the principles of good 
governance—participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability.   
 
1.  CREATION OF TWO SPECIAL MICROCREDIT WINDOWS 
It is recommended the LBP be authorized by IFAD-GOP-DOF to provide 
credit facilities directly to LPCIs through the creation and operationalization of two 
Special Microcredit Windows.   The first special microcredit window shall be an 
application of CAP-PBD to the EDC sub-component and shall be tailored specifically 
for WMCIP-assisted cooperatives and other grassroots organizations that are less 
capable and willing to engage in credit or relending operations but could not readily 
pass LBP’s minimum lending criteria.   
 
In the first microcredit window, the LPCIs are recommended to cover 
grassroots organizations such as POs and neighborhood associations in transition to 
becoming cooperatives and the not-so-strong cooperatives who wish to be 
strengthened and be enabled to have access to LBP’s regular cooperative credit 
facility.   The second special microcredit window shall be designed to accommodate 
the Grameen-type SRTs within the federated structure of POs and other WMCIP-
assisted grassroots organizations in transition to becoming cooperatives. It is 
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recommended that QUEDANCOR’s microcredit delivery and recovery methodologies 
be utilized to operationalize the second mcirocredit window.  Furthermore, once the 
POs are converted into cooperatives, it is recommended that they continue the 
Grameen-type microcredit operations as part of the cooperative’s pro-poor credit 
delivery system. 
 
Beneficiaries of the two special microcredit windows shall be provided by 
WMCIP and partner agencies with credit facilities, capability-building interventions 
and other support services via public service delivery system.  This mechanism aims 
to enable them to graduate from being non-bankable into having continued and 
sustained access to the regular credit programs of LBP, QUEDANCOR and/or PCFC: 
 
 
     A.  CAP-PBD Application 
 
The CAP-PBD application is a Special Microcredit Window exclusively for 
DAR-WMCIP-accredited cooperatives who could not readily pass LBP’s minimum 
accreditation criteria for cooperatives but are eligible for alternative financial 
assistance under temporary conditions.  Moreover, CAP-PBD is a “transition credit 
program” for the not-so-strong cooperatives which would eventually graduate into 
having regular access to financial assistance from LBP and other formal financial 
institutions.   
 
The main objective of the CAP-PBD application is the graduation of less 
capable cooperatives into having access to regular credit facilities of LBP and other 
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financial institutions after a transition period—preferably one year after the first loan 
availment.  Eligible borrowers under this special microcredit window should 
preferably be those who fall under the third quartile of the poverty pyramid. 
 
     B.  QUEDANCOR Microcredit Window for Self-Reliant Teams 
 
The Special Microcredit Window for SRTs should be created and implemented 
exclusively for the DAR-WMCIP-accredited POs with SRT sub-groupings.  Its main 
objective is to eventually convert the POs into cooperatives and consequently be 
graduated into having access to regular credit facilities from LBP and other formal 
financial institutions.  Eligible borrowers under this special lending window shall 
preferably be those who fall under the first or second quartile of the poverty pyramid. 
  
The QUEDANCOR Microcredit Window’s main objective is to enable the 
DAR-WMCIP-accredited  POs  to meet the minimum cooperative qualification 
requirements, be converted into regular cooperatives and eventually pass the regular 
LBP accreditation criteria within the maximum transition period—preferably one year 
after the first loan availment. 
 
This special lending window can be operationalized under the following 
conditions: 
1.) Eligible borrowers under QUEDANCOR special lending window are 
automatically disqualified from all other credit programs under WMCIP 
while their DAR-WMCIP-QUEDANCOR accreditation remains in force; 
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2.) The POs are deemed graduated into becoming cooperatives after an agreed 
transition period.  The PO accreditation by DAR-WMCIP shall 
automatically expire and become non-renewable after an agreed transition 
period, depending on demonstrated capabilities; and 
3.) If—subject to performance evaluation after the transition period—POs 
converted into cooperatives still could not pass the regular LBP 
accreditation criteria, they shall be placed under the CAP-PBD application 
upon termination of their DAR-WMCIP-QUEDANCOR accreditation. 
 
2.  CREATION OF A SPECIAL POVERTY ALLEVIATION SUB- 
      COMPONENT (SPAS) 
 
 The creation and operationalization of a Special Poverty Alleviation Sub-
component (SPAS) is aimed at providing the necessary public support services to the 
loan-funded projects of beneficiaries who will qualify for credit services under the two 
special microcredit windows mentioned earlier.  The SPAS is intended for the delivery 
of social safety nets to the poorest and the most vulnerable beneficiary-households 
who belong to the fourth quartile of the poverty pyramid.  This poverty group actually 
needs social safety nets more than subsidies—but not microcredit. 
 
Furthermore, the SPAS shall also be utilized to provide support services and 
other capability-building interventions to all beneficiaries and partner organizations as 
follows: 
a.) Support to microcredit operations under special credit partnership covering 
LCCs and/or LPCIs which shall fund a portion of administrative costs for the 
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delivery, recovery, and other microcredit support services to qualified 
borrowers under WMCIP-LCC/LPCI cost-sharing arrangements; and 
cooperatives/POs/associations for the distribution of  grant/subsidy to qualified 
beneficiaries; 
b.) Trainings and seminars shall be conducted  nearest to the location of the 
beneficiaries’ source of livelihood;  
c.) Hands-on interventions include field trials and experiments which shall be 
conducted right in the beneficiaries’ farms for crops/fishing technologies and 
right in their homes for livestock/poultry raising; 
d.) Demonstration farms and nurseries shall be used as channels for resource 
transfers. The assigned personnel in every barangay shall ensure that 
communities and beneficiaries are socially prepared and ready to accept, adopt, 
own, manage and benefit from the demonstration farms and nurseries prior to 
actual transfer of new resources and technologies through the establishment of 
demonstration farms and nurseries.   
 
Grouped beneficiaries themselves and their institutions shall contribute their 
share and participate in the establishment and management of demonstration 
farms and nurseries. Consequently, commodities (crops, livestock, fishery) 
produced by the demonstration farms and nurseries shall be distributed to the 
participant-beneficiaries to start their own and apply the new technologies 
learned.  For crops, produce from demonstration farms/nurseries shall be 
distributed to the participants as their planting materials. 
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e.) Monitoring and marketing cover at least one personnel assigned in every 
barangay who shall ensure that appropriate livelihood and microcredit support 
services are adequately provided.  Except for reasons of natural or manmade 
calamities and disasters, they shall constantly monitor the performance of the 
LPCI/LCC-financed projects to prevent harvest failures.  Direct contact with 
beneficiaries through daily or weekly home and field visits will facilitate 
monitoring and provision of necessary assistance when the need arises. 
 
Marketing of harvested crops/livestock/poultry/fishery products shall be 
handled by the WMCIP who shall, in turn, facilitate contact with prospective 
buyers, perform actual marketing/selling of beneficiaries’ harvests and ensure 
beneficiaries’ loan repayment to LCC or LPCI.    
 
In cases when the beneficiary could not sell his/her harvest to downtown 
buyers, the personnel assigned in every barangay shall facilitate and expedite 
the same, collect the sales, pay the borrower’s loan amortization to LCC/LPCI 
from the sales and return the net earnings to the beneficiary in his/her home.  
In certain cases, the assigned field personnel shall function as collector of  the 
borrower’s periodic amortizations and remit such collections  to LPCIs or 
LCCs. 
 
Finally, budgetary support for other beneficiary, community and institutional 
development prerequisites—that will enable the beneficiaries and their associations or 
organizations to be eligible and qualified for credit/loan services—shall be sourced 
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from the CID component.  Likewise, budgetary allocation needed for resource 
transfers and/or natural resource procurement and enhancement to complete 
development programs and other pertinent interventions shall be sourced from the  
NRM component.  Moreover, the recommended function of Component IV (PI) shall 
be to manage the different stages of interface to ensure effective, efficient and 
sustainable collaboration between the three components (NRM, CID and SEDC). 
 
3.  ADMINISTRATION OF MICROCREDIT PROGRAM AND SPECIAL 
POVERTY ALLEVIATION SUB-COMPONENT (SPAS) 
 
 
The administration and management of the microcredit program and SPAS 
provide the operating guidelines for making microcredit and SPAS as major 
components of the reformulated and revitalized EDC sub-component of WMCIP.  
These guidelines can also be used for related poverty reduction initiatives and rural 
development programs of the government. 
 
In the implementation arrangements, the cooperatives/POs shall be responsible 
in identifying members who are eligible for social safety nets/subsidy and its delivery.  
In consultation with the assigned WMCIP staff and concerned LGU personnel, the 
grassroots organizations shall pass a resolution recommending to WMCIP the 
member-beneficiaries who are qualified for social safety nets/subsidies under the 
SPAS.  Likewise, the cooperatives/POs shall be responsible for the retrieval of 
material grants/subsidies from the WMCIP’s provincial offices and distribution of the 
same to their member-recipients. 
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In evaluating the poverty conditions or the general socio-economic conditions 
of target beneficiaries, the recommended parameters are as follows:  
 
A.  Socio-Economic Parameters (Poor and Non-Poor Beneficiaries) 
 
There are two categories to be used to classify the socio-economic conditions 
of beneficiaries based on the poor and non-poor classification.  For measuring the 
poverty conditions of poor beneficiaries, three levels of measurement shall be used.  
The first level of measurement shall be the estimated net household cash flow; the 
second shall be the main source of income for the household; and the third shall be the 
type of house where the beneficiary lives and the nature of ownership of the house or 
dwelling unit.  The levels of measurement are as follows: 
 
1.) Estimated Net Monthly Household Cash Flow 
a. Poorest and Most Vulnerable—4th Quartile (4th and lowest) below 
poverty threshold with estimated net monthly household cash flow of 
PhP1,153.13 and below (1st priority for social safety nets). 
b. Poor and Vulnerable—3rd Quartile below poverty threshold (2nd from 
lowest quartile and third from highest quartile) with estimated net 
monthly household cash flow between PhP1,153.14 and PhP2,310.27 
(eligible for social safety nets or subsidies, whichever is necessary). 
c. Enterprising Poor—2nd Quartile below poverty threshold (3rd from 
lowest quartile and 2nd from highest quartile) with estimated net 
monthly household cash flow between PhP2,310.28 and PhP3,465.40 
(eligible for credit-related public support services). 
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d. Microenterprise Operators—1st Quartile of below poverty threshold 
(highest quartile and 4th from lowest quartile—1st priority for 
microcredit) with estimated net monthly household cash flow between 
PhP2,465.41 and PhP4,602.50 (some target beneficiaries may not at all 
need any form of public support services). 
e. Non-Poor—outside the poverty pyramid and not belonging to any of 
the four poverty categories; with net monthly household cash flow 
above the poverty threshold (PhP4,520.51 and above).  This group 
could be provided with business/marketing referral and small enterprise 
development services. 
 
2.) Main Source of Income 
a. Poorest and Most Vulnerable—No income/no regular source of 
income/no income transfer (1st priority for social safety nets). 
b. Poor and Vulnerable—Laborer (social safety nets or subsidies, 
whichever is necessary). 
c. Enterprising Poor—Farming/fishing for home consumption and 
barangay market (microcredit plus credit-related public support 
services). 
d. Microenterprise Operators—Home-based microenterprises and 
production activities (farming, fishing, etc.) primarily intended for the 
market—carinderia/vending/trading/processing (highest—1st priority 
for microcredit; some target beneficiaries may not at all need any form 
of public support services). 
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e. Non-Poor—Small Enterprises with minimum capitalization of 
PhP150,000.00 (business/market advisory or small enterprise 
development services). 
 
3.) Type of house/dwelling unit 
a. Concrete (cemented) with galvanized iron (GI) sheets roof (highest—
1st priority for microcredit).  Some target beneficiaries may not at all 
need any form of credit-related public support services. 
b. Wood with roof made of GI sheets (eligible for microcredit plus public 
support services). 
c. Bamboo/Nipa shingles/cogon roof (eligible for social safety nets or 
subsidies or microcredit, whichever is necessary). 
d. Not owned/lives with relatives (lowest—1st priority for social safety 
nets). 
 
The first level of evaluation shall be based on the estimated net household cash 
flow. This shall be obtained based on the computed monthly average value of all 
inflows (e.g., cash received and the estimated cash equivalent of all non-cash inflows).  
Then the average monthly outflows (e.g., cash expenses and other estimated cash 
equivalent values of non-cash outflows) shall be deducted from the total inflows.  The 
resulting estimated monthly average net household cashflow shall be used as the first 
basis of classifying the poverty category where the beneficiary should belong.  Finally, 
based on NEDA definition, the beneficiary shall be classified as non-poor if the 
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estimated monthly net household cashflow falls above the poverty threshold level of 
PhP 4,602.50 for a family of five. 
 
The second level of measurement pertains to the main source of income for the 
household.  If there is a perfect match between the poverty categories based on the net 
household cash flow (first level) and the main source of income (second level), the 
beneficiary shall be classified according to the poverty categories.    
 
Under this condition, the third level shall only be applied to determine the 
capability of the beneficiary to provide collateral based on the nature of ownership of 
the house.  Thus, if there is a perfect match among net household cash flow (first 
level), main source of income (second level) and type of house (third level), the 
poverty category where the beneficiary belongs shall be considered final. 
 
If the remaining first and second categories still do not match, the final poverty 
classification of the beneficiary shall be based on the main source of income (second 
level) of the beneficiary himself/herself or the head of the family, not anymore the 
entire household.  Under this condition, the main source of income shall then be 
considered as the primary means of survival of the individual beneficiary. This means 
that the overall benefits derived from his/her main economic activity for a day is only 
intended to satisfy his/her minimum daily need for food for that particular day.  Thus, 
the ultimate poverty classification of the beneficiary shall be based on the main source 
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of income of the individual beneficiary himself/herself or the head of the family, not 
anymore the entire household. 
 
If however, there is no perfect match among the three measurement levels, the 
third level of measurement shall no longer be considered.  The poverty category where 
the beneficiary belongs shall only be based on the perfect match between the first and 
second levels of measurement only. Under this condition, the poverty category where 
the beneficiary belongs shall be considered final. 
 
Furthermore, any other forms of mismatch between the first and second 
measurement levels shall be decided by the assigned WMCIP officer in consultation 
with the concerned beneficiary using either the first level or the second level of 
measurement.  The final poverty classification shall be based on whichever category is 
most advantageous and acceptable to all stakeholders—WMCIP, LGUs, MFIs and 
other partner agencies and the concerned beneficiary (see Table 51).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 407
Table 51.  Levels of Measuring the Poverty Classification of Beneficiaries 
Net Household Cash Flow 
(Poverty Category for households with 
a maximum of 5 members) 
Main Source of Income Type of House 
1 — PhP1,155.13 and below    
  (Fourth/lowest Poverty   
Quartile—poorest and most 
vulnerable)  
None/No regular source of 
income (seasonal income and/or 
economically dependent) 
Bamboo/ nipa/ 
cogon 
(preferably not 
owned shanty-
type) 
2 — PhP1,154.14 - PhP2,310.27   
         (Third Poverty Quartile—  
           laboring poor and vulnerable) 
Sale of manual labor (e.g., 
laborer, helper, etc. with regular 
daily, weekly or monthly wages) 
Bamboo/nipa/ 
cogon (owned/ 
not owned, 
shanty-type) 
3 — PhP2,310.28 - PhP3,465.40 
         (Second Poverty Quartile— 
          enterprising poor and less  
          vulnerable) 
Farming, fishing, vending, 
food processing (no paid 
helper/ laborer) 
Made of wood 
(owned/not 
owned) 
4 — PhP3,465.11 - PhP4,620.50   
        (First/highest Poverty  Quartile— 
           microenterprise operators and  
           least vulnerable) 
Microenteprises (usually 
home-based carinderia, trading 
business, etc. with maximum of 3 
paid helpers/ laborers) 
Concrete 
(owned/not 
owned) 
Net Household Cash Flow 
(Poverty Category for households with 
a maximum of 5 members) 
Main Source of Income Type of House 
5 — PhP4,620.51 and above 
  (non-poor and not vulnerable; 
not included in the poverty 
categories)) 
Employment, pension, 
small or medium 
enterprises* or commercial 
businesses (minimum of 4 paid 
helpers/ laborers/employees) 
Concrete with 
lot/land (owned) 
                  * minimum capitalization of PhP150,000.00 based on the classification of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
 
Finally, validation of eligibility for grants/subsidies and priority shall be 
conducted by an assigned WMCIP staff in consultation with concerned LGU officials 
as approved by the WMCIP Provincial Manager.  In order to avoid duplication of 
functions and activities, the Provincial Manager shall ensure that subsidies and grants 
are complementary and well-coordinated with the activities of the other project 
components such as Natural Resource Management (NRM) and the Community and 
Institutional Development (CID).   
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B. Operating Guidelines for Microcredit and SPAS 
 
The recommended operating guidelines for the administration of the SPAS and 
microcredit delivery and recovery operations are as follows: 
1. Uptake of CID and NRM outputs based on SEDC input pre-
requisites/requirements.  In consultation with concerned LGUs and based 
on the recommendations of concerned cooperatives/POs, the qualified 
beneficiaries shall be identified according to actual need either for 
grant/subsidy, microcredit, or other forms of assistance that WMCIP can 
provide. 
2. Eligibility for grant/subsidy under SPAS or microcredit. The eligibility 
for grant/subsidy or microcredit services of beneficiaries shall be based on 
the poverty classification and in consultation with concerned LGUs.  
Priority shall be given to the poorest and most vulnerable households 
belonging to the fourth and third quartiles of the poverty pyramid.  
3. The 5 Beneficiary-Categories.  The proposed categories below which 
include the non-poor are not mutually exclusive.  Based on the BRAC 
model and the poverty pyramid, the poor beneficiaries shall be divided 
equally into four quartiles.  The nature and extent of intervention shall be 
based on the needs and capabilities of each beneficiary.  Administration of 
pertinent intervention shall be in accordance with the category where the 
beneficiary belongs.  Different doses of interventions shall be administered 
to different categories of beneficiaries simultaneously.  That is, for each 
beneficiary, completion of interventions in the lowest category (4th 
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quartile) implies his/her graduation into the next higher category (3rd 
quartile), and so on until the entire cycle is completed, then the next cycle 
begins and so on.  
 
The recommended poverty classification includes the identification and 
classification of beneficiaries and the administration of appropriate doses of 
interventions.  The beneficiaries are eligible either for social safety nets, subsidy, 
microcredit services or referral to regular commercial/bank loans within categories as 
follows: 
1. Poorest and Most Vulnerable (4th Quartile):  beneficiaries shall be 
eligible for full grants/subsidies for basic needs (food, house repairs, 
medicines, vocational trainings for at least one qualified household 
member, and other social safety net provisions). 
— all qualified beneficiaries shall graduate into the 3rd quartile after the 
transition period of six months to one year depending on demonstrated 
capabilities.  All shall be automatically disqualified from the 4th 
quartile after the transition period—graduation to the 3rd quartile.   
Those who will not qualify may remain in the same category but no 
longer eligible for direct social safety nets/subsidies. 
2. Poor and Vulnerable (3rd Quartile):  beneficiaries shall be eligible for 
selected subsidies (free farm inputs: seeds, fertilizers, poultry/livestock for 
breeding, feeds, veterinary services, marketing assistance, etc.) 
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— all qualified beneficiaries shall graduate into the 2nd quartile after the 
transition period of six months to one year depending on demonstrated 
capabilities.  They shall be automatically disqualified from the 3rd 
quartile after the transition period.  Those who will not qualify may 
remain in the same category but no longer eligible for selected social 
safety nets/subsidies. 
3. Enterprising Poor (2nd Quartile):  beneficiaries shall be eligible for 
microcredit, support services and other forms of assistance covering the 
following stages: 
a. Savings generation and mobilization, 
 
b. Enabling for the management of microcredit-funded projects 
(availability, access, utilization, repayment), 
 
c. Market analysis and agri-product/sub-sector assessment, 
d. Loan application with cooperatives and QUEDANCOR, 
 
e. Procurement of projects’ inputs and supplies, 
 
f. Monitoring and supervision of financed projects, 
 
g. Market linkages especially contact with buyers preferably 
indicating volume of demand or purchase orders and other forms 
of marketing assistance,  
 
h. Transfer of products from producer/seller to buyer) 
 
i. Repayment of loan (cycle ends) 
 
j. Back to savings generation and mobilization (savings 
augmentation and expansion of projects) 
 
 
— upon establishment of demonstrated/manifested good credit standing 
and track record, beneficiaries shall be eligible for LCCs’ regular 
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credit facilities and automatically disqualified from WMCIP’s credit 
facility—graduation to the 1st quartile. 
4. Microenterprise Operators (1st Quartile):  beneficiaries shall be  eligible 
for enterprise development assistance, business advisory services and 
referral to other fund sources and assistance  for access to special 
microcredit programs as follows: 
1. Volume of business and capitalization shall automatically qualify 
them to regular microcredit facilities of MFIs. 
2. Graduation out of the poverty classification shall be based on good 
credit track record and commercial viability of the project. Upon 
graduation to the regular credit facilities of thrift banks, rural and 
other commercial banks such as LBP or DBP, concerned 
beneficiaries shall be deemed automatically disqualified from 
WMCIP’s EDC sub-component. 
5. The Non-Poor (Outside the Poverty Pyramid): beneficiaries shall be 
deemed automatically disqualified from WMCIP’s EDC sub-component.  
They shall be eligible only for business advisory services, assistance for 
taking advantage of market opportunities abroad (export) and other local 
markets in Metro Manila and Cebu, and referral to other fund sources and 
assistance for access to commercial bank loans, and other assistance 
appropriate to small and medium enterprises.    
— the volume of business and capitalization of at least PhP150,000.00 
in addition to properties and assets that are acceptable as collateral 
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for loans shall automatically qualify them for commercial credit 
facilities. 
 
 Based on the recommended program design for the EDC sub-component, the 
application of Joe Remenyi’s poverty pyramid is shown in Figure 5.   Although some 
beneficiaries may actually opt for a combination of credit and public support services, 
the new EDC sub-component should be based on which type of assistance from 
WMCIP and partner agencies best suits the needs and capabilities of intended 
beneficiaries.   
 
Figure 5.  Recommended program design based on the poverty pyramid 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The applied poverty pyramid also shows that some beneficiaries in the lower 
categories may graduate into the next higher categories as soon as they demonstrate 
satisfactory performance in their livelihood activities.  That is, some beneficiaries may 
graduate into the next higher category faster than the others while a few may not 
graduate at all.  Moreover, there is also the possibility that the beneficiaries who 
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belong to the higher quartiles in the poverty classification may slip down to the lower 
quartiles after a certain period. 
 
Finally, the target beneficiaries who are readily eligible for credit services may 
be given the option to avail of microcredit services for the enterprising poor from 
QUEDANCOR or production loans and pertinent services from the LBP cooperative 
credit program.   The less qualified target beneficiaries and their non-so-strong 
organizations should be provided with necessary credit assistance and other public 
services through the CAP-PBD.  Since the laboring poor are considered as disqualified 
from any credit program, they should be provided with subsidies and other public 
services to enable them to pass minimum credit standards.  Finally, the poorest and the 
most vulnerable could be better helped with the provision of social safety nets. 
 
4.  THE RECOMMENDED MICROCREDIT GOVERNANCE MODEL 
 
 Under the reformulated and revitalized program design and implementation 
strategies of the EDC sub-component, microcredit governance depicts a framework 
that outlines the mechanisms of implementation and the management of pro-poor 
microcredit program plus public support services using the four core principles of 
good governance—participation, transparency, accountability and sustainability.  
These are necessary for the improvement in the processes involved in client analysis, 
social targeting, the delivery of public services and the monitoring and evaluation of 
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the performance and outcome of the program.  Specific indicators and activities for 
operationalizing microcredit governance are outlined as follows: 
 
A. Participation is aimed at ensuring access of target beneficiaries to the 
program.  Specific operating guidelines and requirements are the following: 
1. Membership in peoples’ organization/cooperatives/NGOs 
 
2. Regular meetings (weekly/monthly) for loan/project-related activities and 
other purposes 
 
3. Regular monitoring (weekly/monthly) of each group member's activities 
 
4. Strict enforcement (no exemptions) of approved Project Plan and Budget 
 
5. Strict enforcement (no exemptions) of accounting and auditing rules 
 
6. Submission of monthly/weekly performance reports 
 
7. Values formation/orientation geared towards credit discipline for new 
members and loan delinquents; or revocation of cooperative or group 
membership for loan defaulters 
 
8. Adequate information dissemination system 
 
9. Clear and simple policies and guidelines (simplification and translation 
into the dialect) 
 
10. Enforcement of penalty for absences during meetings 
 
11. Member's equity contribution that is geared towards savings mobilization 
(minimum of PhP500.00 per annum) 
 
12. Creation of Microcredit Advisory Committee in the Barangay Council 
 
B. Transparency is aimed at ensuring that information is freely and readily 
available to both creditors and borrowers.  Specific operating guidelines are 
the following: 
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1. Background investigation on the credit-worthiness/bankability of target 
borrowers 
 
2. Monthly meetings, trainings and seminars to ensure frequent contact 
between and among group members and creditors and other problem-
solving purposes 
 
3. Monthly reporting to the borrower’s group and to the creditor 
 
4. Active information dissemination and feedback system (bulletin boards, 
brochures, flyers, etc.) 
 
5. Monthly audit of borrowers' and groups’ financial conditions and 
evaluation of project status 
 
6. Regular inspection/monitoring of group activities 
 
7. Regular inspection of book of accounts 
 
8. Submission of monthly performance report to the group and to the 
creditor 
 
C. Accountability is aimed at ensuring that responsibilities, duties and 
functions are adequately accomplished and complied with.  Specific 
operating guidelines are the following: 
1.)  Proper loan utilization 
a.) Regular seminars/trainings on livelihood management and enterprise 
systems 
 
b.) Strict and regular monitoring of loan utilization by the borrower 
 
c.) Regular visits and actual ocular/physical inspection 
 
d.) Provision of technical/extension services and assistance 
 
e.) Regular meetings to share problems, advise and solutions 
 
f.) Assessment of borrower's entrepreneurial capability 
 
g.) Designation of one member to handle group's financial transactions 
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h.) Insurance for the object of loan 
 
i.) Sufficient communication system between creditors and borrowers 
 
j.) Loan release in kind (object of loan), not cash 
 
k.) Group agreement, decisions and activities based on consensus 
 
l.) Guarantor/co-maker for those without collateral 
 
m.) Enforcement of inventory requirements 
 
n.) Regular audit of borrowers’ transactions 
 
o.) Enforcement of collateral requirements 
 
p.) Requiring Promissory note 
 
q.) Trainings on credit risk management and prevention of loan 
delinquency 
 
r.) Organic/socio-cultural clustering of target borrowers 
 
s.) Sufficient background investigation of each borrower 
 
2.) Loan repayment 
a.) Multi-agency field monitoring team/committee 
b.) Assignment of at least one personnel to manage microcredit-funded 
projects per barangay 
 
c.) Monthly evaluation of group's repayment performance 
 
d.) Strict enforcement of loan amortization schedule 
 
e.) Enforcement of collateral requirements 
 
f.) Requiring co-maker/guarantor for borrowers without collateral 
 
g.) Tie-up of production and marketing through inter-agency assistance 
 
h.) Field-level or house-to-house collection 
 
i.) Incentive scheme 
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3.) Penalty for non-repayment of outstanding loan balances 
a.) Case conference regarding any defaulting group member 
b.) Referral of defaulter to barangay captain for appropriate action 
c.) Strict enforcement of penalty rules for defaulting borrowers 
d.) Foreclosure of collateral, equity, savings, capital, and other 
properties or appropriate legal action 
 
e.) Serving of collection reminders/notices on time 
 
f.) Notarization of loan documents 
 
g.) No repeat loan if group loan is not fully paid 
 
h.) Automatic exclusion of defaulting borrower from the group/program 
 
i.) Requiring co-makers to contribute to fully pay defaulter's loan 
balance 
 
j.) Restructuring the loan to reduce amortization based on borrower's 
capability to pay 
 
k.) Allow creditor to take over the delinquent borrower's project 
 
l.) Case conference regarding any defaulting group member 
m.) Referral of defaulter to barangay captain for appropriate action 
n.) Strict enforcement of penalty rules for defaulting borrowers 
o.) Foreclosure of collateral, equity, savings, capital, and other 
properties or appropriate legal action 
 
p.) Serving of collection reminders/notices on time 
 
q.) Notarization of loan documents 
 
r.) No repeat loan if group loan is not fully paid 
 
s.) Automatic exclusion of defaulting borrower from the group/program 
 
t.) Requiring co-makers to contribute to fully pay defaulter's loan 
balance 
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u.) Restructuring the loan to reduce amortization based on borrower's 
capability to pay 
 
v.) Allow creditor to take over the delinquent borrower's project 
 
4.) Borrowers’ actions to take if loan cannot be paid 
a.) Selling or pawning of landholdings/farm lot 
b.) Foreclosure of collateral 
c.) Restructuring/extension of the loan 
d.) Allowing the guarantor/s to pay and be paid later 
e.) Allocation of monthly pension, salary or other fund sources for loan 
repayment 
 
5.) Borrowers’ action towards guarantor if loan cannot be paid 
a.) Guarantor to pay first then will be paid later 
b.) Property/collateral be transferred to guarantor for repayment 
c.) Any form of assistance from relatives and friends 
d.) Render manual labor/services as payment to guarantor 
6.) Borrowers’ action towards defaulting co-borrower 
a.) Regular meeting to enforce loan payment 
b.) Foreclosure of collateral or other properties 
c.) Penalty based on rules and group agreement 
d.) Group members’ contribution to cover unpaid loan balance 
e.) Monitoring of defaulter's activities 
f.) Facilitate request for creditor to restructure/extend loan repayment 
schedule 
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D. Sustainability is aimed at ensuring the financial viability of the microcredit 
program and the profitability of the loan-funded projects.  Specific operating 
guidelines are the following: 
1.) Inter-agency Collaboration 
a.) Regular trainings on new technologies, marketing strategies, 
networking and linkages, and local supply-demand analysis 
 
b.) Entrepreneurship and livelihood trainings 
 
c.) Exploring new profitable livelihood options 
 
d.) Continuous technical/support services  from line agencies 
 
e.) Regular loan/project evaluation, monitoring and supervision 
 
f.) Preparation and enforcement of approved budget and activities 
 
g.) Requiring book of accounts for financial transactions 
 
h.) Replication of successful livelihood projects 
 
i.) Establishment of market linkages/networks within and outside the 
municipality/city/province 
 
j.) Requiring member's patronage of group's products 
 
k.) Involvement of housewives in husband's livelihood activities and vice-
versa 
 
l.) Product promotion through government agencies (e.g., trade fairs) 
 
m.) Putting up of trading and livelihood center/beneficiary’s product 
showroom 
  
2.) Borrowers’ actions to ensure profitability of loan-financed project 
a.) Borrower should personally manage the project 
b.) Avoidance of unnecessary expenses and keeping the profits for future 
use 
 
c.) Proper record keeping, accounting and auditing system 
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d.) Strict adherence to creditor-approved plan of activities and other 
terms and conditions 
 
e.) Weekly or monthly assessment of project status 
 
f.) Sharing of ideas and new technologies with co-borrowers 
 
 Overall, the recommended microcredit governance model explicitly provides a 
framework for implementing and managing a microcredit program plus public support 
services within the framework of a reformulated and revitalized program design and 
implementation strategies of theWMCIP’s EDC sub-component.  The consequent 
implementation of the EDC sub-component under the microcredit governance 
framework emphasizes multiple-institutional collaboration and capability-building for 
the partner organizations and target beneficiaries.   
 
 The model is based on the administrative capacities, credit needs and financial 
capabilities of potential program partners and target beneficiaries. It is likewise 
deemed applicable and appropriate under local contexts and thus, acceptable to 
organized stakeholders and target beneficiaries.  Focusing on multi-organizational 
collaboration with the business and civil society sectors, the microcredit governance 
model is best operationalized when embedded in a larger, comprehensive and 
integrated government program for poverty alleviation and rural development. 
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5. IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
 
 
 The sustainability and overall performance of the recommended program 
design and implementation strategies of the EDC sub-component can only be made 
available at least five or ten years after its official termination.   A thorough 
assessment of the impact of the EDC program design and implementation strategies 
should reveal the annual changes and pattern for a period of at least five years in the 
following indicators:  (1) changes in net profits of LCCs or LPCIs, and (2) changes in 
beneficiaries’ net household cash flow. 
 
A large number of assessment and accomplishment reports of foreign-funded 
development programs has been favorable to funding agencies and implementors.  
However, when project sites are visited 10 or 15 years after program completion, the 
prevailing conditions appear to be similar to conditions before the program was 
implemented.   Despite the interventions, beneficiary conditions have not changed 
over time (see Cracknell 2000). 
 
 It is further recommended that impact assessment studies be conducted by 
independent organizations—preferably academic institutions—and should not involve 
any person or organization previously connected, in whatever way, with the program 
being evaluated.  This is one way of eliminating any form of prejudice in revisiting the 
completed program.  Another benefit from impact assessment is the identification and 
attribution of key result areas that succeeded or failed. 
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 Impact assessment, in general, provides sufficient information on sustainability 
especially on the overall performance and outcomes of the microcredit and special 
poverty alleviation program designs as well as the strategies for implementing them.  
This can be gleaned from the long-term effects of the financial viability of microcredit 
program and profitability of loan-funded projects on the beneficiaries’ overall 
household financial conditions. 
 
 The lessons and recommendations presented in this chapter provide the 
framework for the modification of existing program designs and implementation 
strategies. These are based on the social equity and financial viability value 
orientations of state-driven credit programs for the enterprising poor, other credit 
options for the production-oriented poor, capability-building interventions for the non-
enterprising poor and subsidies or social safety nets for the poorest and the most 
vulnerable target beneficiaries.  
 
The lessons generated from this study will make the replication program more 
acceptable and more appropriate to the administrative capabilities of partner 
organizations, poverty conditions of target beneficiaries and the development of rural 
communities outside Western Mindanao and beyond the EDC sub-component of 
WMCIP. 
 
The revitalized and reformulated program design and implementation 
strategies of the EDC sub-component enables the application of good governance as a 
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framework for attaining social equity and financial viability of microcredit programs 
and other anti-poverty interventions.  This will facilitate and expedite the delivery of 
appropriate doses of microcredit and public support services to the intended 
beneficiaries.   
 
The recommended program design and implementation strategies for the EDC 
sub-component are intended to enable the delivery of microcredit and public support 
services based on the needs and capabilities of WMCIP’s partner organizations and 
intended beneficiaries.   The good governance framework is intended to facilitate the 
implementation of the EDC sub-component and improve the processes involved in the 
delivery of appropriate doses of public services.  These are also intended to make the 
EDC sub-component effective and responsive to the needs and capabilities of WMCIP 
beneficiaries and partner organizations.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AVAILERS  
OF CREDIT SERVICES 
 
 
Barangay Code No:     ___________ 
Respondent Code No.: ___________ 
 
 
PART I.  DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
 
1. Gender:   [   ] Male  [   ] Female   
 
2. Ethnicity:  [   ] Bisaya  [   ] Tausug  [   ] Yakan 
  [   ] Subanen  [   ] Ilonggo  [   ] Sama 
          [   ] Others, specify: __________________ 
 
3. Religion:   [   ] Catholic  [   ] Islam  [   ] Protestant 
          [   ] Others, specify: __________________ 
 
4. Household Role:    
[   ] Husband  [   ] Wife  [   ]  Son  
[   ]  Daughter           [   ] Others, specify: _________________ 
 
5. Number of children:  ________ 
 
6. Age:  ________  
 
7. Type of Dwelling Unit: [   ] Bamboo/Nipa/Cogon 
    [   ] Wood (floor and wall) 
    [   ] Concrete (floor and wall)  
  
 
PART II.  HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL CONDITIONS  
 
 
8. What skill do you possess that can be immediately used for income-generating 
livelihood activities or microenterprises? 
 
      [   ] dressmaking  [   ] cooking  [   ] car/vehicle repair 
   [   ] mat weaving  [   ] vulcanizing [   ] farming 
 [   ] fishing   [   ] livestock/poultry raising/breeding 
            [   ] Others, specify: __________________ 
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9. What is the occupation or income-generating livelihood activity that is most 
important to support your family?  
 
      [   ] rice/corn [   ] copra  [   ] rubber  [   ] seaweeds 
      [   ] fishing [   ] livestock  [   ] carpentry  [   ] driver 
      [   ] employee [   ] laborer  [   ] middleman/trader [   ] vendor 
      [   ] carinderia [   ] sari-sari store  
      [   ] Others, specify: __________________ 
 
10. Who are the regular sources of income for your family? 
 
        Source of Income        Estimated Amount Per Month 
 
      [   ] spouse (husband/wife)  PhP _____________ 
      [   ] son     PhP _____________ 
      [   ] daughter    PhP _____________ 
      [   ] Others: ________________  PhP _____________ 
 
11. How much is your rough estimate of your family’s average monthly income? 
 
[   ] less than PhP1,000 
[   ] PhP1,000  -  PhP2,000 
[   ] PhP2,001  -  PhP3,000 
[   ] PhP3,001  -  PhP4,000 
[   ] PhP4,001  -  PhP5,000 
[   ] PhP5,001  -  PhP6,000 
[   ] PhP6,001  -  PhP7,000 
[   ] more than PhP7,000 
 
12. What are your household expenditure items every month? 
 
Expenditure Item          Estimated Amount Per Month 
 
      [   ] water    PhP _____________ 
      [   ] livestock feeds  PhP _____________ 
      [   ] allowance for children PhP _____________ 
      [   ] clothing   PhP _____________ 
      [   ] electricity   PhP _____________ 
      [   ] food    PhP _____________ 
      [   ] medicines/hospitalization  PhP _____________ 
      [   ] land preparation  PhP _____________ 
      [   ] tuition    PhP _____________ 
      [   ] transportation   PhP _____________ 
      [   ] Others: ________________ PhP _____________ 
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13. Are  you able to save money every month?       [   ] yes       [   ] no 
 
if NO, or you don’t have any extra money or savings, please proceed to         
question no. 15). 
 
14. If you have savings, what do you usually do with the amount you saved (extra 
money)?  
 
     [   ] deposit the money in the bank 
     [   ] keep it for emergency purposes 
     [   ] engage in business 
     [   ] use it for additional capital for my business 
     [   ] buy additional livestock 
     [   ] others, specify _______________________________________ 
 
15. What do you do if money is not enough to meet household expenditure 
requirements? 
 
[   ] be a household helper [   ] do laundry for a fee 
      [   ] be a laborer   [   ] borrow money 
      [   ] sell snack items  [   ] sell properties 
      [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
 
PART III.  CREDIT NEEDS 
 
 
16. During what occasion or situation do you have to spend extra money more than 
the amount you can afford to spend? 
    
      [   ] hospitalization         [   ] birthday 
      [   ] house repair          [   ] health problem 
      [   ] Christmas          [   ] Ramadan 
      [   ] fiesta  
      [   ] wedding 
      [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
 
PART IV.  CREDIT PROVIDERS 
 
17. In case of emergency or important occasion when money is not enough, from 
whom do you normally borrow money? 
      [   ] neighbor    [   ] pawnshop or lending company 
      [   ] relative or friends   [   ] cooperative 
      [   ] trader or “suki”   [   ] others, specify: _________________ 
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18. Reason why you borrow money from your creditor.  (refer to question no. 16) 
 
      [   ] my creditor is very approachable   [   ] easy to borrow money from him/her 
      [   ] my creditor trusts me           [   ] doesn’t charge any interest 
      [   ] my creditor always has money   [   ] creditor is my very close relative 
      [   ] others reasons, specify: __________________ 
 
 
PART V.  CREDIT EXPERIENCES 
 
 
19. In the past two years, have you availed of any credit services or borrowed money? 
 
      [   ] Yes         [   ] No 
 
20. From whom did you borrow money? 
 
      [   ] bank          [   ] cooperative 
      [   ] relatives or friends        [   ] trader or “suki” 
      [   ] lending company        [   ] store 
      [   ] NGO          [   ] neighbor 
      [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
21. How much did you borrow from your creditor? 
 
[   ] less than PhP1,000 
[   ] PhP1,000  -  PhP5,000 
[   ] PhP5,001  -  PhP10,000 
[   ] PhP10,001  -  PhP15,000 
[   ] PhP15,001  -  PhP20,000 
[   ] PhP20,001  -  PhP25,000 
[   ] PhP25,001  -  PhP30,000 
[   ] PhP30,001  -  PhP35,000 
[   ] PhP35,001  -  PhP40,000 
[   ] PhP40,001  -  PhP45,000 
[   ] PhP45,001  -  PhP50,000 
[   ] more than PhP50,000 
 
22. What was the purpose for your borrowing of money? 
 
      [   ] house repair          [   ] hospitalization 
      [   ] to pay previous debt         [   ] capital for sari-sari store 
      [   ] for children’s school fees         [   ] land preparation 
      [   ] farm production loan         [   ] business 
      [   ] household expenses         [   ] purchase of farm equipment 
      [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
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23. What was the interest rate being charged to the loan? 
 
      [   ] none         [   ] 1 - 2 percent        [   ] 3 - 4 percent 
      [   ] 5 percent and above 
 
24. What was the mode of payment or installment scheme? 
 
      [   ] daily         [   ] weekly        [   ] monthly 
      [   ] upon harvest        [   ] others, specify_________________________ 
 
25. Was the loan amount borrowed utilized as intended? 
 
      [   ] Yes         [   ] No 
 
26. Was the loan fully paid?       [   ] yes         [   ] no 
 
if YES, please proceed to question number 29. 
 
27. If NO, or the loan was not fully paid, how much is not yet paid? 
 
[   ] less than PhP1,000 
[   ] PhP1,000  -  PhP5,000 
[   ] PhP5,001  -  PhP10,000 
[   ] PhP10,001  -  PhP15,000 
[   ] PhP15,001  -  PhP20,000 
[   ] PhP20,001  -  PhP25,000 
[   ] PhP25,001  -  PhP30,000 
[   ] PhP30,001  -  PhP35,000 
[   ] PhP35,001  -  PhP40,000 
[   ] PhP40,001  -  PhP45,000 
[   ] PhP45,001  -  PhP50,000 
[   ] more than PhP50,000 
 
28. What is the main reason why the loan is not yet fully paid? 
 
     [   ] loan is not yet due 
     [   ] profit from the project was not enough 
     [   ] loan was used for children’s school fees 
     [   ] not enough time to pay 
     [   ] short of budget 
     [   ] other reasons, specify: __________________ 
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PART VI.  CREDIT PREFERENCES AND DEMAND 
 
29. If credit or loan is available, what income-generating livelihood activity would 
you like to engage in? 
 
     [   ] buy and sell business        [   ] swine raising 
     [   ] seaweeds production        [   ] poultry raising 
     [   ] motorcycle or tricycle        [   ] fishing (fish net/banca) 
     [   ] rice or corn production       [   ] sari-sari store 
     [   ] cow/carabao raising        [   ] food processing 
     [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
30. How much capital is necessary to finance the income-generating activity or project 
that you want to engage in? 
 
[   ] less than PhP1,000 
[   ] PhP1,000  -  PhP5,000 
[   ] PhP5,001  -  PhP10,000 
[   ] PhP10,001  -  PhP15,000 
[   ] PhP15,001  -  PhP20,000 
[   ] PhP20,001  -  PhP25,000 
[   ] PhP25,001  -  PhP30,000 
[   ] PhP30,001  -  PhP35,000 
[   ] PhP35,001  -  PhP40,000 
[   ] PhP40,001  -  PhP45,000 
[   ] PhP45,001  -  PhP50,000 
[   ] if more than PhP50,000, specify, _PhP__________________ 
 
31. If collateral will be required by the creditor, will you be able to put up collateral to 
guarantee a loan?  [   ] yes [   ] no 
 
If NO, please proceed to question no. 33. 
 
32. What asset, property or material possession are you willing to use as collateral? 
 
     [   ] house         [   ] home appliances 
     [   ] land title        [   ] motorcycle/jeep/banca 
     [   ] livestock and poultry       [   ] farm equipment 
     [   ] farm lot        [   ] fishing gear 
     [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
33. What kind of loan assistance and other loan-related support service are still needed 
but are not yet been given? 
 
     [   ] new farming technology      [   ] veterinary services  
     [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
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34. If profit will be realized from loan-financed livelihood/business, what should be 
done with that profit?  
 
     [   ] for additional capital 
     [   ] for children’s school fees 
     [   ] save the profit for future needs 
     [   ] pay the loan 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________ 
 
35. How many months should a loan be fully paid? 
 
     [   ] within 6 months  
     [   ] within 1 year (12 months) 
     [   ] within 2 years (24 months) 
     [   ] within 3 years (36 months) 
     [   ] within 4 years (48 months) 
     [   ] within 5 years (60 months) 
     [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
36. What mode of amortization (installments) is most convenient in order that the loan 
will be fully paid? 
 
     [   ] daily        [   ] weekly        [   ] monthly 
     [   ] every 3 months      [   ] every 6 months      [   ] every year 
     [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
 
PART VII.  MICROCREDIT STRATEGIES 
 
37. Participation before loan release.  What most important activity or action must 
be undertaken to ensure that all group members will share and participate in 
making decisions relative to every activity and action of each group member 
before the loan will be released? 
 
     [   ] problem-sharing among co-borrowers 
     [   ] training/seminar for managing loan proceeds and project management 
     [   ] Regular consultation with loan officers/technicians 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
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38. Participation after loan release.  What activity or action is the most necessary in 
ensuring that all group members will share and participate in making decisions 
relative to every activity and action of each group member after the loan will be 
released? 
 
     [   ] continuous group training for project management 
     [   ] close and strict monitoring of borrower's activities and project status 
     [   ] proper recording of financial transactions and related activities 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
 
39. Transparency.  What most important step or activity must be put in place to 
ensure that all group members will know and be aware of the financial and other 
activities and actions of the other members of the group that will affect the group’s 
loan?  
 
     [   ] group seminar/training 
     [   ] monthly reporting to group and to creditor 
     [   ] regular meetings to ensure frequent contact  
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
 
40. Accountability.  In case it will be impossible to pay a loan, what is the most 
important strategy that must be undertaken to assure and guarantee your creditor/s 
that loan will be fully paid? 
 
     [   ] request a guarantor to pay and be paid later 
     [   ] forfeit/present additional collateral 
     [   ] request for reconsideration or extension 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
 
41. If in case it will be impossible to pay the loan, and then co-makers or co-
guarantors will be forced to pay the loan, what arrangement or mechanism should 
be accomplished? 
 
     [   ] request guarantor to pay first then be paid later 
     [   ] request relatives and/or friends to pay the loan 
     [   ] give property/collateral to guarantor 
     [   ] ask for reconsideration 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
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42. What should be done to ensure that defaulting group members will be 
appropriately dealt with or penalized if necessary?  Please check only the most 
important action that should be undertaken. 
 
     [   ] Contribute for the payment of unpaid loan balance 
     [   ] forfeit collateral or other properties 
     [   ] request for extension/reconsideration from creditor 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
 
43. Sustainability.  What action/strategy is most needed in ensuring the profitability 
of loan-financed project or income-generating activity? (please check one choice 
only) 
 
     [   ] weekly or monthly assessment of project status 
     [   ] proper record keeping, accounting and auditing system 
     [   ] strictly follow creditor-approved plan of activities and other requirements 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
 
44. If you will be able to generate profit from the loan-funded income-generating 
activities, what will you do with the profit? 
 
[   ] keep the profit for future needs 
[   ] use profit as additional capital for project’s expansion 
[   ] for payment of the loan 
      [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
      [   ] don’t know 
*** 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESPONDENTS WHO ARE  
NON-AVAILERS OF CREDIT SERVICES 
 
  
 
Barangay Code No:     ___________ 
Respondent Code No.: ___________ 
 
 
PART I.  DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
 
1. Gender:   [   ] Male  [   ] Female   
 
2. Ethnicity:  [   ] Bisaya  [   ] Tausug  [   ] Yakan 
  [   ] Subanen  [   ] Ilonggo  [   ] Sama 
          [   ] Others, specify: __________________ 
 
3. Religion:   [   ] Catholic [   ] Islam  [   ] Protestant 
          [   ] Others, specify: __________________ 
 
4. Household Role:    
[   ] Husband  [   ] Wife  [   ]  Son  
[   ] Daughter               [   ] Others, specify: ________________ 
 
5. Number of children:  ________ 
 
6. Age:  ________  
 
7. Type of Dwelling Unit: [   ] Bamboo/Nipa/Cogon 
    [   ] Wood (floor and wall) 
    [   ] Concrete (floor and wall)  
 
 
PART II.  HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL CONDITIONS  
 
8. What skill do you possess that can be immediately used for income-generating 
livelihood activities or microenterprises? 
 
 [   ] dressmaking  [   ] cooking  [   ] car/vehicle repair 
   [   ] mat weaving  [   ] vulcanizing [   ] farming 
 [   ] fishing   [   ] livestock/poultry raising/breeding 
            [   ] Others, specify: __________________ 
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9. What is your main occupation or income-generating livelihood activity to support 
your family?  
 
      [   ] rice/corn [   ] copra  [   ] rubber  [   ] seaweeds 
      [   ] fishing [   ] livestock  [   ] carpentry  [   ] driver 
      [   ] employee [   ] laborer  [   ] middleman/trader [   ] vendor 
      [   ] carinderia [   ] sari-sari store  
      [   ] Others, specify: __________________ 
 
10. Who are the sources of income for your family? 
 
        Source of Income                     Estimated Amount Per Month 
 
      [   ] husband     PhP _____________ 
      [   ] wife      PhP _____________ 
      [   ] son      PhP _____________ 
      [   ] daughter     PhP _____________ 
      [   ] Others: ________________   PhP _____________ 
 
11. How much is your rough estimate of your family’s average monthly income? 
 
[   ] less than PhP1,000 
[   ] PhP1,000  -  PhP2,000 
[   ] PhP2,001  -  PhP3,000 
[   ] PhP3,001  -  PhP4,000 
[   ] PhP4,001  -  PhP5,000 
[   ] PhP5,001  -  PhP6,000 
[   ] PhP6,001  -  PhP7,000 
[   ] more than PhP7,000 
 
12. What are your household expenditure items every month? 
 
Expenditure Item          Estimated Amount Per Month 
 
      [   ] water    PhP _____________ 
      [   ] livestock feeds  PhP _____________ 
      [   ] allowance for children PhP _____________ 
      [   ] clothing   PhP _____________ 
      [   ] electricity   PhP _____________ 
      [   ] food    PhP _____________ 
      [   ] medicines/hospitalization  PhP _____________ 
      [   ] land preparation  PhP _____________ 
      [   ] tuition    PhP _____________ 
      [   ] transportation   PhP _____________ 
      [   ] Others: ________________ PhP _____________ 
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13. Are you able to save money every month?       [   ] yes       [   ] no 
 
if NO, or you don’t have any extra money or savings, please proceed to         
question no. 15). 
 
14. If you have savings, what do you usually do with the amount you saved (extra 
money)?  
 
     [   ] deposit the money in the bank 
     [   ] keep it for emergency purposes 
     [   ] engage in business 
     [   ] use it for additional capital for my business 
     [   ] buy additional livestock 
     [   ] others, specify _______________________________________ 
 
15. What do you do when money is not enough to meet household expenditure 
requirements? 
 
[   ] be a household helper [   ] do laundry for a fee 
      [   ] be a laborer   [   ] borrow money 
      [   ] sell snack items  [   ] sell properties 
      [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
 
PART III.  CREDIT NEEDS 
 
 
16. During what occasion or situation do you have to spend extra money more than 
the amount you can afford to spend? 
    
      [   ] hospitalization         [   ] birthday 
      [   ] house repair          [   ] health problem 
      [   ] Christmas          [   ] Ramadan 
      [   ] fiesta            [   ] others, specify: ______________ 
      [   ] wedding 
       
 
PART IV.  KNOWLEDGE ABOUT LOCAL CREDIT PROVIDERS 
 
17. In case of a neighbor’s emergency situation or important occasion when money is 
not enough, who is the usual creditor in your barangay? 
 
      [   ] neighbor    [   ] pawnshop or lending company 
      [   ] relative or friends   [   ] cooperative 
      [   ] trader or “suki”   [   ] bank 
[   ] others, specify: __________________ 
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18. Reason why your neighbors prefer to borrow money from that creditor.   
(refer to question no. 17) 
 
      [   ] very approachable              [   ] easy to borrow money from him/her 
      [   ] very dependable              [   ] doesn’t charge any interest 
      [   ] always has money                   [   ] close relative/friend 
      [   ] others reason/s, specify: __________________ 
 
 
PART V.  PERCEPTIONS AND WILLINGNESS TO AVAIL OF CREDIT  
       SERVICES 
 
 
19. If credit or loan is available, what income-generating livelihood activity would 
you like to engage in? 
 
     [   ] buy and sell business        [   ] swine raising 
     [   ] seaweeds production        [   ] poultry raising 
     [   ] motorcycle or tricycle        [   ] fishing (fish net/banca) 
     [   ] rice or corn production       [   ] sari-sari store 
     [   ] cow/carabao raising        [   ] food processing 
     [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
20. How much capital is necessary to finance the income-generating activity or project 
that you want to engage in? 
 
[   ] less than PhP1,000 
[   ] PhP1,000  -  PhP5,000 
[   ] PhP5,001  -  PhP10,000 
[   ] PhP10,001  -  PhP15,000 
[   ] PhP15,001  -  PhP20,000 
[   ] PhP20,001  -  PhP25,000 
[   ] PhP25,001  -  PhP30,000 
[   ] PhP30,001  -  PhP35,000 
[   ] PhP35,001  -  PhP40,000 
[   ] PhP40,001  -  PhP45,000 
[   ] PhP45,001  -  PhP50,000 
[   ] if more than PhP50,000, specify, _PhP__________________ 
 
21. If collateral will be required by the creditor, will you be able to put up collateral to 
guarantee a loan?  [   ] yes [   ] no 
 
If NO, please proceed to question no. 23. 
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22. What asset, property or material possession are you willing to use as collateral? 
 
     [   ] house         [   ] home appliances 
     [   ] land title        [   ] motorcycle/jeep/banca 
     [   ] livestock and poultry       [   ] farm equipment 
     [   ] farm lot        [   ] fishing gear 
     [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
23. What kind of loan assistance and other loan-related support service are still needed 
but are not yet given? 
 
     [   ] new farming technology      [   ] veterinary services  
     [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
24. If profit will be realized from the loan-financed livelihood project/business, what 
should be done with that profit?  
 
     [   ] for additional capital 
     [   ] for children’s school fees 
     [   ] save the profit for future needs 
     [   ] pay the loan 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________ 
 
25. How many months should the loan be fully paid? 
 
     [   ] within 6 months  
     [   ] within 1 year (12 months) 
     [   ] within 2 years (24 months) 
     [   ] within 3 years (36 months) 
     [   ] within 4 years (48 months) 
     [   ] within 5 years (60 months) 
     [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
 
26. What mode of amortization (installments) is most convenient in order that the loan 
will  be fully paid? 
 
     [   ] daily        [   ] weekly        [   ] monthly 
     [   ] every 3 months      [   ] every 6 months      [   ] every year 
     [   ] others, specify: __________________ 
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PART VI. PERCEPTION ON MICROCREDIT STRATEGIES 
 
 
27. Participation before loan release.  What most important activity or action must 
be undertaken to ensure that all group members will share and participate in 
making decisions relative to every activity and action of each group member 
before the loan will be released? 
 
     [   ] problem-sharing among co-borrowers 
     [   ] training/seminar for managing loan proceeds and project management 
     [   ] Regular consultation with loan officers/technicians 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
 
28. Participation after loan release.  What activity or action is the most necessary in 
ensuring that all group members will share and participate in making decisions 
relative to every activity and action of each group member after the loan will be 
released? 
 
     [   ] continuous group training for project management 
     [   ] close and strict monitoring of borrower's activities and project status 
     [   ] proper recording of financial transactions and related activities 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
 
29. Transparency.  What most important step or activity must be put in place to 
ensure that all group members will know and be aware of the financial and other 
activities and actions of the other members of the group that will affect the group’s 
loan?  
 
     [   ] group seminar/training 
     [   ] monthly reporting to group and to creditor 
     [   ] regular meetings to ensure frequent contact  
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
 
30. Accountability.  In case it will be impossible to pay a loan, what is the most 
important strategy that must be undertaken to assure and guarantee you creditor/s 
that loan will be fully paid? 
 
     [   ] request a guarantor to pay and be paid later 
     [   ] forfeit/present additional collateral 
     [   ] request for reconsideration or extension 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
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31. If in case it will be impossible to pay the loan, and then co-makers or co-
guarantors will be forced to pay the loan, what arrangement or mechanism should 
be accomplished? 
 
     [   ] request guarantor to pay first then be paid later 
     [   ] request relatives and/or friends to pay the loan 
     [   ] give property/collateral to guarantor 
     [   ] ask for reconsideration 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
 
32. What should be done to ensure that defaulting group members will be 
appropriately dealt with or penalized if necessary?  Please check only the most 
important action that should be undertaken. 
 
     [   ] Contribute for the payment of unpaid loan balance 
     [   ] forfeit collateral or other properties 
     [   ] request for extension/reconsideration from creditor 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
 
33. Sustainability.  What action/strategy is most needed in ensuring the profitability 
of loan-financed project or income-generating activity? (please check one choice 
only) 
 
     [   ] weekly or monthly assessment of project status 
     [   ] proper record keeping, accounting and auditing system 
     [   ] strictly follow creditor-approved plan of activities and other requirements 
     [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
     [   ] don’t know 
 
34. If you will be able to generate profit from the loan-funded income-generating 
activities, what will you do with the profit? 
 
[   ] keep the profit for future needs 
[   ] use profit as additional capital for project’s expansion 
[   ] for payment of the loan 
      [   ] others, specify: ________________________________ 
      [   ] don’t know 
 
*** 
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Appendix C 
 
 
List of WMCIP-covered Barangays 
 
 
 
Province Municipality/City Barangay Household Population 
 
Remarks 
1.   Kapatagan Grande 144 sample (1) 
2.   Maligue (Lunot) 339  
1. Isabela City 
3.   Masula 278  
4.   Lubukan 241  
5.   Luukbungsod 129  
6.   Tausan 272 sample (2) 
2. Lantawan 
7.   Canibungan 318  
8.   Calang-canas 240 sample (3) 
9.   Taberlongan 330  
3. Maluso 
10. Tubigan 455  
11. Buili-buli 205  
12. Manaul 366  
13. Basak 139 sample (4) 
14. Upper Cabengbeng 329 sample (5) 
1. Basilan 
      (4 municipalities;  
       15 barangays) 
4. Sumisip 
15. Sapah Bulak 201  
16. Seres  354  
17. Sinuyak 252 sample(6) 
18. Sitog 567 sample(7) 
5. Katipunan 
19. Patik 141  
20. Balubo 148  
21. Canibongan 247  
22. Capase 178 sample(8) 
23. Lipakan 175  
24  Moliton 187  
25. Panampalay 184  
6. Pres. Manuel A. Roxas 
26. Sibatog 126  
27. Dumpilas 165  
28. Moyo 322  
29. Paranglumba (Pob.) 354  
30. Polayo 217  
7. Siayan 
31. Siayan Proper (Pob.) 479  
32. Talinga 217 sample(9) 
33. Titik 333  
8. Sindangan 
34. Bucana 230  
9.  Jose Dalman  35. Poblacion (Ponot) 720  
10. Godod 36. San Pedro 88  
37. Poblacion (Bacungan) 661 sample(10) 
38. Talinga 331 sample(11) 
2. Zamboanga  
    del Norte 
     (5 municipalities;  
      24 barangays) 
11. Leon Postigo  
39. Palandok 195 sample(12) 
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Province Municipality/City Barangay Household Population 
 
Remarks 
40. Damit 300  
41. Depore 361  
42. Depili 151  
43. Kahayagan 629  
44. Lamare 223  
45. Poblacion 787  
46. Salawagan 224 sample(13) 
12. Bayog 
47. Supon 105  
48. Bag-ong Kahayag 379 sample(14) 
49. Biswangan 203 sample(15) 
50. Gasa 118  
51. Poblacion (Lakewood) 733  
52. Matalang 81  
13. Lakewood 
53. Sebuguey 63  
54. Maruing 383  14. Lapuyan 
55. Pingalay 181 sample(16) 
56. Ambulon 174 sample(17) 
57. Kabatan 285 sample(18) 
58. Limason 252 sample(19) 
59. Lunib 254  
3. Zamboanga   
    del Sur 
     (4 municipalities;  
      21 barangays) 
15. Vicencio A. Sagun 
60. Maculay 142  
61. Del Monte 427  
62. Guitom 71  
63. Labrador 372  
64. Muyo 253  
65. Villacastor (Galit) 533  
66. Agutayan 83  
16. Buug 
67. Pling 130  
68. Bulu-an 518 sample(20) 
69. Magdaup 511  
17. Ipil 
70. Makilas 269 sample(21) 
71. Concepcion (Balungis) 524  18. Kabasalan 
72. Nazareth 317  
73. Kaliantana 272 sample(22) 
74. Mamagon 253 sample(23) 
75. Sandayong 262 sample(24) 
19. Naga 
76. Tipan 231  
77. Balucanan 211  20. Siay 
78. Salinding 185  
79. Baluyan 135  21. Imelda 
80. Dumpoc 137 sample(25) 
4. Zamboanga  
    Sibugay 
     (7 municipalities;  
      21 barangays) 
22. Diplahan 81. Mejo 98 sample(26) 
Total 22 municipalities in 4 provinces 81 barangays 
22,677 
households 
26 sampled 
barangays 
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Appendix D 
 
List of Sampled Barangays 
 
 
PROVINCE MUNICIPALITY Barangay Number of Respondents Percent
1. Isabela 1)   Kapatagan Grande 15 3.8 
2)   Basak 16 4.1 2. Sumisip 
3)   Upper Cabengbeng 14 3.6 
3. Maluso 4)   Calang-Canas 13 3.3 
 
 
I.  BASILAN 
4. Lantawan 5)   Tausan 16 4.1 
6)   Ambulon 15 3.8 
7)   Limason 15 3.8 
 
5. V. Sagun 
8)   Kabatan 15 3.8 
9)   Biswangan 15 3.8 6. Lakewood 
10) Bag-ong Kahayag 15 3.8 
7. Bayog 11) Salawagan 15 3.8 
 
 
 
II. ZAMBOANGA  
     DEL SUR 
 
8. Lapuyan 12) Pingalay 15 3.8 
13) Kaliantana 21 5.4 
14) Mamagon 15 3.8 
9. Naga 
15) Sandayong 15 3.8 
10. Diplahan 16) Mejo 15 3.8 
11. Imelda 17) Dumpok 14 3.6 
18) Makilas 14 3.6 
 
 
 
III. ZAMBOANGA  
      SIBUGAY 
 12. Ipil 
19) Buluan 13 3.3 
20) Sinuyak 14 3.6 13. Katipunan 
21) Sitog 15 3.8 
14. Pres. M. Roxas 22) Capase 15 3.8 
15. Sindangan 23) Talinga 15 3.8 
24) Talinga 15 3.8 
25) Poblacion 15 3.8 
 
 
 
IV. ZAMBOANGA  
      DEL NORTE 
 
16. Leon B. Postigo 
26) Palandok 15 3.8 
Total 16 municipalities in 4 provinces 26 barangays 390 100.0 
 
 
 
 
